This Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) establishes the standard operating procedures for when the United States takes direct action, which refers to lethal and non-lethal uses of force, including capture operations, against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hostilities.
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
DoD, DoJ, DHS, ODNI Sharing Cyber Threat Indicators and Defensive Measures by the Federal Government
The abuse of illicit drugs, specifically heroin and cocaine, as well as the opioids fentanyl and oxycodone, has contributed to an increase in drug-related deaths in Philadelphia over the last decade. Specifically, drug-related overdose deaths in Philadelphia have risen 43 percent since 2009, with a corresponding 45 percent increase in heroin-positive toxicology test results.
Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) pose the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States; no other group is currently positioned to challenge them. These Mexican poly-drug organizations traffic heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana throughout the United States, using established transportation routes and distribution networks. They control drug trafficking across the Southwest Border and are moving to expand their share, particularly in the heroin and methamphetamine markets.
DEA continues to identify eight major cartels currently operating in Mexico: Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (New Generation Jalisco Cartel or CJNG), Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO), Los Zetas, Gulf, Juarez/La Linea, La Familia Michoacana (LFM), and Los Caballeros Templarios (Knights Templar or LCT); however, leadership losses for LFM and LCT over the last year have significantly degraded their operational capabilities and organizational cohesion. The attached graphic illustrates fluctuations in the areas of dominant control for Mexico’s major DTOs, most notably the significant expansion of CJNG.
Cell-site simulator technology provides valuable assistance in support of important public safety objectives. Whether deployed as part of a fugitive apprehension effort, a complex narcotics investigation, or to locate or rescue a kidnapped child, cell-site simulators fulfill critical operational needs. As with any law enforcement capability, the Department must use cell-site simulators in a manner that is consistent with the requirements and protections of the Constitution, including the Fourth Amendment, and applicable statutory authorities, including the Pen Register Statute. Moreover, any information resulting from the use of cell-site simulators must be handled in a way that is consistent with the array of applicable statutes, regulations, and policies that guide law enforcement in how it may and may not collect, retain, and disclose data.
Following the Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) April 2011 report on the FBI’s ability to address the national cyber intrusion threat, in October 2012 the FBI launched its Next Generation Cyber (Next Gen Cyber) Initiative to enhance its ability to address cybersecurity threats to the United States. In fiscal year 2014, the FBI initially budgeted $314 million for its Next Gen Cyber Initiative, including a total of 1,333 full-time positions (including 756 agents). In addition, the Department of Justice (Department) requested an $86.6 million increase in funding for fiscal year 2014 to support the Initiative. The objective of this audit was to evaluate the FBI’s implementation of its Next Gen Cyber Initiative.
DoJ Community Oriented Policing Services Facebook, Twitter, YouTube Violent Extremism Awareness Briefs
Online radicalization to violence is the process by which an individual is introduced to an ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from mainstream beliefs toward extreme views, primarily through the use of online media, including social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. A result of radical interpretations of mainstream religious or political doctrines, these extreme views tend to justify, promote, incite, or support violence to achieve any number of social, religious, or political changes.
Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 5 of Executive Order 13636 (Executive Order) requires the DHS Chief Privacy Officer and Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to assess the privacy and civil liberties impacts of the activities the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, or Department) undertakes pursuant to the Executive Order and to provide those assessments, together with recommendations for mitigating identified privacy risks, in an annual public report. In addition, the DHS Privacy Office and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) are charged with coordinating and compiling the Privacy and Civil Liberties assessments conducted by Privacy and Civil Liberties officials from other Executive Branch departments and agencies with reporting responsibilities under the Executive Order.
This document identifies recommended actions and guidance for state and major urban area fusion centers (fusion centers) to integrate information technology, cybersecurity, and cybercrime1 prevention (cyber) intelligence and analytic capabilities. Development of these capabilities will inform local, state, and national detection, mitigation, response, recovery, investigation, and criminal prosecution activities that support and maintain the United States’ cybersecurity.
This Executive Summary provides a brief overview of the results of the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) third review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) use of the investigative authority granted by Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Section 215 is often referred to as the “business record” provision. The OIG’s first report, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of Section 215 Orders for Business Records, was issued in March 2007 and covered calendar years 2002 through 2005. The OIG’s second report, A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section 215 Orders for Business Records in 2006, was issued in March 2008 and covered calendar year 2006. This third review was initiated to examine the progress the Department and the FBI have made in addressing the OIG recommendations which were included in our second report. We also reviewed the FBI’s use of Section 215 authority in calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009.
Any Internet-connected organization can fall prey to a disruptive network intrusion or costly cyber attack. A quick, effective response to cyber incidents can prove critical to minimizing the resulting harm and expediting recovery. The best time to plan such a response is now, before an incident occurs.
DEA Drug Intelligence Report: Rising Oxycodone, Hydrocodone, and Buprenorphine Use in Philadelphia and Delaware
Over the last decade, the states of Pennsylvania and Delaware have experienced a sharp increase in prescription opioid abuse and related overdoses, many resulting in death. In an effort to identify potential sources and demonstrate the availability of these abused pharmaceuticals, the DEA Philadelphia Division Intelligence Program conducted a review and analysis of oxycodone, hydrocodone, and buprenorphine orders by registrants in Pennsylvania and Delaware for the years 2010-2013.
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Plattsburgh Resident Office (RO) and the New York State Police (NYSP) received credible reporting that Tannerite is being used as a substitute for ammonium nitrate using the “one-pot” methamphetamine manufacturing method. Tannerite, an explosive powder, is otherwise used in the making of exploding firearms targets. This is the first time this particular process has been reported in the New York Division’s area of responsibility (AOR).
This final rule revises the existing provisions in the Department’s regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10. The revisions are intended to ensure consistent interpretation and application of the policy; clarify and expand the scope of the policy; and ensure the highest level of oversight when members of the Department seek to obtain information from, or records of, a member of the news media. The most significant change is the elimination of the phrase “ordinary newsgathering activities,” which has been replaced throughout with “newsgathering activities.” The change mandates that, unless one of the exceptions identified in paragraphs (c)(3) or (d)(4) is applicable, when the investigative or prosecutorial need for information or records relates to newsgathering activities, the Attorney General must authorize the issuance of all subpoenas to members of the news media; the use of all subpoenas or court orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(d) or 3123 to obtain communications records or business records as defined by paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (b)(3)(iii); and all applications for warrants to search the premises or property, or to obtain from third-party communication service providers the communications records or business records of members of the news media.
Police leaders who have deployed body-worn cameras say there are many benefits associated with the devices. They note that body-worn cameras are useful for documenting evidence; officer training; preventing and resolving complaints brought by members of the public; and strengthening police transparency, performance, and accountability. In addition, given that police now operate in a world in which anyone with a cell phone camera can record video footage of a police encounter, body-worn cameras help police departments ensure events are also captured from an officer’s perspective.
The 2014 NDTA Summary uses information provided by 1,226 state and local law enforcement agencies through the 2014 National Drug Threat Survey (NDTS). At a 95 percent confidence level, the 2014 NDTS results are within 2.59 percentage points of the estimates reported. NDTS data used in this report do not imply that there is only one drug threat per state or region or that only one drug is available per state or region. A percentage given for a state or region represents the proportion of state and local law enforcement agencies in that state or region that identified a particular drug as their greatest threat or as available at low, moderate, or high levels.
Large-scale events provide local governments with a number of valuable opportunities, including increasing revenue, revitalizing a city, and providing an increased sense of community. With these benefits comes greater responsibility for local law enforcement to ensure the public’s safety. When law enforcement executives are tasked with managing a large event, they can maximize their efforts by learning from other agencies and adopting proven practices. Too often, however, past lessons learned are not documented in a clear and concise manner. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance worked in partnership with CNA to develop this Planning Primer.
Body scanners are used to screen for contraband in a variety of places. Airports, schools, government buildings, and corrections facilities are examples of the types of places that have employed body scanners. Different types of body scanners have different capabilities based on the imaging technologies used and the sophistication of the internal system analysis. Metal detection was one of the first technologies developed to identify metallic objects on a person, but contraband can take many other forms, such as powders (e.g., drugs), paper (e.g., money), and even ceramic or plastic weapons. Correctional facilities in particular are faced with various forms of contraband, and with elaborate methods of evading detection employed by the local population. Manufacturers have responded by producing scanners that are able to detect nonmetallic contraband, as well as systems that can detect contraband inside body cavities. This report identifies commercially available body scanners and discusses the technologies used by these products. Technological limitations pertaining to the type of materials detected and/or the ability to detect contraband inside body cavities are discussed.
This review is a follow-up to three previous OIG reports concerning the FBI’s use of national security letter authorities. In our first and second NSL reports, issued in March 2007 and March 2008, the OIG found repeated instances of the FBI’s misuse of NSL authorities during 2003 through 2006. During our first NSL review we also discovered the FBI’s practice of issuing exigent letters and using other informal methods to obtain telephone records, instead of using NSLs or other legal process. We addressed these practices in a separate report issued in January 2010.
Improved information sharing is a critical component of bolstering public and private network owners’ and operators’ capacity to protect their networks against evolving and increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. As companies continue to adopt the newest technologies, these threats will only become more diverse and difficult to combat. Ensuring that information concerning cyber threats that U.S. companies detect on their domestic networks can be quickly shared will assist those companies in identifying new threats and implementing appropriate preventative cybersecurity measures. But sharing must occur without contravening federal law or the protections afforded individual privacy and civil liberties. In the interest of advancing discussions in this important area, DOJ has prepared this paper providing its views on whether the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.) (SCA) restricts network operators from voluntarily sharing aggregated data with the government that would promote the protection of information systems. We hope that this analysis will help companies make informed decisions about what information legally may be shared with the government to promote cybersecurity.
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Sensor, Surveillance, and Biometric Technologies (SSBT) Center of Excellence (CoE) has undertaken a best practices report of through-the-wall sensor (TTWS) devices for operation by law enforcement and first responder agencies in the United States. These devices use a form of radar to detect movement behind barriers. The ability to sense the presence of individuals through common building materials can be useful during rescue operations, law enforcement operations and other tactical scenarios. This report provides advice, tactics and information related to the use of TTWS in operational settings. The information provides law enforcement individuals and organizations with a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of available TTWS equipment. When put into practice, an agency can make the most of the technology and improve the outcome and safety of operational scenarios in which it is deployed. The best practices report focuses on the use of commercially available TTWS devices suitable for law enforcement or emergency response applications.