If stopping the vehicle puts it within the estimated casualty radius of the possible IED/VBIED, the driver should speed up and quickly move through the danger area to a tactically safe position and distance (the minimum safe distance is dependent on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC] factors).
U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet, September 6, 2005.
Fort Hood conducts an installation-wide after action review (AAR) to prepare a lessons learned document in response to the 5 Nov 09 incident.
•TO PROVIDE DEPLOYING UNITS A TRAINING TOOL FOR IED IDENTIFICATION.
•TO DEPICT IN PHOTOGRAPHIC FORM, VARIOUS EXAMPLES OF THE IED THREAT AND COMMON IED COMPONENTS FROM CONFLICTS AROUND THE WORLD.
•TO DISCUSS IED FACTS & INDICATORS.
The purpose of this handbook is to provide a quick-reference TTP guide for convoy commanders and their subordinates on how to train for and conduct tactical convoy operations on the asymmetric battlefield in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Below are some suggestions on why to release information as early as possible:
1. The American public, Congress and the media are entitled to “timely and accurate” information about the military, per the DoD Principles of Information (See Appendix).
2. Early release of information sets the pace and tone for resolution of a problem.
3. If you wait, the story will often leak anyway. If it does, you jeopardize trust and credibility.
Individuals not specifically addressed within this definition may be included in our PR responsibilities at the direction of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). This expands Army PR responsibilities considerably as multinational partners, American civilians, and citizens from other nations in our operational areas now become potential recovery obligations for the Army.
Traditional & Constant Threats
* Pirated applications
* Copyright violations
* Illegal downloads
* Illegal applications
* Insider threats
ARFORGEN is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availabilityof trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements.
Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. The efforts of PRTs take place every day during a time when major conflict is commonplace in both countries. PRTs have become an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the indigenous people. Integrated appropriately, PRTs serve as combat multipliers for maneuver commanders engaged in governance and economics, as well as other critical lines of operation. In addition, PRTs serve as force multipliers for U.S. Government (USG) development agencies engaged across the stability and reconstruction sectors.
Subject: FW: FOUO DCGS-A Commanders Handbook On Public Website (i.e., http://publicintelligence.net) (UNCLASSIFIED)
From: “Garcia, Michael F LTC NG USA”
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2009 09:42:46 -0700
CC: “McCue, Thomas V Mr CIV USA USAASC”
It has come to our attention our DCGS-A Commander’s Handbook is posted
on your website. The document is FOUO and needs to be password protect
and removed from your website ASAP.
LTC Mike Garcia
Asst TCM-Sensor Processing
Bldg 41419, Ft. Huachuca, Az 85615
Medical Simulation Training Center (MSTC) Systems are an Army training asset, with a regional training requirement, located at Installations, delivering effective medical training with a standardized training platform for both classroom and simulated battlefield conditions, to better prepare Soldiers for application of medical interventions under combat conditions.
Access to the Intelligence Enterprise is through the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A). This Commander’s Handbook is an overview of the capabilities DCGS-A is providing to the commander. It addresses the benefits of employment of DCGS-A as a whole, rather than any particular fielded version. DCGS-A, as a component to the DoD Distributed Common Ground/Surface System Mission Area program, is greatly contributing to the Joint and combined Warfighter needs.
Soldiers and Families (Active, Reserve and National Guard) are being negatively affected by the National Housing Market Crisis. This crisis can impact a Soldier’s ability to sell, purchase, or rent their homes during permanent change of station (PCS) transfers, thus, leaving the Soldier with financial and/or Family separation challenges. Many Soldiers feel they have only two options, taking drastic financial actions or becoming geographical bachelors.
THE PURPOSE OF THE SPAP IS TO PROVIDE PROPER TRAINING AND OVERSIGHT OF ARMY SUICIDE PREVENTION PROGRAM (ASPP) ACTIVITIES. ARMY COMMAND (ACOM), ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND (ASCC) AND DIRECT REPORTING UNIT (DRU) COMMANDERS SHOULD USE APPENDIX D OF THE ACPHP (INSTALLATION, GARRISON, AND MTF COMMANDER CRITICAL ACTION/TASKS) IN THE FORMULATION OF THEIR SPAP, AS WELL AS GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN AR 600-63.
An “organizational conflict of interest” exists when a contractor is or may be unable or unwilling to provide the government with impartial or objective assistance or advice; and may result when factors create an actual or potential conflict of interest on a current contract or a potential future procurement.
The 11 Star Memo, signed in 2005 By CGs FORSCOM, AMC and TRADOC also addressed this gap with specific recommendations to “Realign CONUS DOIMS from IMA to NETCOM for a more unified support similar to OCONUS; optimize C2 for IT management; provide central oversight for IT resources and support; provide MACOMs single POC; and provide adequate investment in DOIM operations” CSA has specifically directed that “ protecting the Army’s networks is not just G6 or G3 business, but rather it is Cdr’s business at all levels (MSG 161304Z Aug 04). Yet, there is no single commander responsible for security and quality of service ensuring CONUS LWN capabilities are prioritized and available to support warfighting, business, and intelligence domains. And, no one is responsible to represent the Information Needs of the Unit and User through all Operational Phases and ensure access to the global collaborative environment.