This handbook provides the tactical operator, commander, and battle staff with information on planning, executing, assessing, and sustaining information operations (IO). The handbook is based on observations collected in Iraq during July and August 2004 by an IO collection and analysis team (CAAT). The application of this tool is both for training and real-world events the Soldier may encounter in the Iraqi area of operations.
The CERP was formally established by the Coalition Provisional Authority in July 2003 to provide U.S. military commanders in Iraq with a stabilization tool that benefitted the Iraqi people. The program supported urgent, small-scale projects that local governments could sustain, that generally cost less than $25,000, and that provided employment. DoD defined urgent as “any chronic and acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that, in the judgment of the local commander, calls for immediate action.” Among other things, CERP funds were used to: build schools, health clinics, roads, and sewers; pay condolence payments; support economic development; purchase equipment; and perform civic cleanup. DoD used CERP as a “combat multiplier” whose projects helped improve and maintain security in Iraq through non-lethal means. The program was considered “critical to supporting military commanders in the field in executing counterinsurgency operations” and its pacification effects important to saving lives.
This Statement of Work (SOW) involves purchasing and installing a Lawful Intercept (LI) capability for the Government of Iraq (GOI). The capability shall include: providing installation, system engineering, system administration, terminal operations support, and mentoring/training Iraqi system operators. The solution should include a disaster recovery feature/configuration that would replicate (backup) the server and database storage at a physically separate facility. LI will provide the GOI a powerful communications intelligence tool to assist in combating criminal organizations and insurgencies by supporting evidence-based prosecutions, warrant-based targeting, and intelligence-based operations.
SIGIR audits, inspections, and investigations have found serious weaknesses in the government’s controls over Iraq reconstruction funds that put billions of American taxpayer dollars at risk of waste and misappropriation. The precise amount lost to fraud and waste can never be known, but SIGIR believes it is significant. As of June 30, 2012, SIGIR audit reports had questioned $635.8 million in costs, and SIGIR Investigations, working with other agencies, had resulted in $176.84 million in fines, forfeitures, and other monetary results.
(U//FOUO) Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Iraqi Federal Police Advisor Guide
As the U. S. Defense Department scales back operations in Iraq, one of the most significant questions that remains is whether the Iraqi security forces will be capable of maintaining civil order on their own. This manual was produced by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) to help prepare deploying advisors, trainers, and partner forces that will work directly with Iraqi police. The intent is to provide a basic understanding of the country of Iraq and a solid understanding of the current organization and utilization of the Iraqi police. This manual also provides guidance on what it means to work ” by, with and through” a counterpart, and includes observations and insights learned by your predecessors.
To establish a single source of facts documenting the 728th Expeditionary Air Control Squadron‘s deployment to Baghdad in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). This final report is based on information collected from each of the squadron’s work centers in garrison, prior to deployment and during operations at Camp Griffin, Baghdad International Airport, Iraq.
More than 1200 pages listing individual dossiers of detainees currently being held by Coalition Forces inside of Iraq. Each dossier contains a list of reasons for detention, along with the time and place that the individual was detained. The dossiers range in classification level from “For Official Use Only” to “Secret” and are believed to be current as of April 14, 2010. This document was originally made available by the pro-Islamic, Arabic News site al-raeed.net.
1. (U) SITUATION: USF-I, DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND NUMEROUS OTHER ENTITIES IN IRAQ HAVE CONTRACTED SECURITY OPERATIONS FOR FORWARD OPERATING BASES (FOB) AND PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS (PSD) TO PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS (PSC). GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI) HAS IN RECENT MONTHS INDICATED THAT CONTRACTED SECURITY COMPANIES ARE NOT OPERATING WITH THE THE PURVIEW OF ESTABLISHED LAW.
The following material was extracted from MCCLL reports based on interviews, lessons and observations from operational units that participated in OIF/OEF over the past 36 months. Although this material is based on collections that took place in 2005 through 2007, comments from recent observers and currently deployed individuals indicate that issues on the ground likely remain the same. Content of this paper is grouped in response to specific questions in the TECOM tasking dated 2 April 2008.
* (U) To discuss the current status and capabilities of the 505th and 506th ING BNs.
* (U) To discover how the Fallujah Insurgency threatened and „beheaded‟ the leadership of these two BNs causing mass desertions from the two units.
* (U) To inform deploying units on AIFs methods of influencing the allegiance of Iraqi Security Forces (ISFs) personnel.
Recent positive developments suggest that Iraq has made important progress towards political and economic stabilization, although the situation remains fragile and reversible. Recent months have seen a sharp decline in incidents of violence, especially in the Baghdad area, and a corresponding decrease in the rate of internal displacement of the population.
Iraq has had two political transitions over the past year, taking steps toward a constitutionally-elected government. Nevertheless, the country faces a violent insurgency that is impeding reconstruction and economic recovery. Immediate challenges are to restore rule of law, establish political legitimacy, and begin to build credible and inclusive institutions. The ability of the Iraqi Transitional Government to include ethnic and religious groups in the political process over the coming months will be important in determining whether a future constitutionally-elected government will improve security and stability, which are preconditions for successful reconstruction.