Public Intelligence

The Human Terrain System is a U.S. Army project intended to provide military decisionmakers in Iraq and Afghanistan with greater understanding of the local population’s cultures and perspectives. HTS deploys Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) of five to nine civilian and military personnel to support brigade, division, and theater-level staffs and commanders with operationally relevant information. The program also provides training for deploying personnel, reachback analysis, and software tools developed by HTS to support socio-cultural analysis. HTS emphasizes the use of tools and approaches commonly associated with the academic disciplines of anthropology and sociology’ in its efforts to collect and analyze data about local populations.

The intent of U.S. UW efforts is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives. Historically, the military concept for the employment of UW was primarily in support of resistance movements during general-war scenarios. While this concept remains valid, the operational environment since the end of World War II has increasingly required U.S. forces to conduct UW in scenarios short of general war (limited war). Enabling a resistance movement or insurgency entails the development of an underground and guerrilla forces, as well as supporting auxiliaries for each of these elements. Resistance movements or insurgencies always have an underground element. The armed component of these groups is the guerrilla force and is only present if the resistance transitions to conflict. The combined effects of two interrelated lines of effort largely generate the end result of a UW campaign. The efforts are armed conflict and subversion. Forces conduct armed conflict, normally in the form of guerrilla warfare, against the security apparatus of the host nation (HN) or occupying military. Conflict also includes operations that attack and degrade enemy morale, organizational cohesion, and operational effectiveness and separate the enemy from the population. Over time, these attacks degrade the ability of the HN or occupying military to project military power and exert control over the population. Subversion undermines the power of the government or occupying element by portraying it as incapable of effective governance to the population.

Two unclassified reports from the U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center that are part of a series titled “Complex Environments – An Alternative Approach to the Assessment of Insurgencies and their Social Terrain”, from November 2009-March 2010.

On December 30, 2010, Captain Andrew Poulos, Jr. of the U.S. Army Police sent Public Intelligence a threatening demand to remove a document from this site. The U.S. Army Police Intelligence Fraudulent Law Enforcement Credentials and Badges Guide, which was posted less than ten hours prior, is a “law enforcement sensitive” and “for official use only” document that details forged credentials which may be used by criminals and terrorists posing as law enforcement officials. The document is unique in that the warnings against publication featured on its cover claim to subject anyone who publishes the document to penalties, stating that the “release of information contained herein without the permission of the United States Government is prohibited by law, and may subject those responsible for its unauthorized release to criminal and/or civil penalties”. The message sent by Captain Poulos seems to echo this statement, demanding that if we do not remove the document we must “provide the name and contact information for the individual for which legal process can be served.”

UXO on the battlefield affects the mobility and mission aspects of all units. Battlefields are littered with UXO hazards from two sources: ordnance that has either failed to function or ordnance designed to be used for area denial, such as conventional land mines and the family of scatterable mines (FASCAM). With the sophistication of modern weapons systems, battlefield commanders can target anything within their theater of operations.
After these attacks are completed, UXO hazards will be left on the battlefield. UXO hazards may not always pose an immediate threat to unit mission or mobility, but they are hazards that have in the past caused needless loss of life and materiel. Battlefield commanders need to know where UXO hazards are, as these hazards can affect the mobility of follow-on elements. This manual teaches personnel about the UXO hazard and how this hazard affects mission capabilities and what procedures are used to report
and protect personnel and equipment. All units should be able to react to the UXO hazard effectively and to report and protect against it.

ITA is pleased to provide this information update as part of our commitment to support your information assurance efforts. All users are strongly advised against attempting to access information posted on the Internet or browse websites that claim to contain classified information from government owned computing systems. This message is in accordance with Headquarters Department of the Army issued All Army Activities (ALARACT) message issued on August 14, 2010 related to the WikiLeaks website. In addition, the Office of the Administrative Assistant (OAA) Communications has advised that all Department of Defense employees are not permitted to access, review, or search for any material pertaining to the WikiLeaks website from a government-issued computer. Users are advised that doing so may include the user as part of the formal ongoing investigation.

Field Manual (FM) 3-19.15 addresses continental United States (CONUS) and outside continental United States (OCONUS) civil disturbance operations. Today, United States (US) forces are deployed on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations worldwide. During these operations, US forces are often faced with unruly and violent crowds intent on disrupting peace and the ability of US forces to maintain peace. Worldwide instability coupled with increasing US military participation in peacekeeping and related operations requires that US forces have access to the most current doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary to quell riots and restore public order.

(U) Zero-point energy (a very general term) is the lowest energy that a given quantum mechanical system can have (i.e., the ground state of the system). In quantum field theory, it refers to the energy of the vacuum (i.e., a space devoid of matter [the energy of "nothing"]). In this paper, we will use the abbreviation ZPE (as is commonly used by those in the field) to refer to the vacuum energy for use in applications.

This document continues discussion on effective targeting methods (lethal and non-lethal) at the Battalion and Brigade level. It continues dialogue on Attacking the Network by further describing Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability analysis themes and their link to network modeling. This document also discusses the use of detailed, Observable Indicators to focus Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets against the enemy’s vulnerabilities. A modified Intelligence Synchronization Matrix (ISM) ensures integration and synchronization to the friendly course of action in a Counter-Insurgency environment. Using doctrinal and situational templates and a modified ISM helps the S2 understand the insurgent networks operating in his Area of Interest, focus assets against the known or suspected Critical Vulnerabilities, and synchronize ISR to give the commander the information he needs at the Decision Points.

(U/FOUO) 1. ALL ARMY ACTIVITIES ARE DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY REVIEW AND REVALIDATE WHO HAS SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR(SA)/POWER USER PRIVILEGES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) REF A, THESE PERSONNEL SHALL BE GRANTED THE MINIMUM SET OF PRIVILEGES REQUIRED TO PERFORM THEIR JOBS AND NOTHING MORE. ALL ACTIVITIES MUST ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED THESE PERSONNEL AND THAT NO OTHER PERSONNEL HAVE THESE PRIVILEGES. THIS IS KEY TO PRECLUDING UNAUTHORIZED DOWNLOADING AND DISSEMINATION OF SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION.

Tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) is the pre-hospital care rendered to a casualty in a tactical, combat environment. The principles of TCCC are fundamentally different from those of traditional civilian trauma care where most medical providers and medics train. These differences are based on both the unique patterns and types of wounds that are suffered in combat and the tactical conditions medical personnel face in combat. Unique combat wounds and tactical conditions make it difficult to determine which intervention to perform at what time. Besides addressing a casualty’s medical condition, responding medical personnel must also address the tactical situation faced while providing casualty care in combat. A medically correct intervention performed at the wrong time may lead to further casualties. Put another way, “good medicine may be bad tactics,” which can get the rescuer and casualty killed. To successfully navigate these issues, medical providers must have skills and training oriented to combat trauma care, as opposed to civilian trauma care.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Contracting Basics Smartcard, February 2008.

The unit radio operator (RO) provides platoon- to brigade-level maneuver leaders a command and control capability that is critical to mission success. The RO is more than a Soldier who carries the radio for the commander, serves as the commander’s driver, or provides the commander personal security, although he often serves in these functions. The RO is the commander’s tactical information manager. The process for selecting and training an RO varies widely and is based on the role the unit commander intends the RO to perform; however, there are common factors that every maneuver RO should possess in order to enable effective unit command and control.

For purposes of this handbook, unit RESET is the process a unit uses to plan and execute those critical tasks needed to restore the unit to combat readiness after redeployment. This process must be carefully planned and synchronized by all stakeholders, beginning with actions a unit sets in place before the unit deploys. The unit follows the RESET model published in Army RESET ordersand executes RESET tasks while still in theater to redeploy and return the unit to collective training capability as quickly as possible. This enormous task is complex and requires detailed planning, clear communication and intent, and strong unit leadership not only from the unit conducting RESET but also from those supporting the mission (e.g., garrison, contractors, and other Department of Defense organizations). The goal is returning the unit to combat readiness quickly, efficiently, and—most importantly—safely.

To establish a single source of facts documenting the 728th Expeditionary Air Control Squadron‘s deployment to Baghdad in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). This final report is based on information collected from each of the squadron’s work centers in garrison, prior to deployment and during operations at Camp Griffin, Baghdad International Airport, Iraq.

This manual provides guidance for training Army special operations forces (ARSOF) personnel in the techniques of animal pack transport and for organizing and operating pack animal units. It captures some of the expertise and techniques that have been lost in the United States (U.S.) Army over the last 50 years. The chapters on care, feeding, and veterinary medicine compose a considerable portion of the manual; however, this material is not intended as a substitute for veterinary expertise nor will it make a veterinarian out of the reader. ARSOF personnel must have a rudimentary knowledge of anatomy and physiology, common injuries, diseases (particularly of the feet), feeding, and watering to properly care for the animals and to avoid abusing them from overloading or overworking.

(U) Many students of insurgency and counterinsurgency attest to the importance of popular support to each side’s quest to achieve its objectives. Key aspects of popular support, including type (passive or active) and scope (limited or significant), are inarguably important in analyzing an insurgency. However, focusing solely or immediately on these aspects risks glossing over insurgent efforts to set conditions necessary to mobilize such support in the first place. Most notably, these conditions include the generation of compliance and the establishment and institutionalization of control.

The Army has dropped the Vietnam-era name “psychological operations” for its branch in charge of trying to change minds behind enemy lines, acknowledging the term can sound ominous. The Defense Department picked a more neutral moniker: “Military Information Support Operations,” or MISO. U.S. Special Operations Command spokesman Ken McGraw said Thursday the new name, adopted last month, more accurately reflects the unit’s job of producing leaflets, radio broadcasts and loudspeaker messages to influence enemy soldiers and civilians.

U.S. Army Surgeon General Brief on Decreasing Suicides in the Army, February 2, 2010.

A key aspect of our Economic Line of Operation is the creation of economic expansion, employment, and skills development opportunities for the people of Iraq. The “Iraqi First” program seeks to leverage this command’s resources to accomplish this critical task. I expect all commanders to be creative and focused on supporting this program, and to make sound, riskbased decisions that provide economic opportunities for the Iraqi people, without compromising mission critical logistics capabilities, force protection, or safety.

U.S. Army Installation Information Infrastructure Architecture Technical Guide, Distribution Statement C, July 2008.

Under DA Authorization, TRADOC and Rapid Equipment Fielding (REF) purchased TACTICOMP and Ku SATCOM systems for the 1-23 IN, 3/2 SBCT for use during a National Training Center (NTC) mission readiness exercise and future deployment. TRADOC Spiral Development Division tasked USAIC Infantry Futures and the SBL to observe the unit and their employment of these systems. The observation team was a compilation of personnel from the SBL Futures Branch, TSM-SB C4ISR, and DCD Battle Command Division.

The IED Effects Simulator (IEDES) kit is a Training Aids Device that will assist the Army in training the joint and individual service on operational support tasks, conditions, and standards needed to achieve U.S. Military IED objectives. The IEDES is configured to simulate a Small, Medium, Large, and Extra Large explosive signature. The IEDES is designed to train key tasks of Explosive Hazards (EHs) defeat, to predict, prevent, detect, classify, neutralize, mark, report and record EH and to protect personnel, equipment and facilities from EH effects.

(U//FOUO) Army Electronic Warfare Brief, May 3, 2010.

Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) are five- to nine-person teams deployed by the Human Terrain System (HTS) to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of events occurring within their area of operations. The team is composed of individuals with social science and operational ackgrounds that are deployed with tactical and operational military units to assist in bringing knowledge about the local population into a coherent analytic framework and build relationships with the local power-brokers in order to provide advice and opportunities to Commanders and staffs in the field.