The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) reviewed the Independent Assessment, titled Information Security Risks of Anti-Virus Software (hereafter “BRG Assessment”), prepared by Berkeley Research Group, LLC (BRG), and dated November 10, 2017. Kaspersky Lab (hereafter “Kaspersky”) submitted the BRG Assessment to DHS as an exhibit to Kaspersky’s request for DHS to initiate a review of Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 17-01. The BRG Assessment, in part, responds to the NCCIC Information Security Risk Assessment (hereafter “NCCIC Assessment”) on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) anti-virus software and Kaspersky-branded products, dated August 29, 2017. The NCCIC Assessment was attached as Exhibit 1 to an Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secreta1Y for DHS Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) to the Acting Secretary of DHS, dated September 1, 2017 (hereafter “Information Memorandum”). This document is a Supplemental Information Security Risk Assessment and will similarly be attached to an Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for CS&C to the Acting Secretary of DHS.
Since April 2016, a loosely affiliated group of highly trained hackers calling themselves TheDarkOverlord (TDO) have conducted various extortion schemes with a recent focus on the public school system. TDO used remote access tools to breach school district networks and then proceeded to steal sensitive data. To extort money from its victims, including students, TDO threatened violence or the release of stolen sensitive data.
FBI Cyber Bulletin: IP Addresses and Domains Used by Iran-Based Cyber Actors to Attack Victims Worldwide
The FBI assesses a group of malicious cyber actors—likely located in Iran—use Virtual Private Server infrastructure hosted in the United States to compromise government, corporate, and academic computer networks based in the Middle East, Europe and the United States. This infrastructure is used in conjunction with identified malicious domains to support a broad cyber campaign which likely includes the use of e-mail spear phishing, social engineering, and malicious Web sites (“watering hole attack”). These cyber actors almost certainly have been involved in this activity since at least early-2015.
The FBI received information of an additional IP address, 126.96.36.199, which was detected in the July 2016 compromise of a state’s Board of Election Web site. Additionally, in August 2016 attempted intrusion activities into another state’s Board of Election system identified the IP address, 188.8.131.52 used in the aforementioned compromise.
The FBI has identified two Android malware families, SlemBunk and Marcher, actively phishing for specified US financial institutions’ customer credentials. The malware monitors the infected phone for the launch of a targeted mobile banking application to inject a phishing overlay over the legitimate application’s user interface. The malware then displays an indistinguishable fake login interface to steal the victim’s banking credentials. According to cyber threat industry reports, both malware families have targeted foreign financial institutions since 2014, gradually broadening the list to include Western banks, and offered the malware for lease or purchase, respectively, in underground forums. At least as of December 2015, the malware expanded its configuration to include the Android package names of US financial institutions.
A financially motivated cyber crime insider trading scheme targets international law firm information used to facilitate business ventures. The scheme involves a hacker compromising the law firm’s computer networks and monitoring them for material, non-public information (MNPI). This information, gained prior to a public announcement, is then used by a criminal with international stock market expertise to strategically place bids and generate a monetary profit.
The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) assesses with high confidence that cyber threat actors routinely target universities, for the purposes of financial gain, notoriety, or entertainment, and often to gain access to personally identifiable information (PII) and/or sensitive research. MS-ISAC believes universities are inherently more vulnerable to cyber targeting than other state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government entities, due to the non-restrictive research environment with less compartmentalization and less access restriction, which results in more opportunity for infection, and when infection occurs, easier transmission through a network.
The FBI has obtained information regarding a group of cyber actors who have compromised and stolen sensitive military information from US cleared defense contractors (CDCs) through cyber intrusions. This group utilizes infrastructure emanating from China to conduct their nefarious computer network exploitation (CNE) activities. Information obtained from victims and subsequent analysis indicates that they were targeted based on their US Navy Seaport Enhanced contracts. The actors did not target information pertaining to a specific contract but instead stole all information that they accessed via their malicious cyber activities. Any activity related to this group detected on a network should be considered an indication of a compromise requiring extensive mitigation and contact with law enforcement.