You are browsing the archive for Counterinsurgency.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Battle Staff Operations in a Counterinsurgency Environment

June 20, 2011 in U.S. Army

IED and Sniper Defeat: The Battle Staff Operations Process in a COIN Environment briefing from April 13, 2007.

ISAF Afghan Insurgent Reintegration Guide and Soldier Information Cards

April 13, 2011 in Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) is active. It provides for both reintegration (where fighters leave the fight and peacefully rejoin their communities) and reconciliation (where entire insurgent groups reach a settlement with GIRoA that ends hostilities). Reintegration is the focus of this guide. Information is presented on the APRP, its place in the COIN Campaign and ISAF‟s role. It provides those in ISAF with what they need to work with community leaders and GIRoA and ANSF partners to build their understanding of the Programme and its opportunities. It is an Afghan Programme and ISAF‟s role is to assist and encourage GIRoA to implement it fully.

U.S. Army “Complex Environments” Insurgency Assessment and Social Terrain Analysis Reports

January 17, 2011 in U.S. Army

Two unclassified reports from the U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center that are part of a series titled “Complex Environments – An Alternative Approach to the Assessment of Insurgencies and their Social Terrain”, from November 2009-March 2010.

(U//FOUO) Asymmetric Warfare Group “Attack The Network” Counterinsurgency Methodology

October 7, 2010 in U.S. Army

This document continues discussion on effective targeting methods (lethal and non-lethal) at the Battalion and Brigade level. It continues dialogue on Attacking the Network by further describing Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability analysis themes and their link to network modeling. This document also discusses the use of detailed, Observable Indicators to focus Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets against the enemy’s vulnerabilities. A modified Intelligence Synchronization Matrix (ISM) ensures integration and synchronization to the friendly course of action in a Counter-Insurgency environment. Using doctrinal and situational templates and a modified ISM helps the S2 understand the insurgent networks operating in his Area of Interest, focus assets against the known or suspected Critical Vulnerabilities, and synchronize ISR to give the commander the information he needs at the Decision Points.

COMISAF Campaign Overview June 2010

July 16, 2010 in North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Commander, International Security Assistance Force Campaign Overview June 2010.

U.S. Army Mechanisms of Afghan Insurgent Control and Local Governance

July 9, 2010 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army

(U) Many students of insurgency and counterinsurgency attest to the importance of popular support to each side’s quest to achieve its objectives. Key aspects of popular support, including type (passive or active) and scope (limited or significant), are inarguably important in analyzing an insurgency. However, focusing solely or immediately on these aspects risks glossing over insurgent efforts to set conditions necessary to mobilize such support in the first place. Most notably, these conditions include the generation of compliance and the establishment and institutionalization of control.

Afghan National Police Strategy January 2010

July 7, 2010 in Afghanistan

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Police Strategy, January 2010.

ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Partnering Directive

June 9, 2010 in Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Partnering Directive, August 29, 2009.

(U//FOUO) Center for Army Lessons Learned “How the Taliban Take a Village”

June 1, 2010 in U.S. Army

A current method used by the Taliban in Afghanistan to gain control of an area deemed of strategic interest to the Taliban leadership, which operates from safe havens in Pakistan or within Afghanistan, is to identify and target villages to subvert. The Taliban have recognized the necessity to operate with the cooperation of the local population, with their modus operandi being to gain villagers’ cooperation through indoctrination (preferred) or coercion (when necessary).

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Lessons Brief

April 16, 2010 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army

FOUO U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Lessons Brief, February 17, 2010.

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Information Engagement in Counterinsurgency

April 13, 2010 in U.S. Army

Targets of Psychological Operations

PSYOP can assist counterinsurgency by reaching the following targets:
-Insurgents
-Civilian Populace (US & HN)
-Military Force
-Neutral Elements
-External Hostile Powers
-Local Government

Canadian Land Force Counter-Insurgency Operations Manual

April 12, 2010 in Canada

A COIN campaign is conducted through a specific philosophy and a set of specific principles that guide the application of combat power. It is distinctly different from the conduct of an insurgency itself, and the lines of operation within the COIN campaign must counter the lines of operation of the insurgents. Within the guiding principles, each COIN campaign must be a custom approach to the insurgency at hand. The constant is the fact that insurgency and counter-insurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular support both at home and in the theatre of operations.

U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide

March 22, 2010 in U.S. Department of State, United States

Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. As such, it is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective. Insurgency is not always conducted by a single group with a centralized, military-style command structure, but may involve a complex matrix of different actors with various aims, loosely connected in dynamic and non-hierarchical networks. To be successful, insurgencies require charismatic leadership, supporters, recruits, supplies, safe havens and funding (often from illicit activities).

Operation Iraqi Freedom Transition Team Battle Book

October 22, 2009 in Multi-National Corps Iraq

You may DETAIN civilians based upon a reasonable belief that the person: (1) must be detained for purposes of self-defense; (2) is interfering with CF mission accomplishment; (3)is on a list of persons wanted for questioning, arrest or detention; (4)is or was engaged in criminal activity; or (5)must be detained for imperative reasons of security.Anyone you detain MUSTbe protected. Force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized to protect detainees in your custody. You MUST fill out a detainee apprehension card for EVERY person you detain.

U.K. Presses Anti-Insurgent Strategy

October 15, 2009 in News

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced plans on Wednesday to send additional troops to Afghanistan, signaling his support for the military strategy backed by the top American commander on the ground there, Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Mr. Brown’s move appeared to plant Britain firmly against a shift toward a less troop-intensive strategy focused on hunting down terror leaders, just as the White House is debating whether to implement such a change.

Joint Prosecution and Exploitation Center

September 27, 2009 in Department of Defense

The Joint Prosecution and Exploitation Center (JPEC) synchronizes coalition force (CF) intelligence and criminal prosecution efforts associated with detainees, detainee related evidence, and other battlefield material while also supporting Iraqi Security Forces development of internationally accepted criminal investigative and forensic practices IOT facilitate the growth and development of the Anbar Criminal Justice System and the establishment of the Rule of Law within the province.