The primary intent of this Center for Army Lessons Learned publication is to provide a reference to assist commanders and planners in understanding how these complex systems are organized, managed, and operated — from a civilian perspective. It will not make the reader an expert. Each chapter was developed by students attending the Command and General Staff College during an elective course titled “Restoring Essential Services in Stability Operations.”
L&O operations have historically been understood to consist of LE missions supporting U.S. military commanders and their efforts to police our military personnel, civilians, and family members working and residing on U.S. military posts, camps, and stations. (Posts, camps, and stations refer to any U.S. military installation, base, or other location within the United States and enduring installations, bases, or other locations outside the United States employed to support long-term military commitments and/or serve as power projection platforms.) U.S. Army doctrine has not historically focused on L&O operations outside of LE support to posts, camps, and stations. L&O support to the operational commander and the capabilities inherent within LE organizations have been largely disregarded within Army (and joint) doctrine. Recent conflicts and the nature of the threat within the OE have increased the relevance of L&O operations and LE capabilities in support of Army operations. The applications of L&O operations and the requirements for Army LE personnel to conduct these operations have grown tremendously as nation building and protracted stability operations have demonstrated the need for civil security and civil control as critical lines of effort within the larger effort to transfer authority to a secure and stable HN government.
In warfighting and counterinsurgency operations, partnering is a command arrangement between a US security force and a host nation (HN) security force in which both forces operate together to achieve mission success and to build the capacity and capability of the HN force. Partnering is not an end, but a deliberate process, a means to an end. A near-term goal might be the standup and development of a HN force increasingly capable of independent operations and decreasingly dependent upon US partnered support. An intermediate objective might be the transition of lead security responsibility from US to HN force. But the ultimate goal is to become “un”-partnered, to enable the HN force to assume full responsibility for security and stability. In warfighting and counterinsurgency partnering, divorce is not a bad ending, it is the desired outcome.
This report provides an assessment of Department of Defense (DoD) efforts over the past two years to implement requirements set forth in the 2009 DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations. It highlights significant initiatives currently underway or planned throughout DoD and provides recommendations and key findings to achieve further progress.