The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation-a social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he controlled. The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S. political system through what it termed “information warfare.” The campaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. The IRA’s operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA. Section II of this report details the Office’s investigation of the Russian social media campaign.
A collection of documents released publicly on July 11, 2012 in response to a Freedom of Information request from the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet for material relating to WikiLeaks, Julian Assange and Bradley Manning.
A copy of the appeal presented by Julian Assange’s lawyers to the U.K. Supreme Court in the matter of Julian Paul Assange vs. the Swedish Prosecution Authority.
A script produced by the military for the Article 32 hearing of PFC Bradley Manning was released as part of a public court filing and was first reported on by Politico.
Freedom of expression and the right to receive and impart information and its corollary, freedom of the media, are indispensable for genuine democracy and democratic processes. Through their scrutiny and in the exercise of their watchdog role, the media provide checks and balances to the exercise of authority. The right to freedom of expression and information as well as freedom of the media must be guaranteed in full respect of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, hereinafter “the Convention”). The right to freedom of assembly and association is equally essential for people’s participation in the public debate and their exercise of democratic citizenship, and it must be guaranteed in full respect of Article 11 of the Convention. All Council of Europe member States have undertaken, in Article 1 of the Convention, to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” protected by the Convention (without any online/offline distinction).
In April 2011, a colloquium was held at the private military college Norwich University in conjunction with the Vermont branch of the FBI’s Infragard program. These presentations from the colloquium provide insight into government responses to WikiLeaks and other similar initiatives.
Decision by the Queen’s Bench Division of the UK High Court of Justice in the matter of Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority issued November 2, 2011.
This order directs structural reforms to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks that shall be consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. Agencies bear the primary responsibility for meeting these twin goals. These structural reforms will ensure coordinated interagency development and reliable implementation of policies and minimum standards regarding information security, personnel security, and systems security; address both internal and external security threats and vulnerabilities; and provide policies and minimum standards for sharing classified information both within and outside the Federal Government. These policies and minimum standards will address all agencies that operate or access classified computer networks, all users of classified computer networks (including contractors and others who operate or access classified computer networks controlled by the Federal Government), and all classified information on those networks.
Public Intelligence The U.S. Army has launched a web-based program to encourage the reporting of suspicious activity among U.S. military personnel, including “insider threats” like that posed by alleged WikiLeaks contributor Bradley Manning. The “iSALUTE” program, which launched in August…
Collection of emails obtained by the Dominion News Cooperative following a request to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade under the Access to Information Act.
WikiLeaks Financial Blockade Complaint Against Visa and MasterCard concerning infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of the EU Treaty.
A confidentiality agreement that Julian Assange and WikiLeaks allegedly require their partners to sign.
Under my current restrictions, in addition to being stripped at night, I am essentially held in solitary confinement. For 23 hours per day, I sit alone in my cell. The guards checked on me every five minutes during the day by asking me if I am okay. I am required to respond in some affirmative manner. At night, if the guards can not see me clearly, because I have a blanket over my head or I am curled up towards the wall, they will wake me in order to ensure that I am okay. I receive each of my meals in my cell. I am not allowed to have a pillow or sheets. I am not allowed to have any personal items in my cell. I am only allowed to have one book or one magazine at any given time to read. The book or magazine is taken away from me at the end of the day before I go to sleep. I am prevented from exercising in my cell. If I attempt to do push-ups, sit-ups, or any other form of exercise I am forced to stop by the guards. Finally, I receive only one hour of exercise outside of my cell daily. My exercise is usually limited to me walking figure eights in an empty room.
PROTECTING INFORMATION CRITICAL TO OUR NATION’S SECURITY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EVERYONE. THAT RESPONSIBILITY BECOMES MORE COMPLEX IN AN ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US ALL TO PROMOTE GOOD SECURITY PRACTICES ON THE NETWORK, MAINTAINING AN INFORMATION ADVANTAGE WHILE BALANCING INFORMATION SECURITY. WE OWE IT TO OURSELVES AND OUR FELLOW SAILORS AND MARINES TO PROTECT VITAL INFORMATION NECESSARY TO FIGHT AND WIN. REFS A THROUGH E ARE INTENDED TO IMPROVE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF INFORMATION SECURITY. THESE PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICES NEED TO BECOME OUR STANDARD AND NOT THE EXCEPTION.
Julian Assange Swedish Sex Allegations Documentation from November 23, 2010.
ITA is pleased to provide this information update as part of our commitment to support your information assurance efforts. All users are strongly advised against attempting to access information posted on the Internet or browse websites that claim to contain classified information from government owned computing systems. This message is in accordance with Headquarters Department of the Army issued All Army Activities (ALARACT) message issued on August 14, 2010 related to the WikiLeaks website. In addition, the Office of the Administrative Assistant (OAA) Communications has advised that all Department of Defense employees are not permitted to access, review, or search for any material pertaining to the WikiLeaks website from a government-issued computer. Users are advised that doing so may include the user as part of the formal ongoing investigation.
In the wake of the recent WikiLeaks disclosures of U.S. classified information, the U.S. Office of Management & Budget (OMB) and the Department of Defense (DoD) published guidance that prohibits federal government employees and federal contractor personnel from accessing the WikiLeaks web site to view or download classified information. As federal contractors, the Deloitte U.S. Firms and their professionals are obligated to protect the integrity of classified information.
Our national defense requires that sensitive information be maintained in confidence to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, and our homeland. Protecting information critical to our nation’s security is the responsibility of each individual who is granted access to classified information. Any unauthorized disclosure of classified information is a violation of our law and compromises our national security. The recent irresponsible disclosure by WikiLeaks has resulted in significant damage to our national security. Any failure by agencies to safeguard classified information pursuant to relevant laws, including but not limited to Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information (December 29, 2009), is unacceptable and will not be tolerated.
I am writing in response to your 26 November 2010 letter to U.S. Ambassador Louis B. Susman regarding your intention to again publish on your WikiLeaks site what you claim to be classified U.S. Government documents. As you know, if any of the materials you intend to publish were provided by any government officials, or any intermediary without proper authorization, they were provided in violation of U.S. law and without regard for the grave consequences of this action. As long as WikiLeaks holds such material, the violation of the law is ongoing. It is our understanding from conversations with representatives from The New York Times, The Guardian and Der Speigel, that WikiLeaks also has provided approximately 250,000 documents to each of them for publication, furthering the illegal dissemination of classified documents.
The information found on the website “WIKILEAKS” is classified information that was transmitted to that public domain site illegally. Per reference (a) and the enclosures, “Classified Information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information.” Despite the circumstances surrounding WIKILEAKS, we must continue to protect similar or identical information commensurate with the level of classification assigned per reference (b), until the information is assessed by the appropriate Original Classification Authority (DCA).
This video was released in late September 2010 by As-Sahab Media and features U.S.-born Adam Gadahn speaking about Pakistani flood relief. At approximately four minutes into the video, Gadahn references the leak of Afghan war documents by WikiLeaks.
(U/FOUO) 1. ALL ARMY ACTIVITIES ARE DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY REVIEW AND REVALIDATE WHO HAS SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR(SA)/POWER USER PRIVILEGES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) REF A, THESE PERSONNEL SHALL BE GRANTED THE MINIMUM SET OF PRIVILEGES REQUIRED TO PERFORM THEIR JOBS AND NOTHING MORE. ALL ACTIVITIES MUST ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED THESE PERSONNEL AND THAT NO OTHER PERSONNEL HAVE THESE PRIVILEGES. THIS IS KEY TO PRECLUDING UNAUTHORIZED DOWNLOADING AND DISSEMINATION OF SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION.
ARMY PERSONNEL MUST BE VIGILANT WITH REGARD TO THE INFORMATION POSTED ON THE WIKILEAKS WEBSITE AND ANY OTHER WEBSITE THAT PURPORTS TO PUBLISH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. VIEWING, DOWNLOADING OR PRINTING INFORMATION FROM THE WEBSITE COULD POTENTIALLY EXPOSE ARMY NETWORKS TO SENSITIVE DATA OR CREATE SITUATIONS IN WHICH DATA IS IMPROPERLY SAFEGUARDED THUS HARMING OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT MISSIONS VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. INFORMATION MARKED AS CLASSIFIED BUT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS NOT CONSIDERED DECLASSIFIED UNTIL ASSESSED BY THE APPROPRIATE ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY AND A DETERMINATION ON ITS DISPOSITION AND CONTINUED CLASSIFICATION IS RENDERED.
Air Force personnel should not access the WikiLeaks website to view or download the publicized classified information. Doing so would introduce potentially classified infonnation on unclassified networks. There has been rumor that the information is no longer classified since it resides in the public domain. This is NOT true. Executive Order 13526, Section 1.1 ( 4)( c) states “Classified Information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information …