Public Intelligence

This paper describes the foreign banking landscape in the United States. It begins by establishing a vocabulary for discussion of the subject, and then identifies a number of important data-related issues. With that information in hand, the remainder of the paper focuses on identifying the most important underlying trends on both sides of the balance sheets of foreign-owned banks’ U.S. operations. At each step, the investigation considers how foreign-owned banks compare to U.S.-owned domestic banks, and how two types of foreign banks operations in the U.S. — branches and agencies of foreign banks (FBAs), and foreign-owned subsidiary banks (FSUBs) — compare to each other.

The Federal Reserve and the big banks fought for more than two years to keep details of the largest bailout in U.S. history a secret. Now, the rest of the world can see what it was missing. The Fed didn’t tell anyone which banks were in trouble so deep they required a combined $1.2 trillion on Dec. 5, 2008, their single neediest day. Bankers didn’t mention that they took tens of billions of dollars in emergency loans at the same time they were assuring investors their firms were healthy. And no one calculated until now that banks reaped an estimated $13 billion of income by taking advantage of the Fed’s below-market rates, Bloomberg Markets magazine reports in its January issue.

The makeup of the Federal Reserve’s board of directors poses a conflict of interest and there is concern that several financial firms and corporations could have reaped monetary benefits from their executives’ close ties to the Fed, according to a new report released today by the Government Accountability Office. In one case, the Federal Reserve consulted with General Electric on the creation of a commercial paper funding facility and then provided $16 billion in financing to the company while its chief executive, Jeffrey Immelt, served as a director on the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Immelt is now President Obama’s “jobs czar.” JP Morgan Chase could also have benefited from its chief executive Jamie Dimon’s position on the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, according to the GAO. The bank received emergency loans from the Federal Reserve at the same time it served as the clearinghouse for the Fed’s emergency lending program. The Federal Reserve gave JP Morgan Chase an 18-month exemption from risk-based leverage and capital requirements in 2008, the same year that the Fed gave it $29 billion to acquire Bear Stearns, according to the GAO.

The Federal Reserve Act requires each Reserve Bank to be governed by a nine-member board—three Class A directors elected by member banks to represent their interests, three Class B directors elected by member banks to represent the public, and three Class C directors that are appointed by the Federal Reserve Board to represent the public. The diversity of Reserve Bank boards was limited from 2006 to 2010. For example, in 2006 minorities accounted for 13 of 108 director positions, and in 2010 they accounted for 15 of 108 director positions. Specifically, in 2010 Reserve Bank directors included 78 white men, 15 white women, 12 minority men, and 3 minority women. According to the Federal Reserve Act, Class B and C directors are to be elected with due but not exclusive consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor, and consumer representation.

The OCC, Board, FDIC, and SEC (individually, an “Agency,” and collectively, “the Agencies”) are requesting comment on a proposed rule that would implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) which contains certain prohibitions and restrictions on the ability of a banking entity and nonbank financial company supervised by the Board to engage in proprietary trading and have certain interests in, or relationships with, a hedge fund or private equity fund.

For those who wish to understand the true nature of our current financial system, the Pujo Committee’s 1912-1913 investigation of the “Money Trust” is essential reading. The Committee identified a concentrated group of Wall Street bankers who operated a sophisticated financial network unified by 341 interlocking directorships held in 112 corporations valued at more than $22 billion in resources and capitalization exerting significant control and influence over the U.S. economy and monetary system. The companies and individuals comprising this network were primarily agents of the Morgan and Rockefeller banking empires which dominated U.S. finance following the “Industrial Revolution”. The Committee names a number of prominent banking institutions as participating in this system including J.P. Morgan & Co., First National Bank of New York, Kuhn Loeb & Co. and individuals such as Paul Warburg, Jacob H. Schiff, Felix M. Warburg, Frank E. Peabody, William Rockefeller and Benjamin Strong, Jr. Understanding this system of overlapping financial networks and how those networks are used to dominate utilities, railroads, banking and the U.S. financial infrastructure throughout much of the twentieth century is key to the proper analysis of our current economic situation and the influence that the “Money Power” wields over global politics.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) is extending to suppliers an invitation to participate in an Sentiment Analysis And Social Media Monitoring Solution RFP bid process. The intent is to establish a fair and equitable partnership with a market leader who will who gather data from various social media outlets and news sources and provide applicable reporting to FRBNY. This Request for Proposal (“RFP”) was created in an effort to support FRBNY’s Social Media Listening Platforms initiative.

The first top-to-bottom audit of the Federal Reserve uncovered eye-popping new details about how the U.S. provided a whopping $16 trillion in secret loans to bail out American and foreign banks and businesses during the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. An amendment by Sen. Bernie Sanders to the Wall Street reform law passed one year ago this week directed the Government Accountability Office to conduct the study. “As a result of this audit, we now know that the Federal Reserve provided more than $16 trillion in total financial assistance to some of the largest financial institutions and corporations in the United States and throughout the world,” said Sanders. “This is a clear case of socialism for the rich and rugged, you’re-on-your-own individualism for everyone else.”

On numerous occasions in 2008 and 2009, the Federal Reserve Board invoked emergency authority under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 to authorize new broad-based programs and financial assistance to individual institutions to stabilize financial markets. Loans outstanding for the emergency programs peaked at more than $1 trillion in late 2008. The Federal Reserve Board directed the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) to implement most of these emergency actions. In a few cases, the Federal Reserve Board authorized a Reserve Bank to lend to a limited liability corporation (LLC) to finance the purchase of assets from a single institution. In 2009 and 2010, FRBNY also executed large-scale purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities to support the housing market. The table below provides an overview of all emergency actions covered by this report. The Reserve Banks’ and LLCs’ financial statements, which include the emergency programs’ accounts and activities, and their related financial reporting internal controls, are audited annually by an independent auditing firm. These independent financial statement audits, as well as other audits and reviews conducted by the Federal Reserve Board, its Inspector General, and the Reserve Banks’ internal audit function, did not report any significant accounting or financial reporting internal control issues concerning the emergency programs.

A zip file made available by Bloomberg contains the complete contents of their recently granted FOIA request for Federal Reserve Discount Window data on loans made, often to foreign banks, during the height of the financial crisis in 2008.

The Federal Reserve has lifted its veil of secrecy regarding special lending programs during the financial crisis, responding to a mandate from Congress by revealing the specifics of transactions with firms like Goldman Sachs and Citigroup. Critics of the Federal Reserve are poring over the data, seeking red flags regarding potential improprieties. And Congress has asked its Government Accountability Office to sift through the numbers and offer its own analysis. At the same time, it’s possible that the release of details will end up largely vindicating the Fed for the massive financial support that it gave the economy at a time of severe stress. The emergency loans, in the view of many finance experts, helped to avert a much deeper economic slump. And those loans have now been largely paid back without losses to the central bank. The numbers are staggering, encompassing more than a dozen emergency programs set up starting in 2007 or 2008. In one program alone the Fed doled out nearly $9 trillion in funds to borrowers such as Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch, largely at interest rates below 1 percent. (This program involved overnight loans, so the amount of Fed credit outstanding at any single point in time was much smaller.) Other programs, with longer-term loans also measured in the trillions of dollars.

Aerial photos and blueprints of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors building at 1709 New York Ave. in Washington D.C.

Federal Reserve Board of Governors New York Ave., Washington D.C. Building Blueprints, September 15, 2010.

The rapid growth of the market-based financial system since the mid-1980s changed the nature of financial intermediation in the United States profoundly. Within the market-based financial system, “shadow banks” are particularly important institutions. Shadow banks are financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees. Examples of shadow banks include finance companies, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, limited-purpose finance companies, structured investment vehicles, credit hedge funds, money market mutual funds, securities lenders, and government-sponsored enterprises. Shadow banks are interconnected along a vertically integrated, long intermediation chain, which intermediates credit through a wide range of securitization and secured funding techniques such as ABCP, asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and repo. This intermediation chain binds shadow banks into a network, which is the shadow banking system. The shadow banking system rivals the traditional banking system in the intermediation of credit to households and businesses. Over the past decade, the shadow banking system provided sources of inexpensive funding for credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like and seemingly riskless short-term liabilities. Maturity and credit transformation in the shadow banking system thus contributed significantly to asset bubbles in residential and commercial real estate markets prior to the financial crisis.

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in September confirms that the pace of recovery in output and employment continues to be slow. Household spending is increasing gradually, but remains constrained by high unemployment, modest income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Business spending on equipment and software is rising, though less rapidly than earlier in the year, while investment in nonresidential structures continues to be weak. Employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls. Housing starts continue to be depressed. Longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable, but measures of underlying inflation have trended lower in recent quarters. Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. Currently, the unemployment rate is elevated, and measures of underlying inflation are somewhat low, relative to levels that the Committee judges to be consistent, over the longer run, with its dual mandate. Although the Committee anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability, progress toward its objectives has been disappointingly slow.

AIG Global Restructuring Plan Overview, September 28, 2008.

We have asked to meet with you in order to give you an opportunity to substantially reduce your counterparty exposure to AIG and assist in promoting the long-term viability of the company as an ongoing concern. As evidenced by recent government actions, the viability of AIG is an important policy objective given the firm’s systemic importance. As we are sure you can appreciate, a collapse of AIG over the weekend of September 13th and 14th following so closely after the collapse of Lehman Brothers would have jeopardized the financial system in general, and your financial institution in particular, given your firm’s exposure to AIG at the time. Indeed, notwithstanding unprecedented governmental action, there has been a dramatic increase in AIG’s CDS spreads, which highlights the significant economic costs that would have been bourn by AIG’s counterparties had the government not intervened and the sizable counterparty exposure that your firm continues to retain with AIG. For these reasons, it is clear to us that we have a common objective in ensuring the firm’s long-term viability. With these points in mind, we would propose that you make us a compelling offer to unwind all your outstanding CDS contracts with AIG referencing ABS CDOs in exchange for the purchase of the underlying CDOs (where the assets are available) at a percentage of the notional amount for the CDS. Of course, we are open to other proposals you might have that would lead to a final resolution of this complex portfolio and therefore satisfy our common objectives.

The Senate approved an amendment to the Wall Street reform bill Tuesday that would order a one-time audit of the Federal Reserve if the underlying legislation passes. The amendment, which passed 96-0 with overwhelming bipartisan support, was the product of a deal brokered late last week by sponsor Sen. Bernie Sanders (D-Vt.) and Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) to make the provision acceptable to White House and Treasury officials, and appealing to Senate moderates. Sanders’s modified language sets a firm time window for the review of the Fed—from Dec. 1, 2007 to the day the legislation is signed into law—and restricts the Government Accountability Office from looking into the Fed’s decision-making on interest rates.

The biggest U.S. commercial banks will take their fight against disclosure of Federal Reserve lending in 2008 to the Supreme Court if necessary, the top lawyer for an industry-owned group said. Continued legal appeals will delay or block the first public look at details of the central bank’s $2 trillion in emergency lending during the 2008 financial crisis. The Clearing House Association LLC, a group that includes Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co., joined the Fed in defense of a lawsuit brought by Bloomberg LP, the parent company of Bloomberg News, seeking release of records related to four Fed lending programs. The U.S. Court of Appeals in Manhattan ruled March 19 that the central bank must release the documents. A three-judge panel of the appellate court rejected the Fed’s argument that disclosure would stigmatize borrowers and discourage banks from seeking emergency help.

Maiden Lane LLC, Maiden Lane II LLC, Maiden Lane III LLC Balance Sheets from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as of January 29, 2010.

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York lifted a veil of secrecy on the troubled mortgage assets it purchased as part of the 2008 rescues of Bear Stearns Cos. and American International Group Inc. The disclosures listed scores of subprime residential mortgage securities and pieces of commercial loans made to dozens of properties across the country, such as the Crossroads Mall in Oklahoma City—featuring the city’s only indoor full-size carousel—and the Hilton Garden Inn in Panama City, Fla.

The Federal Reserve asked a U.S. appeals court to block a ruling that for the first time would force the central bank to reveal secret identities of financial firms that might have collapsed without the largest government bailout in U.S. history. The U.S. Court of Appeals in Manhattan will decide whether the Fed must release records of the unprecedented $2 trillion U.S. loan program launched after the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. In August, a federal judge ordered that the information be released, responding to a request by Bloomberg LP, the parent of Bloomberg News. “This case is about the identity of the borrower,” said Matthew Collette, a lawyer for the government, in oral arguments today. “This is the equivalent of saying ‘I want all the loan applications that were submitted.’”

List of Participants for the Fourth Meeting of the International Network on Financial Education held in the Sofitel Hotel in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on December 14, 2009.

The Term Auction Facility (TAF) is a “credit facility” which allows depository institutions to bid upon collateralized loans from their local Federal Reserve Bank. Under the program, depository institutions determined to be in good standing with their local Federal Reserve Bank can participate in auctions of short-term loans with varying terms. The facility was created in December of 2007 following a series of similar actions from the European Central Bank, the Bank of Canada, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of England. These actions involved opening “discount windows” through which centralized banking institutions may provide short-term loans to banks to improve liquidity.

Suspects in the subprime crisis
•Technological innovation in the delivery of credit
•Modeling approaches allowed lenders to more finely differentiate and pool riskier borrowers…borrowers who had trouble getting credit in the past
•Did lenders overshoot?
•High CLTV means thin equity for homeowners.
•Doesn’t take much of a decline in prices to put homeowners “under water”
•Lenders might have underestimated the probability of a broad housing shock