Personal information is increasingly distributed online by the media, the public, law enforcement agencies, and even law enforcement personnel themselves. It is imperative that law enforcement personnel understand the importance and consequences of their online activities and be proactive in monitoring and limiting their digital footprint. What may seem like an innocent upload or shared post can have a significant effect not only on law enforcement personnel but on their departments, families, and friends. Law enforcement should take the steps now to protect themselves and their family members before becoming a victim.
InterAgency Board Recommendations on Personal Protective Equipment and Decontamination Products for Fentanyl Exposure
Increased illicit use of opioids, including synthetic opioids such as fentanyl and its analogue carfentanil, is a source of increased risk to responders. Most routine encounters between patients or detainees and EMS or law enforcement do not present a significant threat of toxic exposure. While there are anecdotal reports of public safety personnel being exposed to opioids during operations, they are largely unconfirmed. To proactively address the potential risks, this document establishes guidance for personal protective equipment selection and use, decontamination, detection, and medical countermeasures for first responders who may be exposed to opioids in the course of their occupational activities. Throughout the remainder of this document, the term synthetic opioids will be used to include fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, morphine analogues, the U-series opioids, and others.
As a result of an extensive independent assessment of the San Francisco Police Department’s (SFPD) activities and operations, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) presents findings and recommendations on how to address the agency’s needs proactively in a long-term manner to improve trust between the SFPD and the communities it serves.
Department of Justice Procedures for Direct Actions Against Terrorists Outside U.S. and Areas of Active Hostilities
This Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) establishes the standard operating procedures for when the United States takes direct action, which refers to lethal and non-lethal uses of force, including capture operations, against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hostilities.
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
DoD, DoJ, DHS, ODNI Sharing Cyber Threat Indicators and Defensive Measures by the Federal Government
Cell-site simulator technology provides valuable assistance in support of important public safety objectives. Whether deployed as part of a fugitive apprehension effort, a complex narcotics investigation, or to locate or rescue a kidnapped child, cell-site simulators fulfill critical operational needs. As with any law enforcement capability, the Department must use cell-site simulators in a manner that is consistent with the requirements and protections of the Constitution, including the Fourth Amendment, and applicable statutory authorities, including the Pen Register Statute. Moreover, any information resulting from the use of cell-site simulators must be handled in a way that is consistent with the array of applicable statutes, regulations, and policies that guide law enforcement in how it may and may not collect, retain, and disclose data.
Following the Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) April 2011 report on the FBI’s ability to address the national cyber intrusion threat, in October 2012 the FBI launched its Next Generation Cyber (Next Gen Cyber) Initiative to enhance its ability to address cybersecurity threats to the United States. In fiscal year 2014, the FBI initially budgeted $314 million for its Next Gen Cyber Initiative, including a total of 1,333 full-time positions (including 756 agents). In addition, the Department of Justice (Department) requested an $86.6 million increase in funding for fiscal year 2014 to support the Initiative. The objective of this audit was to evaluate the FBI’s implementation of its Next Gen Cyber Initiative.
DoJ Community Oriented Policing Services Facebook, Twitter, YouTube Violent Extremism Awareness Briefs
Online radicalization to violence is the process by which an individual is introduced to an ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from mainstream beliefs toward extreme views, primarily through the use of online media, including social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. A result of radical interpretations of mainstream religious or political doctrines, these extreme views tend to justify, promote, incite, or support violence to achieve any number of social, religious, or political changes.
Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 5 of Executive Order 13636 (Executive Order) requires the DHS Chief Privacy Officer and Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to assess the privacy and civil liberties impacts of the activities the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, or Department) undertakes pursuant to the Executive Order and to provide those assessments, together with recommendations for mitigating identified privacy risks, in an annual public report. In addition, the DHS Privacy Office and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) are charged with coordinating and compiling the Privacy and Civil Liberties assessments conducted by Privacy and Civil Liberties officials from other Executive Branch departments and agencies with reporting responsibilities under the Executive Order.
This Executive Summary provides a brief overview of the results of the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) third review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) use of the investigative authority granted by Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Section 215 is often referred to as the “business record” provision. The OIG’s first report, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of Section 215 Orders for Business Records, was issued in March 2007 and covered calendar years 2002 through 2005. The OIG’s second report, A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section 215 Orders for Business Records in 2006, was issued in March 2008 and covered calendar year 2006. This third review was initiated to examine the progress the Department and the FBI have made in addressing the OIG recommendations which were included in our second report. We also reviewed the FBI’s use of Section 215 authority in calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009.
Any Internet-connected organization can fall prey to a disruptive network intrusion or costly cyber attack. A quick, effective response to cyber incidents can prove critical to minimizing the resulting harm and expediting recovery. The best time to plan such a response is now, before an incident occurs.
This final rule revises the existing provisions in the Department’s regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10. The revisions are intended to ensure consistent interpretation and application of the policy; clarify and expand the scope of the policy; and ensure the highest level of oversight when members of the Department seek to obtain information from, or records of, a member of the news media. The most significant change is the elimination of the phrase “ordinary newsgathering activities,” which has been replaced throughout with “newsgathering activities.” The change mandates that, unless one of the exceptions identified in paragraphs (c)(3) or (d)(4) is applicable, when the investigative or prosecutorial need for information or records relates to newsgathering activities, the Attorney General must authorize the issuance of all subpoenas to members of the news media; the use of all subpoenas or court orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(d) or 3123 to obtain communications records or business records as defined by paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (b)(3)(iii); and all applications for warrants to search the premises or property, or to obtain from third-party communication service providers the communications records or business records of members of the news media.
Police leaders who have deployed body-worn cameras say there are many benefits associated with the devices. They note that body-worn cameras are useful for documenting evidence; officer training; preventing and resolving complaints brought by members of the public; and strengthening police transparency, performance, and accountability. In addition, given that police now operate in a world in which anyone with a cell phone camera can record video footage of a police encounter, body-worn cameras help police departments ensure events are also captured from an officer’s perspective.
Large-scale events provide local governments with a number of valuable opportunities, including increasing revenue, revitalizing a city, and providing an increased sense of community. With these benefits comes greater responsibility for local law enforcement to ensure the public’s safety. When law enforcement executives are tasked with managing a large event, they can maximize their efforts by learning from other agencies and adopting proven practices. Too often, however, past lessons learned are not documented in a clear and concise manner. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance worked in partnership with CNA to develop this Planning Primer.
Body scanners are used to screen for contraband in a variety of places. Airports, schools, government buildings, and corrections facilities are examples of the types of places that have employed body scanners. Different types of body scanners have different capabilities based on the imaging technologies used and the sophistication of the internal system analysis. Metal detection was one of the first technologies developed to identify metallic objects on a person, but contraband can take many other forms, such as powders (e.g., drugs), paper (e.g., money), and even ceramic or plastic weapons. Correctional facilities in particular are faced with various forms of contraband, and with elaborate methods of evading detection employed by the local population. Manufacturers have responded by producing scanners that are able to detect nonmetallic contraband, as well as systems that can detect contraband inside body cavities. This report identifies commercially available body scanners and discusses the technologies used by these products. Technological limitations pertaining to the type of materials detected and/or the ability to detect contraband inside body cavities are discussed.
This review is a follow-up to three previous OIG reports concerning the FBI’s use of national security letter authorities. In our first and second NSL reports, issued in March 2007 and March 2008, the OIG found repeated instances of the FBI’s misuse of NSL authorities during 2003 through 2006. During our first NSL review we also discovered the FBI’s practice of issuing exigent letters and using other informal methods to obtain telephone records, instead of using NSLs or other legal process. We addressed these practices in a separate report issued in January 2010.
Improved information sharing is a critical component of bolstering public and private network owners’ and operators’ capacity to protect their networks against evolving and increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. As companies continue to adopt the newest technologies, these threats will only become more diverse and difficult to combat. Ensuring that information concerning cyber threats that U.S. companies detect on their domestic networks can be quickly shared will assist those companies in identifying new threats and implementing appropriate preventative cybersecurity measures. But sharing must occur without contravening federal law or the protections afforded individual privacy and civil liberties. In the interest of advancing discussions in this important area, DOJ has prepared this paper providing its views on whether the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.) (SCA) restricts network operators from voluntarily sharing aggregated data with the government that would promote the protection of information systems. We hope that this analysis will help companies make informed decisions about what information legally may be shared with the government to promote cybersecurity.
Attorney General Order on Policy Regarding Questioning, Arresting, or Charging Members of the News Media
This rule amends the policy of the Department of Justice regarding the use of subpoenas, certain court orders, and search warrants, to obtain information from, or records of, members of the news media. The rule also amends the Department’s policy regarding questioning, arresting, or charging members of the news media.
The use of social media is a relatively new phenomenon in policing. Development of formal policy on social media is generally lagging behind practice. A variety of legal, civil rights, and privacy-related issues regarding social media have been raised, but these issues have not yet been settled by legislatures or resolved in the courts. Social Media and Tactical Considerations for Law Enforcement summarizes discussions at a national conference of police executives on these issues, and analyzes the experiences of selected law enforcement agencies in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom that have shown leadership in advancing the use of social media for various purposes. Police agencies can use social media to facilitate two-way communications with the public to disseminate information, manage political demonstrations and other major events, obtain intelligence about “flash mobs” or rioting, and investigate crimes.
This white paper explains the Government’s legal basis for an intelligence collection program under which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains court orders directing certain telecommunications service providers to produce telephony metadata in bulk. The bulk metadata is stored, queried and analyzed by the National Security Agency (NSA) for counterterrorism purposes. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“the FISC” or “the Court”) authorizes this program under the “business records” provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1861, enacted as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 215). The Court first authorized the program in 2006, and it has since been renewed thirty-four times under orders issued by fourteen different FISC judges. This paper explains why the telephony metadata collection program, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Court, is consistent with the Constitution and the standards set forth by Congress in Section 215. Because aspects of this program remain classified, there are limits to what can be said publicly about the facts underlying its legal authorization. This paper is an effort to provide as much information as possible to the public concerning the legal authority for this program, consistent with the need to protect national security, including intelligence sources and methods. While this paper summarizes the legal basis for the program, it is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the program or the legal arguments or authorities in support of it.
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation
A collection of Network Security Agreements (NSAs) entered into with foreign communications infrastructure providers ensuring U.S. government agencies the ability to access communications data when legally requested. The agreements range in date from 1999 to 2011 and involve a rotating group of government agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Defense (DoD) and sometimes the Department of the Treasury. According to the Washington Post, the agreements require companies to maintain what amounts to an “internal corporate cell of American citizens with government clearances” ensuring that “when U.S. government agencies seek access to the massive amounts of data flowing through their networks, the companies have systems in place to provide it securely.”