May 17, 2013 in Iraq, U.S. Army
This handbook provides the tactical operator, commander, and battle staff with information on planning, executing, assessing, and sustaining information operations (IO). The handbook is based on observations collected in Iraq during July and August 2004 by an IO collection and analysis team (CAAT). The application of this tool is both for training and real-world events the Soldier may encounter in the Iraqi area of operations.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Information Operations
March 10, 2013 in U.S. Army
In January 2009 the Army’s authority to unilaterally apprehend and detain insurgents in Iraq expired. The Army now operates in Iraq at the invitation of the Government of Iraq (GOI). The change in the Army’s authority heightens the guiding principle of working by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The Army must work within the Iraqi rule of law when dealing with insurgents who threaten U.S. forces. It requires the Army to work with the ISF and the Iraqi court system to remove insurgents from the street. The Army must learn how the Iraqi system is structured and how its courts operate. The Army must also help educate the Iraqi courts, particularly the judges, on the science of how Americans collect and process evidence (forensics). Educating the judges on forensics is important to the Army having its day in court and its evidence entered into the proceeding against the insurgents.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Iraq, U.S. Army, Warrant-Based Targeting
February 13, 2013 in U.S. Army
A Center for Army Lessons Learned smart card from 2010 detailing procedures for conducting traffic control point operations.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Traffic Control Points, U.S. Army
January 24, 2013 in U.S. Army
Patrols are one of the most common operations a unit will perform in the counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. A patrol is the basis for many other types of operations. Cordon and search, reconnaissance, demonstration of force, security, and traffic control checkpoints are all activities a unit may perform while on patrol. Patrols are invaluable in the COIN environment because they enable units to interface with the indigenous population and gain human intelligence.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, Counterinsurgency, For Official Use Only, U.S. Army
January 8, 2013 in U.S. Army
Managing combat trauma on the modern battlefield represents challenges that are scarcely encountered within the civilian community. The advent of tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) represented a fundamental paradigm shift from the care of casualties (CAX) that evolved in the late 1970s. Special operations forces (SOF) engaged in combat operations, removed from conventional forces (CF) and with austere logistical support, represent a set of unique challenges, as well. The limited amount of equipment and medical supplies, coupled with delays in evacuation, add to what is already a frightening experience. Being wounded also generates great fear and anxiety in the CAX. Special operations medics, exposed to hostile fire while caring for CAX, become likely targets, resulting in the special operations medic unintentionally becoming “part of the problem, not the solution” and forcing CAX to care for themselves. The conditions associated with this type of environment demand specialized training for all SOF. We refer to this specialized training as SOF combat casualty care.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Tactical combat casualty care, U.S. Army
December 19, 2012 in U.S. Army
This newsletter was produced in conjunction with the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Center–Afghanistan (CTC–A) to provide current and relevant information for brigade combat team (BCT), battalion, and company commanders and staffs concerning current U.S. and coalition best practices in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. As a “living document,” it will be updated continuously in order to capture, analyze, and disseminate critical information in support of operations across all lines of effort. It will disseminate key observations, insights, and lessons (OIL) from theater to give commanders a better understanding of the operational environment into which they are preparing to deploy. The information is from your peers—commanders, staff officers, and small unit leaders —who served or who are currently serving in Afghanistan.
Tags: Afghanistan, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Counterinsurgency, For Official Use Only, U.S. Army
December 1, 2012 in U.S. Army
The purpose of this special study is to provide commanders, leaders, and planners at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels a guide that synchronizes strategic-level requirements and outcomes with operational- and tactical-level objectives, therefore providing synergy of effort that will support the Army Force Generation cycle and reset planning timelines. It is our hope that this information will be useful to both sustainment and maneuver commanders, that it will constitute a historical survey of recent drawdown operations, and that it will offer tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be used today and in the future to assist cornmanders at all levels with the planning and execution of the responsible drawdown of forces.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Iraq, Iraq Withdrawl
November 2, 2012 in U.S. Army
The United States and our allies are fighting terrorists who have defined this conflict as religiously based. Commanders on both sides have identified the center of gravity as the popular support of the people and understand the value of leveraging the religious aspects of the indigenous culture. Coalition commanders must apply that knowledge to support the overall objectives. Using chaplains, whose expertise includes religion and religious culture, shows great potential for success for enabling operational goals.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, Chaplain, For Official Use Only, U.S. Army
September 11, 2012 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army
The U.S. military has long been committed to upholding the law of armed conflict and minimizing collateral damage. This includes the killing or wounding of noncombatant civilians — described in this handbook as civilian casualties or CIVCAS — as well as damage to facilities, equipment, or other property. Due to several factors, the impact of CIVCAS has increased to the point that single tactical actions can have strategic consequences and limit overall freedom of action. These factors include: the increased transparency of war, where tactical actions can be recorded and transmitted worldwide in real time; increased expectations for the United States’ conduct of war in light of improved precision and overall capabilities; and the enemy exploitation of CIVCAS to undermine U.S. legitimacy and objectives.
Tags: Afghanistan, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Civilian Casualties, For Official Use Only, International Security Assistance Force, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
August 23, 2012 in U.S. Army
From 28 Feb 06 to 18 Apr 06, a five-man Combat Arms Assessment Team from the 2-315th Field Artillery Transportation Support Battalion focused on collecting the most current security force convoy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in the Iraq Theater. The focus of this collection was convoy security force actions before, during, and after convoy operations including personal security detachment, escort of civilian vehicles (convoy security), and self escort of military convoys.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Security Force, U.S. Army
August 22, 2012 in U.S. Army
The Multi-National Corps–Iraq logistics staff and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) support operations cell, an element of the Iraqi Assistance Group, merged at the operational level to publish plans, policies, and procedures that met the strategic aims of the coalition forces, the national goals of the government of Iraq, and the joint campaign plan published by Multi-National Force–Iraq. Corps sustainment planners published operational objectives for execution at the operational and tactical levels in an effort to develop a sustainment-based system for the ISF. Based on experiences and observations over the past 18 months, the partners, advisors, and planners gathered the best practices for advising and assisting security forces at all levels of the sustainment system. This handbook presents partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining, host nation security force.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Iraq, Partnering Operations, Security Force, U.S. Army
June 22, 2012 in U.S. Army
Vignettes put the rules of engagement (ROE) into context. Rules can be memorized, but without context, those rules have little meaning or value. There is not a repository of vignettes readily accessible to Soldiers. This handbook addresses that shortcoming for units heading to Afghanistan. Soldiers can use this handbook individually, but its value is greatly increased through group discussion and interaction with leaders and judge advocates.
Tags: Afghanistan, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Civilian Casualties, Rules of Engagement, U.S. Army
April 11, 2012 in U.S. Army
The purpose of this handbook is to enhance understanding of Army airspace command and control (A2C2) to mitigate risks between small unit unmanned aerial vehicles (SUAVs) and rotary wing operations below the coordinating altitude. This handbook provides leaders at the brigade and below with guidelines in the form of airspace coordination techniques and procedures regarding SUAV mission planning and airspace deconfliction.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, Drones, For Official Use Only, Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, U.S. Army
March 29, 2012 in U.S. Army
This handbook was written to assist Soldiers and leaders at the platoon, company, and battalion level to better understand the importance of their actions on an objective, as well as to teach the fundamentals of tactical site exploitation (TSE) and cache search operations. While selecting the right Soldiers to be on a TSE team is important, the Soldiers and leaders must also understand the importance of the TSE process and the end results of their efforts. Proper TSE fuels the intelligence-operations cycle and may quickly answer the commander’s critical information requirements and assist in the criminal prosecution of detainees.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Site Exploitation, U.S. Army
December 5, 2011 in U.S. Army
The MWD program endured four decades of peace and brief contingency operations from the end of the Vietnam era to the current Global War on Terrorism. The program remained firmly embedded in the Military Police Corps combat support, law and order, and force protection missions. In late 2001, the onset of military operations in Afghanistan provided the impetus to expand MWD capabilities in support of commanders in the field. In 2002, as a direct result of an immediate operational need in Afghanistan, Army leadership directed the establishment of an Army mine detection dog unit and embedded it in the Corps of Engineers. In 2004, as a result of cooperation between the U.S. Army Engineer School and the U.S. Army Military Police School, the Army added a non-aggressive, specialized search dog (explosives detection dog) to the MWD inventory. Combat tracker dogs are returning to Army use as well, along with a very limited number of human remains detector or cadaver search dogs. Two constants emerge in the 60-plus-year history of Army MWD use: working dogs are used in a variety of units for a wide range of missions, and the size of the MWD program has expanded and contracted over time based on the needs of the Army. In the current and projected future operating environment, the MWD program will undoubtedly expand once again.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Military Working Dogs, U.S. Army
December 4, 2011 in U.S. Army
Complex operations often require the development of specialized teams with multidisciplinary perspectives. Examples of these groups include human terrain teams, provincial reconstruction teams, and, most recently, female engagement teams (FETs). These specialized programs are tasked with engaging local populations to ascertain information on civil-society needs and problems; address security concerns; and to form links between the populace, military, and interagency partners.
Tags: Afghanistan, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Counterinsurgency, Female Engagement Teams, For Official Use Only, U.S. Army
October 18, 2011 in U.S. Army
Being a drill sergeant may be the most challenging and rewarding assignment a noncommissioned officer will ever experience during his military career. While training initial entry Soldiers to fight and win in today’s Global War on Terrorism, drill sergeants must embody and reflect the Army’s values and standards. This handbook is designed to help new drill sergeants conquer the many challenges of their assignment and succeed in their mission of training Soldiers.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, U.S. Army
October 18, 2011 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army
Route clearance (RC) operations for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan are much different from RC operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom in terms of the terrain, seasonal weather, level of infrastructure, volume of insurgent threats, sources of improvised explosive device (IED) components, and motivation for IED emplacement. The purpose of this supplement is to focus on RC in Afghanistan.
Tags: Afghanistan, Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Improvised Explosive Devices, U.S. Army
October 18, 2011 in U.S. Army
This book will familiarize Warfighters and leaders with the MRAP vehicle, its capabilities and limitations, and planning considerations for its employment. The information found in this book does not replace or override any safety precautions, warnings, notes in existing technical and/or operator manuals, or unit standing orders or operating procedures.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, U.S. Army
June 16, 2011 in U.S. Army
The mission of COISTs is to describe the effects of the weather, enemy, terrain, and local population on friendly operations to reduce uncertainty and aid in decision making. This is a simple and clear mission with a powerful purpose. However, the operation of the company COIST is far from simple. Company leaders must review and interpret huge volumes of data on a daily basis to determine their relevance and relationships. A few examples of this data include weapons intelligence team reports, patrol debriefs, intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), link diagrams, and be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) lists. Although the commander will determine and direct the exact requirements for the COIST, specified and implied tasks usually include targeting; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); patrol briefings and debriefings; detainee operations; and site exploitation.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only
June 15, 2011 in U.S. Army
U.S. Army Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) Smart Card from February 2007.
Tags: Biometrics, Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, U.S. Army
August 19, 2010 in U.S. Army
For purposes of this handbook, unit RESET is the process a unit uses to plan and execute those critical tasks needed to restore the unit to combat readiness after redeployment. This process must be carefully planned and synchronized by all stakeholders, beginning with actions a unit sets in place before the unit deploys. The unit follows the RESET model published in Army RESET ordersand executes RESET tasks while still in theater to redeploy and return the unit to collective training capability as quickly as possible. This enormous task is complex and requires detailed planning, clear communication and intent, and strong unit leadership not only from the unit conducting RESET but also from those supporting the mission (e.g., garrison, contractors, and other Department of Defense organizations). The goal is returning the unit to combat readiness quickly, efficiently, and—most importantly—safely.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, U.S. Army
August 19, 2010 in U.S. Army
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) has become a critical capability in the commander’s toolbox for conducting stability operations. CERP funds provide tactical commanders a means to conduct multiple stability tasks that have traditionally been performed by U.S., foreign, or indigenous professional civilian personnel or agencies. These tasks include but are not limited to the reconstruction of infrastructure, support to governance, restoration of public services, and support to economic development. This handbook focuses on basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the application of the CERP. Its intended audience is the brigade, battalion, and provincial reconstruction team commander and staff. This handbook is based on lessons learned and best practices in use today in both Iraq and Afghanistan and identifies the training, planning, and operational procedures required to fund projects and services the commander requires during the conduct of stability operations. This handbook also provides the TTP to guide the commander through the regulatory and administrative requirements of the CERP.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Money as a Weapon
June 28, 2010 in U.S. Army
The advice from this battle-experienced commander is no less relevant today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Battle staffs working in CPs must remain adaptive and proactive in the operational environment (OE) to effectively predict events, engage the threat, and protect friendly forces. Battle staffs predict events to defeat the enemies’ systems and networks. The battle staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) plays an important role in this process.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only
January 22, 2010 in U.S. Army
The purpose of this handbook is to provide a quick-reference TTP guide for convoy commanders and their subordinates on how to train for and conduct tactical convoy operations on the asymmetric battlefield in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Tags: Center for Army Lessons Learned, For Official Use Only, Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Army