While the SSI designation can protect sensitive information, it is also vulnerable to misuse. Bipartisan concerns about the use of the SSI designation by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have existed since the promulgation of the SSI regulations in 2004. Through its investigation, the Committee obtained witness testimony and documents that show possible misuse of the SSI designation by TSA. Witnesses detailed instances in which TSA barred the release of SSI documents against the advice of TSA’s SSI Office. TSA also released SSI documents against the advice of career staff in the SSI Office. The Committee’s investigation revealed that coordination challenges exist among the TSA Administrator, TSA’s Office of Public Affairs (OPA), and TSA’s SSI Office.
This guide gives Department of Defense (DoD) staff and contractors an overview of the kinds of marking required to protect classified and unclassified controlled information that cannot be disseminated to all audiences. The guide offers an integrated approach to the major requirements for marking and control of information, briefly explaining the reasons for marking and providing examples of correctly marked information. To facilitate information sharing and declassification processes, whenever practicable a classified attachment, addendum, annex, enclosure, or similar section shall be used when classified information constitutes only a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document.
The Implementation Manual is a companion document developed to provide amplifying and explanatory guidance on the syntax and use of the markings contained in the CAPCO Register. While not the policy basis for individual agencies’ use of any particular marking, the Implementation Manual cites the applicable authority and sponsor for each marking. Some of the Dissemination Controls and Non-Intelligence Community Dissemination Control Markings are restricted to use by certain agencies. They are included to provide guidance on handling documents that bear them. Their inclusion in the manual does not authorize other Agencies to use these markings. Non-US Classification and Joint Classification Markings are restricted to the respective countries or international organizations.
The 2008 version of the Director of National Intelligence’s Classification and Control Markings Register was released via a FOIA request and is available in a redacted form via the Federation of American Scientists. We have obtained an unredacted version and are presenting selected pages alongside the previously released version to highlight the information that was redacted, including several NSA dissemination control markings such as FRONTO, KEYRUT, SEABOOT and SETTEE.
Central Intelligence Agency Classification Management and Collaboration Group (CMCG) Classification Process Quick Reference Guide (QRG) from 2008.
This order directs structural reforms to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks that shall be consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. Agencies bear the primary responsibility for meeting these twin goals. These structural reforms will ensure coordinated interagency development and reliable implementation of policies and minimum standards regarding information security, personnel security, and systems security; address both internal and external security threats and vulnerabilities; and provide policies and minimum standards for sharing classified information both within and outside the Federal Government. These policies and minimum standards will address all agencies that operate or access classified computer networks, all users of classified computer networks (including contractors and others who operate or access classified computer networks controlled by the Federal Government), and all classified information on those networks.
Table of equivalent classification markings in various countries throughout the globe.
* TOP SECRET-The level applied to information whose unauthorized disclosure could cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.
* SECRET-Information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably cause serious damage to national security.
* CONFIDENTIAL-Information whose unauthorized disclosure could cause damage to national security.
* UNCLASSIFIED-Information that is not classified under the EO 12958, as amended.
1.1. Reissues Reference (a) to update policies and guidance on the United States Security Authority for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Affairs (USSAN).
1.2. Outlines the method for transmitting NATO security policies within the Department of Defense and assigns responsibilities for maintaining NATO security worldwide.