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	<title>Public Intelligence</title>
	<link>http://publicintelligence.net</link>
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	<item>
		<title>DHS, FBI Warn &#8220;Malicious Actors&#8221; Are Using Company Websites, Social Media to Plan Attacks</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The Department of Homeland Security and FBI are warning law enforcement and security personnel around the country that online tools, search engines and corporate websites are a potential source of information for "malicious actors" seeking to plan terrorist attacks.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-terrorist-internet/</link>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Bulletin: Use of the Internet for Attack Planning</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Malicious actors may leverage the Internet to gain information against a potential target to support pre-operational planning efforts for kinetic or cyber attacks. Malicious actors can use Internet search engines for information such as maps, company photographs or blueprints, and gain additional details from social media sites and Web blogs. Some actors may use more sophisticated techniques—such as phishing, spear phishing, or actual penetration of an organization’s network or devices—which can be used to gather personal, sensitive, or proprietary data.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-internet-attack-planning/</link>
			</item>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) DoD Instruction: Intelligence Oversight, Coordination, Assessment and Reporting</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and outlines procedures for oversight, coordination, assessment, and reporting of DoD intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dod-intelligence-oversight/</link>
			</item>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) DoD Instruction: Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The mission of RRMC is to support the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, select DoD Components and, as appropriate, non-DoD agencies of the Federal Government, and to enable the execution of DoD mission-essential functions (MEFs) in accordance with DoDD S-5100.44 and continuity of operations (COOP) plans and operational orders.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dod-rrmc/</link>
			</item>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) DoD Instruction: Counterintelligence (CI) Activities Supporting Research, Development, and Acquisition</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The CI mission in RDA informs the DoD Components and supporting CDCs of foreign collection threats and detects FIE targeting of defense-related technology. The CI support enables RDA program personnel to implement countermeasures and enables CI to develop activities that negate, counter, penetrate, or exploit an FIE.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dod-ci-rda/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>Restricted U.S. Postal Service Mail Cover Request Procedures</title>
		<description><![CDATA[This publication provides instructions to law enforcement agencies requesting a mail cover as part of a criminal investigation. All conditions and procedures contained in these instructions must be met before a mail cover can be authorized.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/usps-mail-cover-requests/</link>
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		<title>San Francisco Bay Area Urban Shield 2013 Overview Presentation</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Urban Shield is a continuous, 48-hour Full Scale Multi-Disciplinary Homeland Security/Disaster Preparedness Exercise hosted by the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, with the support of the Bay Area Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and more than 150 local, state, federal, international and private sector partners.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/alameda-urban-shield-2013/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>(U//FOUO) DoD Directive: Counterintelligence (CI)</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Defense CI activities shall be undertaken as part of an integrated DoD and national effort to detect, identify, assess, exploit, penetrate, degrade, and counter or neutralize intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, espionage, sedition, subversion, assassination, and terrorist activities directed against the Department of Defense, its personnel, information, materiel, facilities, and activities, or against U.S. national security.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dod-ci/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>(U//FOUO) DoD Instruction: Counterintelligence (CI) Inquiries</title>
		<description><![CDATA[This Instruction implements the policy in DoD Directive (DoDD) O-5240.02 to assign responsibilities and establish procedures for conducting CI inquiries within the Department of Defense pursuant to the authority in DoDD 5143.01.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dod-ci-inquiries/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>U.S. Army War College Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide</title>
		<description><![CDATA[This PoC Military Reference Guide is intended to be a resource for military commanders and staffs who must consider PoC while conducting operations in PSO and MOAC contexts as shown below Other interested readers may include international organizations, national militaries, training centers, and civilian and police officials who are also concerned with PoC. ]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/pksoi-protection-of-civilians/</link>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) DoD Procedures for Wire, Electronic and Oral Interceptions for Law Enforcement</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The current Department of Defense manual on the procedures for intercepting wire, electronic and oral communications for law enforcement.  The manual also discusses "access to electronic communications in electronic storage or in a remote computing service."]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dod-law-enforcement-intercepts/</link>
			</item>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Report: Idaho Man Arrested for Providing Material Support to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</title>
		<description><![CDATA[This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) provides information on the 16 May 2013 arrest of Idaho-based Uzbekistan national Fazliddin Kurbanov by the FBI Boise Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). On 16 May, Kurbanov was charged under two indictments alleging terrorism, one each in the United States District Court, District of Idaho and United States District Court, District of Utah. FBI and DHS are providing this information to support their respective activities and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and the private sector in deterring, preventing, or disrupting terrorist attacks against the United States. All events described in this JIB are taken from the criminal indictment. The charges contained in the indictment are mere allegations. As in any criminal case, the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-idaho-extremist/</link>
			</item>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) NSA Ft. Gordon Georgia &#8220;Sweet Tea&#8221; Building Specifications</title>
		<description><![CDATA[More than 1700 pages of building specifications for the NSA/CSS facility at Fort Gordon, Georgia known as "Sweet Tea" dated February 5, 2010.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/nsa-sweet-tea/</link>
			</item>
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		<title>UN Human Rights Council Report: Impact of State Surveillance on Privacy and Freedom of Expression</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The present report analyses the implications of States’ surveillance of communications for the exercise of the human rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and expression. While considering the impact of significant technological advances in communications, the report underlines the urgent need to further study new modalities of surveillance and to revise national laws regulating these practices in line with human rights standards.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/un-state-surveillance-privacy-expression/</link>
			</item>
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		<title>Inspire Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Magazine Issue 11, June 2013</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The eleventh issue of “Inspire” magazine reportedly produced by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s media organization Al-Malahem, released June 1, 2013.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/aqap-inspire-issue-11/</link>
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		<title>American Friends of Bilderberg 2011 Tax Return</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The 2011 tax return for the Washington D.C.-based charity American Friends of Bilderberg.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/american-friends-of-bilderberg-2011-tax-return/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>2013 Bilderberg Meeting Participant List</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The 61st Bilderberg meeting is set to take place from 6 until 9 June 2013 in Hertfordshire, UK. A total of around 140 participants from 21 European and North American countries have confirmed their attendance. As ever, a diverse group of political leaders and experts from industry, finance, academia and the media have been invited.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/2013-bilderberg-meeting-participant-list/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>Ibragim Todashev Post-Autopsy Body Photos</title>
		<description><![CDATA[More than a dozen images originally published on the website Кавказская политика Kavkazskaya Politika (Politics of the Caucasus) after being displayed at a press conference held in Moscow by Ibragim Todashev's father Abdul-Baki Todashev on May 30, 2013.  Ibragim Todashev was shot seven times  in his Orlando, Florida apartment on May 22, 2013 following eight hours of questioning by an FBI Special Agent from the Boston Field Office and at least one Massachusetts State Police trooper.  Law enforcement sources have provided media outlets with several differing versions of the events leading up to Todashev's death.  First, sources described Todashev being shot after he reportedly attacked the FBI agent with a knife.  In later accounts, Todashev was described as being unarmed.  In the most recent version of events Todashev reportedly overturned a table, knocking the FBI agent to the ground, before lunging at the agent with a pole or broomstick.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/ibragim-todashev-photos/</link>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) U.S. Marine Corps Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan Lessons Learned Report</title>
		<description><![CDATA[A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is a civil-military organization, task-organized to a geographical province, whose purpose is to extend the reach and legitimacy of the Central Government of Afghanistan by developing a self-sustaining, peaceful, civil-society. It is a tactical organization with strategic impact. The ratio of military to other governmental, United Nations (UN), and non-governmental organizations depends heavily on the degree to which the area is pacified. The success of a PRT is measured by its ability to increase Central Government capacity and good governance as well as to, “Seize the human terrain and defeat the enemy.” One important element of this is to identify and mentor key Afghan personnel in democratic governance and leadership.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/mccll-afghan-prt/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>DHS Says Aging Infrastructure Poses Significant Risk to U.S.</title>
		<description><![CDATA[A recent version of the Department of Homeland Security's National Risk Profile found that old and deteriorating infrastructure in the U.S. could pose significant risks to the nation and its economy.  According to the report, insufficient funding of inspection and maintenance of critical infrastructure throughout the U.S. could create wide-ranging problems as the nation's infrastructure continues to age. Along with pandemics and nuclear terrorism, a draft version of the DHS National Risk Profile for 2011 lists "aging infrastructure" as having a "potentially significant impact" on the nation's critical infrastructure. The assessment states that "unusable, ineffectual, and deteriorating critical infrastructure, as well as the potential for exploitation of these vulnerabilities, increase risk . . . due to the inadvertent introduction of flaws, reduced inspection and maintenance workforce, and insufficient investment."  Moreover, this is not a limited threat, as the assessment states that the "entire United States is at risk from aging infrastructure that will eventually "affect all critical infrastructure sectors and ultimately reduce or erode their capacity and lifetimes in unexpected and unpredicted ways."]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-national-risk-profile-aging-infrastructure/</link>
			</item>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Bulletin: Increasing Exploitation of Mobile Device Vulnerabilities</title>
		<description><![CDATA[State, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) computer networks have been increasingly targeted by cyber adversaries. At the same time, the expansion of mobile devices integrated into SLTT networks provides new opportunities for cyber adversaries seeking to collect information or disrupt operations by compromising mobile technology and exploiting vulnerabilities in portable operating systems, application software, and hardware. Compromise of a mobile device can have an impact beyond the device itself; malware can propagate across interconnected networks.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-mobile-device-exploitation/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>Congressional Budget Office Report: Distribution of Expenditures in Individual Income Tax System</title>
		<description><![CDATA[A number of exclusions, deductions, preferential rates, and credits in the federal tax system cause revenues to be much lower than they would be otherwise for any given structure of tax rates. Some of those provisions—in both the individual and corporate income tax systems—are termed “tax expenditures” because they resemble federal spending by providing financial assistance to specific activities, entities, or groups of people. Tax expenditures, like traditional forms of federal spending, contribute to the federal budget deficit; influence how people work, save, and invest; and affect the distribution of income. This report examines how 10 of the largest tax expenditures in the individual income tax system in 2013 are distributed among households with different amounts of income.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/cbo-tax-expenditures/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>(U//FOUO) NSA Hardening Network Infrastructure: Security Recommendations for System Accreditors</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Many networks run by public and private organizations have experienced intrusions in recent years, and this cyber exploitation has resulted in an unprecedented transfer of wealth due to lost intellectual property. The threats to our networks and systems exist across numerous components that include end-user-devices, servers, and infrastructure devices. To address threats to routers and other network infrastructure devices, the National Security Agency’s Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) is publishing this IAA to guide U.S. Government systems accreditors’ strategic plan for network hardening.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/nsa-iad-hardening-infrastructure/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>(U//FOUO) NSA Mitigations Guidance for Distributed Denial of Service Attacks</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Adversary actors in cyberspace continue to demonstrate the interest in and ability to execute Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against the United States. The need to offer Internet services in support of mission requirements inherently exposes these services to malicious traffic and the potential for DDoS attack. Proactive preparation to ensure network resilience in the event of a DDoS event is essential. Reactive measures are feasible, but are often too slow to respond to the dynamic nature of today’s threat.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/nsa-iad-ddos/</link>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Bulletin: Diversion as a Terrorist Tactic</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Terrorists and violent extremists have used—or considered using—diversionary tactics in terrorist attacks overseas. Diversionary tactics are often used to draw security forces and first responders away from the intended primary target of the attack and may be used as part of a complex or multi-pronged attack. Diverting first responders to a location other than the primary target of an attack delays the response and the provision of medical care to victims, and depletes first responder resources.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-diversion/</link>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Bulletin: Use of Unsuspecting Civilians in IED Attacks</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Terrorists and violent extremists could use unsuspecting civilians to transport improvised explosive devices (IEDs) artfully concealed in seemingly harmless items for use in attacks in the Homeland. Overseas attacks demonstrate that violent extremists have successfully used unsuspecting individuals to carry items containing IEDs to specific targets where the devices are then detonated remotely. This tactic enables terrorists and violent extremists to place IEDs in secure areas, among large gatherings of people, or at high profile events and detonate them from a standoff distance.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-unsuspecting-civilians/</link>
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		<title>Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Apple Offshore Profit Shifting Exhibits</title>
		<description><![CDATA[On May 21, 2013, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee will hold a hearing that is a continuation of a series of reviews conducted by the Subcommittee on how individual and corporate taxpayers are shifting billions of dollars offshore to avoid U.S. taxes. The hearing will examine how Apple Inc., a U.S. multinational corporation, has used a variety of offshore structures, arrangements, and transactions to shift billions of dollars in profits away from the United States and into Ireland, where Apple has negotiated a special corporate tax rate of less than two percent. One of Apple’s more unusual tactics has been to establish and direct substantial funds to offshore entities in Ireland, while claiming they are not tax residents of any jurisdiction. For example, Apple Inc. established an offshore subsidiary, Apple Operations International, which from 2009 to 2012 reported net income of $30 billion, but declined to declare any tax residence, filed no corporate income tax return, and paid no corporate income taxes to any national government for five years. A second Irish affiliate, Apple Sales International, received $74 billion in sales income over four years, but due in part to its alleged status as a non-tax resident, paid taxes on only a tiny fraction of that income.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/hsgac-apple-offshore-profits/</link>
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		<title>Al-Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp Expansion Satellite Photos</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The following are satellite photos of the Al-Zaatari Refugee Camp in Jordan with analysis provided by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT).  The photos show the growth of the camp from approximately 5,000 shelters in November 2012 to more than 28,000 in May 2013.  According to Al [...]]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/al-zaatari-refugee-camp/</link>
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		<title>U.S. Department of Justice Statistics Report: Firearm Violence 1993-2011</title>
		<description><![CDATA[In 2011, a total of 478,400 fatal and nonfatal violent crimes were committed with a firearm. Homicides made up about 2% of all firearm-related crimes. There were 11,101 firearm homicides in 2011, down by 39% from a high of 18,253 in 1993. The majority of the decline in firearm-related homicides occurred between 1993 and 1998. Since 1999, the number of firearm homicides increased from 10,828 to 12,791 in 2006 before declining to 11,101 in 2011. Nonfatal firearm-related violent victimizations against persons age 12 or older declined 70%, from 1.5 million in 1993 to 456,500 in 2004. The number then fluctuated between about 400,000 to 600,000 through 2011. While the number of firearm crimes declined over time, the percentage of all violence that involved a firearm did not change substantively, fluctuating between 6% and 9% over the same period. In 1993, 9% of all violence was committed with a firearm, compared to 8% in 2011.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/doj-firearms-violence-1993-2011/</link>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Operation Iraqi Freedom Information Operations Tactical Commander&#8217;s Handbook</title>
		<description><![CDATA[This handbook provides the tactical operator, commander, and battle staff with information on planning, executing, assessing, and sustaining information operations (IO). The handbook is based on observations collected in Iraq during July and August 2004 by an IO collection and analysis team (CAAT). The application of this tool is both for training and real-world events the Soldier may encounter in the Iraqi area of operations.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/call-iraq-information-operations/</link>
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		<title>Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Reducing and Mitigating Civilian Casualties: Enduring Lessons</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The United States has long been committed to upholding the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and minimizing collateral damage, which includes civilian casualties (CIVCAS) and unintended damage to civilian objects (facilities, equipment, or other property that is not a military objective). In support of these goals, the U.S. military developed capabilities for precision engagements and accurately identifying targets, such as the development of refined targeting processes and predictive tools to better estimate and minimize collateral damage. These capabilities permitted the conduct of combat operations with lower relative numbers of civilian casualties compared to past operations. However, despite these efforts, and while maintaining compliance with the laws of war, the U.S. military found over the past decade that these measures were not always sufficient for meeting the goal of minimizing civilian casualties when possible. Resulting civilian casualties ran counter to U.S. desires and public statements that the United States did “everything possible” to avoid civilian casualties, and therefore caused negative second-order effects that impacted U.S. national, strategic, and operational interests.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/jcoa-reducing-civcas/</link>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) Defense Security Service Cybersecurity Operations Division Counterintelligence Presentation</title>
		<description><![CDATA[A Defense Security Service presentation from December 2012 outlining information and statistics on defense industrial base cyber incidents and intrusions.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dss-cyber-ci/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>DHS and FBI Bulletins on OpUSA Tools and Tactics</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Multiple groups, and individual hacker handles have claimed their intent to attack U.S. websites as part of OpUSA. As seen in many hacktivist operations (Ops), willing participants have posted free tools to assist other like minded individuals in their attack efforts. Often, more coordinated attacks will name a specific tool, target, day and time for the attack. That has not been the case for OpUSA thus far. Individual hacker groups seem to be conducting attacks independently, each claiming responsibility for individual defacements and data breaches that have supposedly recently taken place. Below you will find some of the tools being posted in conversations about OpUSA and links to US-CERT sites which provide background on the vulnerabilities exploited by these tools as well as mitigation advice for computer network defense actions.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-opusa/</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Afghanistan cultivates, produces and process narcotics that are a threat to the region and worldwide. However, the international community also needs to understand that Afghanistan itself is a victim of this phenomenon. The existence of hundreds of thousands of problem drug users, as well as decades of civil war, terrorism and instability are all related to the existence of narcotics in the country. According to the findings of this survey, the total area under cultivation was estimated at 154,000 hectares, an 18 per cent increase from the previous year. Comparisons of the gross and net values with Afghan’s licit GDP for 2012 also serve to highlight the opium economy’s impact on the country. In 2012, net opium exports were worth some 10 per cent of licit GDP, while the farmgate value of the opium needed to produce those exports alone was equivalent to 4 per cent of licit GDP. On the basis of shared responsibility and the special session of the United Nation's General assembly in 1998, the international community needs to take a balanced approach by addressing both the supply and the demand side equally. In addition, more attention needs to be paid to reduce demand and the smuggling of precursors as well as provide further support to the Government of Afghanistan.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/unodc-afghan-opium-2012/</link>
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		<title>(U//FOUO) New Jersey Fusion Center: Boston Marathon Bombing Used to Disseminate Malware and Conduct Fraud</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Websites and emails referencing the Boston Marathon bombing should be viewed with caution, as malicious actors are using the incident to disseminate malware and conduct fraud. While other agencies investigate the frauds, the NJ ROIC provides this information for situational awareness.]]></description>
		<link>http://publicintelligence.net/njroic-boston-bombing-scams/</link>
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