Four days after the mass shooting last July in Aurora, Colorado, a project of the Houston Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security called Ready Houston released a training video to help educate members the public about how to survive a mass shooting. The six-minute video, which was produced with $200,000 from the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Area Security Initiative, includes a dramatic recreation of a man dressed entirely in black walking into an office building and beginning to shoot people at random with a shotgun that he pulls from a small satchel. Variously described as “outlandish”, “surreal” and “over-the-top”, the video has met with mixed responses since it was re-released by several fusion centers and local agencies, including most recently the Alabama Department of Homeland Security.
As we enter an era in which the administration of law enforcement becomes more complicated, greater challenges are thrust not only upon police officials, but also upon the community at large. The bomb threat is one such challenge. The bomber has a distinct advantage over other criminals because he can pick his time and place from afar, and use the bomb threat as a weapon to achieve his criminal objectives. This bulletin has been prepared in order to provide law enforcement and public safety agencies with a working base from which to establish their own bomb threat response capability; and to enable these same agencies, when called upon by potential bomb or bomb threat targets in the business community, to offer assistance in developing guidelines for a bomb threat response plan.
Because the operational environment (OE) requires Army forces to operate in urban areas, commanders must have accurate information on the complex human elements, infrastructure, and physical terrain that make up the urban environment. The limits on imagery and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) capabilities place a premium on human-based visual reconnaissance. Reconnaissance troops and platoons must be trained to gather and analyze the necessary information and provide it to their commanders and higher headquarters. This chapter discusses definitions, training strategy, prerequisite training, individual task training, and collective task training designed to prepare reconnaissance units at troop level and below for operations in urban terrain.
The Council of Governors and the President of the United States have identified the need for Dual Status Commanders (DSC) to unify the response efforts within the 54 Territories and States of the United States of America. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has identified Title 10 Deputy Commanders (O-6 in grade) to lead a Joint Support Force Staff Element (JSF-SE) that will integrate with the State-Level DSC staff in order to provide unity of effort to the response of both Title 32/State Active Duty (SAD) and Title 10 forces. This Standard Operating Procedures document outlines the USNORTHCOM Staff support to the DSC Program, a template for a T10 Deputy Commander Handbook and the methods, procedures and best practices for the JSF-SE.
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Publication Series is the authoritative reference defining the Commands’ missions and structure, force employment objectives, mission area planning considerations and operational processes from the strategic to the tactical level. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Publication Series also defines the Commands’ doctrine, as well as their operational tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Publication Series is authoritative because it defines the actions and methods implementing joint doctrine and describes how assigned and attached military forces will be employed in the Commands’ joint and combined operations.
This document provides detailed instructions for the implementation and installation of premise wire infrastructure in support of unclassified and classified networks within NSAW, Build-out Facilities, domestic facilities where NSA controls the plenum, domestic facilities where NSA does not control the plenum and all OCONUS field sites. This document provides instructions for implementations and installations of premise wiring in communications facilities, office spaces and machine rooms by ITD Internal Service Providers (ISP), External Service providers (ESP), field personnel stationed at the respective facilities or authorized NSA agents.
National Counterintelligence Executive Specifications for Constructing Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
This Intelligence Community (IC) Technical Specification sets forth the physical and technical security specifications and best practices for meeting standards of Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 705-1 (Physical and Technical Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities). When the technical specifications herein are applied to new construction and renovations of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), they shall satisfy the standards outlined in ICS 705-1 to enable uniform and reciprocal use across all IC elements and to assure information sharing to the greatest extent possible. This document is the implementing specification for Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705, Physical and Technical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-1) and Standards for Accreditation and Reciprocal Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-2) and supersedes Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/9.
Providing support for domestic civilian law enforcement applies to the restricted use of military assets to support civilian law enforcement personnel within the United States and its territories. These operations are significantly different from operations outside the United States. Army forces support domestic civilian law enforcement agencies under constitutional and statutory restrictions, as prescribed by corresponding directives and regulations.
Our national security depends on our ability to share the right information, with the right people, at the right time. This information sharing mandate requires sustained and responsible collaboration between Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and foreign partners. Over the last few years, we have successfully streamlined policies and processes, overcome cultural barriers, and better integrated information systems to enable information sharing. Today’s dynamic operating environment, however, challenges us to continue improving information sharing and safeguarding processes and capabilities. While innovation has enhanced our ability to share, increased sharing has created the potential for vulnerabilities requiring strengthened safeguarding practices. The 2012 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding provides guidance for effective development, integration, and implementation of policies, processes, standards, and technologies to promote secure and responsible information sharing.
These guidelines set out the approach that prosecutors should take when making decisions in relation to cases where it is alleged that criminal offences have been committed by the sending of a communication via social media. The guidelines are designed to give clear advice to prosecutors who have been asked either for a charging decision or for early advice to the police, as well as in reviewing those cases which have been charged by the police. Adherence to these guidelines will ensure that there is a consistency of approach across the CPS.
This Reference Aid was jointly produced by DHS and the FBI to assist in the acquisition of detailed information in the aftermath of a successful or attempted radiological terrorism incident that would be of interest to the national law enforcement and emergency response communities. It is intended to help state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies and private sector entities deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.
The following photos depict members of the 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment (3-321 FAR) training earlier this month in preparation for their deployment as a “quick reaction and rapid response force for U.S. Army North Command in support of…
(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Bulletin: Indicators of Suspicious Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Activity
Law enforcement and first responders may encounter chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) related material or equipment at private residences, businesses, or other sites not normally associated with such activities. There are legitimate reasons for possessing such material or equipment, but in some cases their presence can indicate intent or capability to build CBR weapons, particularly when other suspicious circumstances exist.
This newsletter was produced in conjunction with the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Center–Afghanistan (CTC–A) to provide current and relevant information for brigade combat team (BCT), battalion, and company commanders and staffs concerning current U.S. and coalition best practices in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. As a “living document,” it will be updated continuously in order to capture, analyze, and disseminate critical information in support of operations across all lines of effort. It will disseminate key observations, insights, and lessons (OIL) from theater to give commanders a better understanding of the operational environment into which they are preparing to deploy. The information is from your peers—commanders, staff officers, and small unit leaders —who served or who are currently serving in Afghanistan.
This handbook provides installation commanders with the basic information necessary for effective access control to their installations. It does not discuss the technical issues involved with standards and designs. Information regarding standards and designs is evolving and will be resolved by the Headquarters (HQ) Department of the Army (DA) PS Review Board (DAPSRB) and the PS integrated concept teams. This handbook provides commanders with the legal and jurisdictional issues associated with the inspection procedures at an ACP. Additionally, this handbook equips operators (which includes military police [MP], DA police, and sentinels of augmenting units) of an ACP with the various vehicle inspection criteria and measures necessary to conduct an effective ACP.
Terrorists may attempt to steal or divert precursor materials, uniforms, identification, blueprints, documents, access cards, facility vehicles, or other items–possibly with the help of knowledgeable insiders–for use in pre-operational planning or attacks. Emilio Suarez Trashorras, a Spanish national convicted for his role in the 2004 Madrid train bombings, stole the explosives used in the attack and the vehicles used to transport the explosives from a mining company where he worked.
To examine the current money laundering and terrorist financing threats associated with correspondent banking, the Subcommittee selected HSBC as a case study. HSBC is one of the largest financial institutions in the world, with over $2.5 trillion in assets, 89 million customers, 300,000 employees, and 2011 profits of nearly $22 billion. HSBC, whose initials originally stood for Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, now has operations in over 80 countries, with hundreds of affiliates spanning the globe. Its parent corporation, HSBC Holdings plc, called “HSBC Group,” is headquartered in London, and its Chief Executive Officer is located in Hong Kong.
U.S. Army tactical questioning pocket reference guide from December 2010 produced by the Asymmetric Warfare Group. Tactical questioning consists of interviews in the field, as opposed to formal interrogations, and is “used to gain and exploit time-sensitive information for follow-on missions.”
There is provided a device and system for restraining detainees through devices attached to the detainees and configured to administer electrical shocks when certain predetermined conditions occur. Restraining devices may be activated by internal control systems or by external controllers that transmit activation signals to the restraining device. External controllers may be actuated by an external controlling entity such as a detention guard or other person or system, or may be controlled by an enabling signal sent by wired or wireless connections to the controller. There is also provided a system for detainee restraint where multiple detainees may be restrained collectively or individually in a controlled environment such as a detention facility, a jail, or a detainee transport vehicle.
(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Special Report: IED Targeting of First Response Personnel
Although most terrorist IED attacks outside war zones target civilians or symbols of authority and usually involve a single device, some are designed specifically to target emergency response personnel. The most common tactics involve using secondary or tertiary devices in tiered or sequential attacks intended to kill or maim response personnel after they arrive on the scene of an initial IED incident.
This report is intended to stimulate thinking about the rapid and vast geopolitical changes characterizing the world today and possible global trajectories during the next 15-20 years. As with the NIC’s previous Global Trends reports, we do not seek to predict the future—which would be an impossible feat—but instead provide a framework for thinking about possible futures and their implications.
What kind of “suspicious” behaviors might put you in the sights of your local fusion center? A collection of Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) reports from the Washington State Fusion Center (WSFC) obtained by police accountability activist Andrew Charles Hendricks via a Washington Public Records Act request provide insight into the mechanics of suspicious activity reporting at the local level. More than a dozen reports, which are minimally redacted, detail monthly reporting by the WSFC to its “statewide network of agency-selected law enforcement, fire-fighting and critical infrastructure agency representatives” that ensure “vital disciplines are incorporated into the fusion process by serving as the conduit through which homeland security and crime related information flows to the WSFC for assessment and analysis through the state homeland security Regional Intelligence Groups.” According to the State of Washington, the “end state” of the FLO program “is to have FLOs throughout the state in all aspects of law enforcement, fire service and critical infrastructure” to facilitate the flow of information both to and from the state fusion center.
Terrorists may attempt to gain skills and knowledge necessary to plan and execute by obtaining specialized training, soliciting or stealing technical and proprietary information, or reaching out to academics and experts. In 2007, German police arrested three terrorist suspects for allegedly planning and preparing car bomb attacks against US citizens and interests in Germany. The suspects traveled to Pakistan where they received weapons and explosives training from a Pakistan-based Uzbek jihadist group called the Islamic Jihad Union.
This report examines the UASI grant program, including a detailed review of 15 cities that have received funding through the program. It is intended to assess whether spending on DHS antiterrorism grants like UASI have made us safer, and whether the taxpayer dollars that have been spent on these programs have yielded an adequate return on investment in terms of improved security.
In February and March 2012, unauthorized IP addresses accessed the Industrial Control System (ICS) network of a New Jersey air conditioning company, US Business 1. The intruders were able to access a backdoor into the ICS system that allowed access to the main control mechanism for the company’s internal heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units. US Business 1 was using the Tridium Niagara ICS system, which has been widely reported in the media to contain multiple vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to remotely control the system.