October 29, 2012 in Afghanistan, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
This field guide provides small unit leaders and individual Soldiers and Marines a proven collection of actions to focus their efforts while attacking networks. Primarily, these actions consist of mission analysis, briefing, and execution and are adapted for use by these small unit leaders in a population-centric operating environment.
Tags: Afghanistan, Attack the Network, For Official Use Only, Improvised Explosive Devices
October 16, 2012 in Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
A monthly report from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) detailing IED usage and casualties statistics from every U.S. combatant command for August 2012.
Tags: For Official Use Only, Improvised Explosive Devices
August 3, 2012 in Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
This first edition of the Attack the Network (AtN) Lexicon was produced by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The lexicon contents were developed after extensive interviews with military units who successfully employed AtN principles and practices to reduce the number and effectiveness of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment where they encountered multiple and sometimes interconnected adversary networks. The lexicon contents were further developed and refined by subject matter experts from over fifty organizations across the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security.
Tags: Attack the Network, For Official Use Only, Improvised Explosive Devices
August 3, 2012 in Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
This study investigates Iran’s strategy of smuggling weapons to Afghan insurgents. Based on the hypothesis that Iran utilizes its weapons smuggling networks as proxies to leverage against foreign threats with predictable results, this study will address Iran’s future weapons smuggling behaviors. Iran, like the United States, is a complex actor pursuing rational, national strategic objectives. The perceived dichotomy between Iran’s words and actions results in an atmosphere of suspicion surrounding Iranian motives that can potentially lead to unintended escalations between Iran and other nations. An increase in tensions between the U.S. and Iran, specifically over perceived threats to Iranian sovereignty, will be matched with an increase in the rate and quantity of weapons, an introduction of more capable weapons, or both. Given the elasticity of realizing strategic success by increasing the rate and quantity of weapons, Iran will likely attempt to quickly counter an imminent threat by deploying more destructive weapons comparable to those Iran supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah.
Tags: Afghanistan, Iran
November 7, 2011 in Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
This Recognition Guide focuses on images of VOIED switches, components, and materials. Common IED indicators (observables) are listed and when found, indicate a high probability of IED activity. Refer to this material if something looks: suspicious, out of place, or out of character. This guide is organized by switches (Pressure Plate, Low Metallic Signature, and No Metal Content), main charges, containers, power supplies, initiators, and finally a section on IED factories.
Tags: Afghanistan, Improvised Explosive Devices
April 25, 2011 in Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow waterway that allows maritime access into and out of the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has identified the Strait of Hormuz as one of six critical chokepoints in the global distribution and trade of oil. The concentration of valuable maritime traffic passing through such a relatively small area makes the Strait of Hormuz a strategic area for the targeting of maritime objectives by groups or nations looking to threaten or disrupt global trade. Iran, located on the north bank of the strait, has made repeated threats to strangle maritime traffic passing through the strait in retaliation for any strike against its nuclear program. In addition, al-Qaeda has reportedly been planning strikes at critical maritime chokepoints over the past decade, including the Strait of Hormuz. Al-Qaeda continues to plan maritime attacks, copying successful tactics from other militant groups such as the LTTE. The Strait of Hormuz would be an ideal target for al-Qaeda’s maritime campaign, either through the use of WBIEDs or conventional maritime weapons.
Tags: For Official Use Only, IEDs, Improvised Explosive Devices
May 24, 2010 in Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(U//FOUO) JIEDDO Report: Alternative Motivations for IED Use in Afghanistan, December 11, 2009.
Tags: Afghanistan, For Official Use Only, Improvised Explosive Devices, Opium
August 23, 2009 in Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
• Enemy will focus on irregular warfare using asymmetric means to attack and influence advanced nations
• Conventional, unconventional, lethal, non-lethal, state supported, non-state, hybrid organizations, extremism… produce a very complex environment
Tags: Afghanistan, Department of Defense, IEDs, Improvised Explosive Devices, Iraq