The following maps and satellite photos depict refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan and provide statistics regarding the displacement of persons as the result of the conflict in Syria. The first map was created by the U.S. State Department Humanitarian…
A September 2012 presentation from the Fire Department of the City of New York describing the “transient threat” posed by by gourmet food trucks around the city.
If you’re trying to set up an untraceable shell corporation, your best bet may no no longer be a tax haven or some far away island nation. According to a surprising new study, developed countries like the U.S. and Canada are among the easiest places in the world to set up the kind of anonymous shell corporation that could be used for money laundering, terrorist financing and other nefarious activities. In contrast, known tax havens like the Seychelles, Bahamas and the Cayman Islands all present far more obstacles to the establishment of untraceable corporate structures due to their more stringent compliance with international regulations. In fact, the study found that U.S.-based incorporation services provide one of the easiest routes to establishing an anonymous shell corporation, with only Kenya surpassing the U.S. in terms of noncompliance.
The current transatlantic environment will continue to challenge NATO’s ability to carry its messages proactively and engagingly to diverse audiences across the globe, but it also entails a number of positive trends on which NATO’s future communication efforts should build. From a broader perspective, the public climate in Europe and North America has recently become more supportive of a close transatlantic security relationship compared to previous years. As the 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey shows, the Alliance has regained public support in many, albeit not all Allied countries. Moreover, NATO’s 60th anniversary, the NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl, the arrival of a new Secretary General in late summer and the launching of a public debate about NATO’s new Strategic Concept have spurred broader public attention and interest in the Alliance.
The role of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) is to induce or reinforce the perceptions. attitudes and behaviour of North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved audiences in support of Alliance political and military objectives. Additionally, PSYOPS can mitigate the effective use of hostile propaganda against friendly forces, local civilian audiences and other audiences of importance to NATO.
The purpose of Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.10.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations is to address the planning and conduct of military PSYOPS in support of NATO activities. PSYOPS, as one of the key contributors to most information operations (INFO OPS) activities, will achieve their greatest effect when coordinated within the larger INFO OPS plan and supporting a much broader information strategy. The new construct of INFO OPS is focused on affecting will, understanding, and capability through the three activities of influence, counter-command, and information protection. It must be noted that PSYOPS has influence activity as its mission; and by influencing target audiences (TA) directly, PSYOPS, in turn, has indirect effects on understanding and capability.
Criminal complaint in the matter of United States of America against Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis who is accused of attempting to detonate an explosive device in front of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on October 16, 2012.
A memorandum of understanding between the Obama and Romney 2012 campaigns detailing rules for the arranged Presidential and Vice Presidential debates signed on October 3, 2012.
The aim of this reference book is to provide the additional information needed by Information Operations (Info Ops) practitioners to better understand and implement the advising and coordinating function of Info Ops in the staffs throughout all levels of command. The reference book covers the experiences and lessons learned on principles, procedures, and techniques in current operations as well as some basic understanding on how to best integrate the Info Ops function in the new evolving structures (new Peacetime Establishment) and procedures within NATO with respect to effects based thinking and the new Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.
The Information Environment (IE) comprises the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs. This environment has seen significant changes in recent years. The importance of worldwide distributed information, the speed at which information is communicated, the role of social media and the reliability of information systems have created a situation in which no Alliance decision or action can be taken without considering its potential impact on the IE. The ubiquitous nature of information and the potential strategic ramifications of tactical actions add to the challenge faced by NATO Commanders. In this new IE it is more difficult to distinguish between the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The coordination, synchronisation and execution of information activities (IA) that deliberately create desired effects in the IE is essential to the Alliance’s successful functioning in peace, crisis and conflict.
The purpose of Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations is to explain how Info Ops support the planning, conduct and assessment of operations. The provenance for AJP-3.10 is MC 422/3 NATO Military Policy on Information Operations, which clearly acknowledges the primacy of civil/political direction on information issues and that the policy and subordinate doctrine applies to the military lever of power only. AJP-3.10 is focused on the operational level. It defines and discusses principles of Info Ops, and highlights those particular Info Ops considerations relevant to the conduct of operations, such as the sensitivity to political factors, and the role of non-military entities and emerging technological capabilities in the information environment, both within and external to NATO.
Casualties resulting from the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have risen significantly in 2012 according to statistics from the Department of Defense’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Over a 25-month period from August 2010 through August 2012, JIEDDO found that global IED casualties reached their peak in May 2012 with approximately 1800 people wounded and nearly 600 killed in that month alone.
A monthly report from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) detailing IED usage and casualties statistics from every U.S. combatant command for August 2012.
Documentation from the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) on suggested amendments to domain registration agreements and due diligence recommendations for ICANN to adopt in accrediting registrars supported by the Australian Federal Police, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New Zealand Police, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Serious Organised Crime Agency.
The complete U.S. Customs and Border Protection Security Policy and Procedures handbook from August 2009.
An Open Source Center translation of a decree issued by Hamid Karzai in July 2012 on fighting corruption in Afghanistan.
A chart from November 2011 depicting members of the Mexican Mafia compiled by the Institutional Gang Investigators at Pelican Bay State Prison, California State Prison – Corcoran and San Quentin.
U.S. Special Operations Command Terms of Reference – Roles, Missions and Functions of Component Commands
This directive provides Terms of Reference (TOR) for United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC); Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM); Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC), and Joint Special Operations University (JSOU).
The mission of training and mentoring Afghani police was complicated by (1) the need to establish and occupy nine forward operating bases (FOBs) spread over an area of approximately 28,700 square kilometers, while (2) simultaneously maintaining a level of security that (3) permitted identification of suitable candidates for police and training them, since a police force did not exist yet in the areas in which 2/7 operated and (4) accomplishing this without any established support network. The operational environment was more kinetic and austere than conditions generally experienced by recent veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Companies and platoons were widely dispersed and follow-on units deploying to such areas in Afghanistan must be prepared to operate in a semi-autonomous manner. Training and organization need to be tailored to those conditions and their specific area of operations (AO), and consideration should be given to the proven utility of the MAGTF in such an environment.
The Department of Homeland Security’s production of domestic intelligence has increased substantially over the last few years according to a brochure of “intelligence products” published last month by Cryptome. The 2012 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Product Line Brochure is “a standardized catalogue of intelligence reports and products that represent the full breadth” of the agency’s analytical capabilities. It provides descriptions of each type of product created by the DHS Intelligence Enterprise as well as the classification level and instructions on how DHS “customers” can obtain the products.
In light of the upcoming 2012 US presidential election, NYSIC is providing a snapshot of four historical cases where terrorists conducted attacks in conjunction with upcoming local or national elections, including the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used and how the attacks met or failed to meet the terrorists’ goals of altering the outcome of the election.
The purpose of operations security (OPSEC) is to reduce the vulnerability of US and multinational forces from successful adversary exploitation of critical information. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces. The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control, and protect critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions associated with military operations.
Military information support operations (MISO) play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses.
All modern forces depend on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, the EMS is the key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as the focus of operations themselves. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS throughout the operational environment.
Specific guidance from the joint force commander (JFC) or higher authority during planning will determine the military deception (MILDEC) role in a joint operation. MILDEC is intended to deter hostile actions, increase the success of friendly defensive actions, or to improve the success of any potential friendly offensive action. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation should help to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. In combat situations, the focus is on driving the adversary to culmination and achieving the objectives defined by the JFC. In noncombat situations, the JFC seeks to dominate the situation with decisive operations designed to establish conditions for an early, favorable conclusion.