Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

JIEDDO Social Network Analysis (SNA) Tool Comparison

JIEDDO-SocialNetworkAnalysis

This is a working paper for an ongoing SNA Tool Comparison effort at the Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence Center’s (COIC) Data Analysis Research and Collaboration (DAR C) Cell. It contains the results of the first phase of this effort. A Power Point presentation summarizing this paper is also available. This paper will be edited and amended as additional results become available from subsequent phases. The objective of this study was to compare and analyze four different Social Network Analysis (SNA) tools for the basic measures of Centrality (Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector), in order to set a baseline for further evaluation of the tools and their capabilities. The four tools compared were Analyst Notebook (ANB), Palantir, UCINet and ORA.

(U//FOUO) Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Attack the Network Lexicon

This first edition of the Attack the Network (AtN) Lexicon was produced by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The lexicon contents were developed after extensive interviews with military units who successfully employed AtN principles and practices to reduce the number and effectiveness of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment where they encountered multiple and sometimes interconnected adversary networks. The lexicon contents were further developed and refined by subject matter experts from over fifty organizations across the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security.

JIEDDO Report: Iranian Weapons Smuggling Activities in Afghanistan

This study investigates Iran’s strategy of smuggling weapons to Afghan insurgents. Based on the hypothesis that Iran utilizes its weapons smuggling networks as proxies to leverage against foreign threats with predictable results, this study will address Iran’s future weapons smuggling behaviors. Iran, like the United States, is a complex actor pursuing rational, national strategic objectives. The perceived dichotomy between Iran’s words and actions results in an atmosphere of suspicion surrounding Iranian motives that can potentially lead to unintended escalations between Iran and other nations. An increase in tensions between the U.S. and Iran, specifically over perceived threats to Iranian sovereignty, will be matched with an increase in the rate and quantity of weapons, an introduction of more capable weapons, or both. Given the elasticity of realizing strategic success by increasing the rate and quantity of weapons, Iran will likely attempt to quickly counter an imminent threat by deploying more destructive weapons comparable to those Iran supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah.

JIEDDO Afghanistan Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device (VOIED) Recognition Guide

This Recognition Guide focuses on images of VOIED switches, components, and materials. Common IED indicators (observables) are listed and when found, indicate a high probability of IED activity. Refer to this material if something looks: suspicious, out of place, or out of character. This guide is organized by switches (Pressure Plate, Low Metallic Signature, and No Metal Content), main charges, containers, power supplies, initiators, and finally a section on IED factories.

(U//FOUO) JIEDDO Report: Water-borne IED Threats and the Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow waterway that allows maritime access into and out of the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has identified the Strait of Hormuz as one of six critical chokepoints in the global distribution and trade of oil. The concentration of valuable maritime traffic passing through such a relatively small area makes the Strait of Hormuz a strategic area for the targeting of maritime objectives by groups or nations looking to threaten or disrupt global trade. Iran, located on the north bank of the strait, has made repeated threats to strangle maritime traffic passing through the strait in retaliation for any strike against its nuclear program. In addition, al-Qaeda has reportedly been planning strikes at critical maritime chokepoints over the past decade, including the Strait of Hormuz. Al-Qaeda continues to plan maritime attacks, copying successful tactics from other militant groups such as the LTTE. The Strait of Hormuz would be an ideal target for al-Qaeda’s maritime campaign, either through the use of WBIEDs or conventional maritime weapons.