(U//FOUO) BLUF: The People of FAQIR KHIEL and AFGHANYA villages are not allowing the Taliban to have a presence in their villages and have even used force to run a Taliban commander and his group out.
(U//FOUO) ATMOSPHERIC VALUE: Neutral; The Taliban has suffered heavy losses, including several commanders at the hands of Hezb-e-Islami. These losses have caused them to flee the UZBIN areas of the TAGAB District, KAPISA Province.
(U/ /FOUO) BLUF: If ISAF leaves there will be civil war, even AAF groups are fighting among each other. But the ANA needs assistance if they are going to defend Afghanistan. But the Americans give support to Pakistan even though they support the Taliban and AI Qaeda.
(U//FOUO) ISAF Regional Command SIGACTs Maps October 4-10, 2010.
CSTC-A Afghan National Police Training Facility Maintenance and Life Support Services Contractor Work Statement
CSTC-A requires contracted life support services, to include training facility force protection, in the areas identified in the chart below. These efforts directly support the US and NATO missions to develop a trained and professional Afghan police force, enhancing public security, and supporting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Facilities covered under this requirement support various aspects of the training of the ANP, including providing life support for mentors and trainers of the Afghan government, USFOR-A, and Coalition Forces who support the training of the ANP. Due to the changing nature of combat support requirements, the Contractor shall expect that quantities, types, and/or locations of the services to be required within this geographic area will change over the Period of Performance.
Complete Afghanistan Commander’s Emergency Response Program Project Data from July 31, 2009-August 1, 2010.
Primary Route: Turn left at the main gate. Turn left on to the road parallel to the ISAF Southern Wall. Turn right on the intersection with the road that runs parallel with the ISAF’s East wall with the rear gate on it. Move South following the road until you get on to “Indigo” to the roundabout with route “Violet”. At this roundabout go straight (180º), cross Kabul river. After the Olympic Stadium turm left, proceed to the next intersection (5-way) and turn halfright (45º). Follow the street for about 300m. ACCI gate will appear ahead.
Primary Route: Turn left from the main gate. Pass CFC-A on the south side. At the roundabout go left (270º). Follow route ‘indigo’. First roundabout go straight ahead (180º), after 200m at the crossing turn left. Again after 200m turn right on route ‘green’/ ‘Highway 1’. Follow this road for 2.7km (pass the Kabul zoo (left-hand side)) to the roundabout. Turn left at this roundabout (270º). You are still on route Green. After approximately 1.6km MoCI is on your right-hand side (turn right app 20m before the SIEMENS sign).
(U//FOUO) BLUF: This facility is in dire need of assistance. Daily there are hundreds of children in admittance to this hospital suffering from the following ailments: malnutrition, burns, blast trauma, and the need for urgent surgical intervention. There are very few medical supplies available (few families of the patients can afford the medicine), minimal food (limited to one meal a day), and no consumable medical materials available to adequately treat these patients. The inevitability of death for many of these patients becomes a reality.
Several FOUO Google Earth location maps created by NATO and U.S. forces of Georgian infrastructure and damage to the country following the South Ossetia War in August 2008.
(U//FOUO) ATMOSPHERIC VALUE: Negative: The local people of Zabul Province do not believe that there can be peace made with the Taliban by giving in to some of their demands because there are so many different Taliban leaders fighting for different reasons and goals it would be hard to satisfy all of their demands.
Commander, International Security Assistance Force Campaign Overview June 2010.
ISAF Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) Profile and Branch Locations, August 2009.
(U) Recent Civilian Casualties Have Damaged ISAF. Stories of civilian casualties in Uruzgan and Helmand in February 2010 had a clear and widespread negative impact on Kandahar residents’ attitudes toward international forces. Though the casualties occurred in other provinces, the effects felt by patrolling ISAF troops in Kandahar City included having rocks thrown at them by residents and, in a couple of cases, being spit upon. The negative feelings were not limited to Afghan civilians. Afghan National Police officials in Kandahar City repeatedly brought up the civilian casualties in the Uruzgan air strike with their American police mentors. For more on this subject, see p. 13.
(U//FOUO) Murghab District is a significant poppy cultivation and opiate trafficking region, largely due to its poor, agriculture-based economy and the presence of Taliban forces encouraging cultivation.
ISAF Joint Command District Assessments, April 10, 2008.
Afghanistan’s government structure is designed around a strong, democratic national government. At the national level, the three branches (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) form the foundation of the government, but other entities, such as ministries, the Afghan National Security Forces (military and police), and commissions also carry out government obligations. Below the national level, the public sector consists of provincial-level governments, municipalities, and finally district-level government. However, unlike the U.S. government, each of the 34 provinces does not operate independently of the national government. Kabul, the capital, is the seat of power. Each province answers to the national government.
ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Partnering Directive, August 29, 2009.
ISAF Governance Working Group Brief, May 2010.
All of the PRTs in Afghanistan have been under one theater military command (ISAF) since October 5, 2006, when ISAF completed its four-stage geographic expansion throughout the country by assuming responsibility of Region East. Until then, there were two separate military commands – Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) and ISAF – each commanding PRTs in its own separate area of operation. Bringing all the PRTs under one theater commander constituted a major step forward in achieving unity of effort. But even with a single command, achieving coherence among all 26 PRTs remains a challenge, if for no other reason than, as of March 2008, there are 14 different nations leading PRTs.
Civil-military co-operation is not a new phenomenon within NATO. Traditionally, however, it was seen as presenting little more than a logistic challenge. NATO’s operations beyond its own domestic borders, on territory devoid of fully functioning civil institutions or effective infrastructure present different and more complex challenges. Changes to the environment in which NATO might potentially operate have led to the development of a new Strategic Concept (SC 99)3. This recognises a much wider range of threats to international security than existed hitherto. In addition to continuing to provide for collective defence, the Concept states that the Alliance must stand ready “to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations”.
This document represents the current Concept of Employment (CONEMP) coaltion interoperable intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) system. It provides information for commanders and their staffs on the operational employment of participating network enabled ISTAR systems during coalition operations.
NATO Joint Sea Basing (NJSB) provides the Alliance with another option for the deployment, employment, sustainment and re-deployment of a mission tailored joint force package utilizing a combination of seaborne platforms, strategic sealift and tactical airlift/sealift to rapidly project and sustain multinational forces wherever needed. Simply stated, specified land, air and sea component forces are deployed utilizing existing seaborne platforms resident within NATO member nations’ inventory in conjunction with available strategic sealift assets from the commercial market. Correspondingly, sea basing provides the NATO force commander with a capability to exercise command and control and/or the projection of military and logistics capabilities from seaborne platforms.
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) institutions, corruption, lack of economic opportunity and insufficient physical protection.
• Mission can succeed but requires a fundamentally new approach
– Operational culture of ISAF: focus Counter-insurgency (COIN) on winning support of the people.
– Stronger security partnership: accelerate Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and partner at all levels.
– Responsive and accountable governance: an equal priority with security.
– Internal ISAF organizational changes: Unity of Command, Unity of Effort.
• Time is critical. ISAF must be properly resourced to gain and maintain the initiative while ANSF capacity and capability is built.
In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping.