The intent of U.S. UW efforts is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives. Historically, the military concept for the employment of UW was primarily in support of resistance movements during general-war scenarios. While this concept remains valid, the operational environment since the end of World War II has increasingly required U.S. forces to conduct UW in scenarios short of general war (limited war). Enabling a resistance movement or insurgency entails the development of an underground and guerrilla forces, as well as supporting auxiliaries for each of these elements. Resistance movements or insurgencies always have an underground element. The armed component of these groups is the guerrilla force and is only present if the resistance transitions to conflict. The combined effects of two interrelated lines of effort largely generate the end result of a UW campaign. The efforts are armed conflict and subversion. Forces conduct armed conflict, normally in the form of guerrilla warfare, against the security apparatus of the host nation (HN) or occupying military. Conflict also includes operations that attack and degrade enemy morale, organizational cohesion, and operational effectiveness and separate the enemy from the population. Over time, these attacks degrade the ability of the HN or occupying military to project military power and exert control over the population. Subversion undermines the power of the government or occupying element by portraying it as incapable of effective governance to the population.
Department of Defense
U.S. Navy
(U//FOUO) U.S. Navy WikiLeaks Safeguarding Classified National Security Information Recommendations
PROTECTING INFORMATION CRITICAL TO OUR NATION’S SECURITY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EVERYONE. THAT RESPONSIBILITY BECOMES MORE COMPLEX IN AN ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US ALL TO PROMOTE GOOD SECURITY PRACTICES ON THE NETWORK, MAINTAINING AN INFORMATION ADVANTAGE WHILE BALANCING INFORMATION SECURITY. WE OWE IT TO OURSELVES AND OUR FELLOW SAILORS AND MARINES TO PROTECT VITAL INFORMATION NECESSARY TO FIGHT AND WIN. REFS A THROUGH E ARE INTENDED TO IMPROVE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF INFORMATION SECURITY. THESE PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICES NEED TO BECOME OUR STANDARD AND NOT THE EXCEPTION.
Corporate, Department of Defense
HBGary DoD Cyber Warfare Support Work Statement
Cyber Warfare is warfare in the Cyberspace domain, which is defined by the SECDEF as “a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems and embedded processors and controllers.” Cyber Warfare encompasses Computer Network Operations (e.g. Attack, Defend and Exploit,) Information Assurance, and the network operations that encompass Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and Information Operations (IO) functions that occur within the Cyberspace domain. This includes Computer Network Operations (CNO) against automated systems (e.g. C4ISR), and the interaction between the physical, social and biological networks that define human-machine interaction.
Corporate, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
HBGary DARPA Cyber Genome Technical Management Proposal
While it is a challenging undertaking, we plan to research and develop a fully automated malware analysis framework that will produce results comparable with the best reverse engineering experts, and complete the analysis in a fast, scalable system without human interaction. In the completed mature system, the only human involvement will be the consumption of reports and visualizations of malware profiles. Our approach is a major shift from common binary and malware analysis today, requiring manual labor by highly skilled and well-paid engineers. Results are slow, unpredictable, expensive and don’t scale. Engineers are required to be proficient with low-level assembly code and operating system internals. Results depend upon their ability to interpret and model complex program logic and ever-changing computer states. The most common tools are disassemblers for static analysis and interactive debuggers for dynamic analysis. The best engineers have an ad-hoc collection of non-standard homegrown or Internet-collected plug-ins. Complex malware protection mechanisms, such as packing, obfuscation, encryption and anti-debugging techniques, present further challenges that slow down and thwart traditional reverse engineering technique.
Corporate, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
HBGary General Dynamics DARPA Cyber Genome Program Proposal
Current technologies and methods for producing and examining relationships between software products, particularly malware, are lacking at best. The use of hashing or “fuzzy” hashing and matching techniques are conducted at the program level, ignoring any reflection of the actual development process of malware. This approach is only effective at finding closely related variants or matching artifacts found within malware that are only tangent to the development process, such as hard coded IP address, domains, or login information. This matching process is often unaware of internal software structure except in the most rudimentary sense, dealing with entire sections of code at a time, attempting to align matches while dealing with arbitrary block boundaries. The method is akin to an illiterate attempting comparing two books on the same topic. Such a person would have a chance of correlating different editions of the same book, but not much else. The first fundamental flaw in today’s approach is that it ignores our greatest advantage in understanding relationships in malware lineage, we can deduce program structure into blocks (functions, objects, and loops) that reflect the development process and gives software its lineage through code reuse.
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, U.S. Northern Command
(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI-NORTHCOM Super Bowl 2011 Joint Special Event Threat Assessment
This Joint Special Event Threat Assessment (JSETA) addresses potential threats to the National Football League (NFL)USPER Super Bowl XLV, which will be played on 6 February 2011 at Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas. It focuses on potential threats to the game—and to various NFL-sanctioned events scheduled for the Dallas/Ft. Worth Metroplex-area during the 12 days prior to the game—from international and domestic terrorists, cyber actors, criminals, and foreign intelligence services.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) USMC Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) Information Assurance Directive
Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5239.1 formally establishes the Marine Corps Information Assurance Program (MCIAP) and defines the responsibilities for protecting the Marine Corps information infrastructure as well as delineating Department of Defense (DoD) directives, instructions, and guidance governing DoD Information Assurance (IA). United States Marine Corps (USMC) IA Enterprise Directive 014 Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) outlines the security configuration and implementation standards for WLANs within the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) boundary security framework.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) USMC Engineer Equipment Technical Characteristics Manual
USMC Engineer Equipment Technical Characteristics Manual from June 2009.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) USMC Principal Technical Characteristics of Motor Transportation Equipment 2010
This Technical Manual (TM), authenticated for Marine Corps use and effective upon receipt, provides technical characteristics information for Marine Corps Motor Transport Equipment.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army “Complex Environments” Insurgency Assessment and Social Terrain Analysis Reports
Two unclassified reports from the U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center that are part of a series titled “Complex Environments – An Alternative Approach to the Assessment of Insurgencies and their Social Terrain”, from November 2009-March 2010.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) USMC Enterprise Network Accreditation Process Directive
The Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA) issues Marine Corps Enterprise Information Assurance Directives (EIAD). The EIAD series provides modules that guide the implementation of policy direction established in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5239.2. The modules provide procedural. technical, administrative, and supplemental guidance for all information systems, used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or receipt of data within the MCEN as well as other Marine Corps information systems. Each module focuses on a distinct subject and describes a standard methodology for planning, implementing and executing an element of the Marine Corps Information Assurance Program (MCIAP). The Marine Corps EIAD series will be the authoritative source for implementation of IA policy direction.
U.S. Army
U.S. Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations Manual
Field Manual (FM) 3-19.40 depicts the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that MP will employ when dealing with enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), civilian internees (CIs), US military prisoner operations, and MP support to civil-military operations (populace and resource control [PRC], humanitarian assistance [HA], and emergency services [ES]). FM 3-19.40 is not a standalone manual, and it must be used in combination with other publications. These publications are pointed out throughout the manual, and a consolidated list is provided in the bibliography.
U.S. Air Force
(U//FOUO/LES) U.S. Air Combat Command Threat Information Fusion Cell Reports
The following five reports are from the U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command’s Threat Information Fusion Cell. The “Homeland Defense Information Summary” reports focus entirely on domestic security matters and feature content from local police departments and regional fusion centers. The very existence of the reports should be a matter of scrutiny given the fundamental divide between domestic military affairs and civilian law enforcement necessitated by legislation such as the Posse Comitatus Act.
U.S. Marine Corps
USMC Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.4, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations, operationalizes the concept of information operations (IO). This publication introduces doctrine for employment of IO in support of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. IO language and organizations continue to evolve and to be debated. This publication gives Marines a warfighter’s orientation to IO, providing a basis to understand the relevance of IO and a framework to implement IO. This publication is intended for MAGTF planners responsible for both operational and IO planning.
U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy NATOPS Instrument Flight Manual
This manual presents an overview of information required for flying U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and conditions in various operating environments. It has been prepared for use as a reference for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Aircrew preparing for their annual instrument flight evaluations, especially those unable to attend instrument ground training. It also provides guidance and standardization for instrument flight evaluators and aircrews on criteria for evaluating the instrument flying abilities and proficiency of aircrew members and conducting NATOPS Instrument Flight Evaluations.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) USMC Communication-Electronics Equipment Technical Manual
This Technical Manual (TM), authenticated for Marine Corps use and effective upon receipt, provides technical characteristics information for Marine Corps Communication-Electronics Equipment.
U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy NATOPS F-14 Tomcat Flight Manuals
Two Restricted U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcat Flight Manuals from 2004 and 2001.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) U.S. Marine Corps Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) Concept of Employment
This Concept of Employment (COE) describes the overall concepts, structures, and roles and responsibilities for NetOps Command and Control (C2), planning, Network Common Operational Picture (NetCOP), and systems management as it relates to the Marine Corps Enterprise Network‘s (MCEN‘s) Garrison Secret Internet Protocol (IP) Router Network (SIPRNet). It bridges strategic guidance and detailed operational procedures to describe how the MCEN Garrison SIPRNet is operated and defended through NetOps, much like the Tri-MEF SOP is to the tactical environment.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Unexploded Ordnance Procedures Reference Card
Restricted U.S. Army Unexploded Ordnance Procedures Reference Card from March 2007.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures Manual
UXO on the battlefield affects the mobility and mission aspects of all units. Battlefields are littered with UXO hazards from two sources: ordnance that has either failed to function or ordnance designed to be used for area denial, such as conventional land mines and the family of scatterable mines (FASCAM). With the sophistication of modern weapons systems, battlefield commanders can target anything within their theater of operations.
After these attacks are completed, UXO hazards will be left on the battlefield. UXO hazards may not always pose an immediate threat to unit mission or mobility, but they are hazards that have in the past caused needless loss of life and materiel. Battlefield commanders need to know where UXO hazards are, as these hazards can affect the mobility of follow-on elements. This manual teaches personnel about the UXO hazard and how this hazard affects mission capabilities and what procedures are used to report
and protect personnel and equipment. All units should be able to react to the UXO hazard effectively and to report and protect against it.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO//LES) U.S. Army Police Intelligence Fraudulent Law Enforcement Credentials and Badges Guide
This intelligence assessment explores the availability to purchase fraudulent federal law enforcement credentials and badges and how their use is a direct threat to the security of military installations, federal facilities, other critical infrastructure.
National Security Agency
(U//FOUO) NSA High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) Briefing
FOUO NSA High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) Briefing from December 2010.
National Security Agency
(U//FOUO) NSA National COMSEC Security Incident Trends 2008-2009
FOUO NSA National COMSEC Security Incident Trends 2008-2009 Briefing from December 2010.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Information Technology Agency WikiLeaks Phishing Warning
ITA is pleased to provide this information update as part of our commitment to support your information assurance efforts. All users are strongly advised against attempting to access information posted on the Internet or browse websites that claim to contain classified information from government owned computing systems. This message is in accordance with Headquarters Department of the Army issued All Army Activities (ALARACT) message issued on August 14, 2010 related to the WikiLeaks website. In addition, the Office of the Administrative Assistant (OAA) Communications has advised that all Department of Defense employees are not permitted to access, review, or search for any material pertaining to the WikiLeaks website from a government-issued computer. Users are advised that doing so may include the user as part of the formal ongoing investigation.
U.S. Navy
Sikorsky UH-3H Executive Transport NATOPS Flight Manual
The model UH-3H helicopter is manufactured by Sikorsky Aircraft, Division of United Technologies, Stratford, Connecticut 06615. The helicopter is a Class 1B aircraft, designed for both shore and shipbased operations to provide logistic support and a search and rescue capability as required. The crew consists of a pilot, copilot, and two utility aircrewmen. The UH-3H Executive Transport basic airframe is manufactured by Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of United Technologies Corporation, Stratford, CT., 06615. It is a Class 1B aircraft, designed for shore and ship based operations to provide executive transportation and logistic support. The crew consists of a pilot, copilot, and aircrew member.