An August 2013 presentation from the Texas Department of Public Safety Intelligence & Counterterrorism Division focusing on suspicious activity reporting in relation to critical infrastructure, particularly dams. The presentation is noteworthy for its reference to the use of TrapWire, a private surveillance product designed to correlate suspicious activity across a variety of domains to detect per-operational indicators of terrorist activity.
(U//LES) El Paso Intelligence Center Bulletins: Drug-Smuggling Ambulance, Cocaine in Tin Cans, Contaminated Pot
Three bulletins from the El Paso Intelligence Center on a drug-smuggling ambulance, cocaine hidden in tin cans and pot contaminated with Halon.
The intent of the Houston HIDTA Threat Assessment, produced by the Houston Intelligence Support Center (HISC), is to identify the potential impact of drug trafficking trends within the Houston HIDTA and to deliver accurate and timely strategic intelligence to assist law enforcement agencies in the development of drug enforcement strategies.
A 2010 assessment of pharmaceutical abuse released by the hacktivist collective known as Anonymous provides significant detail about the extent and human toll of prescription medication and “doctor shopping” in Houston and southeast Texas. The bulletin was reported on by major media sources, including the Houston Chronicle, but the report was never released publicly. As far back as 2007, southeast Texas has been referred to as a “mecca” for prescription drug abuse. In October 2007, the Houston Chronicle reported that the amount of Xanax seized by Houston Police had more than quadrupled from the previous year. That same year, narcotics investigators with the Houston Police Department seized 215,946 grams of hydrocodone, an increase of more than twenty-three times from the 9,030 grams seized in all 2005. By 2010, the Houston Chronicle estimated that since 2006 more than 1,300 people had died in Harris County due to the abuse of prescription medication.
(U//LES) Houston High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Overview of Pharmaceutical Abuse and Diversion
The threat of pharmaceutical drug abuse and diversion in the Houston HIDTA has been dangerously high and increasing for the past several years. Drug investigators report that it is becoming more widespread, addicting abusers from middle school to middle age. Perhaps the most concerning threat related to pharmaceutical abuse is the alarmingly high potential for overdose or accidental death from controlled prescription drugs. In Harris County alone, from 2006 through 2008 pharmaceuticals were present in over 66% of the 1533 cases of toxicity-related deaths.1 In 2009, over 78% involved pharmaceuticals. Not only is diversion a deadly problem, it is incredibly profitable. Pain management clinic owners gross an average of $4,000-$5,000 per day at each location. A successful owner running multiple clinics can easily make $75,000 a week from only three operations, getting paid entirely in cash.
On 02/23/2011 Khalid Ali‐M Aldawsari (pictured left), a Saudi national currently attending college at South Plains College, near Lubbock, Texas, was arrested on federal terrorism charges. Aldawsari was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), in connection with the alleged purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary to make an improvised explosive device (IED), in addition to research into possible U.S. based targets. Court documents advise that Aldawsari had performed internet research on how to construct an IED, using chemical components. It has also been alleged he had acquired/taken major steps in acquiring the necessary components and equipment needed to build such a device. According to court documents, on 02/01/2011 a chemical supplier reported to the FBI a suspicious purchase of concentrated phenol, by a man named Khalid Aldawsari. Although the toxic chemical phenol can have legitimate uses; it can also be used to make explosives. Concentrated sulfuric and nitric acids, beakers, flasks, clocks, wiring, and a Hazmat suit were found during 2 FBI searches of Aldawsari’s apartment.
(U//FOUO) Texas-Mexico Border Security Carnage Update, July 2010.
Nuevo Laredo Mexican Drug Cartel Gun Battle Extreme Carnage Overview, July 22, 2010.
Woodman State Jail Security Threat Group Office Gang Dictionary, August 25, 2004.
If you encounter an Apple iPhone where the phone is locked with a Passcode, keep in mind the hand set only allows 5 Passcode attempts before locking out phone. This work-around is limited to iPhones with firmware versions 1.1.2 and earlier. The workaround was disabled on version 1.1.3 in February 2008. Data can be retrieved from the SIM card as well as from the phone handset. To remove the SIM card, place a paperclip in the hole at the top of the phone. Force must be applied to get the SIM holder to pop-up. The SIM card will be inside a plastic tray and can be easily removed. Process the SIM card as normal.
Confidential Harris County Texas Police CJIS Mobile Data Terminal Manual, For Law Enforcement Use Only, 2009.
The Barrio Azteca was organized in the El Paso, Texas, County Jail in 1987 from where it moved to the streets and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice prison system. The Barrio Azteca prison gang – which has chapters in El Paso, Texas, and Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico – has historically been linked to the Juarez Cartel. Barrio Azteca membership is estimated at 3,500 inside and outside of the prison system. Members have been reported in Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, Arizona, California, Oklahoma, Idaho, Washington, Kansas, Illinois, South Carolina, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York and Utah. They participate in enforcing the rules of the Juarez Cartel in El Paso, Texas, and southern New Mexico.
This booklet is published by the Texas Department of Public Safety, Criminal Intelligence Service, with the cooperation of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Security Threat Group Management Office. It is being provided as a resource to assist law enforcement agencies and correctional staff in identifying possible members of Security Threat Groups (STGs) and is not to be disseminated outside your agency.