The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Execute Order (EXORD) would not enable sufficiently rapid sourcing to provide for the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces for a domestic complex catastrophe.
Tag Archive for Complex Catastrophes
Department of Defense
DoD Memo: Actions to Improve Defense Support in Complex Catastrophes
In a domestic complex catastrophe, with effects that would qualitatively and quantitatively exceed those experienced to date, the demand for Defense support of civil authorities would be unprecedented. Meeting this demand would be especially challenging if a cyber attack or other disruption of the electrical power grid creates cascading failures of critical infrastructure, threatening lives and greatly complicating DoD response operations.
Department of Defense
DoD Memo: Definition of the Term Complex Catastrophe
This definition provides a baseline for follow-on efforts to better identify Defense Support of Civil Authorities requirements and assess a broader range of forces, defense installations assets, and other DoD capabilities that could aid in response to complex catastrophes, if approved by the Secretary of Defense or directed by the President.
Department of Defense
DoD Memo: Implementation of the Defense Support of Complex Catastrophes Initiative
In a domestic complex catastrophe, one whose effects would qualitatively and quantitatively exceed those experienced to date, the demand for DoD support of civil authorities would be unprecedented- DoD must be ready to meet the demand to save and protect lives, and must do so in ways that would not require additional force structure.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Doctrine Publication: Defense Support of Civil Authorities July 2019
ADP 3-28 clarifies similarities and differences between defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and other elements of decisive action. DSCA and stability operations are similar in many ways. Both revolve around helping partners on the ground within areas of operations. Both require Army forces to provide essential services and work together with civil authorities. However, homeland operational environments differ from those overseas in terms of law, military chain of command, use of force, and inter-organizational coordination among unified action partners. This ADP helps Army leaders understand how operations in the homeland differ from operations by forces deployed forward in other theaters. It illustrates how domestic operational areas are theaters of operations with special requirements. Moreover, this ADP recognizes that DSCA is a joint mission that supports the national homeland security enterprise. The Department of Defense conducts DSCA under civilian control, based on U.S. law and national policy, and in cooperation with numerous civilian partners. National policy, in this context, often uses the word joint to include all cooperating partners, as in a joint field office led by civil authorities.
Department of Defense
DoD-M 3025.01 Defense Support of Civil Authorities Volumes 1-3 August 2016
This manual is composed of several volumes, each containing its own purpose. In accordance with the authority in DoD Directives (DoDDs) 5111.13 and 3025.18 the manual assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and identifies authorities for DoD Components to provide support of civil authorities and non-DoD entities. For DoD support described in this manual that is not under the oversight of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)), this manual identifies the offices of responsibility and oversight.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army North Commander Testimony: The Role of the Army in the Homeland
Our history is replete with examples where both Guard and Active forces were employed to respond to our Nation’s disasters. In the recent era, the defining disaster was Hurricane Katrina, a Category 3 hurricane that forced the breach of levies and the subsequent massive flooding of New Orleans. It rapidly overwhelmed the capabilities of Louisiana that saw the C, NGB send upwards of 50,000 Guardsmen from other States and the President send in the 82nd Airborne Division. There have been other similar incidents in our lifetime: Hurricane Andrew (1992) where President Bush sent 2,000 to 5,000 Troops from Ft Bragg, Hurricane Hugo (1989) where over 3,000 Service members were sent in support, and the 1988 Yellowstone Fires where approximately 1,000 active duty Soldiers and Marines provided direct fire line support as part of JTF Yellowstone. These show that there are those potential catastrophic disasters (New Madrid Seismic Zone, Cascadia Subduction Zone, Cyber Attack, or even an Improvised Nuclear Detonation) that can hit the United States where the President will not hesitate to call upon Federal Forces.