Public Intelligence

This Reference Aid was jointly produced by DHS and the FBI to assist in the acquisition of detailed information in the aftermath of a successful or attempted radiological terrorism incident that would be of interest to the national law enforcement and emergency response communities. It is intended to help state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies and private sector entities deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.

This drill book provides platoon, squad, and team leaders with standardized drills that are designed for use by trainers at the platoon and squad level. Standardized drills are essential to the success of platoon leaders, trainers, and small-unit leaders. These drills provide the performance measures, standards, and sequential procedures that will help guide the unit through training tasks for which doctrine is just now being developed. Chemical Corps platoons and squads must be able to perform these drills quickly, effectively, and to standard at all times.

The available facts about the power of the atomic bomb as a military weapon lie in the story of what it did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many of these facts have been published, in official and unofficial form, but mingled with distortions or errors. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, therefore, in partial fulfillment of the mission for which it was established, has put together in these pages a fairly full account of just what the atomic bombs did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Together with an explanation of how the bomb achieved these effects, this report states the extent and nature of the damage, the casualties, and the political repercussions from the two attacks. The basis is the observation, measurement, and analysis of the Survey’s investigators. The conjecture that is necessary for understanding of complex phenomena and for applying the findings to the problems of defense of the U.S. is clearly labeled.

This publication describes ARSOF CBRN missions and tasks for the chemical reconnaissance detachment (CRD), chemical decontamination detachments (CDDs), ARSOF CBRN reconnaissance and survey operations, decontamination and reconnaissance teams (DRTs), and ARSOF sensitive site exploitation (SSE), and discusses reachback capability. This publication provides a basis for understanding the requirements of individual special operations forces (SOF) personnel operating in CBRN environments, as well as the requirements of ARSOF staff planners across the range of military operations. The manual also provides guidance for commanders who determine force structure, equipment, material, and operational requirements necessary to conduct SOF CBRN missions described herein.

Despite past denials by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders that the group intends to target Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, TTP Mohmand Agency leader Omar Khalid said in a 21 March video that the TTP aims to use Pakistan’s nuclear technology, among other assets, to ensure Islam’s survival. This is the first time that OSC has observed a TTP leader publicly list Pakistan’s nuclear weapons among its goals. Other elements of Khalid’s statement suggest that he may be seeking to boost his own stature within the group.

Israel’s intelligence services agree with American intelligence assessments that there is not enough proof to determine whether Iran is building a nuclear bomb, according to a report published Sunday in the New York Times. The newspaper said that senior American officials believe there is little disagreement between the Mossad and U.S. intelligence agencies over Iran’s nuclear program, despite the fact that Israeli political leaders have been pushing for quick action to block Iran from becoming what they describe as an existential threat.

Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these. Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.

Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China’s technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China’s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a “key supplier” of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran.

The Pentagon would like to see the new fleet of nuclear-capable bombers in place no later than the middle of the next decade. The sought-after fleet would number between 80 to 100 aircraft that could be flown remotely or by a human pilot. Currently, the youngest long-range bombers in the U.S. nuclear arsenal are more than 10 years old. Defense Department acquisition head Ashton Carter has spoken individually with officials from Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Boeing, department spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin said. The three defense contractors are anticipated to compete to win the $55 billion bomber order.

An independent, unclassified analytic Red Cell session, sponsored jointly by the U.S. Departments of Energy and Homeland Security, found a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) attack on the U.S. homeland to be highly appealing from a terrorist standpoint. The Red Cell group, which simulated two different terrorist cells, believed an RDD attack would be relatively easy to prepare and mount and could have wide-ranging physical, psychological, political, and economic impacts. The group believed radioactive materials would be easy to procure, especially from abroad, and found a variety of potential targets across the country. Participants expected that public distrust of official guidance would heighten fear and panic.

Declassified Top Secret UK Cabinet Office Secret Atomic Activities in Israel Report from March 1961.

The objective of this document is to provide guidance to other Federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and to state and local governments regarding the safe and effective use of potassium iodide (KI) as an adjunct to other public health protective measures in the event that radioactive iodine is released into the environment. The adoption and implementation of these recommendations are at the discretion of the state and local governments responsible for developing regional emergency response plans related to radiation emergencies.

The mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) includes acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning. In support of the Department’s mission, the primary mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. Consistent with these missions, the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework (June 2008) sets forth DHS as the coordinating agency for all deliberate attacks involving nuclear/radiological materials, including radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) and improvised nuclear devices (INDs).

The Obama administration has concluded that Chinese firms are helping Iran to improve its missile technology and develop nuclear weapons, and has asked China to stop such activity, a senior U.S. official said. During a visit to Beijing last month, a delegation led by Robert J. Einhorn, the State Department’s special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, handed a “significant list” of companies and banks to their Chinese counterparts, according to the senior U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue in U.S.-Chinese relations. The official said the Obama administration thinks that the companies are violating U.N. sanctions, but that China did not authorize their activities.

This document presents the results of the Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solutions Analysis (FNA/FSA) for the functional area of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND). The FNA/FSA are structured in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01D, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and its companion manual, CJCSM 3170.01A, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.

The purpose of this guidance is to provide emergency planners with nuclear detonation specific response recommendations to maximize the preservation of life in the event of an urban nuclear detonation. This guidance addresses the unique effects and impacts of a nuclear detonation such as scale of destruction, shelter and evacuation strategies, unparalleled medical demands, management of nuclear casualties, and radiation dose management concepts. The guidance is aimed at response activities in an environment with a severely compromised infrastructure for the first few days (e.g., 24 – 72 hours) when it is likely that many Federal resources will still be en route to the incident.

Despite recent international pressure pressure on the Netanyahu government to answer claims it holds atomic weapons, there is no real threat to Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity, Defense Minister Ehud Barak said on Monday. “I do not think there is a real or significant danger to Israel’s traditional stance of nuclear ambiguity,” Barak told the Knesset foreign affairs and defense committee. Israel has neither confirmed nor denied having nuclear arms. But the country is widely believed to have begun a weapons program in the 1950s and analysts estimate that Israel now has as many as 200 atomic warheads.

The United States and Russia have reached a deal on their most extensive nuclear arms-control agreement in nearly two decades, the Kremlin announced Wednesday. The pact appeared to represent President Obama’s first victory in his ambitious agenda to move toward a nuclear-free world. The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) would replace a 1991 pact that expired in December. Experts called the new agreement the most significant arms-control accord since the 1993 signing of START II, which the Russians never ratified.

During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed thousands of “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons that were intended to be used in support of troops in the field during a conflict. These included nuclear mines; artillery; short, medium, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range “strategic” nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations. At the end of the 1980s, before the demise of the Soviet Union, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, both the United States and Soviet Union announced that they would withdraw most and eliminate many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Natanz (نطنز) is a hardened Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) covering 100,000 square meters that is built 8 meters underground and protected by a concrete wall 2.5 meters thick, itself protected by another concrete wall. In 2004, the roof was hardened with reinforced concrete and covered with 22 meters of earth. The complex consists of two 25,000 square meter halls and a number of administrative buildings. This once secret site was one of the two exposed by Alireza Jafarzadeh in August, 2002. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei visited the site on 21 February 2003 and reported that 160 centrifuges were complete and ready for operation, with 1000 more under construction at the site. Under the terms of Iran’s safeguards agreement, Iran was under no obligation to report the existence of the site while it was still under construction. There are currently approximately 7,000 centrifuges installed at Natanz, of which 5,000 are producing low enriched uranium.

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (Persian نیروگاه اتمی بوشهر) is a nuclear power plant in Iran which is under construction 17 kilometres (11 mi) south-east of the city of Bushehr, between the fishing villages of Halileh and Bandargeh along the Persian Gulf. The nuclear power plant was planned to go on network in 2009. As late as November 28, 2009, the construction of the facility was said to be on schedule for completion.

Iran began work on Tuesday to make higher-grade nuclear fuel, a senior official said, and the Pentagon said the United States wanted a U.N. Security Council resolution on Iran “within weeks” over its nuclear programme. The Islamic Republic, which denies its programme has military aims, announced on Sunday it would produce uranium enriched to a level of 20 percent for a Tehran research reactor making medical isotopes. This followed a failure to agree terms for a proposed nuclear swap with major powers, under which Iran would send most of its low-enriched uranium abroad in return for such fuel.

The Mount Weather Special Facility is a Continuity of Government (COG) facility operated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The 200,000 square foot facility also houses FEMA’s National Emergency Coordinating Center. The site is located on a 434 acre mountain site on the borders of Loudon and Clarke counties, approximately 48 miles west of Washington, DC in Bluemont, Virginia. The above ground support facilities include about a dozen buildings providing communications links to the White House Situation Room.

Three main reason used for retaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe:

* Russia could turn bad and still has a lot of nonstrategic nuclear weapons
* Symbol of continued U.S. commitment to NATO: provides trans-Atlantic glue
* Other countries on NATO’s southern periphery are developing weapons of mass destruction