This handbook provides an understanding of the processes and procedures being employed by joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to plan, execute, and assess counter threat finance (CTF) activities and integrate them into their joint operation/campaign plans. It provides fundamental principles, techniques, and considerations related to CTF that are being employed in the field and are evolving toward incorporation in joint doctrine.
Tag Archive for Terrorism
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS Religious Facilities Vulnerabilities and Terrorist Indicators
This report is part of a series created by the Department of Homeland Security’s Protective Security Division concerning common vulnerabilities and the detection of terrorist activity at critical infrastructure locations.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS Terrorist Backpressure Contamination of Water Systems
Backpressure, the reverse flow of contaminated water into a potable water distribution system, has the potential to affect the public health of a community by using residential, commercial, or industrial connections in water distribution systems as a pathway for contamination. A water contamination incident using an effective contaminant and delivery method would cause immediate public health effects, require costly cleanup, and cause lasting economic and psychological impact. The amount of toxicity depends on many factors, including the type of contaminant, dilution and solubility of the contaminant, and the proximity of the consumer to the point of entry.
News
Think Like the Enemy: The U.S. Military’s Terrorist Training Exercise
A U.S. military training program designed to enhance soldiers’ abilities to operate in irregular conflicts includes exercises which encourage soldiers to think like terrorists in order to examine opposing ideologies. The exercises are part of a course designed to help trainees with practical decision-making skills in “irregular conflicts” and counterinsurgency called Combat Observation and Decision-making in Irregular and Ambiguous Conflicts (CODIAC). The course was initially created in 2010 as a way of enhancing the “ability of individuals and small teams to address irregular challenges by training enhanced observation, battlefield sensemaking, human terrain pattern recognition, and environmental analysis (including knowledge of combat tracking).” The CODIAC course incorporates curriculum from a number of other military programs, including the U.S. Marine Corps’ Combat Hunter program, and it is designed to primarily for military personnel as well as “interagency paramilitary personnel, such as Border Patrol or Police Officers, as well as multinational allies.” The course focuses on a number of core subject areas related to decision making, intelligence and observation, physical tracking and “human terrain” analysis.
U.S. Joint Forces Command
(U//FOUO) USJFCOM Combat Observation and Decision-Making in Irregular and Ambiguous Conflicts (CODIAC)
This curriculum was directly inspired by the US Marine Corps’ Combat Hunter program. Created in 2007, in response to a dramatic increase in precision fire causalities in Baghdad, Combat Hunter is systematic training designed to improve cognitive skills, showing personnel how to read the human terrain, establish a baseline, detect an anomaly, and make decisions “left of bang.” In other words, Combat Hunter was designed to train personnel to anticipate danger and meet it proactively. In an irregular conflict, this enables personnel to be the “hunters”—not the “hunted.” CODIAC integrates the USMC Combat Hunter principles, along with proven battlefield decision-making and irregular warfare instruction from across the Joint services. The goal of CODIAC is to enhance the ability of individuals and small teams to address irregular challenges by training enhanced observation, battlefield sensemaking, human terrain pattern recognition, and environmental analysis (including knowledge of combat tracking).
United States
Iran-Linked Saudi Arabian Ambassador Assassination Plot Criminal Complaint
Criminal complaint issued in the Iran-linked plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States, USA vs. MANSSOR ARBABSIAR a/k/a “Mansour Arbabsiar” and GHOLAM SHAKURI a/k/a “Ali Gholam Shakuri”.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS HUJI Claims Responsibility for India High Court Bombing
According to multiple media reports, on 7 September an explosion occurred inside the reception area of the Delhi High Court in New Delhi, India at approximately 10:00am local time. The blast killed at least 11 people and injured some 76 others. Indian authorities reported to the press that the explosives were inside a briefcase left in a reception area in between the security gates of the High Court. India’s National Security Guard Director indicated that the device contained ammonium nitrate, which was also used in the most recent bomb against the court complex on 25 May. Harakat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI) claimed responsibility for the blast in an e-mail message and demanded that India repeal the death sentence of Afzal Guru, who was convicted of attacking the Indian Parliament building in 2001 and is awaiting execution.
United States
Rezwan Ferdaus Remote Controlled Airplane Terror Affidavit
FBI affidavit for Rezwan Ferdaus accused of planning to use remote controlled airplanes to attack the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol.
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Potential Al-Qaeda Threat to New York City and Washington, DC During 9/11 Anniversary Period
We assess that al-Qa‘ida has likely maintained an interest since at least February 2010 in conducting large attacks in the Homeland timed to coincide with symbolic dates, to include the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We also remain concerned that the May 2011 death of Usama bin Ladin (UBL), coupled with the subsequent removal of several key al-Qa’ida figures, could further contribute to al-Qa’ida’s desire to stage an attack on a symbolic date—such as the 10-year anniversary of 9/11—as a way to avenge UBL’s death and reassert the group’s relevance, although operational readiness likely remains the primary driving factor behind the timing of al-Qa’ida attacks.
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Al-Qaeda Interest in Targeting Trains on September 11, 2011
As of February 2010, al-Qa‘ida was allegedly contemplating conducting an operation against trains at an unspecified location in the United States on the tenth anniversary of 11 September 2001. As one option, al-Qa‘ida was looking at the possibility of tipping a train by tampering with the rails so that the train would fall off the track at either a valley or a bridge. Al-Qa‘ida noted that an attack from tilting the train would only succeed one time because the tilting would be spotted. Al-Qa‘ida also noted that newer train cars each have their own braking system, and that movement in a specific direction would derail it, but would not cause it to fall off the track.
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Updated Small Arms and Lone Shooters Warning August 2011
This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) updates a DHS-FBI joint analytic product of the same title dated 3 September 2010 and is intended to provide warning and perspective regarding the scope of the potential terrorist threats to the United States, specifically towards US persons. This product is provided to support the activities of DHS and FBI and to help federal, state, and local government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks directed against the United States.
Department of Homeland Security
DHS Terrorist Watchlist Service Privacy Impact Assessment
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) currently uses the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), a consolidated database maintained by the Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) of identifying information about those known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity in order to facilitate DHS mission-related functions, such counterterrorism, law enforcement, border security, and inspection activities. DHS and TSC are improving the current method of transmitting TSDB data from TSC to DHS. Through a new service called the “DHS Watchlist Service” (WLS), TSC and DHS will automate and simplify the current manual process. TSC remains the authoritative source of watchlist data and will provide DHS with near real-time synchronization of the TSDB. DHS will ensure that each DHS component system receives only those TSDB records which they are authorized to use under the WLS Memorandum of Understanding and authorized under existing regulations and privacy compliance documentation between TSC and DHS (WLS MOU) and any amendments or modifications thereto. DHS conducted this privacy impact assessment (PIA) because the WLS will maintain a synchronized copy of the TSDB, which contains personally identifiable information (PII), and disseminate it to authorized DHS components.
Headline
Norway Anders Behring Breivik Attack Memorial Photos
Connie Maria Westergaard – http://www.flickr.com/photos/comawe/ strumpet101 – http://www.flickr.com/photos/strumpet101/ marekbz – http://www.flickr.com/photos/mbz/ Jon Kristian Fjellestad – http://www.flickr.com/photos/jkfjellestad/ cherikson – http://www.flickr.com/photos/chreriksen/
Norway
Utøya Gunman Anders Behring Breivik Video Manifesto “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence”
A video is an overview of Anders Behring Breivik’s manifesto title “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence”. It was reportedly posted by Breivik himself and was removed by YouTube. We have reposted it for the sake of posterity.
Norway
Mirror of Utøya Gunman Anders Behring Breivik’s Facebook Page and Photo Gallery
Mirror of Utøya gunman Anders Behring Breivik’s Facebook page and photo gallery, provided because profiles on social networking sites are often removed after their owners engage in high profile criminal/terrorist activities.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS U.S. Lodging Industry Protective Measures Guide
Preventing terrorism, enhancing security, and ensuring resilience to disasters are core missions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Accomplishing these missions necessitates building and fostering a collaborative environment in which the private sector and Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments can better protect critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). The U.S. Lodging Industry is designated as CIKR because it is essential to the Nation’s economic vitality and way of life. It is critical to the Department’s vision of ensuring a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards. As such, DHS developed the Protective Measures Guide for the U.S. Lodging Industry in collaboration with the American Hotel & Lodging Association to provide options for hotels to consider when implementing protective measures. The guide provides an overview of threat, vulnerability, and protective measures designed to assist hotel owners and operators in planning and managing security at their facilities. It provides suggestions for successful planning, organizing, coordinating, communicating, operating, and training activities that contribute to a safe environment for guests and employees. In addition, when contemplating appropriate protective measures to implement, owners and operators should consider their own knowledge of the property‘s operations and vulnerabilities, as well as the general surroundings and its place within the community. When implementing appropriate protective measures, owners and operators should make use of additional resources, from local law enforcement and emergency management agencies to the security resources listed in the appendices of this guide.
California, Intelligence Fusion Centers
(U//FOUO) San Diego Fusion Center: Hotels are Potential Bomb Labs
Hotels, motels, and other lodging facilities have been used by extremist individuals and groups as locations to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in close proximity to their intended targets. Hotels, specifically rooms with kitchens or kitchenettes, allow these groups or individuals to greatly reduce the potential for a premature detonation. Given the short distance to the intended target the risk of premature detonation during transportation is minimized.
United Kingdom
United Kingdom “Contest” Strategy for Countering Terrorism July 2011
The leadership of Al Qa’ida is now weaker than at any time since 9/11. It has played no role in recent political change in North Africa and the Middle East. Its ideology has been widely discredited and it has failed in all its objectives. Continued international pressure can further reduce its capability. But Al Qa’ida continues to pose a threat to our own security; and groups affiliated to Al Qa’ida – notably in Yemen and Somalia – have emerged over the past two years to be a substantial threat in their own right.
Russia
Russian Ministry of Justice List of People and Organizations Linked to Russian Terrorism Financing
This “previously confidential list of people and organizations found to be involved in laundering money and funding terrorism” was presented by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the Russian-government owned newspaper. It was originally compiled by the Russian Ministry of Justice.
Russia
Russian Foreign Ministry List of People and Organizations Financing Terrorism
This “previously confidential list of people and organizations found to be involved in laundering money and funding terrorism” was presented by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the Russian-government owned newspaper. It was originally compiled by the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICE List of Specially Designated Countries (SDCs) that Promote or Protect Terrorism
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General issued a report in May 2011 titled “Supervision of Aliens Commensurate with Risk” that details Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) detention and supervision of aliens. The report includes a list of Specially Designated Countries (SDCs) that are said to “promote, produce, or protect terrorist organizations or their members”. The report states that ICE uses a Third Agency Check (TAC) to screen aliens from specially designated countries (SDCs) that have shown a tendency to promote, produce, or protect terrorist organizations or their members and that the purpose of the additional screening is to determine whether other agencies have an interest in the alien. ICE’s policy requires officers to conduct TAC screenings only for aliens from SDCs if the aliens are in ICE custody.
U.S. Southern Command
Guantanamo Detainee Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants
JTF-GTMO primarily uses three types of indicators to assess a detainee: 1) the detainee himself provides acknowledgement of a fact; 2) another detainee, document, government, etc. provides an identification of the detainee; and 3) analysis of the detainee’s timeline, activities, and associates in context with other known events and individuals. A fourth method may be available for a few select detainees in their SCI addendum, where special intelligence provides more specific information about a detainee.
Department of Homeland Security
DHS Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability and Terrorist Activity Indicator Reports
Over the next two weeks, Public Intelligence will be publishing several dozen reports from the Department of Homeland Security’s Protective Security Division concerning vulnerabilities and the detection of terrorist activity at critical infrastructure locations. This information was inadvertently disseminated by a non-profit organization that is concerned with domestic preparedness. Due to flaws in their website’s construction, a members area for sharing documentation was openly accessible to anyone and had been largely indexed in Google’s search results. The documents range in date from 2003-2004 and provide early background on critical infrastructure security activities, including known vulnerabilities that often have not been fixed and tenuous listings of so-called “suspicious activity” indicators. The documents also provide background on a number of “critical infrastructure” categories about which there has previously been a lack of publicly-available information. Some of these categories include railroad yards, wastewater treatment facilities, undersea cable landings and milk processing plants. For easier browsing, reports will be added to the list below as they are published.
Texas
(U//FOUO/LES) Arlington Police Department Khalid Ali‐M Aldawsari Saudi IED Plot Advisory
On 02/23/2011 Khalid Ali‐M Aldawsari (pictured left), a Saudi national currently attending college at South Plains College, near Lubbock, Texas, was arrested on federal terrorism charges. Aldawsari was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), in connection with the alleged purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary to make an improvised explosive device (IED), in addition to research into possible U.S. based targets. Court documents advise that Aldawsari had performed internet research on how to construct an IED, using chemical components. It has also been alleged he had acquired/taken major steps in acquiring the necessary components and equipment needed to build such a device. According to court documents, on 02/01/2011 a chemical supplier reported to the FBI a suspicious purchase of concentrated phenol, by a man named Khalid Aldawsari. Although the toxic chemical phenol can have legitimate uses; it can also be used to make explosives. Concentrated sulfuric and nitric acids, beakers, flasks, clocks, wiring, and a Hazmat suit were found during 2 FBI searches of Aldawsari’s apartment.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(U//FOUO) FBI Terrorist Training and Recruitment of CONUS Subjects: Lackawanna, Portland, and Northern Virginia
This assessment addresses the central role of terrorist training in three significant post-9/11 continental United States (CONUS) terrorism investigations: Lackawanna, Portland, and Northern Virginia. This assessment does not address other individuals who may have sought training independently, nor does it address groups of individuals who sought training in regions outside of South or Central Asia.