• Allows high-priority emergency telephone calls to avoid congestion on wireless telephone networks
• Access is granted via a pin number issued to eligible personnel
• Wireless counterpart to Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) which offers similar features for landline phones

The Nationwide Wireless Priority Service (WPS) is a system in the United States that allows high-priority emergency telephone calls to avoid congestion on wireless telephone networks. This complements the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), which allows such calls to avoid congestion on landline networks. The service is overseen by the Federal Communications Commission and administered by the National Communications System in the Department of Homeland Security.12

During a local or national emergency, wireless telephone networks are likely to become congested with calls. Even absent emergencies, some towers and networks receive more calls than they can handle. WPS allows high-priority calls to bypass that congestion and receive priority. The system is authorized only for use by National Security and Emergency Preparedness personnel, classified into five categories:

• Executive leadership and policy makers (e.g. the President of the United States and members of Congress)
• Disaster response/military command and control
• Public Health, safety, and law enforcement command
• Public services/utilities and public welfare
• Disaster recovery

Unlike the GETS system, which provides landline priority telephone calls, participation in the WPS system is optional for telephone companies. As such, support is only available on selected networks and usually requires additional fees for activation, availability, and use.

Although the system is said to ensure a high probability of call completion, it is not without serious limitations. The WPS will not preempt calls in progress, so the user will have to wait for bandwidth to open. It is also not yet supported by all carriers. In order for a call to work, telephone infrastructure must be powered and functioning. Finally, a call that receives priority using WPS does not automatically get priority on landline networks. Therefore, congestion on the Public Switched Telephone Network may prevent the call from completion unless the user makes additional steps to access the GETS service for landline calls as well. Because of these and other limitations, the WPS explicitly does not guarantee call completion.3

Accesibility

Before using the system, each user must receive authorization from the National Communications System and subscribe to the service with a participating provider. Once authorized, a user simply needs to dial the vertical service code of “*272″ to receive priority consideration on the wireless network.

From Wireless Priority Service enable device:

Dial *272 before any call, including a GETS call.

Eligibile Persons

Executive Leadership and Policy Makers

Individuals in executive leadership and policy making roles. Examples include the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, selected military leaders, state governors and lieutenant governors, members of Congress, cabinet level officials, mayors and county officials, and a minimum number of senior support staff.

Disaster Response/Military Command Control

Individuals key to managing the initial response to an emergency at the local, state, regional, and Federal levels as well as personnel essential to continuity of government and national security functions. Examples include Federal and state emergency operations center coordinators.

Public Health, Safety, and Law Enforcement Command

Individuals who direct operations critical to life, property, and maintenance of law & order immediately following an event. Examples include Federal, state, and local police, fire, and emergency service leadership; search & rescue team leaders; and emergency communications coordinators.

Public Services/Utilities and Public Welfare

Individuals responsible for managing not only public works and utility infrastructure damage assessment and restoration efforts, but also transportation services for emergency response activities. Examples include US Army Corps of engineers; telecommunications, power, water, and sewage utilities; and transportation leadership.

Disaster Recovery

Personnel responsible for managing recovery operations after the initial response has been accomplished. Examples include medical recovery operations and detailed damage assessment leadership; disaster shelter coordination & management; and critical Disaster Field Office support personnel.

1. Nationwide Wireless Priority Service.  Wikipedia.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationwide_Wireless_Priority_Service
2. Wireless Priority Service Brochure.  National Communications Service.  http://gets.ncs.gov/docs/WPS%20Brochure.pdf
3. Ibid.

• Allows emergency access and priority processing for local and long distance calls on the public switched telephone network
• Access is granted via a pin number issued to eligible personnel
• Landline counterpart to Nationwide Wireless Priority Service (WPS) which offers similar features for wireless phone systems

The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) is a White House-directed emergency phone service provided by the National Communications System (NCS) in the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications Division, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. GETS supports Federal, State, local, and tribal government, industry, and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel in performing their National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) missions. GETS provides emergency access and priority processing in the local and long distance segments of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). It is intended to be used in an emergency or crisis situation when the PSTN is congested and the probability of completing a call over normal or other alternate telecommunication means has significantly decreased.1 2

Purposes and Intent

GETS supports federal, state, local, and tribal government, industry, and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel during crises or emergencies by providing emergency access and priority processing for local and long distance calls on the public switched telephone network. GETS is intended to be used in an emergency or crisis situation when the public switched telephone network is congested and the probability of completing a call over normal or other alternate telecommunication means is reduced.3

GETS is necessary because reliance on telecommunications has been accompanied by an increased vulnerability to network congestion and system failures. Although backup systems are in place, disruptions in service can still occur. Natural disasters, power outages, fiber cable cuts, and software problems can cripple the telephone services of entire regions. Additionally, congestion in the public switched telephone network, such as the well-documented “Mother’s Day phenomenon,” in which Mother’s Day generally has the highest blocking of long-distance telephone calls of any single day of the year, can prevent access to circuits. However, during times of emergency, crisis, or war, government personnel and emergency workers need to know that their calls will go through.

For cellular telephone users, a related capability is offered by the Nationwide Wireless Priority Service (WPS). WPS users have the ability to queue at the top for the next available communications channel to their registered base station in order to place their call, greatly enhancing their ability to complete wireless calls during times of congestion. WPS is available only to designated leadership at all government levels, national security, emergency responders, and private sector critical infrastructure personnel, as approved by the NCS and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Rules and Requirements.4

GETS uses these major types of networks:

• The local networks provided by local exchange carriers and wireless providers, such as cellular carriers and personal communications services (PCS)
• The major long distance networks provided by interexchange carriers such as AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint, including their international services
• Government-leased networks, including the Federal Technology Service and the Defense Switched Network

Accessibilty

GETS is accessed through a dialing plan and Personal Identification Number (PIN) card verification system. The user dials a universal access number using common telephone equipment. A prompt directs the entry of the user’s PIN and the telephone number. Once the user is authenticated as a valid, his or her call receives special treatment.

Main GETS Access Number: 1-710-NCS-GETS (627-4387)

1. Dial GETS Access Number
2. Listen for tone, then enter your PIN (do not enter # after last digit)
3. Listen for voice prompt: “Please enter your destination number now.”
4. Enter the destination number (omit the 1 before the area code)
5. You will hear an announcement “You are using GETS, AT&T/MCI/Sprint”
6. Network will route your call to the destination telephone number

Eligibility

The following user categories are considered eligible for issuance of GETS pin numbers:

National Security Leadership
This user performs NS/EP functions essential to national survival when nuclear attacks threatens or occurs. In addition, this user provides support to critical orderwire and control services necessary to ensure the rapid and efficient provisioning or restoration of other NS/EP services. These user functions may include the following:

1. Critical orderwire or control service supporting other NS/EP functions
2. Presidential support critical to continuity of Government and national security
   leadership
3. National Command Authority support for military command and control critical
   to national survival
4. Intelligence critical to warning of potentially catastrophic attack
5. Support for the conduct of diplomatic negotiations critical to arresting or
   limiting hostilities

National Security Posture and US Population Attack Warning
This user type performs additional NS/EP functions essential to maintaining an optimum defense, diplomatic, or continuity of government posture before, during, and after crisis situations. Such situations are those ranging from national emergencies to international crises, including nuclear attack. These user functions may include the following:

1. Threat assessment and attack warning
2. Conduct of diplomacy
3. Collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence
4. Command and control of military forces
5. Military mobilization
6. Continuity of Federal Government before, during, and after crisis situations
7. Continuity of state and local government functions supporting the Federal
   Government during and after national emergencies
8. Recovery of critical national functions after crisis situations
9. National space operations

Public Health, Safety, and Maintenance of Law and Order
The user type performs NS/EP functions necessary for giving civil alert to the US population by maintaining law and order and the health and safety of the US population in times of national, regional, or serious local emergency. These user functions may include the following:

1. Population warning (other than attack warning)
2. Law enforcement
3. Continuity of critical state and local government functions (other than support of the Federal
   Government during and after national emergencies)
4. Hospitals and distribution of medical supplies
5. Critical logistic functions and public utility services
6. Civil air traffic control
7. Military assistance to civil authorities
8. Defense and protection of critical industrial facilities
9. Critical weather services
10. Transportation to accomplish foregoing NS/EP functions

Public Welfare and Maintenance of National Economic Posture
This user type performs NS/EP functions necessary for maintaining the public welfare and national economic posture during any national or regional emergency. These user functions may include the following:

1. Distribution of food and other essential supplies
2. Maintenance of national monetary, credit, and financial systems
3. Maintenance of price, wage, rent, and salary stabilization, and consumer rationing programs
4. Control of production and distribution of strategic materials and energy supplies
5. Prevention and control of environmental hazards or damage
6. Transportation to accomplish the foregoing NS/EP functions

Disaster Recovery
This user type performs NS/EP functions of managing a variety of recovery operations after the initial response has been accomplished. These user functions may include the following:

1. Managing medical resources such as supplies, personnel, or patients in medical facilities
2. Other activities such as coordination to establish and stock shelters, to obtain detailed damage assessments, or to support key disaster field office personnel may be included.
3. Examples of those eligible include:
   • Medical recovery operations leadership
   • Detailed damage assessment leadership
   • Disaster shelter coordination and management
   • Critical Disaster Field Office support personnel

1. Government Emergency Telecommunications Service.  Wikipedia.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Emergency_Telecommunications_Service
2. NCS – Government Emergency Telecommunications Service.  National Communications System. http://gets.ncs.gov/eligibility.html
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Photos obtained via Cryptome FOIA request.  Includes both aerial photos from the NYPD aviation unit as well as photos taken by unknown persons on the ground.

30 Photos of Body Parts Ejected from WTC 9/11 March 10, 2010 (29MB)
153 NYPD WTC Collapse Photos 11 September 2001 March 9, 2010 (64MB)

• 1 page
• May 27, 2004

Role

The T-Mobile USA, Inc. Law Enforcement Relations Group (LERG) is committed to efficiently assisting the law enforcement community with all lawfully authorized activities. Our Law Enforcement Relations unit is staffed by personnel who are well acquainted with the technical and evidentiary needs of federal, state, and local prosecutors and investigative officers. The unit maintains their proactive philosophy by offering educational presentations, reference materials and expedient, secure procedures that support the mission of the public safety community in an unparalleled fashion. Responsibilities of the LER Group include the following:

Responsibilities
• Processing lawful requests for subscriber identification information and historical billing data
• Providing technical assistance in the conduct of Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance
• Providing expert testimony
• Ensuring company technical and procedural compliance to federal Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act requirements.
• Providing education to law enforcement regarding T-Mobile’s GSM technology

Contact Information
ALL TIME ZONES
MAIN PHONE: (973) 292-8911 FAX: (973) 292-8697
BUSINESS HOURS: 24 X 7
Law Enforcement Relations Director
Michael McAdoo
(973) 292-8903 – Office
LER Group
4 Sylvan Way
Parsippany, NJ 07054
9-1-1 Emergencies:

During an emergency, Law Enforcement Relations Group (LERG) will attempt to verify the caller’s identity as a legitimate representative of the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP or 911 Emergency Dispatcher). LERG will ask that the PSAP fax a demand letter requesting subscriber information as soon as possible. LERG prefers to receive demand letters prior to the release of information to the PSAP, but in ongoing emergency situations, the letter may be faxed after the emergency has been resolved.

Demand letters should be forwarded to (973) 292-8697.

• 15 pages
• October 3, 2006

1.0 OBJECTIVE

Date ofissue: April 22, 2002

It is the policy of MetroPCS to comply with the letter and spirit of all laws of the United
States, including the Communications Assistant for Law Enforcement Act (hereinafter
referred to as “CALEA”) relating to the implementation of law enforcement wiretap
requests. CALEA requires MetroPCS to implement security measures to safeguard the
privacy and reliability of information obtained through lawfully authorized interceptions
of communications (i.e., wiretaps, pin registers, and subpoenas) and to help prevent
unauthorized interceptions. MetroPCS Personnel must receive appropriate legal
authorization and appropriate carrier authorization (as such terms are defined herein) to
implement the interception of communications or access to call-identifying information.

2.0 SCOPE

This Policy applies to all employees, contractors, and consultants of MetroPCS and each
of its subsidiaries (collectively “MetroPCS Personnel”).

3.0 DEFINITIONS

3.1 Appropriate Legal Authorization

The tenn “Appropriate legal authorization” means:
• A court order signed by a judge or magistrate authorizing or approving
interception of wire or electronic communications, or
• Other authorization issued pursuant to an appropriate federal or state
statute (i.e., Title 18, federal trap and trace statutes, Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act or any other relevant federal or state statue.).

3.2 Appropriate Carrier Authorization

The tenn “Appropriate carrier authorization” means the policies and procedures
adopted by MetroPCS to supervise and control MetroPCS personnel authorized to
assist law enforcement in conducting any interception of communications or
access to call identifying infonnation. Compliance with these policies and
procedures requires, but is not limited to:

• Verification of appropriate legal authorization (Section 3.1)
• The legal authorization is what it purports to be (i.e., is valid on its face)
• The request is described in sufficient detail such that it can be technically
implemented

3.3 Appropriate Authorization

• The tenn “appropriate authorization” means both appropriate legal
authorization and appropriate carrier authorization.

…

4.0 POLICY

Date of Issue: April 22, 2002

It is MetroPCS’ policy that no interception of communications (i.e. wiretaps) or access to
call-identifying information using MetroPCS’ equipment and/or systems will be activated
unless done so pursuant to a written court order or other lawful authorization requesting
such action and with the affirmative intervention of MetroPCS’ Staff VP Audit &
Security Services or his designates. All written requests (i.e., court orders and subpoenas)
from law enforcement agencies must be forwarded to the Compliance Department for
review, approval, and implementation.

Interceptions of communications and access to call-identifying information shall only be
made by MetroPCS Personnel authorized by MetroPCS’ Staff VP Audit & Security
Services and pursuant to appropriate authorization. A background check and a
nondisclosure agreement shall be required for all authorized personnel. It is against
Company policy for unauthorized personnel to intercept and/or access call-identifYing
information.

4.1 Exigent Circumstances

In certain limited situations, law enforcement personnel can declare that “Exigent
Circumstances” exist that require, without a Subpoena or Court Order,
respectively, (1) that certain customer information be turned over to them, (2) that
a specific customer’s service be turned off or on, or (3) that a Temporary PIN
Register or Wiretap be granted for up to 48 hours. It is the responsibility of the
Staff VP Audit & Security Services to determine the validity and authority for the
declaration of Exigent Circumstances.

4.2 Responsibility For Oversight Of Process

The Staff VP Audit & Security Services shall oversee, review, and approve (refer
to Section 3.3) all requests and shall ensure that each request is supported by
appropriate legal authorization, as defined in Section 3.1. This responsibility
requires expertise to recognize requests that meet federal and state statutes
permitting interceptions. Responses to authorized and approved requests will be
made in a timely manner with consideration given to the number of requests (i.e.,
workload) and the number of available personnel. Verbal requests for
interceptions from law enforcement agencies shall not be honored unless Exigent
Circumstances exist.

…

4.3 Records Retention

Date oflssue: April 22, 2002

The Staff VP Audit & Security Services shall be responsible for maintaining
secure and accurate records as required by the FCC’s rules, including, but not
limited to, the records of each interception (made with or without appropriate
authorization). The Audit & Security Services Department will retain the original
written request for record keeping purposes for a minimum of five years, and will
record and store a certification that includes the following information for a
minimum of five years:

• Telephone number(s) and/or circuit identification numbers
• Start date and start time of the interception and/or access to call identifying
information
• Identity of the law enforcement officer presenting the authorization
• Name of the judge, magistrate, or prosecuting attorney signing the
authorization
• Type of interception and/or access to call identifying information
• The name of the MetroPCS Personnel responsible for initiating the
interception in accordance with the policies established herein.

This certification must be signed by the Staff VP Audit & Security Services or his
designate. By his or her signature, such individual will certify that the record is
complete and accurate. This certification must be compiled either
contemporaneously with, or within a reasonable period of time after the
completion of the interception of the communications or access to call-identifying
information.

• 13 pages
• August 01, 2003

This Guide was prepared for Law Enforcement to facilitate the processing of subpoena requests and compliance with court orders for electronic surveillance directed to Nextel Communications, or any of its operating subsidiaries (collectively “Nextel”). This Guide references the Nextel points-of-contact that have been authorized to assist Law Enforcement with subpoena compliance, as well as with the provisioning of lawful interceptions of communications on Nextel’s wireless networks. In addition, this Guide provides Law Enforcement with an overview of Nextel’s current administrative practices and policies required to support these requests.

Any contacts made with, or information received from Nextel personnel other than those identified in this Guide for the subject matter identified, for the purposes indicated in this Guide, is neither authorized nor endorsed by Nextel. It is Nextel’s policy to honor and act on only contacts made with and information received from identified, authorized contact persons.

Nextel Subpoena and Court Order Compliance Contacts

Law Enforcement should direct requests for subscriber information such as customer name,
address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records; Fraudbuster Reports; Calls to
Destination Searches; telephone number or other subscriber number or identity; subscriber’s
length of service, and types of services the subscriber utilizes. Submit request to:

Nextel Communications
Attention: Subpoena Compliance
2000 Edmund Halley Drive Mail stop DS-1
Reston, VA 20191
Contact Number: (703) 433-8860 Fax Number: (703) 433-8842

Law Enforcement should direct all inquiries regarding electronic surveillance, Title III, new
court orders, court order extensions, court order cancellations, switch coverage, and real time
location information to:

Nextel Communications
Attention: Court Order Compliance
2000 Edmund Halley Drive Mail stop DS-1
Reston, VA 20191
Contact Number: (703) 433-4398 Fax Number: (877) 293-9824
Email: LEADMIN@Nextel.com

…

Required Documentation for Subpoenas

Basic subscriber information will be provided to the LEA upon receipt of the proper legal
process or authorization. Nextel toll records include airtime and local dialing information on the
subscriber’s invoice in addition to any long distance charges. Nextel subscriber’s invoice will
provide the subscriber’s dialed digits. Incoming phone numbers will be marked INCOMING
and the incoming callers phone number will not be displayed.

The Fraudbuster database is a tool utilized by Nextel for fraud detection. The Fraudbuster
database maintains 30 days of call detail records of incoming and outgoing calls. The
information is not considered a transitional record and Nextel does not guarantee the accuracy of
the report.

Nextel will provide a Fraudbuster report to the LEA only if the agency agrees to pay an
additional fee of $50.00 per number, per request. The LEA must specify in the subpoena
“request to capture the incoming and outgoing call detail records thru the Fraudbuster Database”.
Nextel will not honor any request for incoming and outgoing call detail request without
specifying Fraudbuster in the body of the subpoena. Nextel will not be able to process any
request received outside of the data retention period of 30 days.

Nextel recycles phone numbers once a subscriber deactivates service. It is critical that all
Subpoenas contain the Subscriber’s PTN (the Nextel phone number assigned to the handset,
including area code) and the relevant time frame of the requested information. This will insure
that Nextel provides the correct subscriber information the agency is seeking.
Required Documentation for Court Orders

The Nextel Law Enforcement Administrator will review all court orders to verify that the court
order contains the necessary information required to comply with the desired surveillance
request. It is imperative that all court orders contain accurate and valid information to facilitate
the implementation of the court order.

All court orders submitted to Nextel must contain the following customer information:

♦ Subscriber’s name and billing address if known
♦ Subscriber’s PTN (the Nextel phone number assigned to the handset, including area code)
Also requested but not required:
♦ Subscriber’s IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identifier) and IMSI (International
Mobile Subscriber Identifier).

If the customer information contained in the court order does not match the customer
information found in the Nextel billing systems, Nextel will notify the LEA that the court order
must be modified.

…

Installation Fees

Initiation charge for Interconnect and Dispatch Pen Register or Title III Wiretap – $1500
per target

The $1500 charge will include installation in all requested switches within the market. In the
event that the law enforcement agency requests that the court order be implemented in a switch
outside of that market, Nextel will charge an additional $500 per target, per switch outside of
that initial market.

Monthly maintenance fee for Interconnect and Dispatch Pen Register or Title III Wiretap -
$250 per target

The $250 charge will be applied for each month after the month of initiation, and the monthly
maintenance charge will be applied for partial months. A partial month will be billed as a
complete month of maintenance. No pro-rating will be done by Nextel.

Charge for providing “real-time” location information (pinging a phone) – $150 per ping
Charge for Call-to-Destination Searches or cell site information – $125 per number, per
request

Charge for providing call detail cell site support via reports from Nextel’s fraud management
system – $125 per target, per report

• Missouri Homeland Security
• 28 pages
• November 5, 2008

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden (L) is greeted by Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad upon his arrival for their meeting in the West Bank city of Ramallah March 10, 2010. Biden heard in the West Bank on Wednesday a pessimistic Palestinian assessment of prospects for peace after Israel announced plans to build more homes for Jewish settlers. REUTERS/Ammar Awad (WEST BANK)

By Herb Keinon
Jerusalem Post
March 10, 2010

The US is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, Vice President Joe Biden said in Jerusalem on Tuesday, stressing that when it came to Israel’s security, there was “no space between the United States and Israel.”

Following a two-hour meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu in his office, about an hour of that in private conversation, Biden – standing next to Netanyahu – said the cornerstone of the US-Israeli relationship was “our absolute, total, unvarnished commitment to Israel’s security.”

“Bibi, you heard me say before, progress occurs in the Middle East when everyone knows there is simply no space between the United States and Israel,” Biden said. “There is no space between the United States and Israel when it comes to Israel’s security. And for that reason, and many others, addressing Iran’s nuclear program has been one of our administration’s priorities.”

Biden said that the US determination to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons was the reason Washington was working with countries around the world to “convince Teheran to meet its international obligations and cease and desist.”

In addition to halting its nuclear program, Biden said the Islamic Republic must “curb its other destabilizing actions in the region,” such as continued support for terrorist groups that threaten not only Israel, but US interests as well.

Netanyahu, who has called on the US and the international community to impose paralyzing sanctions on Iran’s energy sector, said he appreciated the US efforts to lead the world to impose tough sanctions.

“The stronger those sanctions are, the more likely it will be that the Iranian regime will have to choose between advancing its nuclear program and advancing the future of its own permanence,” theprime minister said.

“I think that the international community and the leading countries in the international community have to join the American effort. And Israel has been helping out with key countries and continues to do so,” he said.

Earlier, Biden – who arrived with his wife Jill and key staffers on Monday night for a three-day visit – met President Shimon Peres, who advocated surroundingIran with an “envelope” of missile defense systems, “which will be an additional weight in limiting the danger of Iran.”

Peres also called on the US to couple economic sanctions against Iran with “moral sanctions.”

“A person like [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad that calls openly to destroy the State of Israel cannot be a full member ofthe United Nations,” he said.

Peres said Ahmadinejad should be treated as a military dictator, a term US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used recently in reference to the Iranian leader. A man who calls for acts of terrorism and hangs people in the streets “cannot go around almost like a cultural hero,” Peres said.

Apparently prodding the US into more active support of the opposition movement in Iran, Peres said these “moral sanctions” will “also help the people of Iran, the Persians, to continue their struggle to defend their culture. They are ashamed of him. In my judgment, this should be done strongly, clearly, vocally.”

Biden said that the “moral sanctions” had begun and were being imposed not by the US, but by the Iranians themselves.

“The people of Iran are making that argument clearly, engaging in their own form of morally sanctioning their government as we have and as the rest of the world is,” he said.

Biden, who expressed staunch support for Israel in all his public statements, also met with opposition leader Tzipi Livni.

The vice president is scheduled to meet with Quartet envoy Tony Blair on Wednesday morning in Jerusalem, and then travel to Ramallah for meetings with the Palestinian Authority’s President Mahmoud Abbas andPrime Minister Salam Fayyad. He is also set to travel to Bethlehem and tour a Palestinian marble factory there.

Following the meeting with Netanyahu, Biden returned to his hotel, the David Citadel in Jerusalem, and taped an interview with MSNBC’s Chris Matthews.

He then went to Mount Herzl and laid a wreath on the graves of Theodor Herzl and former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. The wreath on Herzl’s grave read, “Your vision inspires our commitment to peace,” while the one on Rabin’s grave was inscribed, “The case of peace for which you fought has become our own.”

Biden was flanked by his wife and joined in the ceremony by Rabin’s children, Yuval and former deputy defense minister Dalia Rabin-Pelossof.

Biden then went to Yad Vashem and, after signing the guest book, said he had taken his sons to Dachau as teenagers so that they could understand as young men that “mankind could be so brutal.”

He said he had also taken his sons to Israel, “to let them know that the indomitable spirit of human beings is not able to be snuffed out.”

Biden and his wife then joined Netanyahu and his wife, Sara, for a private dinner at the Prime Minister’s Residence.

© The Jerusalem Post 2010

U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden, left, and Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, right, shake hands prior their meeting in the West Bank city of Ramallah, Wednesday, March 10, 2010. Israel's new plan to build 1,600 homes for Jews in Palestinian-claimed east Jerusalem overshadowed Biden's visit to the West Bank on Wednesday. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)

Israel sorry for announcing homes plan during Biden visit (guardian.co.uk):

Israel apologised to Joe Biden today for announcing a plan to build 1,600 homes on occupied Palestinian land during his visit, after the US vice-president launched a strongly worded attack on the planned construction in an East Jerusalem settlement.

An Israeli cabinet minister apologised for the timing of the announcement but not for its substance. “This should not have happened during a visit by the US vice-president,” the welfare minister, Isaac Herzog, told Army Radio. “This is a real embarrassment and now we have to express our apologies for this serious blunder.”

The Israeli interior ministry’s approval of the plan cast a cloud over a visit to the country by Biden just hours after he pledged strong support for the Israeli government.

In a statement issued after he arrived 90 minutes late for a dinner with the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, Biden said: “I condemn the decision by the government of Israel to advance planning for new housing units.”

He said the blueprint for Ramat Shlomo, an ultra-Orthodox settlement in an area of the West Bank annexed to Jerusalem, “undermines the trust we need right now and runs counter to the constructive discussions I’ve had in Israel”.

The approvals came just a day after the Israeli defence ministry announced that 112 apartments would be built in Beitar Illit, a settlement on the occupied West Bank. The new building comes at a delicate moment in the long-stalled peace process after Israeli and Palestinian leaders agreed to start indirect negotiations.

Biden meets Abbas amid row over settlements (BBC):

US Vice-President Joe Biden is meeting the Palestinian Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas, in Ramallah.

The Israeli government’s approval of plans for 1,600 more homes in a Jewish settlement in occupied East Jerusalem is expected to dominate the talks.

Mr Biden earlier said the substance and timing of the decision had undermined the trust needed for peace talks.

The Palestinian Authority said the move showed the Israelis believed US efforts had failed before they had even begun.

Both sides have agreed to hold indirect “proximity talks” in a bid to restart the peace process, which has been stalled for 17 months.

…

Mr Abbas has refused to resume direct negotiations with the Israeli government because of its refusal to put a complete stop to the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

In November, Israel announced a 10-month suspension of new building in the West Bank, under heavy US pressure. But it considers areas within the Jerusalem municipality as its territory and the restrictions do not apply.

Close to 500,000 Jews live in more than 100 settlements built since Israel’s 1967 occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. They are considered illegal under international law, although Israel disputes this.

With Biden in West Bank, Settlements Cloud Talks (New York Times):

Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. arrived here on Wednesday to meet with Palestinian leaders as the Palestinian prime minister, Salam Fayyad, expressed dismay at Israel’s announcement a day earlier that it planned to build 1,600 new housing units for Jews in East Jerusalem

“It is damaging, for sure,” Mr. Fayyad said. “This is a moment of challenge to the efforts led by the United States to get the peace process going again. We definitely appreciate the strong statements of condemnation by the administration vis-à-vis this action. This definitely undermines confidence in prospects of the political process which we are all working very hard on.”

Mr. Biden was due to see Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas afterward.

Hours after Mr. Biden vowed unyielding American support for Israel’s security here on Tuesday, . Mr. Biden condemned the announcement of the new housing as “precisely the kind of step that undermines the trust we need right now.”

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was clearly embarrassed at the move by his interior minister, Eli Yishai, leader of the right-wing Shas Party, who has made Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem one of his central causes.

Overview

Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC) is a underground continuity of government facility built by the U.S. government in the early 1950s. It is located about 14 km (8.7 miles) east of Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, and 10 km (6.2 miles) north-northeast of Camp David, Maryland. It is also called the Raven Rock Military Complex, or simply Site R. Other designations and nicknames include “The Rock”, NMCC-R (National Military Command Center Reservation), ANMCC (Alternate National Military Command Center), AJCC (Alternate Joint Communications Center), “Backup Pentagon”, or “Site RT”; the latter refers to the vast array of communication towers and equipment atop the mountain. Colloquially, the facility is known as an “underground Pentagon”.1

Site R is the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) located in Raven Rock mountain [hence the name Site R] just over the Pennsylvania State Line near Waynesboro, Pa. The DISA Site-R Computer Operations staff provides computer services to the NCA, the Joint Staff, the OSD and other DoD agencies through Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs). The facility functions as the disaster recovery site for the JSSC’s GMC and DISA GCC. The various service [Army, Navy and Air Force] Emergency Operations Centers (AFEOC) are also located at Site R. Support is provided 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. The facility’s Operations Center, DCS Technical Control Facility, the Northeast Dial Service Assistance Center and Information Center provide planning, installation, operation, and maintenance of over 38 communications systems (switching, transmission, data distribution, visual information, and power generation) that support the various customers of the Alternate Joint Communications Center Site R.2

Many of the facility’s activities are classified, and distribution of most unclassified information about the facility is discouraged by the government.

Signs outside of Site-R warn against taking pictures or making sketches of the site. Photo: WIRED

On May 25, 2007, the Federal Register published a Defense Department policy declaring that it is unlawful for any person “entering in or on the property … to make any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map or graphical representation of the Raven Rock Mountain Complex without first obtaining the necessary permission.3

History

The initial concept for the Alternate Joint Communications Center originated in 1948. After the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1949, a high priority was established for the Joint Command Post to be placed in a protected location with close proximity to Washington, D.C. for swift relocation of the National Command Authorities and the Joint Communications Service. In 1950, President Truman approved Raven Rock Mountain, Pennsylvania, as part of Camp Albert Ritchie, Maryland. This new site was named the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) Site R (R for Raven Rock). In 1951, construction of the facility began, and in 1953, the AJCC Site R became operational.4

In 1976, the unit was redesignated as the USACC Site R Telecommunications Center, a direct reporting element to the 7th Signal Command. And in 1978, the unit was moved back under the command of the Fort Ritchie Garrison, as the Directorate of Telecommunications. 5

The Special Projects Office (later to become the Protective Design Center) was created in 1977 to work on a classified Department of Defense program. The Alternate National Military Command and Control Center Improvement Program involved criteria development, studies, and preliminary design of a deep underground highly hardened and survivable command and control center. The center included separate structures for command personnel, power, fuel, and water. Over 3 miles of air entrainment tunnels were required as well as access shafts to the surface. Although canceled in 1979, the experience, expertise, and leadership in protective design and classified programs that Special Projects gained from this work brought other unique projects and major programs to the District.

In October 1981, USACC Site R Telecommunications Center was reorganized and redesignated as USACC Site R under Headquarters, 7th Signal Command. In May 1984, USACC Site R was redesignated as USAISC-Site R, remaining as a direct reporting unit to 7th Signal Command. In October 1988, USAISC-Site R was redesignated as the 1111th U.S. Army Signal Battalion* and placed under the 1101st U.S. Army Signal Brigade, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C., as the Army support battalion responsible for the maintenance, upkeep and communications of the AJCC Site R.6

In October 1993, the 1111th U.S. Army Signal Battalion was placed under the 1108th U.S. Army Signal Brigade, Fort Ritchie, MD. Most base operations activities were removed from the battalion’s mission, leaving communications as the primary unit mission.

The 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission directed the relocation of U.S. Army Signal Command units and some Base Operations support personnel from Fort Ritchie to Fort Detrick, which will become the home of East Coast long-haul communications. These units include the 1108th U.S. Army Signal Brigade, the 1111th U.S. Army Signal Battalion and Information Systems Engineering Command-Continental United States (ISEC-CONUS). The 1110th U.S. Army Signal Battalion, already at Fort Detrick, is assigned to the 1108th. More than 1,140 military members and civilian employees will be transferred under the order. Site R and its personnel came under control of the Fort Detrick commander 01 October 1997. The actual movement of units began 01 October 1996, and Fort Ritchie was scheduled to be closed by Sept. 30, 1998, well ahead of schedule.7

The RRMC was one of the “undisclosed locations” frequently used by Vice President Dick Cheney following the September 11 attacks.8

Documents and Resources

• Army Regulation 190–15, Physical Security of the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC), May 6, 1994
• Collective Bargaining Agreement between Washington Headquarters Services, Raven Rock Mountain Complex and International Association of Firefighters, Local F-301

Aerial Imagery

April 17, 1994

Site-R Overview

Portals A and B

Portals C and D

Portals C and D

Sewage plant just north of Portals C and D.

Antenna complex at the center of the above-ground portion of Site R.

Antenna complex and western guard tower.

Guard tower.

Another guard tower.

More antennas.

North gate.

South gate.

1. Raven Rock Site-R Alternate Joint Communications Center.  Federation of American Scientists.  http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/raven_rock.htm
2. Ibid.
3. DoD Policy Concerning conduct on Pentagon Reservation and Raven Rock Mountain Complex.  Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2007/05/fr052507.html
4. Site-R Raven Rock Alternate Joint Communications Center.  GlobalSecurity.org  http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/raven-rock.htm
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Undisclosed location disclosed. Knight Ridder.  http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/07/20/undisclosed_location_disclosed/

• 2 pages
• Law Enforcement Sensitive
• July 24, 2008

Recently, emails have been circulating about the Open Carry movement and its members’ attempts to openly carry firearms in public places. The intent may be to have an officer arrest them or seize their firearm so they can file a civil lawsuit against the officer. Because of the recent incidents in the Sacramento RTTAC region and the likelihood that the incidents will continue, the following information is being provided to law enforcement agencies for purposes of Officer Safety and Situational Awareness.

The Open Carry movement began in 2004 when the website, OpenCarry.org, was
established by two gun-rights activists. The website not only serves as a legal resource,
but also as a social networking portal for thousands of American gun owners. Based on a
review of the website, it appears to be well visited with many daily postings to several forum
topics.

The Sacramento Police Department recently received a phone call from an individual
inquiring about carrying an unloaded handgun in public. Additional information was
received indicating that members of the group ‘Open Carry’ suggested going to a
Sacramento restaurant wearing non-concealed pistols on their belts in an attempt to lure
police into arresting them while other members of the group secretly videotape the incident.
The video could then be used in a civil lawsuit against the officer.

In addition, there was an incident in Turlock earlier this month where officers responded to
a citizen report of an armed person in a park on a Saturday afternoon. Upon arrival,
officers encountered an adult male armed with a handgun carried in a belt holster.
Employing customary officer safety practices, the person was disarmed at gun point and
detained. The handgun was found to be unloaded and properly registered. The male adult
possessed valid identification and declared that he was engaging in his “constitutional right”
to openly carry an unloaded firearm. Because the firearm was unloaded and not
concealed, no criminal violation occurred. Once the person was properly identified and the
weapon checked for registration status, the person was released.

The following Monday, an individual identifying himself as a co-founder of “OpenCarry.org”
called Turlock Police Department and suggested that Turlock Police Officers required
training on the “right to carry firearms”. OpenCarry.org also posted a message from an
individual, “CA_Libertarian”, who claimed he was “illegally detained and harassed” by
Turlock Police Officers. The website posting suggested that the incident was being
reviewed by an attorney for the purposes of pursuing a civil rights violation action and that there was an audiotape recording of the entire incident. In addition, the individual
confronted and detained by officers was not a Turlock resident and his posting related his
experiences of openly carrying firearms throughout different communities.

Based on a review of their website, it appears that the Open Carry movement is spreading
to this region. The founders are based on the east coast and much of the activity has been
in that area, but recent activity in the central valley and some of the forum postings indicate
that law enforcement agencies in California may experience an increase in the number of
Open Carry encounters in their jurisdictions.

If you logon to their website www.opencarry.org and click on “Our Forum” at the top left,
then scroll down to “California”, you will see that there are 7 pages of postings, all with a
sizeable number of replies. Included in the postings are the Turlock P.D. incident and the
Sacramento P.D. incident (including the High Priority internal memo) as well as meetings
and “meet and greets” that have either taken place or are being planned throughout
California. All California law enforcement personnel should be aware of the following
firearms laws in case they are confronted with a subject openly carrying a firearm.

• PC 12025 (f), unloaded firearms carried openly in belt holsters are not concealed
within the meaning of section 12025.

• PC 12025 only applies to concealable firearms, which is defined in PC 12001(a) as a
pistol, revolver or firearm with a barrel less than 16 inches. There is nothing
prohibiting someone from carrying an unloaded, concealed rifle or shotgun on their
person or in their vehicle unless the barrel is less than 16 inches.

• PC 12031(g), A firearm shall be deemed to be loaded for the purposes of this
section when there is an unexpended cartridge or shell in, or attached in any manner
to, the firearm, including, but not limited to, in the firing chamber, magazine, or clip
thereof attached to the firearm. **Case law now states the ammunition must be in a
position from which is can be fired (People. v. Clark)

• PC 12031(e), in order to determine whether or not a firearm is loaded for the
purpose of enforcing this section, peace officers are authorized to examine any
firearm carried by anyone on his or her person or in a vehicle while in any public
place or on any public street in an incorporated city or prohibited area of an
unincorporated territory. Refusal to allow a peace officer to inspect a firearm
pursuant to this section constitutes probable cause for arrest for violation of this
section.

• 1 page
• For Official Use Only
• October 20, 2008

The website http://msn.whitepages.com was brought to our attention as an officer safety concern due to the ease in which personal information, such as home address, could be obtained. This bulletin will provide you with information on how to remove your name and personal information from the list:

• In your internet browser type in “http://msh.whitepages.com in the URL address bar
• Type in your name under “People Search”.

• If your name appears click on the details button
• Scroll down near the bottom of the page to the “White pages.com Privacy Options” section and click on “Is this you? Remove from listing” link.

The information was removed within a couple of minutes; however, it can take up to 5 days per the website.

If you have any questions or further information, please contact the Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (SAC RTTAC) at 916-808-8383.

• 72 pages
• For Official Use Only
• December 2008

This plan, which is designed to serve as guidance, assigns responsibilities and describes how air carriers and Federal agencies should respond to an aviation accident involving a significant number of passenger fatalities and/or injuries. Organizations given authority or responsibility by legislation should develop procedures specific to their role. Supporting legislation is located in appendix A.

…

SCOPE
This plan pertains to any domestic or foreign commercial aviation accidents occurring within the United States, its territories, possessions, and territorial seas.

ASSUMPTIONS
1. The Chairman of the NTSB will request Federal agencies to support the NTSB in accordance with the references included in appendix A.
2. Pursuant to the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996, the NTSB has the primary Federal responsibility for facilitating victim recovery and identification. It is understood that the presiding medical examiner or coroner is legally responsible for victim recovery and identification. (It is noted that there are differences between a medical examiner and coroner. For the purposes of this document, the term “medical examiner” is used interchangeably with “coroner.”) To ensure adequate resources for medical examiners to accomplish their jurisdictional responsibilities, the NTSB coordinates the resources of various Federal agencies to effect victim recovery and identification. The NTSB supports the use of State and local mass fatality teams and other trained experience personnel under the direction of the medical examiner.
3. For purposes of this document, the terms “family,” “family members,” “friends,” and “relatives” are used to refer to those people who have a relationship to a person involved in the accident. Although these terms have slightly different meanings, they are used interchangeably throughout the document.
4. Large numbers of family members of those killed in the accident will travel to the city closest to the accident and will utilize the accommodations provided by the air carrier. Other family members will remain at their local residences.
5. Most, if not all, families of those seriously injured will travel to where the injured are hospitalized; once the injured are released from the hospital, these family members and the injured will return home.
6. Implementation of this plan assumes that the accident will occur in a geographical area where the resources described above are available. Air carriers operating equipment over remote areas (for instance, Alaska) should contact NTSB TDA about modifications needed for accident response in those locations.

GENERAL MISSION TASKS
The family assistance mission tasks following an aviation accident are as follows:
1. Notify family members of victims involved in the aviation accident based on manifest documents and other available information.
2. Monitor search and recovery operations, and offer assistance as needed.
3. Determine the status and location of injured victims.
4. Obtain approval of the local medical examiner for Federal assistance (for instance, the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team [DMORT]) to assist in the identification of fatalities and the notification of their families.
5. Provide crisis intervention, logistical support, and services to victims and their family members.
6. Provide daily briefings to families on the progress of recovery efforts, identification of victims, the investigation, and other areas of concern.
7. Arrange for a memorial service, if desired by families.
8. Provide for the return of personal effects.
9. Maintain contact with victims and their families to provide continuous updates regarding the progress of the investigation and other related matters, both at the accident location and once the families have returned home.

…

U.S. State Department

What is the role of the U.S. State Department during an aviation disaster (domestic or foreign air carrier) in the United States or its territories?

The U.S. Department of State is responsible for providing official notification to foreign governments whose citizens were involved in the accident. Notifications take place after necessary information about foreign passengers is obtained from the air carrier. The State Department can also assist the air carrier in notifying U.S. citizens who may reside or are traveling outside the United States that a member of their family has been involved in an aviation accident.

For foreign carriers, the State Department can assist by alerting the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) that a corporate “Go Team” is en route to the accident city. They can assist with obtaining required visas or other documents needed to gain entry into the United States. Assistance can also be given to family members en route to the accident city. The State Department will work with USCIS to ensure that entry into the United States by these families is done in a timely, compassionate, and professional manner.

• Proposed Top Secret plan from 1962 stating intent among the Joint Chiefs of Staff to stage terrorist attacks, including killing innocent civilians, to provoke war with Cuba
• Proposals include use of drone aircraft to stage foreign attacks, staging hijackings, staging attacks on U.S. vessels and facilities, staging riots, as well as the creation of “terror campaigns” on U.S. soil

Operation Northwoods was a plan circulated in the U.S. government in 1962 to stage false flag terrorist attacks inside the U.S. and abroad to provoke “military intervention in Cuba”.  The plan called for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or other operatives to commit genuine acts of terrorism in U.S. cities and elsewhere. These acts of terrorism were to be blamed on Cuba in order to create public support for a war against that nation, which had recently become communist under Fidel Castro. One part of the Operation Northwoods plan was to “develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.”  The document was signed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer and reportedly presented to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on March 13, 1962. 1 2

The previously Top Secret document was originally made public on November 18, 1997, by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board, a U.S. federal agency overseeing the release of government records related to John F. Kennedy’s assassination.3

“Appendix to Enclosure A” and “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A” of the Northwoods document were first published online by the National Security Archive on November 6, 1998 in a joint venture with CNN as part of CNN’s 1998 Cold War television documentary series—specifically, as a documentation supplement to “Episode 10: Cuba,” which aired on November 29, 1998.  “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A” is the section of the document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.4

U.S. Government’s Willingness to Stage Terrorist Attacks

In the recommendations section of the “Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)” memo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff make clear their willingness to stage actual terrorist events with legitimate casualties to sustain their intentions to “intervene” militarily in Cuba’s affairs.  The cumulative effect of many of the recommendations is stated as being to provoke reactions from the Cuban government which would justify “military intervention”.  Many of the suggested actions have a strong component of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) designed to simultaneously engender domestic U.S. support for “military intervention” while portraying the Cuban government as a rogue, dangerous entity which will internationally serve to justify the U.S. military intervention.  The suggested actions include:

• Use of drone (unmanned) aircraft to simulate air-related catastrophes

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a “MAY DAY” message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to “sell” the incident.5

• Staging “hijacking attempts” of civilian vessels

7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba.6

• Creation of “terror campaigns” inside the U.S. with legitimate victims

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.7

• Destruction of U.S. military vessels

A “Remember the Maine” incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.8

• Staging fires and mortar attacks on U.S. military bases to cause actual damage to installations and potentially personnel

5. Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
6. Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
7. Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.9

• Using friendly provocateurs to stage riots

4. Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans)10

1. Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuban Invasion in 1962.  National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/index.html
2. Lyman Lemnitzer.  Wikipedia.org.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyman_Lemnitzer
3. Operation Northwoods.  Wikipedia.org.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Northwoods
4. Ibid.
5. Operation Northwoods Documents.  Public Intelligence. http://publicintelligence.net/operation-northwoods-documents/
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

• RL32572
• Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
• 31 pages
• January 14, 2010

During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed thousands of
“nonstrategic” nuclear weapons that were intended to be used in support of troops in the field during a conflict. These included nuclear mines; artillery; short, medium, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range “strategic” nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations. At the end of the 1980s, before the demise of the Soviet Union, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, both the United States and Soviet Union announced that they would withdraw most and eliminate many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now retains approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with a few hundred deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 2,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The
Bush Administration indicated that nuclear weapons remained essential to U.S. national security
interests, but it did quietly redeploy and remove some of the nuclear weapons deployed in
Europe. In addition, Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security
concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from 1991 and
may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia’s
weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group;
questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy, and the likelihood
that either nation might use these weapons in a regional contingency with a non-nuclear nation;
questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a
continuing need for the United States to deploy these weapons at bases overseas; and questions
about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy,
particularly whether a U.S. policy that views these weapons as a militarily useful tool might
encourage other nations to acquire their own nuclear weapons, or at least complicate U.S. policy
to discourage such acquisition.

Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter
its policy. Others, however, argue that the United States should reduce its reliance on these
weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and
Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of
these weapons, possibly by negotiating an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and
allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. Others have
suggested that any potential new U.S.-Russian arms control treaty count both strategic and
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This might encourage reductions or the elimination of these
weapons. The 111th Congress may review some of these proposals.

…

The Distinction Between Strategic and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

The distinction between strategic and nonstrategic (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons
reflects the military definitions of, on the one hand, a strategic mission and, on the other hand, the
tactical use of nuclear weapons. According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
Terms,6 a strategic mission is:

Directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of
progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s warmaking capacity and will to
make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical
material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, and
other such target systems. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are
designed to have a long-range rather than immediate effect on the enemy and its military
forces.
In contrast, the tactical use of nuclear weapons is defined as “the use of nuclear weapons by land,
sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations or facilities, in support of
operations that contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope, or in
support of the military commander’s scheme of maneuver, usually limited to the area of military
operations.”

• R41049
• Larry Parker, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
• January 26, 2010

The European Union’s (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a cornerstone of the EU’s
efforts to meet its obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. It covers more than 10,000 energy
intensive facilities across the 27 EU Member countries; covered entities emit about 45% of the EU’s carbon dioxide emissions. A “Phase 1” trading period began January 1, 2005. A second, Phase 2, trading period began in 2008, covering the period of the Kyoto Protocol. A Phase 3 will begin in 2013 designed to reduce emissions by 21% from 2005 levels.

Several positive results from the Phase 1 “learning by doing” exercise assisted the ETS in making the Phase 2 process run more smoothly, including: (1) greatly improving emissions data, (2) encouraging development of the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based mechanisms—Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), and (3) influencing corporate behavior to begin pricing in the value of allowances in decision-making, particularly in the electric utility sector.

However, several issues that arose during the first phase were not resolved as the ETS moved into
Phase 2, including allocation schemes and new entrant reserves, and others. A more
comprehensive and coordinated response by the EU has been made for Phase 3 with harmonized
and coordinated rules being developed by the European Commission.

The United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol. However, five years of carbon emissions
trading has given the EU valuable experience in designing and operating a greenhouse gas trading
system. This experience may provide some insight into cap-and-trade design issues currently
being debated in the United States.

• The U.S. requires only electric utilities to monitor CO2. The EU-ETS experience
suggests that expanding similar requirements to all facilities covered under a capand-
trade scheme would be pivotal for developing allocation systems, reduction
targets, and enforcement provisions.

• In the U.S. debate continues on comprehensive versus sector-specific reduction
programs; the EU-ETS experience suggests that adding sectors to a trading
scheme once established may be a slow, contentious process.

• As with most EU industries, most U.S. industry groups either oppose auctions
outright or want them to be supplemental to a base free allocation. The EU-ETS
experience suggests Congress may want to consider specifying any auction
requirement if it wishes to incorporate market economics more fully into
compliance decisions.

• EU-ETS analysis suggests the most important variables in determining Phase 1
allowance price changes were oil and natural gas price changes; this apparent
linkage raises possible market manipulation issues, particularly with the inclusion
of financial instruments such as options and futures contracts. The EU will
examine the matter in preparation for Phase 3. Congress may consider whether
the government needs enhanced regulatory and oversight authority over such
instruments.

• Via FOIA request by nistreview.org
• 92 pages
• Confidential
• Released April 2002

The World Trade Center is one of the most prominent commercial real estate c0mplexes in the world and a hallmark of the Manhattan skyline. This document discusses many of the physical characteristics of the complex. various protection and risk control aspects and some of the potentially catastrophic incidents that might occur.

The discussion focuses on the following components of the complex:

• The two 110-story office towers (One and Two World Trade Center)
• The office portion of the two nine-story buildings (Four and Five World Trade Center
• The retail area of the World Trade Center. referred to in the rep on as the Mall which consists of retail space located on the Concourse level
• The Subgrade space. which consists of six basement levels (B-1 through B-6) that project about 70 below the Concourse.

It is estimated that 50,000 people work in the World Trade Center and
that 150.000 commuters’ travel through the concourse to access Path and
MTA subway trains. on a daily basis. Annually approximately 2 million
tourists visit the Observation Deck.

Much of the discussion of the physical characteristics has been taken
from documents developed by the Pon Authority’s real estate advisors.
The loss estimates (PML’s and MFL’s) outlined in the repon are
predicated on conventional risk control conventions or the major HPR
underwriters.

…

• Joe Treadway, Fred Hervey
• 18 pages
• September 21, 2005

ASTM E119 – Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials

ASTM E119 prescribes a standard fire exposure of controlled extent and severity.

Performance is defined as the period of resistance to standard exposure before the first critical point in behavior (conditions of acceptance)is observed.

Conditions of acceptance for floor systems include:
• Sustained applied load during classification period
• No passage of flame or hot gasses
• Maximum and average temperatures of the unexposed side of
the specimen
• Maximum and average temperatures of the steel joists
…

Prince Bernhard and his daughter Queen Beatrix Photo: REX FEATURES

By Bruno Waterfield
telegraph.co.uk
March 5, 2010

“Bernhard, a secret history” has revealed that the prince was a member of the German Nazi party until 1934, three years before he married Princess Juliana, the future queen of the Netherlands.

Annejet van der Zijl, a Dutch historian, has found membership documents in Berlin’s Humboldt University that prove Prince Bernhard, who studied there, had joined Deutsche Studentenschaft, a National Socialist student fraternity, as well as the Nazi NSDAP and its paramilitary wing, the Sturmabteilung.

He left all the groups on leaving university in December 1934, when he went to work for the German chemical giant, IG Farben.

The prince always denied having been a member of the Nazi party, although he admitted that he briefly had sympathised with Adolf Hitler’s regime. In one of the last interviews he gave before his death in 2004, he said: “I can swear this with my hand on the Bible: I was never a Nazi.”

As the Nazis invaded Holland in 1940, the young prince consort, then aged 28, organised a group of palace guards that engaged in combat with German forces.

Denied the chance to stay and organise resistance by the then Queen Wilhelmina, he became head of the Dutch Royal Military Mission based in London.

As “Wing Commander Gibbs” – an honorary rank he held in the RAF – the prince later flew Allied bombing raids over occupied Europe before returning in 1944 as a Dutch war hero.

© Telegraph Media Group Limited 2010

• Originally leaked in 2007 to BYU physicist Steven E. Jones by an individual associated with the Silverstein Group
• 210 pages
• July 1967 – February 1984

(74.3 MB zip file)

• 40 pages
• For Official Use Only
• February 2004

The purpose of this guide is to give Commanders, Leaders and Soldiers a training tool representing some of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) used in both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operation.

The intent of this guide is to support readiness, unit training, operational planning, and awareness as well as provide information in relation to Reacting to a Possible Improvised Explosive Device (IED) common task 093-401 -5050. Both training and awareness are a proven and effective force protection tool as well as a combat multiplier.

This guide is not all inclusive and should not be used as a sole source of information. Commanders and leaders must remain abreast of current intelligence, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and local command standing operating procedures (SOPs) available in particular areas of operation in relation to the Improvised Explosive Device threat.

This guide does not cover IED firing / fuzing systems (internal design) or Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tactics, techniques and procedures. This guide is derived from multiple unclassified source documentation and materials.

…

• Stanford University
• Umran S. Inan
• 57 pages
• January 2003

A three year research program is proposed to establish an array of wideband ELF/VLF receivers and to conduct continuous measurements of the magnetospheric response to the injection of ELF/VLF waves using the HAARP HF heater. The primary objective of the proposed program is to detect the so-called ‘one-hop’ direct and the ‘two-hop’ whistler-mode echo of a HAARP-injected ELF/VLF signal, and to study the characteristics of these signals to determine the degree to which injected ELF/VLF signals are amplified by the magnetospheric plasma, leading to the triggering of new emissions and enhanced precipitation of energetic electrons from the radiation belts. The scientific opportunities, background and justification for ELF/VLF wave-injection and magnetospheric probing experiments with HAARP are provided in Attachment A, which is a copy of a detailed report prepared earlier (April 2001) by Stanford for preliminary ELF/VLF wave-injection campaigns conducted under the auspices of the Polar Aeronomy and Radio Science (PARS) program.

…

…

Adam Gadahn is seen in these undated pictures released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Pakistani security agents have arrested an American al Qaeda spokesman wanted in the United States for treason in threatening violence unless al Qaeda demands are met, Pakistani officials said on March 7, 2010. News of the arrest of Gadahn, a California-born convert to Islam, came the day a video was released in which he called for Muslims in the United States to launch attacks to undermine the economy, according to a website monitoring al Qaeda announcements. REUTERS/FBI/Handout

Pakistanis arrest man, but whom? (Los Angeles Times):

U.S. officials cast doubt early Monday on Pakistani intelligence statements that Karachi officials had arrested a Southern California native, a top propagandist for Al Qaeda who is wanted by the U.S. on treason charges.

U.S. intelligence agencies spent Sunday sorting out conflicting reports on the purported arrest of Adam Gadahn of Riverside. By late Sunday night, U.S. officials said the picture remained unclear.

“In terms of who may have been arrested, the Pakistani rumor mill belched out three very different possibilities in about six hours,” one U.S. official said. “That should tell you something right there. It’s by no means clear who, if anyone, the Pakistanis may have captured.”

Another U.S. official, who asked not to be identified, said early Monday, “There’s no reason to believe that it’s true, and we are highly skeptical.”

The names that surfaced Sunday included Gadahn, Abu Yahya Al-Libi and Abu Yahya Mujahdeen Al-Adam, said to be an Al Qaeda affiliate born in Pennsylvania.

Pakistan Arrests American Al Qaeda Member, Identity Not Confirmed (ABC News):

A Taliban leader who goes by the name Abu Yahya, just like American-turned-al Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn, was picked up in Karachi in recent days, but that person is not Gadahn, a senior Pakistani government official told ABC News.

Reports of the capture of an American-born al-Qaeda member by Pakistani authorities gave rise to speculation over whether it was Gadahn, the 31-year-old California-born Muslim convert who has been wanted since 2004.

The official told ABC News the leader who was arrested was possibly Abu Yahya Mujahdeen al-Adam, said to be another American member of al Qaeda, but the Pakistanis have yet to make that identification positive, the official said.

Dawn, an English-language newspaper, reports that Abu Yahya Mujahdeen al-Adam is an Egyptian-born U.S. citizen from Pennsylvania who helps command foreign militants fighting in Afghanistan and coordinates activities from Dubai.

The newspaper reports he is a close aide of Osama bin Laden and one of the “main financiers” of al Qaeda, and that he was arrested with the help of U.S. intelligence, and has been transported to Islamabad for interrogation.

American-born al-Qaeda spokesman arrested in Pakistan (timesonline.co.uk):

An American-born al-Qaeda spokesman who is also the first US citizen to be charged with treason in more than half a century has been arrested by Pakistani security forces on the outskirts of Karachi.

Adam Gadahn, considered a key figure because of his success in recruiting English-speaking converts to jihad, was picked up on a tip-off indicating the extent of support by Pakistani intelligence in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taleban.

Gadahn was born in Oregon to parents of Jewish heritage and raised on a goat farm in southern California. He worshipped a form an obscure offshoot of heavy metal music known as “death metal” as a teenager and converted to radical Islam in his twenties. Now 31, he has been on the FBI’s mostwanted list since he started appearing in al-Qaeda propaganda videos as Abu Yahya Mujahideen Al-Adam in 2004.

Gadahn was arrested while being driven in a pick-up truck on Saturday night near where Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was detained last month, intelligence sources confirmed yesterday.

Suspect arrested in Pakistan not Gadahn: officials (Reuters):

Pakistani security agents denied on Monday that an American al Qaeda spokesman wanted in the United States for treason had been arrested, saying there had been confusion over the identity of a detained suspect.

Some Pakistani officials had said on Sunday that Adam Gadahn, a California-born convert to Islam with a $1 million U.S. bounty on his head, had been arrested on the outskirts of the city of Karachi.

But a senior government official and two security agents said on Monday the suspected al Qaeda operative picked up in Karachi was not Gadahn.

“Our initial impression was that the guy was Adam Gadahn but that information now looks incorrect,” said one security official, who declined to be identified. The arrested man was believed to be an American who goes by the alias Abu Yahya, the officials said. Gadahn is known to have used a similar alias.

“Probably the name and his origin caused the confusion,” the first official said.

He declined to speculate about the identity of the arrested man except to say he was apparently an American al Qaeda operative.

“We don’t know yet how big a catch he is,” he said.

Pakistan is battling indigenous, al Qaeda-linked Taliban militants and has resisted U.S. pressure to launch military offensives against Afghan Taliban factions based in rugged ethnic Pashtun lands on its northwestern border.

Doubts Over Arrest Of American-Born Al-Qaida (AP):

There’s growing confusion over whether an American-born spokesman for al-Qaida has been arrested by Pakistani intelligence officers.

Two officers and a government official say Adam Gadahn was recently captured in Karachi. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release the information.

U.S. defense, intelligence and law enforcement officials could not immediately verify the reported detention of Gadahn, who has appeared on videos threatening the West, including one that emerged earlier today.

Some observers are cautious about giving credence to the claim that Gadahn is in custody as reports emerged that the man arrested might instead be a Taliban militant leader.

• v.3
• October 9, 2006

GOLDEN RULES

There are general principles to follow when responding to any crime scene in which computers and electronic technology may be involved. Several of those principles are as follows:

Officer safety – secure the scene and make it safe.

If you reasonably believe that the computer is involved in the crime you are investigating, take immediate steps to preserve the evidence.

Do you have a legal basis to seize this computer (plain view, search warrant, consent, etc.)?

Do not access any computer files. If the computer is off, leave it off.
If it is on, do not start searching through the computer.

If the computer is on, go to the appropriate sections in this guide on
how to properly shut down the computer and prepare it for
transportation as evidence.

If you reasonably believe that the computer is destroying evidence,
immediately shut down the computer by pulling the power cord from
the back of the computer.

If a camera is available, and the computer is on, take pictures of the
computer screen. If the computer is off, take pictures of the
computer, the location of the computer and any electronic media
attached.

Do special legal considerations apply (doctor, attorney, clergy,
psychiatrist, newspapers, publishers, etc)?

…

AUTHORITY FOR SEIZING EVIDENCE

This guide assumes that the patrol patrol officer, detective or investigator is
legally present at a crime scene or other location and has the legal authority to
seize the computer, hardware, software or electronic media.

If you have a reason to believe that you are not legally present at the location or
the individual (suspect or victim) does not have the legal ability to grant consent
then immediately contact the appropriate legal counsel in your jurisdiction.

PLAIN VIEW

The plain view exception to the warrant requirement only gives the legal authority
to SEIZE a computer, hardware, software and electronic media, but does NOT
give the legal authority to conduct a SEARCH of this same listed electronic
media.

CONSENT

When obtaining consent, be certain that your document has language specific to
both the seizure and the future forensic examination of the computer hardware,
software, electronic media and data by a trained computer forensic examiner or
analyst.

If your department or agency has a consent form relevant to computer or
electronic media and its analysis by a computer forensic examiner, it should be
used. If you do not have a form and are drafting a consent form, consult with
your District Attorney, State Prosecutor or Assistant United States Attorney for
advice regarding proper language and documentation.

SEARCH WARRANT

Search warrants allow for the search and seizure of electronic evidence as
predefined under the warrant. This method is the most preferred and is
consistently met with the least resistance both at the scene and in a court of law.
Search warrants for electronic storage devices typically focus on two primary
sources of information:

Electronic Storage Device Search Warrant

• Search and seizure of hardware, software, documentation, user notes and
storage media.

…

Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC):

Victim Questions:
• Has the victim been on-line in any chat rooms?
• Does the victim use the internet, e-mail or chat from any other computers? If so,
at what locations?
• Did the victim provide any information to anyone on line regarding their true
name, age and location?
• What is the victim’s e-mail address or on-line chat room name?
• Who is on the victim’s “buddy list” in chat rooms?
• Does the victim save / archive chat room logs?
• What type of chat / e-mail client does the victim use?
• What were the specific sexual acts observed in the images or the electronic
communications?
• Has the victim received any pictures or gifts from the suspect?
Suspect / Target Questions:
• Where are all of the suspect’s computers?
• Does the suspect remotely store data (external hard drive, on-line storage, etc)?
• What is the suspect’s on-line identity or chat room name?
• Has the suspect electronically communicated with any person?
• How does the suspect communicate with other persons? (chat, e-mails, etc.)
• Has the suspect viewed any child pornography using the computer? If so, how
did the suspect obtain the child pornography?
• Did the suspect send child pornography to any other person in the suspect’s state
or in another state?
• Did the suspect realize that they were viewing images of children as opposed to
computer generated images of children?

Intrusions / Hacking: (Network Questions)

Home Networks
• Can you physically trace all of the network cables back to their respective
computers?
• Can each computer be associated to an individual user?
• Is the network connected to the internet?
• How is the network connected to the internet (DSL, Cable, Dial-up, etc)?
• Where is the DSL / cable modem located? Is it currently connected?
• Who is the internet service provider (ISP)?
• Is there more than one computer that can connect to the internet?
• Is there any wireless networking in place?

INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

Business Networks
• Who first observed the illegal activity?
• Obtain the type of illegal activity and contact information for all witnesses.
• Identify the network administrator and obtain contact information. (The network
administrator should not be contacted by the first responder.)
• Are any employees / former employees considered to be a suspect?
• Is there a printed diagram of the network available?
• Are computer logs being maintained?
• Can the computer logs be immediately secured for further investigation?
• Have any other law enforcement agencies been contacted?

Crimes Involving E-Mails

Victim Questions:
• Identify victim e-mail addresses and internet service provider (ISP) information.
• Identify all usernames and e-mail accounts used by the victim.
• Obtain any printed copies of e-mails that the victim has received. Do not turn on
the computer to print e-mails.

Suspect / Target Questions:
• Identify suspect e-mail addresses and internet service provider (ISP) information.
• Identify all usernames and e-mail accounts used by the suspect.
• Obtain all passwords and associated software / usernames used by the suspect.
Instant Messaging / Internet Relay Chat (IRC) Crimes

Victim Questions:
• Ask if the victim had logging or archiving activated during chat sessions.
• Identify the victim’s online screen name and e-mail addresses.
• Obtain copies of any material the victim has already printed.
• What type of software / chat client is used by the victim?

Suspect/Target Questions:
• Identify the suspect’s online screen name and e-mail addresses.
• Obtain all passwords and associated software / usernames used by the suspect.

UPDATE: Continuing Series of White Powder Letters in New Jersey

• New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center
• 2 pages
• For Official Use Only
• March 3, 2010

Hospital Suspicious White Powder Incidents

• Boston Regional Intelligence Center
• 1 page
• Law Enforcement Sensitive
• For Official Use Only
• April 8, 2009

Responding to a “White Powder” incident

• Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center
• 3 pages
• Law Enforcement Sensitive
• For Official Use Only
• December 9, 2008
  

Hoax Letters Target Financial Institutions

• Washington D.C. FireWatch
• 1 page
• For Official Use Only
• October 24, 2008

]]> http://publicintelligence.net/fusion-centers-warn-of-white-powder-letter-incidents-2008-2010/feed/ 0 http://publicintelligence.net/eu-chile-earthquake-preliminary-damage-assessment-maps/ http://publicintelligence.net/eu-chile-earthquake-preliminary-damage-assessment-maps/#comments Sun, 07 Mar 2010 01:58:13 +0000 admin1 http://publicintelligence.net/?p=9448 G-MOSAIC

TALCAHUANO, Chile. Preliminary Damage Assessment 1 page For Official Use Only March 3, 2010

CONCEPCION, Chile. Preliminary Damage Assessment 1 page For Official Use Only March 3, 2010

• 6 pages
• For Official Use Only
• May 24, 2004

This document will serve as the first State Homeland Security Strategy (SHSS) for New Hampshire. The purpose of this strategy is to identify a strategic direction for enhancing statewide capability and capacity to prevent and reduce the vulnerability of New Hampshire from weapons of mass destruction (WMD)/terrorism incidents. This is an exceedingly complex mission that requires coordination, cooperation and focused effort from the entire state-citizens, local, state, and federal government, as well as the private and non-profit sectors.

This strategy was developed based upon the results of the New Hampshire assessment completed by eleven (11) designated jurisdictions in December 2003. The assessment included a comprehensive risk, capabilities, and needs assessments. The results of the assessment provided an insight into the requirements of the state.

The State of New Hampshire will apply the resources available from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) to address unique planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs to assist in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, respond to and recover from threats or acts of terrorism.

The State of New Hampshire will provide the citizens of New Hampshire with a properly equipped,
trained and exercised emergency response force capable of responding, detecting, mitigating and
recovering from the state’s most probable weapons of mass destruction/terrorist event.
1. Use “all-hazards” approach.

2. Build and maintain an emphasis on incident command and unified command structure.

3. Focus resources to allow local jurisdictions to protect responders and save lives until additional
mutual aid, state, regional or federal aid arrives.

4. Enhance capabilities through planning, training, and exercises that includes all disciplines.

5. Enhance and build a fully interoperable, multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional communications
network encompassing all New Hampshire first responders.

The focus of this strategy is based on FY03 Homeland Security Funding that is allocated to the State
of New Hampshire through March 31, 2005. The State believes that it should focus on the funds
available to us currently and therefore our goals reflect a 2005 deadline. We feel this is an attainable
date for both short and long-term with the goals that we have developed.
When the New Hampshire assessment and strategy effort was initiated, the Governor designated the
Commissioner of the Department of Safety as the State Administrative Agent(SAA)for the State
Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program. The SAA formed several committees at
various levels that includes representatives from all disciplines. The committees were responsible for
making recommendations regarding the strategy preparation phase for program goals, objectives,
and implementation plans. Once those suggestions for completion were made they were presented to
the SAA for review and final approval.

• Office of Homeland Security
• 108 pages
• State Homeland Security Sensitive
• For Official Use Only
• January 6, 2008

This State Homeland Security Strategy (Strategy) was developed to provide overarching guidance to the State’s Homeland Security programs and initiatives, to include guidance in support of the homeland security governance provided through the Governor’s Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) and nine Regional Homeland Security Oversight  Committees (RHSOC). This Strategy will help prepare our State for the work ahead in several ways. It provides direction to state government agencies, departments, and offices on activities Missouri plans to undertake in order to sustain existing capabilities in four U.S. Department of Homeland Security mission areas (prevention, protection, response, and recovery) and enhance the emergency preparedness posture statewide between 2009 and 2011. Missouri’s Department
of Public Safety (DPS), specifically the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), will use the Strategy as a mechanism to track progress in implementing and completing security-related projects.

As other priorities at the local, state, and national level emerge that will compete for funding and resources, the strategy will server as a “road map” to help state and local officials establish priorities at all levels and find the proper balance between the competing priorities. The Strategy will also be released to Missouri’s Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) areas of Kansas City and St. Louis, to continue synchronizing activities inclusive of the whole state. The Strategy will be adjusted and amended over time. We must be prepared to adapt to the ever changing threat spectrum, economic climate, and political agendas, yet ensure consistency in our strategy, so that Missouri citizens are well served by their homeland security program.

Starting in 2006, Missouri adopted an all-hazard, capability-based approach to homeland security planning to: 1) better assess preparedness; 2) enhance development of preparedness strategies; 3) prioritize use of limited resources; and 4) otherwise guide and measurably improve preparedness planning. The State has adopted an annual, capability-based planning cycle that fosters continuous improvement. This cycle will help with coordination and collaboration efforts to streamline emergency preparedness activities across all levels of government and geographic areas, and to develop a consistent and systematic approach to investing resources. Current improvements have resulted from enhanced training programs, identification of technology development priorities, and performance evaluations during exercises and real incidents. This Strategy—based on the 37 Target Capabilities identified by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—promises to extend improvements.

While aligned with the DHS Strategic Plan, this Strategy recognizes Missouri’s expanded all-hazard viewof homeland security. The Strategy recognizes that homeland security embraces more than just the threat to our security from terrorist attack. It also recognizes that while government cannot possibly deter or prevent most natural occurring disasters and diseases, and much traditional criminal activity, an aggressive and unified preparedness program allied with vigilance of state, county, and local governments can address the broader threat spectrum Missouri encounters. To achieve its mission, the State of Missouri, through a comprehensive state-wide emergency program, will effectively prepare for, prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from all hazards—including threats identified in the National Planning Scenarios. The State will plan, organize, train, equip, and exercise its resources in a focused effort to sustain its existing capacity, and build additional capabilities required to meet National Preparedness Guidelines and ultimately protect lives and property of Missouri citizens.

…

• 22 pages
• For Official Use Only
• February 3, 2006

A. Purpose:

The purpose of the Nebraska State Homeland Security Strategy (NSHSS) is to identify a strategic direction for enhancing the State of Nebraska?s capability and capacity to detect, prevent against, protect against, respond to, and recover from threats or incidents of terrorism, natural disasters, major emergencies, and incidents of national significance. This is an exceedingly complex mission that requires coordination, cooperation and focused effort from the entire State’s citizens, local, tribal, state, and
federal government, as well as the private and non-profit sectors.

This strategy incorporates the vision of The National Preparedness Goal and will enhance the introduction of several of the building blocks in support of the establishment of a  State Preparedness System. The State Preparedness System can best be achieved through the application of a systems-based approach, utilizing capabilities based planning as a common, all-hazard, major events planning process. This will
provide a mechanism for measuring preparedness and identifying future preparedness investments. The
State Preparedness System is a system of systems. As stated in the National Preparedness Goal, ?a
system is a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications integrated
into a common organizational structure to achieve a mission or outcome.? Many processes, programs,
and capabilities already in place within State, local, tribal, and private sector homeland security programs
and across disciplines will support the National Preparedness Goal. The State Preparedness System
provides a way to enhance these existing resources by networking them together more effectively
through the utilization of the National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List (UTL), Target Capabilities
List (TCL), and the seven National Priorities. The strategy will also build on the regionalization of
equipment and resources and the interoperability of communication projects supported by previous
Homeland Security Grants. These projects were identified as a result of the Nebraska assessment
completed by local county jurisdictions in November 2003. The assessment included a comprehensive risk,
capabilities, and needs assessment. The results of the assessment provided an insight into the
requirements of the State.

The State of Nebraska will apply the resources available from the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) through the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), and The Center for Disease Control (CDC) to address unique planning, equipment, training, and
exercising needs to assist in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent against, protect
against, respond to, and recover from threats or incidents of terrorism, natural disasters, and major
emergencies.

B. Describe the state vision for the strategy

The State of Nebraska will reduce the vulnerability of people and communities of the state to damage,
injury, and loss of life and property resulting from terrorism, natural disasters, and major emergencies,
authorize and provide for cooperation and coordination of activities relating to mitigation of, protection
of, prevention of, preparedness for and response to terrorism, natural disasters, and major emergencies
by agencies and officers of this state and its political subdivisions and similar state, local, tribal, interstate,
federal-state and foreign activities in which the state and its political subdivisions may participate; and
assist in mitigation and prevention of terrorism, natural disasters, and major emergencies.

…

G. Regionalization and Mutual Aid

The Nebraska Emergency Management Act of 1996 states, ?It shall be a sufficient reason for the
Governor to require an interjurisdictional emergency management agreement or arrangement pursuant to
section 81-829.47 of the Nebraska Emergency Management Act if the area and local governments
involved have available equipment, supplies, and forces necessary to provide mutual aid on a regional
basis?. A key aspect of Nebraska’s strategy since 1999 has been to develop State Memorandums of
Understanding (MOU) Emergency Response Teams in selected jurisdictions with HazMat capabilities to
become a state resource for HazMat/WMD response. There are 11 MOU jurisdictions geographically
located across the State in addition to 1 Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) consisting of 3 counties
surrounding the core City of Omaha. These jurisdictions and the UASI have been identified as priority
jurisdictions for past and future Homeland Security Grants with an emphasis on regional HazMat/WMD
response capability.

In addition to the HazMat/WMD MOU jurisdictions, we have also identified 13 interoperable
communications regions for the entire State. These regions were developed in cooperation with the
Nebraska Division of Communications. Common use frequencies based on current mutual aid agreements,
geographical distribution of the communities with common threats and capabilities and the ability to
leverage existing financial resources were the criteria for this regionalization. Prior to receiving Homeland
Security Grant funding each communication region had to develop a communications plan for approval by
the Nebraska Division of Communications. The State of Nebraska plans to utilize the 13 interoperable
communication regions or areas of common interest to implement the National Preparedness Goal and
State Preparedness System on a regional basis.

Interstate response activities at the local level are accomplished by response organization, city and village
governments, and county governments maintaining active mutual aid agreements that cross state
boundaries and the state to state assistance is accomplished through the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC).

Fusion Center

In support of the National Priority, emphasizing terrorism information sharing, the Nebraska State Patrol
(NSP) supported by the SAA has been very successful in its previous Homeland Security initiatives by
identifying, combining and/or enhancing existing resources. Creating a second information gathering and
dissemination point is not the best use of the tax payers dollars and would add an unnecessary, redundant layer in the information sharing arena that is in operation today.

The following resources are currently available and used for information fusion between and among state,
local, federal, and interstate partners in law enforcement and terrorism prevention.

The Nebraska Law Enforcement Information Network System (NeLEIS) is an automated information
gathering / research / dissemination tool developed by the NSP and the Nebraska Crime Commission in
1997. The original concept was designed for the submission and dissemination of information directly
related to narcotics distribution. The original concept of this information sharing system has been
expanded over the years to include all criminal information and potential terrorist activities. This system
also taps information sources from the following agencies Lincoln Police Department (LPD), Omaha Police
Department (OPD), Norfolk Police Department, Grand Island Police Department, NSP, and the federal
agencies DEA, Midwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (MHIDTA) and the FBI. The system also
accesses the Nebraska NCJIS data source. This system offers secure e-mail and secure instant messaging
for authorized users. The NeLEIS was designed with an automated deconfliction component built into it.
This insures that when a user accesses information the submitter of that information is notified. This
facilitates communication between the two agencies.

The Nebraska Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (NeLEIN) is a communications network that specially
trained local and state law enforcement officers use to gather, submit, and share information related to
criminal activity across the state. NeLEIN is a primary network used by the NSP as well as several local,
county, state and Federal law enforcement agencies and are members of the MHIDTA.

The Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) is a nation wide intelligence gathering and dissemination
system developed in the mid 80’s to facilitate the exchange of criminal intelligence information across the
United States. Nebraska is an active member of the RISS net through participation in our regional
clearing house, the Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center (MOCIC). During 1999, RISS
began expansion of RISSNET to electronically connect state and federal law enforcement agency systems
as nodes to provide additional resources to all users. As of May 2005, 17 High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Areas, 18 state agencies, and 12 other federal and regional systems have an established node connection
to RISSNET.

In September 2002, the FBI Law Enforcement On-line (LEO) system interconnected with RISS. In
October 2003, the RISS/LEO interconnection was recommended in the National Criminal Intelligence
Sharing Plan as the initial sensitive but unclassified communications backbone for implementation of a
nationwide criminal intelligence sharing capability. The Plan encourages agencies to connect their system to
RISS/LEO.

In April 2003, RISS expanded its services and implemented the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange,
now called the Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX), to provide additional users with access
to homeland security, disaster, and terrorist-threat information. RISS member agencies as well as
executives and officials from other first-responder agencies and critical infrastructure entities can access
ATIX.

Gary Jones, General Manager of British Petroleum (BP) in Iraq, right, talks to Salah Abdulkarim, an employee of the Iraqi South State Oil Company, left, at the Rumaila oil field in Basra, Iraq, Tuesday, March 2, 2010. Backed by armed bodyguards, international oil executives have flocked to this southern Iraqi city to survey their potentially lucrative prizes: the fields that they hope will one day be pumping out dramatically greater amounts of cheap, plentiful crude. (AP Photo/Nabil al-Jurani)

Iraq Opens Up to Foreign Oil Majors (Bloomberg):

BP Plc and Exxon Mobil Corp. took the best deal they could get in Iraq last year when they won the largest oil contracts since addam Hussein was toppled in 2003. Oil companies may wait a long time to get a better one.

Parliamentary elections may produce a weak or unstable government incapable of tendering new oil contracts, said Samuel Ciszuk, a London-based analyst at IHS Global Insight. He said he does expect the 10 technical-services contracts won by Exxon, BP and 20 other companies to be honored.

“One thing that’s fairly certain is there won’t be a strong coalition, so it may take time for the next government to get its act together,” Ciszuk said in a telephone interview.

“Bottlenecks could hold up production increases” if no government forms by June.

Western producers haven’t had access to oil fields in southern Iraq since 1972, when the country nationalized production including concessions owned by the companies now known as BP, Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Exxon.

The contracts awarded in two auctions, which pay a per-barrel fee for development work rather than granting a share in the production itself, will cost the companies a total of about $100 billion to develop deposits, Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani said in December. Iraq, with the world’s third-largest oil reserves, will earn about $200 billion a year.

Iraq’s oil deals dominate PM election campaign (AP):

Backed by armed bodyguards, international oil executives have flocked to this southern Iraqi city to survey their potentially lucrative prizes: the fields that they hope will one day be pumping out dramatically greater amounts of cheap, plentiful crude.

For their companies, the fields that they won the rights to develop in two biddings rounds last year are their first foray into Iraq’s oil sector in over three decades.

For Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the executives and their investments are a vital part of his bid to win a second term in March 7 elections. Al-Maliki has billed himself to voters as the leader that can ensure the development of Iraq’s dilapidated oil sector and bring in billions of dollars to rebuild the country’s struggling economy.

Al-Maliki’s promises could take years to fulfill and many experts see his predictions for increasing oil output as wildly optimistic. But what matters for the premier is persuading voters to keep him in his post to shepherd the process.

“Al-Maliki can present himself as a guarantor to these plans … whether they are going to meet their huge targets or not,” Mideast oil analyst Samuel Ciszuk of the London-based IHS Global Insight said.

Iraq sits atop 115 billion barrels of crude, the world’s third largest proven reserves of conventional crude oil. But current production of about 2.4 million barrels per day remains well below levels before the 2003 U.S.-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein.

Iraqi Candidates Challenge Oil Deals (Wall Street Journal):

Iraq’s parliamentary elections could result in new legal challenges to government oil deals with foreign oil investors, hindering long-stalled efforts to develop the country’s prized fields.

In recent months, Iraq’s oil ministry has auctioned and approved large-scale development contracts with companies from China, the U.K., U.S. and elsewhere. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s oil minister crafted those deals after a petroleum law stalled in parliament— saying the government didn’t need parliamentary approval, and causing some lawmakers to cry foul.

If Mr. Maliki’s slate of candidates performs well, the prime minister would be in position to lead Iraq’s next government and the deals would likely be preserved.

Other candidates, including Ayad Allawi, who has emerged as a top challenger to Mr. Maliki, have raised the contracts as an election issue and called for them to be scrapped or reviewed.

“We aim to review all signed contracts in accordance with valid laws,” Mr. Allawi, the leader of a popular, cross-sectarian bloc, said in a statement Friday.

The deals are still relatively new, with very little field work completed so far. Any effort to reopen the oil contracts by a new government would likely slow or halt investment, say company officials and analysts.

Work “is not going to move forward with any urgency whatsoever if the government wants to renegotiate,” says Jason Gammel, an energy analyst with Macquarie Research.

Mr. Maliki’s government hailed the deals as crucial to boosting oil exports, which generate most of the country’s revenue. Big oil companies viewed the deals as footholds into some of the world’s largest fields, long closed to foreign investment and under-explored.

Iraq oil sales up but plans ‘unrealistic’ (UPI):

Iraq’s oil exports last month were listed as the highest since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. That may enhance Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s election prospects but industry analysts say his plans to quadruple oil production in the next few years is way beyond Iraq’s capabilities.

“Oil exports for February reached 2.069 million barrels (per day) and this is the highest level since 1990,” Oil Ministry spokesman Assem Jihad said Tuesday.

“This is a step toward the ministry’s goal of exporting 2.15 million barrels per day this year.”

In some quarters, the ministry’s claim was taken with a pinch of salt amid suspicions it was a last-minute ploy to boost the chances of Maliki’s Iraq National Alliance in parliamentary elections scheduled for Sunday.

The ministry has in recent months signed 20-year contracts with foreign oil companies to take over 10 of the country’s major oil fields with the task of boosting production as soon as possible.

Maliki’s government has said it aims to push production, currently averaging 2.4 million bpd, to 10 million-12 million bpd in the next seven years.

Cnooc Near Deal to Develop Iraq Oil (Wall Street Journal):

A consortium led by Cnooc Ltd., the Hong Kong-listed unit of China National Offshore Oil Corp., is the front-runner to win the right to develop Iraq’s 2.5 billion-barrel Missan oil-field complex after agreeing to Iraqi government proposals, officials said Thursday.

The Iraqi Oil Ministry has concluded talks with Cnooc and its partner, Sinochem International Corp., relating to the development of the three Missan fields in southern Iraq and has submitted a draft contract to the cabinet for final approval, said one official familiar with the talks.

Cnooc officials couldn’t be reached for comment.

An agreement would further cement China’s strong role in developing Iraq’s oil fields. Cnooc’s rival, China National Petroleum Corp., has been the dominant player there, finalizing an agreement in November as part of a consortium including BP PLC to develop southern Iraq’s giant Rumaila oil field and clinching a $3 billion deal in 2008 for the Ahdeb field in Wasit province in southeastern Iraq.

China’s state-owned oil companies have been heavily investing overseas in recent years, albeit with mixed success, in an effort to ensure adequate supplies of fuel for the country’s booming economy.

If the Cnooc-led group wins the right to develop the fields, they would have to pay a recoverable signature bonus of $300 million, according to the Iraq oil ministry’s tender protocol.

The Cnooc-Sinochem alliance made an unsuccessful bid for the complex in the country’s first licensing auction in June. The two Chinese state-run companies initially offered to receive a remuneration fee of $21.40 for each extra barrel of oil produced and suggested raising production from the Fakka, Buzurgan and Abu Ghirab fields to 450,000 barrels a day.

• 2 pages
• January 31, 2007

eBay, Inc., has established a Fraud Investigations Team (FIT) to promote safe use of our platforms and encourage prosecution of those responsible for misconduct on them. Law enforcement agencies in North America seeking assistance and records for investigations that relate to either the eBay or PayPal should use the Frequently Asked Questions below as guidance in how FIT can assist in these investigations.

Q. What investigative tools are available on the public ebay.com site?

• Search by seller ID for 30 days of active/completed sales: http://pages.ebay.com/search/items/search_seller.html
• Search for active listings using search string or specific item number. Ability to search b2 pagesy nearest zip code using search options on left hand column: http://pages.ebay.com/search/items/basicsearch.html
• Feedback Profile reflects comments made by other users regarding prior transactions
• Create your own Favorite Searches: http://pages.ebay.com/help/find/search_favorites.html
• Create your own department/agency eBay account at eBay.com. http://pages.ebay.com/help/newtoebay/durreg_ov.html

Please do not bid or purchase unless you plan to follow through and pay for the item

Q. Can eBay help me search for a Stolen Item?

A. eBay now makes listing and member information immediately available to law enforcement via Leadsonline’s First

Responder Service. See Section A on the next page for more details.
Please note eBay/PayPal FIT is unable to perform any specialized internal searches for items – only users.

Q. How can I acquire BOTH eBay and PayPal records for the same case?

A. You may send in a single subpoena, court order, legal process for this information. This Subpoena must be addressed to eBay AND PayPal and must include all suspect data referenced in Sections C and D on Page Two of this doc.

Q. What information must I submit to acquire records?

A. In most cases, we require a minimum of name, email address and User Name (for eBay investigations) to locate the correct account. Please provide as much information on your subject as possible to assist us in searching for records of over 200 million users. Please reference Page Two of this document for specific guidance on releasing data.

– In addition, we require you provide your full contact details including name, e-mail address, agency, phone/fax numbers and physical address (no P.O. Boxes). For faster delivery of your records, please include your email address.

Q. Where do I send my formal data request?

A. Please address your data request to eBay/PayPal Fraud Investigations Team and send via Fax: 408.967.9915. Please only mail data requests if you do NOT have access to a fax machine: 2211 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95131.

Q. How and when will the data be returned?

A. eBay and PayPal provide all records electronically, via secure website or via CD Rom via Fed Ex Ground (For faster service please provide agency Fed Ex account number and specify delivery timeframe). Please be sure to provide your email address in your data inquiry. Please reference Page Two for turnaround time estimates.

Q. Does eBay/PayPal supply all accounts linked/related to my subject?

A. Please inform us in your data request if linked/ related accounts are required. Due to our privacy agreement with our users, we must use strict standards when making this determination. Our common linkage criteria includes financial instruments and identical registration data.

Q. How long do eBay and PayPal retain records?

A. eBay keeps most account records indefinitely and most transaction records for two years. Records may not be available for Inactive or closed accounts. PayPal currently keeps all records indefinitely

Q. Does eBay/PayPal inform the subject of my investigation of my query?

A. eBay/PayPal does not disclose inquiries to the account holder

Q. How can I follow up on a query already submitted?

A. If you do not have the FIT Analyst/Investigator’s direct line or email, please leave a message on our help line
(408.967.9919) and somebody will return your call within 24 hours.

…

B. eBay User Contact Details and limited transaction history (12 months maximum)

Please submit a signed fax (non-subpoena) on department letterhead stating specifically what you require. eBay can provide the following information for users under investigation of illegal activity only:
• Contact Name, City, State, Zip, and Telephone Number
• All email addresses and eBay User ID’s added to account with date/time stamps
• eBay Fraud complaints (*If Requested)
• Account listing/bid history dating back one year (*If Requested)
To assist us in searching for records, the following data must be included in your data request (if available):
- All known names, aliases, street addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers
- Known eBay ID(s) and Item Numbers
- Statement relating to the illegal nature of the activities being investigated
Please fax data request to: Fax: 408.967.9915 Turnaround Time: Typically within 15 business days

C. All Records relating to an eBay user
Please submit a subpoena, court order, or other legal process stating specifically what you require. We can provide:

• Full eBay Contact Details, including the billing and mailing address
• eBay IP addresses: time of registration and at time of item listing
• Complete Listing and/or bid history – 2 yr max (including bidder information if specifically requested)
• Credit card and checking account information added to eBay account (if available)

To assist us in searching for records, the following data must be included in your data request (if available):
- Full name of the subject, and any known aliases
- All known addresses, including email addresses, and phone numbers
- Known eBay ID(s) and Item Numbers

**If you require the related PayPal records, please address your Subpoena to EBAY AND PAYPAL and include all available PayPal details outlined in Section D below.
Please fax data request to: Fax: 408.967.9915 Turnaround Time: Typically within 10 business days

D. All Records relating to a PayPal user — Please note all PayPal records require a subpoena.

Please submit a subpoena, court order, or other legal process stating specifically what you require. We can provide:
• All PayPal account information including, SSN*, names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses
• PayPal IP addresses (at each login)
• Financial instruments added to PayPal account
• Complete PayPal transactional information (including complaints if requested and available)
To assist us in searching for records, the following data must be included in your data request (if available):
- Full name of the subject, and any known aliases, and known email addresses
- All known financial instruments and any transaction details linked to the relevant PayPal activity
**If you require the related eBay records, please address your Subpoena to EBAY AND PAYPAL and include all
available eBay details outlined in Section C above. * If applicable

Please fax data request to: Fax: 408.967.9915 Turnaround Time: Typically within 10 business days

• 8 pages
• September 2, 2005

Mailing Address:
Custodian of Records
MySpace.com
1333 2nd Street, First Floor
Santa Monica, CA 90401

Email Address:
lawenforcement@MySpace.com

Telephone Numbers:
Phone: 310.917.4949 x8
Fax: 310.394.4180

…

Available Information

Most profile information is publicly viewable and available. Publicly available information includes journal entries (in most cases), images, user comments, and public profile information.

In order to make an electronic copy of the profile, save the webpage(s) and files on your own computer. Do this before it gets modified or deleted. While viewing the profile in question, click your browser’s File (in the upper left-hand corner) then click ‘Save As’. Make sure to do the same for all journal entries and the image gallery.

To request the following information from MySpace.com, we require a subpoena:
-IP logs (recorded at time of login)
-Dates and times of login (PST)
-Email address
-Zip code
-Name
-Private Messages

Please note that all information above is not necessarily accurate. Users do not need to
confirm their email address, nor provide verified information. Users may also fake IP
addresses if they use a proxy.

Please note that we do not have street address or credit card information. MySpace.com is
a free site and does not require credit card use at any time.

MySpace may disclose private information to law enforcement without a subpoena in
limited, emergency situations in which the safety of a MySpace user or member of the
public is at risk and there is insufficient time for the law enforcement agency to obtain a
subpoena. In these circumstances, MySpace will require the delivery of a signed statement
on law enforcement letterhead certifying the existence of an emergency and supplying all
the information that would be required in a subpoena.

…

Length of time MySpace.com retains records

Active Accounts
Data/Images on an active account
MySpace.com does not retain information that is altered/removed on an active profile.
Once a change is made, existing information is overwritten.
IP Logs
IP Logs are available for up to ninety days after a user’s last login.
Private Messages in an active account
User’s Inbox – Retained until user removes them. We cannot recover that message unless
it is in another user’s Sent Mail.
Sent Mail – Retained for 14 days.
Trash Mail – Retained 30 days or less. Users can empty their trash at any time.

Deleted Accounts
No mail is available for deleted accounts.
User ID, IP Address, Login date stamps are retained for up to 90 days after account
deletion.
Profile information is available for up to ten days after account deletion.
Preserving an account
A letter of preservation can be faxed to MySpace.com. Please note the following regarding
preserved accounts:
-They are still publicly viewable
-The user will not be able to log into the account
-We can only preserve a currently active (non-deleted) account
-Information in the Sent Mail/Trash can is still subject to automatic deletion.
If restricting the user’s access to the profile will impede an investigation, you can request
that private messages be output to flat file for preservation before a subpoena is served.

• RL32544
• Clay Wilson, Specialist in Technology and National Security,
  Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
• 19 pages
• March 26, 2008

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is an instantaneous, intense energy field that can overload or disrupt at a distance numerous electrical systems and high technology microcircuits, which are especially sensitive to power surges. A large scale EMP effect can be produced by a single nuclear explosion detonated high in the atmosphere. This method is referred to as High-Altitude EMP (HEMP). A similar, smaller-scale EMP effect can be created using non-nuclear devices with powerful batteries or reactive chemicals. This method is called High Power Microwave
(HPM). Several nations, including reported sponsors of terrorism, may currently have a capability to use EMP as a weapon for cyber warfare or cyber terrorism to disrupt communications and other parts of the U.S. critical infrastructure. Also, some equipment and weapons used by the U.S. military may be vulnerable to the effects of EMP.

The threat of an EMP attack against the United States is hard to assess, but some
observers indicate that it is growing along with worldwide access to newer
technologies and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the past, the threat of
mutually assured destruction provided a lasting deterrent against the exchange of
multiple high-yield nuclear warheads. However, now even a single, speciallydesigned
low-yield nuclear explosion high above the United States, or over a
battlefield, can produce a large-scale EMP effect that could result in a widespread
loss of electronics, but no direct fatalities, and may not necessarily evoke a large
nuclear retaliatory strike by the U.S. military. This, coupled with the possible
vulnerability of U.S. commercial electronics and U.S. military battlefield equipment
to the effects of EMP, may create a new incentive for other countries to develop or
acquire a nuclear capability.

Policy issues raised by this threat include (1) what is the United States doing to
protect civilian critical infrastructure systems against the threat of EMP, (2) how does
the vulnerability of U.S. civilian and military electronics to EMP attack encourage
other nations to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and (3) how likely are terrorist
organizations to launch a smaller-scale EMP attack against the United States?

…

Electromagnetic Pulse and Power

Electromagnetic energy, characterized as weapon potentially threatening to
national security, can be created as a pulse traditionally by two methods: overhead
nuclear burst and microwave emission. High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
(HEMP) is an instantaneous electromagnetic energy field produced in the atmosphere
by the power and radiation of a nuclear explosion, and that is damaging to electronic
equipment over a very wide area, depending on the design of the nuclear device and
altitude of the burst. High-Power Microwave (HPM) electromagnetic energy can be produced as an instantaneous pulse created through special electrical equipment that transforms battery power, or powerful chemical reaction or explosion, into intense
microwaves that are very damaging to electronics within a much smaller area.
In addition, while HEMP weapons are large in scale and require a nuclear
capability along with technology to launch high altitude missiles, HPM weapons are
smaller in scale, and can sometimes involve a much lower level of technology, which
may be within the capability of some extremist groups or non-state organizations.
HPM can cause damage to computers similar to HEMP, although the effects are
limited to a much smaller area. The technical accessibility, lower cost, and the
apparent vulnerability of U.S. civilian electronic equipment could make small-scale
HPM weapons attractive for terrorist groups in the future.
Description of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse

HEMP is produced when a nuclear weapon is detonated high above the Earth’s
surface, creating gamma-radiation that interacts with the atmosphere to create an
instantaneous intense electromagnetic energy field that is harmless to people as it
radiates outward, but which can overload computer circuitry with effects similar to,
but causing damage much more swiftly than a lightning strike.13 The effects of
HEMP became fully known to the United States in 1962 during a high-altitude
nuclear test (code named “Starfish Prime”) over the Pacific Ocean, when radio
stations and electronic equipment were disrupted 800 miles away through parts of
Hawaii. The HEMP effect can span thousands of miles, depending on the altitude
and the design and power of the nuclear burst (a single device detonated at an
appropriate altitude over Kansas reportedly could affect all of the continental United
States)14, and can be picked up by metallic conductors such as wires or power cables,
acting as antennas to conduct the energy shockwave into the electronic systems of
cars, airplanes, and communications equipment.

• Nikolai G. Lehtinen and Umran S. Inan
• STAR Lab, Stanford University
• January 7, 2006

• 30 pages
• For Official Use Only
• January 17, 2006

The purpose of this strategy is to identify a strategic direction for enhancing our State, Region and Parish response capabilities and capacity to prevent and reduce the State’s vulnerability to all-hazard disaster events, to include Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Explosive (CBRNE) incidents. This is an exceedingly complex mission that requires coordination, cooperation, and focused effort from the entire State (citizens, local, state, and federal partners) as well as private industry and non-profit voluntary agencies. To that end, each of the sixty four (64) parishes will update or will develop Memorandums of
Understanding (MOU) over the next year agreeing to assist each other in event of major CBRNE incidents.

The State of Louisiana consists of 64 parishes with each parish participating in one of the nine Homeland Security Regions designated by the State in 2002. In addition, the State is home to four federally recognized Indian tribes which for the purposes of this strategy are included in the parishes they reside.

This strategy was developed based upon the results of the assessments completed by the sixty-four
jurisdictions between July – September 2003. These included comprehensive risk, capabilities, and needs
assessments. The results of the assessments provided an insight into the requirements of the State.

Louisiana will apply the resources available from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
through the Office for Domestic preparedness (ODP) and other state and federal grant associated
initiatives to address unique planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs to assist in building an
enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, respond to, and recover from disasters, to include threats
or acts of terrorism.

We envision the State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program as the implementation
mechanism of our Louisiana Homeland Security Strategy and a model endeavor toward protecting citizens
and property within our state. Our strategy has been forged from the strong partnerships with state
agencies, local governments and within the private sector, rooted in existing resources and capabilities
while leveraging new initiatives and deploying emerging technology.

The focus of the Louisiana initiative is to ensure the unified Homeland Security effort is a collaborative and
deliberate effort. The strategy may use the steps below, but with the consensus from representatives of
the State agencies and Regional Homeland Security Coordinators. The plan will:

1. Use an “all-hazards” approach;

2. Maintain an emphasis on incident command and unified command structure;

3. Enhance capabilities through planning, equipment, training, and exercises that include all disciplines;

4. Increase the capability of emergency responders to respond, detect, deter, contain, and recover from
the effects of a CBRNE incident;

5. Develop a coordinated mutual aid response team that allows local jurisdictions to protect responders
and save lives until additional mutual aid, state, or federal aid arrives;

6. Enhance the regional response capabilities of detection and decontamination, mass casualty care, and
Urban Search and Rescue teams;

7. Increase capabilities of current emergency response teams to a higher level response capability;

8. Develop a financing and resourcing strategy;

9. Working as a team to ensure better results.

The focus of Louisiana revolves around three priorities that have been identified in the Louisiana Homeland
Security Strategy: Vital, Important, and Peripheral.

The Vital interests identified for Louisiana are:

– Life and well-being of residents and visitors

– Governmental bodies and their ability to govern

– Uninhibited critical physical infrastructure

Important interests are next in the hierarchal intensity of interests. If unfulfilled, Important interest will
result in damage that will eventually affect critical Louisiana interests. Identified Important interests
include:

– Stable critical cyber infrastructure

– Economic stability

– Unconstrained Special Security Events

– Viability of Public/Private property

– Enduring Key Assets

The last category in the intensity of interests is Peripheral. These interests will result in damage that is
unlikely to affect critical Louisiana interests if unfulfilled. The identified Peripheral Louisiana interest is listed
below:

– Life and property outside of Louisiana

Strategic objectives outline what is to be accomplished. When accomplished these objectives would
create, or contribute to, the achievement of the desired end state and serve the attainment of our State
interests. The prevailing Louisiana Strategic Objectives are identified as:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within Louisiana (Prevention)

- Reduce Louisiana’s vulnerability to terrorism (Preparedness)

- Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur (Response)

Police stand outside the Labor Ministry in Athens on Monday, March 1, 2010. About 150 left-wing protesters tried to force their way into the building, where Europe's financial affairs chief Olli Rehn was meeting with Labor Minister Andreas Loverdos, but were repelled by riot police. The EU pressed Greece hard to make more painful budget cuts amid reports that fellow European nations such as France and Germany are preparing a financial rescue to get the country out of its debt crisis. (AP Photo/Thanassis Stavrakis)

Reuters
March 4, 2010

BERLIN – Greece should consider selling some of its islands as one option to reduce debt, two members of the German parliament in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s centre-right coalition said.

Josef Schlarmann, a senior member of Merkel’s Christian Democrats, and Frank Schaeffler, a finance policy expert in the Free Democrats, were quoted on Thursday as saying that selling islands and other assets could help Greece out of its crisis.

“Those in insolvency have to sell everything they have to pay their creditors,” Schlarmann told Bild newspaper. “Greece owns buildings, companies and uninhabited islands, which could all be used for debt redemption.”

Greece has launched an austerity programme designed to secure European help to tackle its crippling debt burden. Opinion polls show Germans are overwhelmingly against taxpayers bailing out Greece.

Greece’s deficit was 12.7 percent of GDP in 2009, well ahead of the EU’s 3 percent of GDP limit.

Merkel will meet Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou in Berlin on Friday.

“The chancellor cannot promise Greece any help,” Schaeffler told Bild in a story under the headline: “Sell your islands, you bankrupt Greeks! And sell the Acropolis too!”

“The Greek government has to take radical steps to sell its property — for example its uninhabited islands,” Schaeffler told Germany’s best-selling daily newspaper.

Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsas was asked about the idea in an interview with ARD TV.

“I’ve also heard the suggestion we should sell the Acropolis,” Droutsas said. “Suggestions like this are not appropriate at this time.”

Germans have had an allergic reaction to reports their country may be part of a bailout for Greece. Europe’s biggest economy itself is only just creeping out of its worst post-war recession.

(Reporting by Erik Kirschbaum; editing by Matthew Jones)

© Copyright 2010 Thomson Reuters

• 45 pages
• For Official Use Only
• January 8, 2008

The purpose of the Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy (SHSS) is to identify and address statewide priorities to achieve and sustain a strengthened ability to prevent, detect, deter, mitigate against, prepare for, respond to and recover from any natural, manmade and/or technological emergency or disaster up to and including any act of terrorism. The State, through implementation of this strategy, is seeking outcomes that will ensure a safe and secure Nevada through enhanced capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, rapid first response and recovery, the protection of critical infrastructure, and to promote public education and awareness.

…

Focus

Nevada continues to be one of the fastest growing states in the nation and depends heavily upon the tourism industry to support the State’s economy. The majority of the world’s largest resorts are located in Nevada, the tourism sector provides the largest employment base, and more than 50 million visitors pass through the state’s major airports annually. Tourism provides a multi-billion dollar funding stream to the state that is used to fund schools and other public facilities, critical infrastructure, and public safety. More than 70% of the state’s population, and 70% of the revenue derived from this industry, comes
from southern Nevada. Therefore, it is critical that a large focus of the SHSS focus on increased communication and coordination, establishing and maintaining alignment between federal, tribal, state, and local goals, objectives, and initiatives, and leveraging resources among federal, state, tribal and local agencies, non-profit organizations, and volunteer groups. More specfically, Nevada’s focus for the next three years will include, but is not limited to:

1) Measures in prevention through improved sharing of intelligence information and surveillance;
2) Communications Interoperability;
3) Development, review, and/or update of state and local emergency operations plans, continuity of government plans and terrorism prevention and
detection plans while ensuring complete implementation of the National Incident Management System;
4) Development, review, and/or update of statewide interstate and intrastate mutual aid compacts, regional plans and regional collaboration;
5) Continued equipping and training of Nevada’s emergency first responders and support agencies;
6) Establishing/enhancing agro-terrorism preparedness capabilities;
7) Improving Nevada’s capabilities to detect, identify, and report radiological and nuclear materials present in unauthorized locations;
Public education and awareness programs;
9) Enhancing measures to secure and harden critical infrastructure sites;
10) Development and implementation of systems to secure and coordinate transportation resources;
11) Development, review, update and/or finalization of medical facility emergency care plans, and medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities;
12) Establish programs to serve special needs populations; and
13) To create an awareness of the legal issues that surround emergency management, emergency response and homeland security activities.
Through these initiatives, Nevada will continue to build and enhance a comprehensive and coordinated statewide and regional partnership of all agencies,
preparing them to adequately respond to any type of emergency or disaster.

• 24 pages
• For Official Use Only
• January 28, 2010

Opening Statements

▼Never before has it been possible for one person to potentially affect an entire Nation’s security.
▼In 1999 (10 years ago), two Chinese Colonels published a book called “Unrestricted Warfare” that advocated “not fighting” the U.S. directly, but “understanding and employing the principle of asymmetry correctly to allow us [the Chinese] always to find and exploit an enemy’s soft spots.”
▼The idea that a less-capable foe can take on a militarily superior opponent also aligns with the views of the ancient Chinese general, Sun Tzu. In his book “The Art of War,” the strategist advocates stealth, deceptionand indirect attackto overcome a stronger opponent in battle.

Cyberspace is a Domain -The Principles of War Apply

…

According to the S.773 Bill (Cybersecurity Act of 2009) the term „Cyber‟ means:

• any process, program, or protocol relating to the use of the Internet or an intranet, automatic data processing or transmission, or telecommunication via the Internet or an intranet; and
• any matter relating to, or involving the use of, computers or computer networks.

Cyber Crosses All Domains –Sea –Air -Land -Space

…

▼In lieu of a Concise Definition

• Cyber Warfare, warfare conducted in Cyberspace, is essentially any act intended to compel an opponent to fulfill our national will, executed against the software, hardware, and firmware controlling processes within an adversary’s system.

▼Electronic Warfare

• An Overlapping Discipline (e.g. 802.11 Wireless, EMP)
• Actions involving the use of the electromagnetic spectrumor directed energy to control the spectrum

▼Information Operations (IO) / Computer Network Operations (CNO)

• Computer Network Attack –Exploitation –Defense (CNA/CNE/CND)

The Nucleus of Cyber Warfare Strategy
▼Core elements required to create a highly effective Cyber Warfare Strategy:

• Intelligence Fusion and Collaboration

−Combine intelligence from multiple sources in order to achieve inferences.

• Cyber Surveillance and Target Acquisition

−Ability to detect system compromise and assist in determining who was behind the attack.

• Adaptive Cyber Attack Countermeasures

−Capability to counterattack an incoming threat thereby destroying/altering its ability in such a way that the intended effect on the target is significantly impeded.

▼The President’s Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI)

• Establish a front line of defense
• Demonstrate resolve to secure U.S. Cyberspace & set conditions for long-term success
• Shape the future environment to demonstrate resolve to secure U.S. technological advantage and address new attack and defend vectorsCustomer

…