Documents

U.K. Operation Yellowhammer No-Deal Brexit Worst Case Planning Assumptions Document

When the UK ceases to be a member of the EU in October 2019 all rights and reciprocal arrangements with the EU end. The UK reverts fully to ‘third country’ status. The relationship between the UK and the EU as a whole is unsympathetic, with many MS (under pressure from the Commission) unwilling to engage bilaterally and implementing protections unilaterally, though some MS may be more understanding. No bilateral deals have been concluded with individual member states with the exception of the reciprocal agreement on social security coordination with Ireland. EU Citizens living in the UK can retain broadly all rights and status that they were entitled to prior to exit from the EU, at the point of exit.

(U//FOUO) DHS Intelligence Bulletin: Worldwide Terrorist Operations Linked to Lebanese Hizballah or Iran

This Reference Aid examines tactics and targets garnered from a review of attacks or disrupted terrorist operations from 2012-2018 linked to either Lebanese Hizballah (LH) or Iran. It identifies behaviors and indicators that may rise to the level for suspicious activity reporting in areas such as recruitment, acquisition of expertise, materiel and weapons storage, target type, and operational security measures, which could assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism agencies, law enforcement officials, and private sector partners in detecting, preventing, preempting, and disrupting potential terrorist activity in the Homeland. This Reference Aid does not imply these indicators would necessarily be observed or detected in every situation or that LH and Iran necessarily use the same tactics or demonstrate the same indicators. Some of these detection opportunities may come during the course of normal investigations into illegal activities in the United States such as illicit travel or smuggling of drugs, weapons, or cash, and lead to the discovery of pre-operational activity.

FBI Report: Ambushes and Unprovoked Attacks on Law Enforcement Officers

Over a number of years, data collected by the FBI’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted {LEOKA} Program began to demonstrate an alarming trend in the number of officers who were killed in ambushes and unprovoked attacks. While the overall number of officers who were feloniously killed was declining, the percentage of officers feloniously killed during surprise attacks was increasing. The LEOKA Program launched a thorough examination of ambushes and unprovoked attacks in an effort to gain insight into the phenomenon and to provide information to enhance training programs for law enforcement officers. The research focused on the mindset and perceptions of officers involved and offenders who carried out those acts. In particular, why the incidents may have occurred and how those involved reacted to the situation.

FBI Cyber Bulletin: Targeting of Audio and Visual Communication Devices on Business Networks to Identify Vulnerabilities for Exploitation

The FBI identified incidents over the past few months in which cyber actors scanned for and sought to exploit audio and visual communication devices on networks to identify vulnerabilities which could later be used to gain access and unlawfully acquire information about the organization. In addition to targeting corporate information, vulnerable devices may be targeted for compromise for use in botnets or other criminal activities. The types of devices targeted include: Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phones, video conferencing equipment, conference phones, VoIP routers, and cloud-based communication systems. While cyber actors have targeted VoIP and other communication devices in the past, the FBI continues to see these devices scanned by cyber actors for vulnerabilities.

(U//LES) FBI Bulletin: Anti-Government, Fringe Political Conspiracy Theories Likely Motivate Domestic Extremists to Commit Criminal, Violent Activity

The FBI assesses anti-government, identity based, and fringe political conspiracy theories very likely motivate some domestic extremists, wholly or in part, to commit criminal and sometimes violent activity. The FBI further assesses in some cases these conspiracy theories very likely encourage the targeting of specific people, places, and organizations, thereby increasing the likelihood of violence against these targets. These assessments are made with high confidence, based on information from other law enforcement agencies, open source information, court documents, human sources with varying degrees of access and corroboration, and FBI investigations.

Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure in the 2016 Election

From 2017 to 2019, the Committee held hearings, conducted interviews, and reviewed intelligence related to Russian attempts in 2016 to access election infrastructure. The Committee sought to determine the extent of Russian activities, identify the response of the U.S. Government at the state, local, and federal level to the threat, and make recommendations on how to better prepare for such threats in the future. The Committee received testimony from state election officials, Obama administration officials, and those in the Intelligence Community and elsewhere in the U.S. Government responsible for evaluating threats to elections.

(U//FOUO) Joint Staff Briefing Paper on China’s “System Attack” Concept of Warfare

China plans to defeat powerful adversaries by systematically targeting the linkages and nodes that hold an advanced network-centric force together as a cohesive whole. The PLA calls this theory of victory “systems attack and destruction warfare,” hereafter, “system attack. Authoritative PLA doctrine emphasizes importance of system attack as China’s “basic operational method” of warfare. System attack is perhaps best remembered as “the American way of war with Chinese characteristics,” since the PLA developed the concept based on observing U.S. military victories In the 1990s. Some of the PLA’s writings on systems attack are clearly aspirational, but this does not preclude the effectiveness of the approach, and the doctrine shows that the Pl.A is thinking seriously and realistically about how to defeat.an advanced adversary. The requirements of system attack are actively driving PLA reform, acquisitions, operations and training, and the doctrine telegraphs how Chine intends to fight.

U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center Report: Mass Attacks in Public Spaces 2018

This report is NTAC’s second analysis of mass attacks that were carried out in public spaces, and it builds upon Mass Attacks in Public Spaces – 2017 (MAPS-2017). In MAPS-2017, NTAC found that attackers from that year were most frequently motivated by grievances related to their workplace or a domestic issue.  All of the attackers had recently experienced at least one significant stressor, and most had experienced financial instability. Over three-quarters of the attackers had made threatening or concerning communications, and a similar number had elicited concern from others. Further, most had histories of criminal charges, mental health symptoms, and/or illicit substance use or abuse.

Joint Publication 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare

All modern forces depend on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, the EMS is the key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as the focus of operations themselves. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS throughout the operational environment.

Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment: Russian Strategic Intentions

This white paper was prepared as part of the Strategic Multilayer Asssessment, entitled The Future of Global Competition and Conflict. Twenty-three expert contributors contributed to this white paper and provided wide-ranging assessments of Russia’s global interests and objectives, as well as the activities—gray or otherwise—that it conducts to achieve them. This white paper is divided into five sections and twenty-five chapters, as described below. This summary reports some of the white paper’s high-level findings, but it is no substitute for a careful read of the individual contributions.

Joint Publication 3-13.3 Operations Security

Commanders ensure operational security (OPSEC) is practiced during all phases of operations. OPSEC is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities. As adversary analysts apply more information to an analytical model, the likelihood increases that the analytical model will replicate the observed force. Thus, current and future capabilities and courses of action can be revealed and compromised.

Joint Publication 3-07.3 Peace Operations

Peace operations are activities intended to build, keep, enforce, or make peace, or when necessary, prevent conflict. They include crisis response and limited contingency operations and frequently involve international military missions to contain conflict, restore peace, and shape the strategic security environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding, as well as to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. They include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace building, peacemaking, conflict prevention, and peace enforcement operations (PEO). Peace operations may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), another international organization, within a coalition of nations, or unilaterally.

Joint Publication 3-72 Nuclear Operations

Nuclear weapons are a key feature of the security environment. Adversaries increasingly rely on nuclear weapons to secure their interests. Those seeking ways to use nuclear weapons for coercion and war termination present complex deterrence and escalation management challenges. US nuclear weapons and the associated capabilities needed to conduct nuclear operations are essential to ensure an effective deterrent.

DoD Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in U.S. National Airspace

This policy memorandum provides guidance for the domestic1 use of Department of Defense (DoD) unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in U.S. National Airspace to ensure that such use is in accordance with U.S. law and DoD policy. Policy Memorandum 15-002, “Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” February 17, 2015 is hereby rescinded. This guidance implements measures identified in DoD’s efficiency and effectiveness review of domestic use of DoD UAS. The revisions in this memorandum streamline the approval process for domestic use.

FBI Private Sector Report: US Adversaries Exploit Social Media Information to Target US Individuals and Government Clearance Holders

The FBI’s Washington Field Office, in coordination with the FBI’s Office of Private Sector (OPS), is informing private sector partners regarding foreign intelligence services’ (FIS) exploitation of social media platforms and data to target corporate and US government (USG) clearance holders. FIS and US adversary intelligence officers are using popular US-based social media platforms to identify, recruit, and conduct operations against USG clearance holders, to include private sector employees or contractors supporting the USG. FIS officers will use popular US-based platforms and their respective countries’ social media platforms for personal and intelligence gathering/operations purposes.

(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI-NCTC Bulletin: ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Appears in Video for the First Time in Nearly Five Years

This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide information on the recent video appearance by the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The video addresses the group’s territorial defeat in Syria, discusses the acceptance of pledges of allegiance from ISIS supporters, and praises recent attacks in Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia. This JIB is provided by the FBI, DHS, and NCTC to support their respective activities and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and private sector security partners in deterring, preventing, or disrupting terrorist attacks against the United States. All video details described in this JIB are taken from the translated transcript of Baghdadi’s speech.

(U//FOUO) FBI Counterintelligence Note: Update on Huawei Chinese Government-Subsidized Telecommunications Company March 2018

With the expanded use of Huawei Technologies Inc. equipment and services in US telecommunications service provider networks, the Chinese Government’s potential access to US business communications is dramatically increasing. China’s intelligence services and Chinese cyber actors could exploit Chinese Government-supported telecommunication equipment on US networks operating as an advanced persistent threat. China makes no secret that its cyber warfare strategy is predicated on controlling global communications network infrastructure.

Restricted U.S. Army Special Forces Military Free-Fall Operations Manual

DODD 5100.01 tasks the Army to “train and equip, as required, forces for airborne operations, in coordination with the other military Services, and in accordance with joint doctrine.” This guidance directs the Army, which has primary responsibility for the development of airborne doctrine, procedures, and techniques, to develop, in coordination with the other military Services, doctrine, procedures, and equipment that are of common interest.

Department of Justice Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election

The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation-a social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he controlled. The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S. political system through what it termed “information warfare.” The campaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. The IRA’s operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA. Section II of this report details the Office’s investigation of the Russian social media campaign.

(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Report: Envisioning the Emergence of Shia Homegrown Violent Extremist Plotters in the US

We assess that a Shia homegrown violent extremist (HVE) attack in the US is highly unlikely absent a catalyzing event that could galvanize some US-based Shia to engage independently in violence. Given sustained bilateral US-Iran tensions, the occurrence of such a catalyst could prompt Shia HVE activity relatively quickly, underscoring the benefits of early engagement with Shia communities about indicators of HVE radicalization. Potential triggering events for such Shia HVE violence include US military action against Iran and Lebanese Hizballah, Shia leadership or senior clerics sanctioning violence in the US, prominent Sunni government attacks on Shia, or high-profile anti-Shia activity in the US, judging from the results of a structured NCTC brainstorming exercise.

(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Guide: Sunni Extremist Attacks and Plots in the US Before 9/11

NCTC assesses that the Sunni extremist threat to the US before 9/11 was characterized by diverse extremist organizations and lone actors motivated by multiple ideological narratives and other factors, including Salafi jihadism, Palestinian nationalism, theological disputes within Islam, anti-Semitism, and anti-Hindu sentiments. We have identified a dozen successful attacks, four disrupted plots, and one attempt to set up an extremist training camp in the US between 1973 and 2001, underscoring the persistent threat from al-Qa‘ida–associated extremists, Palestinian terrorist groups, and Sunni extremist lone actors in the decades leading up to 9/11. These extremists chose a wide array of targets, with the majority of their attacks before 1993 focused on Hindu, Jewish, or Muslim individuals or institutions. Most attacks after that date were against civilian or US Government targets, because of al-Qa‘ida–associated extremists’ focus on indiscriminate mass casualty attacks. In some cases, we lack clear insight into the attackers’ motivations because of information gaps, and FBI disagrees about the motivations underlying two of these attacks.