Tag Archive for Counterintelligence

Defense Personnel Security Research Center Counterintelligence Reporting Essentials (CORE) Guide

PERSEREC-CORE

Supervisors and coworkers are willing to report on behaviors that have a clear connection to security, such as transmitting classified documents to unauthorized personnel, but they are unwilling to report on colleagues’ personal problems, such as alcohol abuse. Because it was difficult to discern which reporting requirements were clearly related to security, there was very little reporting. PERSEREC, in collaboration with counterintelligence professionals, developed a clear, succinct list of “Coworker Reporting Essentials” (CORE) behaviors that could pose a possible threat to national security and thus should be reported if observed. The draft CORE was reviewed and edited by counterintelligence professionals at the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), and was coordinated by the DoD Investigative Working Group (IWG).

Defense Security Service Counterintelligence Best Practices for Cleared Industry

DSS-CI-Booklet

United States cleared industry is a prime target of many foreign intelligence collectors and foreign government economic competitors. Cleared employees working on America’s most sensitive programs are of special interest to other nations. The number of reported collection attempts rises every year, indicating an increased risk for industry. While any geographic region can target sensitive or classified U.S. technology, DSS has consistently found that the majority of suspicious contacts reported by cleared industry originate from East Asia and the Pacific regions. Every region has active collectors. Cleared contractors should remain vigilant regardless of the collector’s assumed country of origin.

Terms and Definitions of Interest for Counterintelligence Professionals

DoD-CI-Definitions

This Glossary is designed to be a reference for counterintelligence (CI) professionals within the Department of Defense (DoD); however other CI professionals may find it of use. It provides a comprehensive compilation of unclassified terms that may be encountered when dealing with the dynamic discipline of counterintelligence and related activities. Where some words may several meanings within the counterintelligence or intelligence context, a variety of definitions are included.

(U//FOUO) FBI Counterintelligence Vulnerability Assessment for Corporate America

FBI-CorporateAmericaCI

To prevent foreign entities from achieving their goals, a Counterintelligence Program (CIP) proactively searches for and uses information from multiple sources. An effective CIP draws information from security programs and other internal systems, as well as from the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC). Once this information is assembled, an effective CIP develops a coherent picture and crafts a strategy to prevent the foreign entity from successfully achieving its goals and minimizes the damage already done. An effective CIP conducts active analysis of available information, requires annual CI education for all employees, and provides a system for immediate referral of behavior with CI implications.

(U//FOUO) DoD Directive: Counterintelligence (CI)

DoD-CI

Defense CI activities shall be undertaken as part of an integrated DoD and national effort to detect, identify, assess, exploit, penetrate, degrade, and counter or neutralize intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, espionage, sedition, subversion, assassination, and terrorist activities directed against the Department of Defense, its personnel, information, materiel, facilities, and activities, or against U.S. national security.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Marine Corps Human Intelligence Exploitation Team (HET) Operations in Iraq Lessons Learned Report

HET is viewed as a highly valuable and effective intelligence generating asset which, in conjunction with other intelligence sources, provides a significant amount of actionable intelligence during operations in Iraq. “The HET teams produced more reporting … than any other intel asset we have out there.” “HETs have been the pointy tip of the spear in this counterinsurgency fight. Two-thirds of MNF-W operations are directly driven by HET operations.” Key observations from this collection include the following.