February 15, 2012 in U.S. Army
Currently, the intelligence warfighting function includes a formidable set of capabilities across all echelons from “mud-to-space.” This flexible force of personnel, organizations, and equipment collectively provides commanders with the timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence they need. We provide the intelligence that continuously supports the commander in visualizing the operational environment, assessing the situation, and directing military actions through ISR synchronization and the other intelligence tasks. The intelligence warfighting function is comprised of nine powerful intelligence disciplines. Eight of those disciplines essentially feed the discipline of all-source intelligence which in turn is focused on the commanders’ requirements. Technological advances have enabled single-discipline analysts to leverage other analysts and information and to conduct multi-discipline analysis to an extent not possible in the past. However, all-source intelligence is still the nexus that integrates information and intelligence from all units and the other intelligence disciplines.
February 15, 2012 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army
Most US personnel that are serving in Afghanistan have already served a tour in Iraq and are accustomed to doing things “the Iraq way”. Many people are trying to apply the lessons learned in Iraq to Afghanistan, which in many cases is inappropriate. AF2 wants to provide a product to US units to compare and contrast Iraqi tribal structure and Pashtun tribal structure to prevent future missteps by US forces.
February 12, 2012 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army
Senior ranking US military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the US Congress and American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become unrecognizable. This deception has damaged America’s credibility among both our allies and enemies, severely limiting our ability to reach a political solution to the war in Afghanistan. It has likely cost American taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars Congress might not otherwise have appropriated had it known the truth, and our senior leaders’ behavior has almost certainly extended the duration of this war. The single greatest penalty our Nation has suffered, however, has been that we have lost the blood, limbs and lives of tens of thousands of American Service Members with little to no gain to our country as a consequence of this deception.
February 10, 2012 in U.S. Army
This hand book synthesizes current doctrine and emerging TTPs into a handbook for units assigned a Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission. Security Force Assistance is not a unit; it is a mission assigned to a unit. Army leaders will assign this mission to Modular brigades more frequently according to the realities of the operational environment. The Modular Brigade, with its broad and flexible command and control structure, is designed to conduct Full Spectrum Operations, which includes Security Force Assistance, but it requires augmentation and specific task organization to effectively accomplish Security Force Assistance tasks.
January 28, 2012 in U.S. Army
U.S. Army TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Female Suicide Bombers report from January 2011.
January 27, 2012 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army
Local governance in rural Afghanistan is not simple. Older customary local assemblies operate alongside GIRoA officials, Community Development Councils (CDC’s), and insurgent groups. Although we speak of insurgent governments as “shadow governments,” they rarely exist in the shadows for those over whom they wield power. In villages where insurgents continue to exercise control, the insurgents and not GIRoA perform traditional governmental functions; they levy taxes, resolve disputes (they are, in many villages the only law in town), and maintain local defense forces. Western Powers have invested their hope and their treasure in inventing a new form of local control: Community District Councils that come out of the National Solidarity Program (NSP). Managed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) with funds from NGO’s and from the World Bank, these organizations set priorities for the expenditure of donor money and oversee contracts. Although they offer an alternative to the indiscriminate funding of the past that encouraged favoritism and corruption, these organizations have little authority except when it comes to the stewardship of outside money. As those development funds begin to dry up, will CDC’s vanish? Can they be further empowered?
January 25, 2012 in U.S. Army
All assets and capabilities at a commander’s disposal have the capacity to inform and influence selected audiences to varying degrees. While specific assets termed as “information-related capabilities” are information-centric in mission and purpose, others are standard capabilities that inform and influence officers use for planning to support commanders’ information strategy and mission objectives. The primary information-related capabilities that support inform and influence activities typically include, but are not limited to, public affairs, military information support operations, combat camera, Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs, cyber electromagnetic activities, counterintelligence, operations security, military deception, and others so designated by a commander. In addition to the primary information-related capabilities, there are operational capabilities not solely designed to inform or influence that commanders can designate to assist in achieving mission objectives, such as maneuver forces, engineers, and medical units. Success depends on commanders and staffs effectively employing all available operational assets to best shape the information environment.
January 3, 2012 in U.S. Army
This report is an executive summary of interviews conducted by CALL in support of the JCOA comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS. Topics included CIVCAS incidents, pre-deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with recent operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq.
January 1, 2012 in U.S. Army
U.S. Army instructional presentation from 2008 on the history and major sects within Islam.
December 30, 2011 in U.S. Army
To effectively defeat an enemy, one must first understand the enemy. Intelligence professionals have forgotten the basic principles on which intelligence analysis is conducted, instead they sub-scribe to the paradigm that the enemy faced in this Global War on Terror has no structure or doctrine. Any organization, military or civilian, must have a structure and a way of doing business if they are to have any chance of being successful.
December 22, 2011 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army
The Smart Book contains information designed to enhance Soldier’s knowledge of Afghanistan, including history, politics, country data and statistics, and the military operational environment. The Smart Book concludes with an overview of the culture of Afghanistan including religion, identity, behavior, communication and negotiation techniques, an overview of ethnic groups, a regional breakdown outlining each province, a language guide, and cultural proverbs, expressions and superstitions.
December 21, 2011 in U.S. Army
This guide assists in three areas. First, it aides military leaders and all personnel to be aware of the indicators associated with insider threat activity while serving in a partnering environment. Second, this guide informs commanders and other leaders by giving them options on how to deal with insider threat activities. This guide is not all encompassing so there are other options a commander has dependent on their operating environment. Lastly, this guide is meant to generate open dialogue between coalition partners and partner nation personnel. Partnering in itself is a sensitive mission and only by creating trust and having an open dialogue with all forces will the mission be accomplished.
December 20, 2011 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army
U.S. Army report on “Taliban Top 5 Most Deadly Tactics Techniques and Procedures” from June 2010.
December 15, 2011 in U.S. Army
U.S. Army TRISA handbook on “Political Groups in Afghanistan” from December 2009.
December 12, 2011 in U.S. Army
TC 2-50.5 replaces FM 34-8-2, dated 1 May 1998. This publication does not replace the fundamental principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures contained in the other FM 2-series manuals; however, it does focus on their application. It is to be used in conjunction with the other FM 2-series manuals and conforms to the overarching doctrinal concepts presented in FM 3-0 and FM 2-0. The target audience for this manual is the intelligence officers serving as the G-2/S-2 and their staffs— intelligence warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted Soldiers. TC 2-50.5 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated.
December 9, 2011 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army
Restricted U.S. Army training presentation on “Taliban Insurgent Syndicate Intelligence Operations” from October 2009.
December 9, 2011 in U.S. Army
U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group Afghan Key Leader Engagement (KLE) Tactical Pocket Reference from October 2009.
December 5, 2011 in U.S. Army
The MWD program endured four decades of peace and brief contingency operations from the end of the Vietnam era to the current Global War on Terrorism. The program remained firmly embedded in the Military Police Corps combat support, law and order, and force protection missions. In late 2001, the onset of military operations in Afghanistan provided the impetus to expand MWD capabilities in support of commanders in the field. In 2002, as a direct result of an immediate operational need in Afghanistan, Army leadership directed the establishment of an Army mine detection dog unit and embedded it in the Corps of Engineers. In 2004, as a result of cooperation between the U.S. Army Engineer School and the U.S. Army Military Police School, the Army added a non-aggressive, specialized search dog (explosives detection dog) to the MWD inventory. Combat tracker dogs are returning to Army use as well, along with a very limited number of human remains detector or cadaver search dogs. Two constants emerge in the 60-plus-year history of Army MWD use: working dogs are used in a variety of units for a wide range of missions, and the size of the MWD program has expanded and contracted over time based on the needs of the Army. In the current and projected future operating environment, the MWD program will undoubtedly expand once again.
December 4, 2011 in U.S. Army
Complex operations often require the development of specialized teams with multidisciplinary perspectives. Examples of these groups include human terrain teams, provincial reconstruction teams, and, most recently, female engagement teams (FETs). These specialized programs are tasked with engaging local populations to ascertain information on civil-society needs and problems; address security concerns; and to form links between the populace, military, and interagency partners.
November 16, 2011 in U.S. Army
This document facilitates discussion, training, and implementation of effective information superiority methods at the Battalion and Brigade level. This paper discusses the Center of Gravity analysis model for identifying threat networks, Critical Capabilities, and Critical Vulnerabilities; use of the methodology to determine the threat vulnerabilities; and as a basis for understanding how to achieve Information Superiority.
November 16, 2011 in U.S. Army
U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Reference Card from October 2007.
November 3, 2011 in U.S. Army
A study directed by the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), “Study to Establish Levels of Digital Literacy for Soldiers and Leaders in the U.S. Army” from February 28, 2011.
October 18, 2011 in U.S. Army
Being a drill sergeant may be the most challenging and rewarding assignment a noncommissioned officer will ever experience during his military career. While training initial entry Soldiers to fight and win in today’s Global War on Terrorism, drill sergeants must embody and reflect the Army’s values and standards. This handbook is designed to help new drill sergeants conquer the many challenges of their assignment and succeed in their mission of training Soldiers.
October 18, 2011 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army
Route clearance (RC) operations for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan are much different from RC operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom in terms of the terrain, seasonal weather, level of infrastructure, volume of insurgent threats, sources of improvised explosive device (IED) components, and motivation for IED emplacement. The purpose of this supplement is to focus on RC in Afghanistan.
October 18, 2011 in U.S. Army
This book will familiarize Warfighters and leaders with the MRAP vehicle, its capabilities and limitations, and planning considerations for its employment. The information found in this book does not replace or override any safety precautions, warnings, notes in existing technical and/or operator manuals, or unit standing orders or operating procedures.