This Joint United States-Canada Electric Grid Security and Resilience Strategy (Strategy) is a collaborative effort between the Federal Governments of the United States and Canada and is intended to strengthen the security and resilience of the U.S. and Canadian electric grid from all adversarial, technological, and natural hazards and threats. The Strategy addresses the vulnerabilities of the two countries’ respective and shared electric grid infrastructure, not only as an energy security concern, but for reasons of national security. This joint Strategy relies on the existing strong bilateral collaboration between the United States and Canada, and reflects a joint commitment to enhance a shared approach to risk management for the electric grid. It also articulates a common vision of the future electric grid that depends on effective and expanded collaboration among those who own, operate, protect, and rely on the electric grid. Because the electric grid is complex, vital to the functioning of modern society, and dependent on other infrastructure for its function, the United States and Canada developed the Strategy under the shared principle that security and resilience require increasingly collaborative efforts and shared approaches to risk management.
Radicalization is a critical subset of the terrorist threat. The RCMP defines radicalization as the process by which individuals — usually young people — are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views. While radical thinking is by no means problematic in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism.
The text of the CETA agreement is made public here exclusively for information purposes. The text presented in this document is the text at the end of the negotiations conducted by the European Commission. It will be subject to legal revision in order to verify the internal consistency and to ensure that the formulations of the negotiating results are legally sound. It will thereafter be transmitted to the Council of the European Union and to the European Parliament for ratification. The text presented in this document is not binding under international law and will only become so after the completion of the ratification process.
The Canadian Forces (CF) is organized, equipped and trained to defend Canada and, in cooperation with Canada’s allies, protect and advance Canada’s interests in the world community. While the CF focuses on its purely military tasks, the inherent flexibility of military units, many with unique capabilities, makes the CF a potential source of assistance which may be called upon to support Canadian civil authorities and the Canadian public in Canada. CF domestic operations are any CF activities which provide assistance in response to requests for support from Canadian civil authorities, or from the Canadian public.
This bilateral plan provides a framework for military forces of one nation to support military forces of the other nation that are providing military support of civil authorities. The focus of this document is the unique, bilateral military planning considerations required to align our respective national military plans to respond quickly to national requests for military support of civil authorities. Nothing in this plan prevents either nation from responding unilaterally; rather, this plan will facilitate unity of effort, if and when requests for bilateral support are received.
In 2004, the Government of Canada issued its first National Security Policy (NSP), Securing an Open Society, to ensure that Canada would be prepared for and could respond to future threats. Recognizing that threats to national security are beyond the capacity of individuals, communities or provinces to address alone, the NSP envisaged greater integration and more strategic co-ordination of key security functions, particularly those related to intelligence collection, threat assessments and emergency preparedness through the implementation of a strategic framework and an action plan. To make substantive improvements in integration and co-ordination with regard to terrorist threats, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), in co-operation with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP), are developing National Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Requirements (NCTIR). The NCTIR is envisaged as an integral component of a broader national strategy involving training, information-sharing and a co-ordinated response to terrorist threats involving the whole of government.
Several Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) bulletins were obtained via an information request from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) by Paroxysms. Most of the documents were also simultaneously released to the Globe and Mail, though the collection released to Paroxysms is more complete and contains several additional bulletins that are not included in the other collection.
Tattoos are useful indicators to identify individuals who are members of a gang or a criminal organization. It is important to note that an image may have several different, occasionally innocuous, meanings, depending on the interpretation of the individual or gangs using it. The Organized Crime Section (OCS) is providing the following tattoos and their definitions as a tool to assist officers in detecting gang members or members of a criminal organization. It is important that Border Services Officers contact their Regional Intelligence Officers to assist in determining a subject’s admissibility to Canada.
Coalitions, which are created for limited purposes and for a set time, do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances. Thus, planners must closely study the political goals of each participant as a precursor to detailed planning. Political considerations weigh more heavily with coalitions than with alliance operations. Coalition military operations are not new. The American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) nations have participated together in several coalition operations during the twentieth century. Since human nature has not changed, conflicts over territory, religion, politics, and economics, such as those that prompted previous military operations, will continue to be widespread. The precise role of armies in these operations will vary according to each political and military situation.
American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies Security Force Capacity Building Handbook
SFCB has come to play an increasingly important role in each of our armies over the last decade and will undoubtedly feature in operations spanning the spectrum of conflict in the future. Its affect on organization, training, equipping and doctrine has been felt to a greater or lesser extent by each of us and will help define recent conflicts and their effects. However, SFCB cannot be done in isolation. What must be borne in the military planner‘s mind from the outset is that SFCB is a part of the wider SSR campaign and as a consequence must be part of a comprehensive approach. Furthermore, if coalition partners are present, an extra layer of complexity is present and must be planned for. Failure to take these two aspects into account runs the risk of failure at worst or a fragmented HNSF as a result, at best. This handbook aims to assist the military planner in their approach to SFCB. It is aimed at both commanders and staff officers, primarily on brigade and divisional staffs, although it also has utility for those charged with training, mentoring and advising HNSF forces at the tactical level.
The City of Toronto hereby directs you immediately to stop engaging in the activities listed above and to remove immediately any tent, shelter, structure, equipment and debris from St. James Park. If you do not immediately remove any and all tents, shelters, structures, equipment and debris from St. James Park, such tents, shelters, structures, equipment and debris shall be removed from St. James Park by or on behalf of the City of Toronto. You are further ordered immediately to stop using, entering or gathering in St. James Park between the hours of 12:01 a.m. and 5:30 a.m..
McGill School of Architecture 2011 Cyclical Academic Unit Review (AUR) withheld from students and the public after the dismissal of the Director of the School of Architecture (SoA) Michael Jemtrud. The document outlines the problematic relationship between the SoA and the Faculty of Engineering and attests to the fact that there is a clear division in the faculty over their support of Jemtrud. Students who asked to see the document, hoping to find in it some explanation for the swift and drastic changes made in the school, changes that had a direct impact on their academic careers, were told that the document was always intended to serve only as advisory to the Provost and as such would only been seen by an academic review committee, who would in turn draft a report (of the AUR) and present its findings to the Senate. The first meeting came and went, and the document was not brought up, not even alluded to.
Le ministère des Transports du Québec signe de plus en plus de contrats puisque le volume de ses travaux est en pleine croissance. Sa planification quinquennale fait état de plus de 4 000 projets routiers qui en sont à différentes étapes de préparation. En moyenne, seulement pour les travaux de construction, plus de 700 nouveaux contrats sont octroyés annuellement’. Or dans ce contexte d’externalisation croissante des dépenses de l’État dans ce secteur d’activités, on craint que des entreprises concluent entre elles des ententes secrètes à leur bénéfice, mais qui sont préjudiciables au bien public. On parle ici de collusion entre quelques joueurs majeurs de l’industrie, ce qui permet une prise de contrôle occulte du processus d’attribution des contrats de sous-traitance, réservés alors à quelques initiés. Et si la collusion prend une telle importance dans le domaine particulier de la construction routière, c’est sans contredit en raison du caractère massif et continu des investissements qui y sont faits et qu’on nous annonce encore pour les années à venir.
US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand Joint Public Key Infrastructure Cross-Certification Standards
This section provides the long-term Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) interoperability architecture for the CCEB Allies as agreed at the February 2005 Canberra Collocated Meeting. The architecture enables interoperability through direct cross-certification of each National Defence PKI (NDPKI) in a mesh configuration.
Collection of emails obtained by the Dominion News Cooperative following a request to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade under the Access to Information Act.
U.S. Confidential Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) August 25, 2010 Draft.
You are an important community partner and you can help us with our planning by asking your staff to be alert and vigilant. For instance, ask employees to:
Report to your security officers and the Toronto Police Service any suspicious persons found in the “staff only” areas of downtown locations,
Report to your security officers and the Toronto Police Service any suspicious activity that could be of potential concern such as suspicious photography in or around the work place; suspicious packages; insecure doors;
Photos taken from Flickr.
* The PBO was asked to assess the reasonableness of the security costs for the upcoming G8 and G20 Summits in Huntsville and Toronto.
* The Government of Canada has been relatively transparent, when compared to other countries, on the costs of security related to the summits. The total cost of security for the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits amounts to $930M, which includes $507M for RCMP, $278M for Public Safety, $78M for National Defence and a $55M contingency reserve.
* The PBO found it difficult to find comparable data of past events to assess the security costs related to the 2010 Summits. This is largely due to the lack of disclosure by other jurisdictions, differences in key considerations and cost drivers of summit security and differences between base versus incremental funding.
The Government of Canada has chosen Toronto as the location of the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit on Saturday and Sunday, June 26 and 27, 2010 at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre. Security for the Summit is being managed by the Integrated Security Unit (ISU), a joint security team led by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in partnership with the Toronto Police Service (TPS), the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), the Canadian Forces (CF) and Peel Regional Police (PRP).
Electronic warfare (EW) has been practiced in every conflict since World War I. Fundamentally, the practice of EW has not changed. However, the context in which EW must operate has. The Canadian Land Force has developed new doctrine and has placed a greater emphasis on joint and coalition operations. As well, closer relationships with national and strategic agencies have had significant impacts on the conduct of EW. The purpose of this chapter is to place EW in context of these new developments.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the “freedom of conscience and religion” for every Canadian.
Accordingly, CF regulations direct that, subject to operational and service exigencies, commanding officers shall make provision for spiritual service support and religious accommodation for the soldiers under their command.
This manual is based on the precept that crowd confrontation situations could occur on any CF operation. The doctrine has been
designed to facilitate the use of CCO as a unique operation, which may be a subset of any other CF operation. Where peace support operations (PSO), domestic operations, or armed conflict examples are used, the concepts presented are intended to cover all operations. The manual stresses that the CCO hierarchy can be applied during any operation to assist in the decisions of what equipment to acquire or deploy and what training is to be based on.
The doctrine within publication recognizes that in order to reach enduring operational and strategic end states, the root causes of a conflict must be addressed in light of the given environment and its influencing elements and systems. To this end, land forces do not simply undertake physical activities and effects against adversarial forces. Land forces apply their capabilities to complete a combination of physical activities and influence activities that create effects on the physical and psychological lanes. In doing so, a wide range of targets is engaged. This range will certainly include adversaries, but also other groups, systems, and
individuals within the battlespace and environment that play a role in reaching the operational and campaign objectives and end states.
A COIN campaign is conducted through a specific philosophy and a set of specific principles that guide the application of combat power. It is distinctly different from the conduct of an insurgency itself, and the lines of operation within the COIN campaign must counter the lines of operation of the insurgents. Within the guiding principles, each COIN campaign must be a custom approach to the insurgency at hand. The constant is the fact that insurgency and counter-insurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular support both at home and in the theatre of operations.