A collection of all Combat Integration Support Team (CIST) Global IED Reports for the month of June 2016. The reports are produced by the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, formerly the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).
Shabaab al-Mujahideen (aka al-Shabaab, aka Mujahideen Youth Movement) is the Salafist-Jihadist off-shoot of the Mogadishu-based Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Al-Shabaab’s leaders maintain connections with al-Qaeda, and receives financial, logistical, and rhetorical support. The group is fighting the internationally recognized TFG for control of Somalia’s southern cities, and ultimately seeks to control the entire Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab employs IEDs in support of its broader strategy of ousting the TFG and the contingent of African Union peacekeepers (mostly from Uganda and Burundi) protecting the TFG, called the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As a result, their IEDs target TFG and AMISOM personnel and operations. Al-Shabaab will continue to focus its IED efforts against TFG and AMISOM operations, primarily in Mogadishu, as part of an al-Qaeda-inspired strategy of attrition and exhaustion.
Despite official statistics showing a decrease in the number of arrests related to Salafist-jihadist activity, EU-based security services have thwarted numerous IED-centered plots since 2003. Many of the EU plots involve al Qaeda-networked terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and included plots in Spain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (UK). Two recent plots are representative of the current IED threat in the EU: the Sauerland plot in Germany (2007) and the Barcelona plot in Spain (2008).
This is a working paper for an ongoing SNA Tool Comparison effort at the Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence Center’s (COIC) Data Analysis Research and Collaboration (DAR C) Cell. It contains the results of the first phase of this effort. A Power Point presentation summarizing this paper is also available. This paper will be edited and amended as additional results become available from subsequent phases. The objective of this study was to compare and analyze four different Social Network Analysis (SNA) tools for the basic measures of Centrality (Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector), in order to set a baseline for further evaluation of the tools and their capabilities. The four tools compared were Analyst Notebook (ANB), Palantir, UCINet and ORA.
This field guide provides small unit leaders and individual Soldiers and Marines a proven collection of actions to focus their efforts while attacking networks. Primarily, these actions consist of mission analysis, briefing, and execution and are adapted for use by these small unit leaders in a population-centric operating environment.
A monthly report from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) detailing IED usage and casualties statistics from every U.S. combatant command for August 2012.
This first edition of the Attack the Network (AtN) Lexicon was produced by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The lexicon contents were developed after extensive interviews with military units who successfully employed AtN principles and practices to reduce the number and effectiveness of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment where they encountered multiple and sometimes interconnected adversary networks. The lexicon contents were further developed and refined by subject matter experts from over fifty organizations across the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security.
This study investigates Iran’s strategy of smuggling weapons to Afghan insurgents. Based on the hypothesis that Iran utilizes its weapons smuggling networks as proxies to leverage against foreign threats with predictable results, this study will address Iran’s future weapons smuggling behaviors. Iran, like the United States, is a complex actor pursuing rational, national strategic objectives. The perceived dichotomy between Iran’s words and actions results in an atmosphere of suspicion surrounding Iranian motives that can potentially lead to unintended escalations between Iran and other nations. An increase in tensions between the U.S. and Iran, specifically over perceived threats to Iranian sovereignty, will be matched with an increase in the rate and quantity of weapons, an introduction of more capable weapons, or both. Given the elasticity of realizing strategic success by increasing the rate and quantity of weapons, Iran will likely attempt to quickly counter an imminent threat by deploying more destructive weapons comparable to those Iran supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah.
This Recognition Guide focuses on images of VOIED switches, components, and materials. Common IED indicators (observables) are listed and when found, indicate a high probability of IED activity. Refer to this material if something looks: suspicious, out of place, or out of character. This guide is organized by switches (Pressure Plate, Low Metallic Signature, and No Metal Content), main charges, containers, power supplies, initiators, and finally a section on IED factories.
The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow waterway that allows maritime access into and out of the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has identified the Strait of Hormuz as one of six critical chokepoints in the global distribution and trade of oil. The concentration of valuable maritime traffic passing through such a relatively small area makes the Strait of Hormuz a strategic area for the targeting of maritime objectives by groups or nations looking to threaten or disrupt global trade. Iran, located on the north bank of the strait, has made repeated threats to strangle maritime traffic passing through the strait in retaliation for any strike against its nuclear program. In addition, al-Qaeda has reportedly been planning strikes at critical maritime chokepoints over the past decade, including the Strait of Hormuz. Al-Qaeda continues to plan maritime attacks, copying successful tactics from other militant groups such as the LTTE. The Strait of Hormuz would be an ideal target for al-Qaeda’s maritime campaign, either through the use of WBIEDs or conventional maritime weapons.
(U//FOUO) JIEDDO Report: Alternative Motivations for IED Use in Afghanistan, December 11, 2009.
• Enemy will focus on irregular warfare using asymmetric means to attack and influence advanced nations
• Conventional, unconventional, lethal, non-lethal, state supported, non-state, hybrid organizations, extremism… produce a very complex environment