The COVID-19 pandemic sheds an important light on the criticality of futures-based thinking to move us beyond conventional assumptions and positions. In today’s chaotic cycle of rapid change, growing complexity, and radical uncertainty, the national security establishment must develop the skills and flexibility to adapt to the unexpected. To be sure, the fallout from COVID-19 has revealed overlooked vulnerabilities for our supply chains, our society, our economy, and—most pertinent for this report— our national security strategy, which relies on all three. The primary aim of this report is to disrupt how we conceptualize national security futures. Rather than arrive at “definitive” conclusions or prescribe budgetary, policy, or force structure recommendations, this document instead challenges us to consider how the future can defy accepted probabilities to affect the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force.
This publication identifies multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). At the tactical level, it assists military planners, commanders, and individual Department of Defense (DOD) components employing military resources and integrating with National Guard Civil Support activities while responding to domestic emergencies in accordance with United States (US) law.
This Strategic Master Plan (SMP) translates the United States Air Force’s 30-year strategy, America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future, into comprehensive guidance, goals, and objectives. The complete SMP consists of a core narrative, goals, objectives. and four annexes: the Human Capital Annex (HCA), Strategic Posture Annex (SPA), Capabilities Annex (CA), and the Science and Technology Annex (STA). The core SMP will be updated every two years, while the annexes may be revised annually. as required. The SMP’s primary audience includes the Headquarters Air Force (HAF) staff, the Air Force Major Commands (MAJCOMs), and the Core Function Leads (CFLs) that reside within the MAJCOMs who are responsible for planning, progran1ming and budgeting. However, guidance in the SMP also serves as authoritative· direction for all Air Force programs and Flight Plans.
Training guide released in November 2014 for airmen who perform “duties to develop, sustain, and enhance cyberspace capabilities to defend national interests from attack and to create effects in cyberspace to achieve national objectives. Conduct Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) and Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) using established tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to achieve COCOM and national objectives. Executes command and control (C2) of assigned cyberspace forces and de-conflict cyberspace operations across the kinetic and non-kinetic spectrum. Supports cyberspace capability development, testing and implementation. Partners with DoD, interagency and Coalition Forces to detect, deny, disrupt, deceive, and mitigate adversarial access to sovereign national cyberspace systems.”
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency represents a significant renaming and revision to the November 2007 publication Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation CBRN Defense. It expands the scope from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense to all-hazards installation emergency management (IEM), including the management of CBRN events. This publication defines the roles of Department of Defense (DOD) installation commanders and staffs and provides the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) associated with installation planning and preparedness for response to, and recovery from, hazards to save lives, protect property, and sustain mission readiness. The purpose of this publication is to summarize existing policies, responsibilities, and procedures for IEM programs at DOD installations worldwide for all hazards, as defined by DODI 6055.17, and to translate this policy into tactical terms applicable to military installation commanders.
Operations involving DI support using ISR/OPSRECCE/RPA involve a balancing of fundamental interests: conducting aircrew training in support of national security objectives and providing incident awareness and assessment support when requested while also protecting individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the U.S. The primary objective of the ACCI is to ensure that ACC units conducting DI missions within U.S. do not infringe on or violate the Constitutional or privacy rights of U.S. persons. Commanders, inspectors general, and judge advocates at all levels must be cognizant of DI policies.
Both the current fiscal and future operational environments facing the Air Force influence the landscape for investments in the development and fielding of new technologies. This document refines the Air Force strategic vision for the future of RPA and reemphasizes the inherent potential and emerging capabilities of small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS). The RPA Vector outlines concepts and capabilities needed over the next 25 years. It can inform the capabilities planning and requirements development process as well as inform the CFLIs as they execute their responsibilities for implementation planning in the plans, programming, budgeting and execution process.
This report assesses opportunities, risks, and challenges attendant to future development and deployment of UAS within the National Airspace System (NAS) affecting UAS forecast growth from 2015 to 2035. Analysis of four key areas is performed: technology, mission needs, economics, and existing or anticipated challenges to routine use in NAS operations. Forecast effects of emerging technologies as well as anticipating new technological innovations in areas of airframes, powerplants, sensors, communication, command and control systems, and information technology and processing are evaluated. Anticipated mission needs include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as new areas such as stores delivery, cargo transport, search and rescue, and pilot augmentation; example business case models are developed for each of these areas. Challenges to routine UAS usage in the NAS include: absence of legislation and regulations for safe flight in integrated airspace; pilot training and certification; regulatory, policy, and procedural issues; social issues, such as privacy and nuisance concerns; environmental issues, such as noise and emissions; and safety.
This publication identifies multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and Integrating with National Guard Civil Support. It sets forth MTTP at the tactical level to assist the military planner, commander, and individual Service forces in the employment of military resources in response to domestic emergencies in accordance with United States (US) law. This MTTP focuses on planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of DSCA operations conducted within the US and its territories.
This functional concept details capabilities and effects necessary to perform operational cyberspace functions desired by the warfighter, from the present through 2030. This concept broadly describes how AFSPC intends to conduct cyberspace operations in support of both joint and AF operations of all types, and provides a foundation for developing more detailed concept documents. Moreover, AFSPC will use this concept, along with emerging joint guidance, to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct cyberspace operations. Finally, this concept provides the operational perspective to underpin the many activities necessary to realize the AF institutional vision for a mature set of cyberspace capabilities.
The United States Air Force (USAF) Blueprint for Cyberspace provides commander’s guidance and intent, identifies opportunities and delineates objectives and strategies that will shape USAF actions over the next five years. This document describes the first phase of a two-phase approach. It defines specific actions to align cyber activities and functions, to evolve and integrate the unique capabilities the USAF brings to the joint fight, and to build cyberspace operational capacity.
Many countries view ballistic and cruise missile systems as cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power. In addition, they present an asymmetric threat to US airpower. Many ballistic and cruise missiles are armed with weapons of mass destruction. Ballistic and cruise missiles present a significant threat to US and Allied forces overseas, and to the United States and its territories. Missiles are attractive to many nations because they can be used effectively against an adversary with a formidable air defense system, where an attack with manned aircraft would be impractical or too costly. In addition, missiles can be used as a deterrent or an instrument of coercion. Missiles also have the advantage of fewer maintenance, training, and logistic requirements than manned aircraft. Even limited use of these weapons could have devastating consequences because missiles can be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.
Nation-state adversaries regularly use accounts on popular social networking sites to facilitate social engineering against DoD members. Information disclosed or discovered on social networking sites creates a significant operations security (OPSEC) concern and in the context of a wide spread collection effort could be by adversaries to form a classified picture.
This Special Product was produced in response to reports of Department of Defense (DoD) personnel becoming victims of internet-based extortion scams known as sextortion. Its purpose is to inform United States Air Force (USAF) personnel of this new online scam and offer mitigating steps that can reduce the chances of becoming a victim.
This publication provides multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) to standardize and describe the use of internet tactical chat (TC) in support of operations. Thus, it provides commanders and their units with guidelines to facilitate coordination and integration of TC when conducting multi-Service and joint force operations.
This Statement of Work (SOW) involves purchasing and installing a Lawful Intercept (LI) capability for the Government of Iraq (GOI). The capability shall include: providing installation, system engineering, system administration, terminal operations support, and mentoring/training Iraqi system operators. The solution should include a disaster recovery feature/configuration that would replicate (backup) the server and database storage at a physically separate facility. LI will provide the GOI a powerful communications intelligence tool to assist in combating criminal organizations and insurgencies by supporting evidence-based prosecutions, warrant-based targeting, and intelligence-based operations.
This publication provides multi-Service TTP for the seamless integration of air assets during the conduct of maritime surface warfare. The maritime domain is defined as the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. AOMSW is intended to support the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives by providing capabilities/forces in support of joint maritime operations. The end state of this publication is a streamlined support process for maritime surface warfare within the joint force maritime component commander’s (JFMCC’s) area of operations (AO).
The Air Force Public Affairs Agency created this guide to help all Airmen safely and wisely use social media. This guide provides simple, easy-to-follow tips to help you use social media tools in your professional and personal life. This guide is for informational purposes only and does not replace official Air Force instructions.
Several statistics reports on unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) mishaps that are compiled yearly by the Air Force Safety Center. The following reports are the most recent that are publicly available.
(U//FOUO) U.S. Air Force Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS) Airpower Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan
“Enduring Airpower Lessons from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)” is one of three lessons learned (L2) focus areas directed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) at CORONA Top 2008. This report is the third and last in a series of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) L2 reports produced for fiscal year 2009 and focuses on Small UAS (SUAS) capabilities and issues.
JFIRE is a pocket-size, quick-reference guide for requesting fire support in accordance with approved joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). JFIRE contains calls for fire, joint air attack team (JAAT) techniques, a format for joint air strike requests, close air support (CAS) coordination and planning procedures, communications architecture, and weapons data.
This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication will assist in advising foreign forces. It serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team missions. This MTTP is intended to provide units and personnel that are scheduled to advise foreign forces (FF) with viable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) so that they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission. Currently, material regarding advising is found in joint and Service doctrinal treatment of foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), security assistance (SA), and unconventional warfare (UW). Several Services are developing documents that focus on basic survival and common advisor skills, but do not sufficiently cover how an advisor team might function at all levels. This MTTP provides guidance that will help to enhance the activities of some advisor functions and improve inter-Service coordination for this joint mission.
Every year as technology grows and advances thus do the threats that surround it. Predicting what new cyber threats to look for may not always be an easy task. By keeping up with the past trends and ever changing current environment, may help to give us a good handle on how to prepare for what may be to come.
U.S. Air Force presentation detailing human interface systems for drone ground control stations from May 2010.
RPAs are revolutionary surveillance and weapons delivery systems – changing the way the Air Force builds situation awareness and engages enemy forces – but their full potential has yet to be realized. To begin to address this issue, the Air Force initiated this study to review the state-of-the-art in RPA operations, focusing on control and connectivity in an irregular warfare (IW) environment. The Panel was specifically tasked to identify RPA architectures and operational concepts centered on human-systems integration, distributed systems operations, and effective command and control – a cluster of concepts and technologies we subsequently labeled as “mission management” enablers. The Panel was also tasked to recommend mid- to far-term S&T development roadmaps for advancing these technologies to improve the flexibility and capability of RPA operations.