The Uganda Cultural Field Guide is designed to provide deploying military personnel an overview of Uganda’s cultural terrain. In this field guide, Uganda’s cultural history has been synopsized to capture the more significant aspects of the country’s cultural environment, with emphasis on factors having the greatest potential to impact operations.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Uganda, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Uganda.
The Ethiopia Cultural Field Guide is designed to provide deploying military personnel an overview of Ethiopia’s cultural terrain. In this field guide, Ethiopia’s cultural history has been synopsized to capture the more significant aspects of the country’s cultural environment, with emphasis on factors having the greatest potential to impact operations.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Ethiopia, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Ethiopia.
On Saturday, September 21, 2013, members of Al Shabaab, a Somali based Islamic terrorist organization affiliated with the international Al Qaeda network, executed a complex terrorist attack on an upscale shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The attackers simultaneously entered the mall from two different entrances, shooting shoppers with assault rifles and throwing hand grenades. The terrorists remained in the mall, engaging government security forces for the next four days, resulting in a major fire and partial collapse of the mall. The Kenyan government has officially reported 72 deaths and more than 200 injured as a result of the attack. A significant number of those killed and injured were foreign citizens, including 6 U.S. citizens who were injured in the attack.
This handbook provides basic reference information on the Senegal, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to the Senegal.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Djibouti, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Djibouti.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Botswana, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Botswana.
U.S. Army Africa Pamphlet: Cultural, Historical, and Natural Resource Protection During African Operations
This pamphlet is applicable to United States (US) forces conducting operations in Africa operating under the control of US Army Africa (USARAF) or applicable joint task forces (JTF). The intent of this pamphlet is to provide guidance on the protection and management of recognized cultural, historic, and natural resources that may be placed at risk due to the conduct of the full spectrum of US ground operations and associated close air/naval support operations.
From late 2011, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has recorded 27 cases of deaths in custody where there is significant information to suggest that torture was the cause, and is aware of allegations about additional cases which it has not been able to fully investigate. Eleven of the 27 cases, detailed in this report, took place in 2013, all in detention centres under the nominal authority of the Government but effectively under the authority of armed brigades.
A coordinated and integrated StratCom approach to support NATO action in response to events in Libya is key to achieving the Alliance’s overall objective. Managing the information domain will be critical to NATO’s efforts being understood – and ultimately supported – by the audiences. It will require the use of the full range of information and communication capabilities, in line with NATO policies and authorities establishing an appropriate level of NATO visibility will be important to ensure unity of message, to manage and shape perceptions, to counter potential misinformation and to build public support.
The group or individuals responsible for the attack on the Benghazi consulate remains unknown. It is also unclear if the attack was premeditated or simply a demonstration that spun out of control. Following the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi and the ensuing civil war, Libya has been awash with small arms and light weapons. The use of such arms at the demonstration does not necessarily indicate a pre-meditated, coordinated attack. Online jihadi groups have claimed the attack was due to a statement released by al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri regarding the earlier death of another al-Qa’ida leader, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Others have suggested that the attack was pre-meditated to coincide with the 9/11 anniversary in the United States. Neither of those claims has been substantiated. Until more evidence comes out, OSAC is unable to conclude whether this was a pre-meditated, planned, and coordinated assault on the Consulate.
Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaida ally, relies on a broad range of funding sources to support its terrorist and paramilitary operations in Somalia. However, little comprehensive information is available on the character and extent of this funding network within the large communities of Somali expats in Kenya. Existing reports suggest that alternative remittance systems (ARS), especially hawaladars, are a reliable source of income for Somalis still living in Somalia. Expat family members living in Kenya rely on these systems to transfer money to their relatives in Somalia. Recent reports suggest al-Shabaab is a beneficiary of these services1. Al-Shabaab could exploit current and future hawaladar networks in Kenya to transit funds to support IED operations against US or allied humanitarian or military operations. Thus, networks of undocumented and unmonitored hawaladars within the country could pose a threat to future counterterrorism or humanitarian operations in the region. Further study of the role of ARS in Kenya in the funding of al-Shabaab operations is recommended.
Understanding master narratives can be the difference between analytic anticipation and unwanted surprise, as well as the difference between communications successes and messaging gaffes. Master narratives are the historically grounded stories that reflect a community’s identity and experiences, or explain its hopes, aspirations, and concerns. These narratives help groups understand who they are and where they come from, and how to make sense of unfolding developments around them. As they do in all countries, effective communicators in Somalia invoke master narratives in order to move audiences in a preferred direction. Somali influencers rely on their native familiarity with these master narratives to use them effectively. This task is considerably more challenging for US communicators and analysts because they must place themselves in the mindset of foreign audiences who believe stories that — from an American vantage point — may appear surprising, conspiratorial, or even outlandish.
The Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, Public Law 111-172, requires the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress on implementation of the President’s strategy to support disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and assistance provided toward a lasting solution to the conflict in northern Uganda.
Documents concerning CIA rendition of terrorism suspects, with the help of the UK, recovered from the offices of Libyan intelligence and published by Human Rights Watch.
A leaked document from the United Nations regarding post-conflict deployment to Libya and discussing the possible continued role of NATO in military peacekeeping operations.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is a conventional armed force with a mandate to protect and to maintain internal security. It carries out its mandate mainly through ground forces, including Popular Defence Force (PDF) militia, as well as an air force and navy. The Supreme Commander of the armed forces, Lieutenant General Omar Hassan Ahmad el-Bashir, holds both the posts of National President and Commander-In Chief of the Armed Forces and People’s Defence Forces (PDF). For operational purposes he exercises this power through the Minister of Defence (currently major-general Bakri Hassan Saleh). The Minister appoints a Commander of the Armed Forces and Chief of General Staff (currently, general Abbas Arabi) who, together with five Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, Administration, Training and Morale), form the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Command Group. The air force and navy are individual services under the commander-in-chief.
Libyan Investment Authority Management Information Report documenting the Qaddaffi regime’s foreign investments as of June 2010.
Photos of hundreds of Egyptian State Security officers, including the names of more than fifty high ranking officers. These photos were recently removed by Flickr for “copyright violations” after they were posted by protesters that recovered the information from DVDs taken from State Security headquarters.
There are two functional security checkpoints along the main road between the Tunisian-Libyan border crossing at Ra’s Ajdir and the town of Abu Kammash 19km to the east, as based on an analysis or satellite imagery acquired on 3 and 5 March 201 1 Both are likely permanent locations established before the present crisis. Although there are clear indications that these checkpoints are actively controlling road traffic, there are however no associated large concentrations of either people or vehicle traffic leading to the checkpoints, strongly suggesting that these sites are NOT responsible for the drop in the number of people reaching the border at Ra ‘s Ajdir, as observed on 3 and 4 March 2011. It is possible that there are additional security checkpoints or temporary roadblocks located east of Abu Kammash which could be responsible for the reduction in traffic. UNITARJUNOSAT will continue to task and analyze additional satellite imagery along this transport corridor leading to the Tunisian border.
This atlas provides baseline geographic information over Tripoli, Libya. It is produced by UNITAR/UNOSAT in support of international humanitarian assistance to the people of Libya. The atlas is created to respond to the needs of UN agencies and their partners. It is intended to provide objective geographic information and has been designed for easy printing and readability on A4 and A3 paper.
United Nations Libya General Logistics Planning Map from March 3, 2011.
This is a satellite-based quantitative analysis of the newly-established transitional camp for displaced peoples fleeing the conflict in Libya, located along the southern side of highway route P1, 8.5 kilometers west of the Ra’s Ajdir border crossing facility in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia. This assessment provides an estimate of the number of tent shelters erected within the camp, the average approximate tent size, and the derived potential current population capacity, as based on satellite imagery recorded on the morning of 3 March 2011.