| CHARACTERISTICS AND COMMON VULNERABILITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORY: AGRICULTURAL STORAGE FACILITIES | SENSITIVE HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE | December 15, 2003 | Download |
| POTENTIAL INDICATORS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORY: AGRICULTURAL STORAGE FACILITIES | SENSITIVE HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE | December 15, 2003 | Download |
Common Storage Facility Characteristics
Traditionally, food in America is produced through a series of processes commonly referred to as
the “farm to table” continuum. This process is comprised of multiple components, including
production, distribution, processing, transportation, wholesaling, exporting/importing, retail
sales, and consumption. Each component of the “farm to table” continuum is achieved in a
variety of ways specific to the particular end product being produced. At multiple stages of these
processes, raw agricultural products, farm input supplies, and consumer-ready foods are stored in
large facilities. These agricultural storage facilities include facilities storing raw agricultural
products (wheat, corn, apples, etc.) prior to processing; farm input supplies (fertilizers,
chemicals, etc.), live animals (cattle, swine, chickens, etc.), or processed products ready for
distribution and consumption (cheese, cereals, packaged products, etc.). In this regard, there is
not a “typical” agricultural storage facility. Rather, a variety of facilities specific to the storage
requirements of a given product or component serve the “farm to table” continuum.
Across the stated continuum, agricultural storage facilities are quite varied.
• Raw agricultural products are stored in facilities designed to receive and house a variety
of goods from local producers. The producers send their products to storage facilities
located at processing plants or facilities that store raw agricultural products prior to
distribution to processing facilities. These facilities are traditionally located near rural
farming communities from which their particular products are grown.
• Animal and aquaculture slaughtering and rearing facilities represent another aspect of
“agricultural storage” with unique vulnerabilities. Due to efficiencies gained in animal
production as well as storage and distribution, specific vulnerabilities surround the
dissemination of transmittable diseases and the rapid distribution of contaminated
products across the country. Currently, just 2% of America’s feedlots produce 78% of
United States (U.S.) cattle. Nearly all cattle are processed in four slaughterhouses, and
almost all hogs move through four, separate slaughterhouses. Nine farms produce 59% of
the country’s broiler chickens. Poultry, swine, and beef storage, slaughtering, and
distribution efforts are regionally based, and as such, the storage facilities associated with
each commodity are regionally located. This particular “storage” vulnerability has
massive economic, public health, and public confidence implications, which require
multi-jurisdictional preparation, prevention, response, and recovery efforts.
• Storage of processed and packaged goods represent another component of the “farm to
table” continuum. In this component, food products are stored in facilities prior to
distribution to wholesalers, retailers, restaurants, and consumers. Depending on the scale of the storage and distribution facility, this component may represent a more regional
vulnerability.
…
CONSEQUENCE OF EVENT
The consequences associated with an attack on an agricultural storage facility or a series of
coordinated attacks across multiple facilities would depend on the type of event(s), the location
of the event and the type of facility involved. Particular consequences can only be estimated or
inferred from historical events.
Traditionally, much of the emphasis for food-borne contamination has been focused on the actual
food production processes and processing facilities. Traditional food safety practices and the
inspection of these practices by the FDA and the USDA mainly occur at food processing
facilities. In addition to the inspection of processing facilities, industry focuses its resources on
testing for and diagnosis of particular pathogens and toxins in the food processing process. Food
storage facilities have received comparatively little consideration from a food security
perspective.
Estimating the consequence of a deliberate contamination of or an attack on an agricultural
storage facility depends on the downstream impact of the consumption and distribution of the
products stored at a particular location. There is, of course, a local impact associated with the
destruction of a particular facility.
Historical cases can illustrate the quick and far-reaching potential of this type of event. In 1984,
members of a religious cult in Dalles, Oregon, contaminated salad bars with salmonella serotype
typhimurium. Though the attack was locally contained, 751 people became ill, and the
surrounding medical resources were strained beyond their normal capacity. In addition, the event
spread fear throughout the U.S. and temporarily impacted the revenues normally generated at
these types of eating establishments.
Recent outbreaks of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and Foot and Mouth Disease
(FMD) in Britain in 1994 and 2001, respectively, provide some perspective on the human and
economic impacts of contagious diseases spread through the cattle population. Bear in mind that
the spread of such diseases can take place at storage facilities where there is an increased risk of
infection spreading. It is not, however, safe to assume that the spread and impact of diseases and
biological agents are directly linked to vulnerabilities at agricultural storage facilities. During the
1994 BSE outbreak, Britain experienced a 40% drop in cattle sales and a 26% drop in domestic
household consumption of beef and veal. In the 2001 FMD outbreak, more than $63 million was
paid in indemnities to farmers for the slaughter and quarantine of infected cattle. Additionally,
the estimated cost to the British economy was between $3.6 billion and $11.6 billion
(U.S. dollars) for FMD and roughly $5.8 billion (U.S. dollars) for BSE.
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