January 24, 2012 in U.S. Marine Corps
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Studying past combat helps gain insight into how insurgents may operate in the future. This guide uses short, simple vignettes to highlight common Afghan insurgent tactics. Each vignette focuses on a particular mission profile, such as raids, ambushes, and defending against a cordon and search. While tactics are continually evolving, the Afghans have a well documented history of using similar techniques against foreign militaries. Most of the vignettes in this guide are from the 1980s when Afghan insurgents fought the Soviet Union. Despite being more than 20 years old, many of the tactics remain in use today. For a more complete description of Afghan insurgent tactics against the Soviets, MCIA strongly recommends reading The Other Side of the Mountain by Ali Jalali and Les Grau, which this guide is based on. The final three vignettes in this guide are from recent operations in Afghanistan and demonstrate the evolution of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) by Afghan insurgents.
January 9, 2012 in U.S. Marine Corps
In certain parts of the US government, when an operation has unintended negative second or third-order consequences, they are called “blowback.” The radical Islamic movements in the Pashtun areas today were always present, but putting them on steroids in the 1980′s was pretty short-sighted by any reasonable accounting — a classic case of “blowback.” During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Pakistanis had their own agenda. The Pakistani Army’s intelligence branch, called the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, became extremely powerful by cooperating with the United States and the government of Saudi Arabia to channel roughly $7.2 billion dollars worth of covert foreign military aid to their preferred Mujahideen clients. To control the Mujahideen, the ISI formed seven resistance groups, each with a notional political party associated with it. These became known as “the Peshawar Seven.” CIA oversight of the covert money was weak, and much of it went into ISI’s pockets.
January 8, 2012 in U.S. Marine Corps
The focus of Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) is the personal development of each Marine in a team framework using a standardized, trainable, and sustainable close combat fighting system. As a weapon-based system, all techniques are integrated with equipment, physical challenges, and tactics found on the modern battlefield. The MCMAP is designed to increase the warfighting capabilities of individual Marines and units, enhance Marines’ self-confidence and esprit de corps, and foster the warrior ethos in all Marines. The MCMAP is a weapon-based system rooted in the credo that every Marine is a rifleman and will engage the aggressor from 500 meters to close quarter combat.
December 29, 2011 in Department of Defense
The Kill Box MTTP reinforces kill boxes as three-dimensional areas used to facilitate the integration of joint fires while also being a permissive fire support coordination measure (FSCM) in accordance with JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. The publication offers a detailed explanation of kill box employment and provides information to effectively organize, plan, and execute kill box procedures.
December 17, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
To inform Deputy Commandants (DCs) Aviation, Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), Installations and Logistics (I&L), Commanding General (CG), Training and Education Command (TECOM), Director of Intelligence, operating forces, and others on results of a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) collection conducted April – May 2011 to document lessons and observations regarding unmanned aerial systems (UAS) operations in support of Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
December 5, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
The purpose of this document is to outline the role of female engagement on the ground and best uses of female engagement initiatives. While existing academic literature on females in Afghanistan is limited mostly to the urban areas, it is evident that the lives of women in rural Helmand are complex and difficult than is generally understood from open source and academic literature. Female engagement encompasses methodical, long-term outreach efforts to the entire population, men, women, and children, which is essential in a counterinsurgency. Such engagement efforts provide opportunities to connect with both men and women, counter negative Taliban IO efforts, and improve civil affairs efforts.
September 2, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
This paper summarizes the responses of six Marine battalion commanders who served in stability and support operations (SASO) and counterinsurgency (COIN) environments of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). These commanders were interviewed on their approach to their duties, how they exercised their authority and balanced the use of kinetic and non-kinetic effects in accomplishing their myriad missions and tasks. The content of this report may serve to guide future commanders.
May 28, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 4-11.9, Ammunition Logistics, provides guidance for commanders, staffs, logisticians, ammunition and aviation ordnance officers, supply officers, and ammunition and aviation ordnance Marines. This publication discusses the Marine Corps ammunition and aviation ordnance communities’ organization and support structure, the general responsibilities of ammunition and aviation ordnance personnel, the systems used in support of ammunition logistics, planning considerations, safety issues, training, and the regulatory environment in which Marine Corps ammunition logistic operations are planned and executed. Various elements of Navy supporting establishments with ammunition responsibilities that have not been addressed in other USMC Service doctrine are introduced in the MCWP 4-11.9.
January 24, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5239.1 formally establishes the Marine Corps Information Assurance Program (MCIAP) and defines the responsibilities for protecting the Marine Corps information infrastructure as well as delineating Department of Defense (DoD) directives, instructions, and guidance governing DoD Information Assurance (IA). United States Marine Corps (USMC) IA Enterprise Directive 014 Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) outlines the security configuration and implementation standards for WLANs within the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) boundary security framework.
January 22, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
January 20, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
January 14, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
The Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA) issues Marine Corps Enterprise Information Assurance Directives (EIAD). The EIAD series provides modules that guide the implementation of policy direction established in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5239.2. The modules provide procedural. technical, administrative, and supplemental guidance for all information systems, used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or receipt of data within the MCEN as well as other Marine Corps information systems. Each module focuses on a distinct subject and describes a standard methodology for planning, implementing and executing an element of the Marine Corps Information Assurance Program (MCIAP). The Marine Corps EIAD series will be the authoritative source for implementation of IA policy direction.
January 11, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.4, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations, operationalizes the concept of information operations (IO). This publication introduces doctrine for employment of IO in support of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. IO language and organizations continue to evolve and to be debated. This publication gives Marines a warfighter’s orientation to IO, providing a basis to understand the relevance of IO and a framework to implement IO. This publication is intended for MAGTF planners responsible for both operational and IO planning.
January 9, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
January 2, 2011 in U.S. Marine Corps
This Concept of Employment (COE) describes the overall concepts, structures, and roles and responsibilities for NetOps Command and Control (C2), planning, Network Common Operational Picture (NetCOP), and systems management as it relates to the Marine Corps Enterprise Network‘s (MCEN‘s) Garrison Secret Internet Protocol (IP) Router Network (SIPRNet). It bridges strategic guidance and detailed operational procedures to describe how the MCEN Garrison SIPRNet is operated and defended through NetOps, much like the Tri-MEF SOP is to the tactical environment.
December 8, 2010 in U.S. Marine Corps
This manual provides easy-to-use reference data for the more common items of Marine Corps ordnance equipment. The equipment description sheets, which make up the bulk of the manual, provide a description, function, and technical characteristics of the equipment, including, when applicable, fuel and power requirements, power outputs, major components, and associated components. If available, photographs or drawings of the equipment are provided.
October 27, 2010 in U.S. Marine Corps
In the asymmetrical threat climate of the 21st century, stability and support operations (SASO) are often conducted from a companylevel firm base (FB). These company and platoon size units need immediate, on-scene intelligence support to deal with an enemy that can recruit, rest, and resupply amongst the population in a predominately urban environment. This requires an intense collection and analysis effort by even the smallest unit. And, because of the noncontiguous nature of SASO, it is unrealistic to expect that higher echelon staffs will consistently be available to support them. Therefore, Marines in small units must establish and maintain a limited, but effective, capability for themselves.
October 17, 2010 in U.S. Marine Corps
The information found on the website “WIKILEAKS” is classified information that was transmitted to that public domain site illegally. Per reference (a) and the enclosures, “Classified Information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information.” Despite the circumstances surrounding WIKILEAKS, we must continue to protect similar or identical information commensurate with the level of classification assigned per reference (b), until the information is assessed by the appropriate Original Classification Authority (DCA).
October 5, 2010 in U.S. Marine Corps
This short book provides an up-to-date introduction to the tactics employed by insurgents in southern Afghanistan during the years 2005-2008. It includes vignettes and maps on 19 different tactically significant engagements. The book covers three types of attacks: ambushes, attacks on fixed positions, and defensive engagements. The intended audience is Marines and soldiers going into theatre.
August 31, 2010 in U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Judge Advocates have been providing wartime legal support to operational commanders since the Vietnam War. Judge Advocates who deployed to Operation DESERT STORM reported an increased need for operational law support and a diminished need for traditional military justice (court-martial) support. Observations by Judge Advocates and infantry commanders who served in OEF/OIF between 2003 and 2006 show that the need for operational law support of ground commanders has continued to expand and is now required on a consistent basis at the infantry battalion level.
August 22, 2010 in U.S. Marine Corps
Marines are personally responsible for all content they publish on social networking sites, blogs, or other websites. In addition to ensuring Marine Corps content is accurate and appropriate, Marines also must be thoughtful about the non-Marine related content they post, since the lines between a Marine’s personal and professional life often blur in the online space. Marines must be acutely aware that they lose control over content they post on the Internet and that many social media sites have policies that give these sites ownership of all content and information posted or stored on those systems. Thus Marines should use their best judgment at all times and keep in mind how the content of their posts will reflect upon themselves, their unit, and the Marine Corps.
May 10, 2010 in U.S. Marine Corps
Information Operations (BOTTOM LINE)
•IT IS NOT:
–All about technology
–Focused on individual capabilities, i.e., PYSOP, EW, CNO, etc
–All about influencing key decision makers and populations through operations within and affecting the information environment
–The art of integrating lethal and non-lethal capabilities to affect the information environment (supports combat operations)
–Employed across the spectrum of conflict and throughout every phase (0-5) of operations
–Consistent with strategic communication goals and synchronized with public affairs
The following material was extracted from MCCLL reports based on interviews, lessons and observations from operational units that participated in OIF/OEF over the past 36 months. Although this material is based on collections that took place in 2005 through 2007, comments from recent observers and currently deployed individuals indicate that issues on the ground likely remain the same. Content of this paper is grouped in response to specific questions in the TECOM tasking dated 2 April 2008.