Even at this late date, it is difficult to assess the precise international impact of the TARP or other U.S. rescue programs because Treasury gathered very little data on how TARP funds flowed overseas. As a result, neither students of the current crisis nor those dealing with future rescue efforts will have access to much of the information that would help them make wellinformed decisions. In the interests of transparency and completeness, and to help inform regulators‟ actions in a world that is likely to become ever more financially integrated, the Panel strongly urges Treasury to start now to report more data about how TARP and other rescue funds flowed internationally and to document the impact that the U.S. rescue had overseas. Going forward, Treasury should create and maintain a database of this information and should urge foreign regulators and multinational organizations to collect and report similar data. The crisis also underscored the fact that the international community‟s formal mechanisms to resolve potential financial crises are very limited. Even though the TARP legislation required Treasury to coordinate its programs with similar efforts by foreign governments, the global response to the financial crisis unfolded on an ad hoc, informal, countryby-country basis. Each individual government made its own decisions based on its evaluation of what was best for its own banking sector and for its own domestic economy. Even on the occasions when several governments worked together to rescue specific ailing institutions, as in the rescues of European banks Dexia and Fortis, national interests often came to the fore. These ad hoc actions ultimately restored a measure of stability to the international system, but they underscored the fact that the internationalization of the financial system has outpaced the ability of national regulators to respond to global crises.
On 18 December 2007, the ECB published the TARGET2-Securities (T2S) User Requirements Document for public consultation. In parallel, the ECB published a note setting out the proposed methodology for the economic impact analysis (EIA) of T2S. This note proposed two indicators to evaluate the potential benefits of T2S for market participants and the European economy. The first indicator is the average cost per settlement instruction. The aim of this indicator is to focus on a direct comparison between the cost per settlement instruction with T2S and the current market structures without T2S.
This consolidated programme plan encompasses all Eurosystem activities and is based on the ECB’s internal detailed planning and an extract of the 4CB’s internal planning. As part of the consolidation exercise, the project office of the ECB and of the 4CB tried to minimise the impact of the 7 additional months needed for the validation of the General Functional Specifications, without impacting the scope of T2S, the expected quality of the final delivery, the price or the go-live date. This was achieved through an increased parallelism of activities, in particular in the production of the UDFS and the conduct of the Eurosystem and User Acceptance testing phases.
Incomplete liberalization is keeping prices high. While many countries in the region have implemented reforms to promote greater competition and private sector participation in various ICT sub-sectors, incomplete liberalization in most of the region has allowed incumbent telecommunications operators to use their monopoly power to keep prices high in areas key to economic development such as international bandwidth and access to Internet. Over the past five years, the policy trend in the ICT sector has moved in one direction – that of more competition – and this i s having a significant positive impact on customers. However, a key issue which is emerging, particularly in relation to the development of backbone networks and broadband services, i s the details of market liberalization and regulation.
This Program Document proposes an Integration and Competitiveness Development Policy Loan (ICL) for Tunisia in the amount o f US$250 million. This ICL supports the key strategc elements o f Tunisia’s 1 I* National Development Plan (2007-1 1) which seeks to strengthen growth and ensure that this growth i s translated into employment. It is also a cornerstone of the World Bank’s program in Tunisia as outlined in the Country Assistance Strategy (FYO5-08) and the Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report (2007) that set out an indicative program for FY09-10.
In September 2008, nearly 2,000 people gathered in Accra, Ghana, for the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF). They represented a wide range o f development actors-low-income countries, middle-income countries, fragile states, donor countries, international aid organizations, global funds, civil society organizations, parliaments, media-but they were united by the goal o f improving the delivery and use o f development assistance. To move this agenda forward, they ended the HLF by endorsing the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA).
There is general agreement that the ongoing global financial crisis has produced a serious decline in the availability of trade credit along with increases in pricing. In order to better understand the current trade environment and develop actions to alleviate some of the problems associate with it, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bankers Association for Trade and Finance (BAFT) have commissioned Flometrix to conduct a survey among banks worldwide.
Iraq has had two political transitions over the past year, taking steps toward a constitutionally-elected government. Nevertheless, the country faces a violent insurgency that is impeding reconstruction and economic recovery. Immediate challenges are to restore rule of law, establish political legitimacy, and begin to build credible and inclusive institutions. The ability of the Iraqi Transitional Government to include ethnic and religious groups in the political process over the coming months will be important in determining whether a future constitutionally-elected government will improve security and stability, which are preconditions for successful reconstruction.
Uruguay is currently in the midst of a dual transition. First, there is an economic transition from the 2002 crisis towards a path of equitable and sustainable development, as the economy continues to recover strongly. Second, there is a political transition, as the victory of the Frente Amplio – Encuentro Progresista – Nueva Mayoría coalition in the October 2004 elections marked a new phase in the country’s political history.
The FY03-05 CAS and the FY06-07 ISN were aligned around Nicaragua’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which was later revised and renamed the National Development Plan in 2005. Although Nicaragua’s core objective to reduce extreme poverty was not achieved to the extent desirable, achievements were made across the program with considerable progress in promoting a stable macroeconomic environment, reducing the fiscal deficit significantly, and lowering external debt to sustainable levels by achieving the HIPC Completion Point and obtaining further debt reduction through the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Growth has been modest averaging around 3.2 percent per year since 2002, and exports have doubled. Though the Bank was instrumental in the increase of poverty spending from 9.6 percent of GDP in 2002 to 13.6 percent in 2006, greater expenditure has yet to translate into significant gains in poverty reduction.