According to FM 3-24, the population is the center of gravity for COIN operations. Afghanistan‘s population is roughly half female, half male, but in Afghanistan, the culture segregates by gender. As such, the appropriate operational response that is culturally sensitive to that segregation is to interact male to male & female to female. We want to understand 100% of the community by engaging them directly (Figure 1). By doing so, we get the insight that we need, while being respectful of the culture, yet building the fundamentally essential social contracts founded on trust and established in a cooperative environment. That social contract needs to be with the male and female population…both of whom are making decision about the future of this country, whether publicly or privately. ISAF forces are currently making decisions along all lines of operations that affect the entire population but with limited insight or perspective from the female half of the population.
For the National Security Prosecutor’s Unit (NSPU) or a provincial court to prosecute and convict detainees, including Afghan murder suspects or National Security criminals, capturing units must provide evidence and witness statements against the suspects for use in an Afghan court of law. Appropriate evidence collection may result in admissible evidence in support of effective prosecutions. Turn all evidence associated with the suspect over to Afghan authorities and obtain a thoroughly documented receipt for the evidence.
A 2011 version of the International Security Assistance Force Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) Advisor Guide.
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) Organizational Chart from January 17, 2012.
The level of partnership with ANSF units largely depends on the individual coalition commander’s discretion whether it is a partnered unit or an advisor team. Although this discretion is important to empower leaders on the ground, the current parameters in partnering guidance are very broad which leads to varying levels of effectiveness and consistency. Standardized guidelines would provide specific tasks (e.g. develop and conduct all planning and operations from a Joint TOC) to units designated as ANSF partners. Additionally, true embedded partnership improves ANSF development, mission accomplishment and force protection. The recommendations in this paper offer uniformed standards throughout diverse allied forces, assistance during RIP/TOA, improvement in the development of the Afghan forces, and a path to effective transition.
In the 20th century, the various governments of Afghanistan were actively involved with the international community in adopting human rights initiatives, including gender equality. However, the conservative nature of Afghan society coupled with weak central governance limited each regime’s ability to extend modern programs beyond the major urban areas. Initiatives that the constitutional monarchy and communist government attempted to implement often faced significant opposition from the countryside and were ultimately eliminated with the rise of the Taliban. Afghanistan joined the international community in ratifying the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and established legislation and processes to integrate women into public life from the 1950s through the 1980s. However, in 1996 the Taliban relegated women to a domestic role with brutal enforcement.
The level of corruption across Afghanistan’s public and private sectors represents a threat to the success of ISAF’s mission and the viability of the Afghan state. Corruption undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of Afghanistan’s government, fuels discontent among the population, and generates active and passive support for the insurgency. Corruption and organized crime also serve as a barrier to Afghanistan’s economic growth by robbing the state of revenue and preventing the development of a strong licit economy, thus perpetuating Afghan dependence on international assistance. Corruption also threatens the process of security transition, as institutions weakened by criminality will be unable to accept the transfer of responsibility for security and governance.
Media Operations is responsible for the Command’s media relations activities, including identifying media to engage with to disseminate information, responding to queries, arranging interviews, and advising senior leaders and IJC members on media issues. Media Operations works with local and international media. The staff also manages the IJC media accreditation and embed programs, and works closely with Regional Commands and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) Public Affairs staffs. IJC Media Operations distributes, under its letter head, releases from special operations units.
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) IED Detector Dogs Standard Operating Procedures 3402 from May 2011.
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Standard Operating Procedures for Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel from August 2006.
There is likely to be an IED threat in all military deployments and this should be a key consideration when undertaking the preparation, planning and execution of current and future NATO deployed operations. Generic detail of the threat environments and the C-IED approach are described in Reference A but for each deployment further specific operational analysis must be undertaken to ensure a mission focussed approach. Key to this is the generation of C-IED awareness and capability within the staff at every level of command. This handbook sits under References A and B and is intended to be complimentary to existing NATO doctrinal publications and formation HQ operational planning and capability development. It should be noted that although the handbook is aligned with the AJP 3.15A, it seeks only to provide an operational and tactical level staff perspective. It is designed for use within military HQs at all levels and is equally applicable for National C-IED capability development. It will be a living document and updated and amended in conjunction with NATO publications and the lessons identified/ lessons learned process.
(U//FOUO) NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Status Update
An October 18, 2011 update prepared by NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) to COMISAF regarding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) current status and way-ahead as the Afghans prepare to take the lead.
An October 18, 2011 update prepared by NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) to COMISAF regarding the Afghan National Police (ANP) current status and way-ahead as the Afghans prepare to take the lead.
Afghan National Army Base and Incentive Pay Chart via NATO Training Mission Afghanistan from April 2011.
Comprehensive Agreements on Security of Information Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed in June 2002.
NATO Restricted Outsourcing Balkans Communications and Information Systems Support from January 2008.
The mission of CJTF Phoenix is to train and mentor the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to conduct independent, self-sustained Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Security Operations in order to defeat terrorism and provide a secure, stable environment within the borders of Afghanistan. The ANSF is primarily composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Patrol (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).
The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) is active. It provides for both reintegration (where fighters leave the fight and peacefully rejoin their communities) and reconciliation (where entire insurgent groups reach a settlement with GIRoA that ends hostilities). Reintegration is the focus of this guide. Information is presented on the APRP, its place in the COIN Campaign and ISAF‟s role. It provides those in ISAF with what they need to work with community leaders and GIRoA and ANSF partners to build their understanding of the Programme and its opportunities. It is an Afghan Programme and ISAF‟s role is to assist and encourage GIRoA to implement it fully.
One very important first step in the establishment of a military command structure for NATO was the North Atlantic Council’s selection of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe in December 1950. After General Eisenhower arrived in Paris in January 1951, he and the other members of the multinational SHAPE Planning Group immediately began to devise a structure for the new Allied Command Europe. They quickly established a basic command philosophy that divided Allied Command Europe into three regions: the North, containing Scandinavia, the North Sea and the Baltic; the Center, with Western Europe, and the South, covering Italy and the Mediterranean (Greece and Turkey were not yet members of NATO). As for the organizational structure, General Eisenhower’s initial concept was to give each region an overall Commander-in-Chief (CINC). Underneath the CINCs there would be separate Land, Air and Naval Commanders for each region. This concept made great sense militarily, but its implementation soon encountered major political problems in two of the three regions.
Increasingly NATO nations are being involved in military operations that are radically different from traditional scenarios, and that involve operations in towns and cities that may be occupied by a combination of non-combatants and hostile forces. This will lead to requirements for new concepts of operations to be developed, and the impact of novel sensors, or novel ways of deploying or using existing sensors to be investigated. Previous studies have looked at the requirements for operations in this new theatre but have not addressed sensor characteristics or limitations specifically.
This data represents a complete breakdown of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) planned spending in 2010-2011 by province and per capita as reported in CENTCOM’s CIDNE (Combined Information Data Network Exchange). The data includes information on more than 4300 projects going back as far as 2001.
Naval operations in high latitudes provide unique challenges to planning, seamanship, ingenuity, endurance, and foresight. The elements, always dangerous, become hostile. Mountainous seas, stormforce winds and near-zero visibility for days on end put tremendous strain on men and material. The Arctic has been defined in a variety of ways. For naval considerations, it is considered to be the area surrounding the geographic North Pole consisting of a deep central basin; the peripheral shallow seas (Bering, Chukchi, East Siberian, Laptev, Kara, Barents, and Norwegian); ice-covered portions of the Greenland and Norwegian Seas; Baffin Bay, Canadian Archipelago, Seas of Japan and Okhotsk; the continental margins of Canada and Alaska; and the Beaufort Sea.
Training is a national responsibility and each NATO country undertakes to train its own units with its own facilities to the limits of its own capabilities. Coordination between units of different nationalities is facilitated if training is based on the doctrine promulgated in Allied Tactical Publications. The state of training of submarines taking part in exercises is presumed to be such that antisubmarine operations may be undertaken. Submarines taking part in submarine versus submarine exercises must be given prior approval for advanced anti-submarine exercises by national commanders.
NATO Anti-Piracy Multinational Doctrine Manual containing 813 pages of material relating to Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations, including information on captured persons, materiel and documents.
Thirteen reports and maps from the NATO Information Dominance Center ranging from NATO UNCLASSIFIED to the NATO RESTRICTED level of classification