Central to the transformation of U.S. Forces are development and fielding of integrated Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) capabilities to enable U.S. forces to collaboratively plan and rapidly share an accurate picture of the battlespace. This roadmap provides an overview of JBMC2 capability and Global Information Grid (GIG) development efforts in the Department of Defense. It is intended to assist policymakers and decisionmakers in aligning and integrating Service and Combatant Command doctrine, concept development and acquisition efforts. The goal of this roadmap is to provide a coherent and executable plan for fielding integrated JBMC2 capabilities to U.S. Forces.
Department of Defense
U.S. Central Command
CENTCOM Engineering Contingency Construction Overview August 2010
FOUO CENTCOM Engineering Contingency Construction Overview, August 2010.
U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy Carrier Vessel NATOPS Landing Signal Officer Manual
This manual is a single source of LSO information for LSOs, unit commanders, and air crewmembers that contains descriptions of visual landing aids, command relationships, a compendium of LSO-related policies and responsibilities, pilot and LSO training requirements and qualifications, descriptions of visual landing aids, and LSO procedures for recovering fixed-wing non-V/STOL aircraft aboard CV and CVN-class ships.
U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy Carrier Vessel Nuclear (CV/N) NATOPS Manual
This manual issues policy, guidance and information for CV and CV/N commanding officers, air officers, airoperations officers, air wing commanders, squadron commanding officers, aircraft detachment Officers-In-Charge, and aircrews aboard CV/N class ships. The information presented herein includes relationships, responsibilities, training requirements, and selected normal and emergency procedures for conducting flight operations on and in the vicinity of the CV/N.
Afghanistan, Department of Defense
(U//FOUO) US Forces-Afghanistan Private Security Contractor Management
OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN REQUIRE ARMED CONTRACTORS (ACS) AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSCS) TO FULFILL A VARIETY OF IMPORTANT SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND OTHER ENTITIES OPERATING IN THE COMBINED JOINT OPERATIONS AREA – AFGHANISTAN (CJOA-A). INCLUDED IN THESE ARMED CONTRACTORS AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES ARE TRADITIONAL PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES, THE AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS AND DOD CONTRACTORS WHO ARE ARMED FOR PERSONAL PROTECTION. TRADITIONAL PSC’S PERFORM CONVOY ESCORT, STATIC SECURITY AND PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS. AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS (ASG’S) PROVIDE LOCAL STATIC SECURITY TO FOB’S, COP’S AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE WITH LOCAL AFGHAN COMPANIES. DOD CONTRACTORS MAY BE ARMED EITHER AS A FUNCTION THE SERVICE THEY PROVIDE OR THEIR OPERATING LOCATION. THESE AC/PSC’S ARE NOT COMBATANTS; THEY EXECUTE SERVICES TO PROTECT PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT AND FIXED FACILITIES. WEAPONS EMPLOYED BY AC/PSCS ARE FOR PURELY DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY.
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Air Force Social Media Guide
This guide provides Air Force Public Affairs professionals with basic social media knowledge needed to maneuver in the online information space and the basic-level tactics explained here should be used to compliment the traditional forms of Public Affairs, to include internal communication, community relations and media relations.
Defense Intelligence Agency
(U//FOUO) Defense Intelligence Agency Ammonium Nitrate Threat Warning
(U//FOUO) Terrorists typically favor basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), off-the-shelf technology and readily available resources when planning and carrying out an attack. While simplistic in effort, these factors can be a lethal and destructive combination. Terrorists also continue to explore innovative attack options that take advantage of overlooked vulnerabilities inherent to the civilian sector. One such vulnerability is transporting bulk quantities of ammonium nitrate (AN) via the road, rail and waterway network. Using a region’s bulk AN transportation network to attack critical infrastructure and urban centers would arguably qualify as a high probability — high casualty/destruction threat scenario.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Army Unauthorized Information Dissemination Safeguards in Response to WikiLeaks
(U/FOUO) 1. ALL ARMY ACTIVITIES ARE DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY REVIEW AND REVALIDATE WHO HAS SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR(SA)/POWER USER PRIVILEGES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) REF A, THESE PERSONNEL SHALL BE GRANTED THE MINIMUM SET OF PRIVILEGES REQUIRED TO PERFORM THEIR JOBS AND NOTHING MORE. ALL ACTIVITIES MUST ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED THESE PERSONNEL AND THAT NO OTHER PERSONNEL HAVE THESE PRIVILEGES. THIS IS KEY TO PRECLUDING UNAUTHORIZED DOWNLOADING AND DISSEMINATION OF SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Army WikiLeaks Warning: Classified Public Information
ARMY PERSONNEL MUST BE VIGILANT WITH REGARD TO THE INFORMATION POSTED ON THE WIKILEAKS WEBSITE AND ANY OTHER WEBSITE THAT PURPORTS TO PUBLISH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. VIEWING, DOWNLOADING OR PRINTING INFORMATION FROM THE WEBSITE COULD POTENTIALLY EXPOSE ARMY NETWORKS TO SENSITIVE DATA OR CREATE SITUATIONS IN WHICH DATA IS IMPROPERLY SAFEGUARDED THUS HARMING OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT MISSIONS VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. INFORMATION MARKED AS CLASSIFIED BUT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS NOT CONSIDERED DECLASSIFIED UNTIL ASSESSED BY THE APPROPRIATE ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY AND A DETERMINATION ON ITS DISPOSITION AND CONTINUED CLASSIFICATION IS RENDERED.
U.S. Air Force
(U//FOUO) Air Force Wing Leadership Guide to the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF)
The basic concept of the AEF we use today was born of necessity after years of rotations between Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. High operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) forced us to update our Air Force-wide system of organizing, scheduling and presenting our forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs). Launched in 1998 by Gen Mike Ryan, CSAF, Cycle 1 of the AEF was 15 months long and included approximately 60,000 Airmen. Today the AEF operates on a 24-month schedule and includes over 300,000 Airmen. It remains fl exible to accommodate CCDR’s needs, whether for 4 months, 6 months, or 365 days.
Department of Defense
Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS)
The Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) is a tethered aerostat-based system that has been in use by the U.S. Army since 2004. According to the PTDS is equipped with multi-mission sensors to provide long endurance intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and communications in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to information provided by the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, the PTDS “leverages a wide-area, secure communications backbone for the integration of threat reporting from multiple available sensors. The system’s sensor integration architecture supports the automated interoperability between tactical/theater surveillance assets and the dissemination of threat data to operational forces to aid interdiction of hostile fires and unconventional threats.”
Department of Defense
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) Tethered Aerostat Specifications
This document specifies the performance of the Baseline and Tactical Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS). Section 3 specifies the requirements for the Baseline PTDS and Section 4 specifies the requirements for the Tactical PTDS (T-PTDS). Throughout this specification, the acronym PTDS (without B- or T-) applies to both the Baseline PTDS and Tactical PTDS.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) OEF/OIF Legal Services Support To Operational Commanders
Marine Corps Judge Advocates have been providing wartime legal support to operational commanders since the Vietnam War. Judge Advocates who deployed to Operation DESERT STORM reported an increased need for operational law support and a diminished need for traditional military justice (court-martial) support. Observations by Judge Advocates and infantry commanders who served in OEF/OIF between 2003 and 2006 show that the need for operational law support of ground commanders has continued to expand and is now required on a consistent basis at the infantry battalion level.
U.S. Central Command
(U//FOUO) Concept of Operations for Biometrics in U.S. Central Command AOR
(U) Purpose. This Concept of Operations (CONOP) documents concepts and procedures for the use of biometric technologies to support identity superiority, protection and management in the entire USCENTCOM AOR. This CONOP focuses on the biometrics process and key systemic enablers. This CONOP contains UNCLASSIFIED and CLASSIFIED 100 annexes. The body of the CONOP is UNCLASSIFIED however, Annex E, “HUMINT Biometrics Management”, is CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOFORN.
U.S. Marine Corps
USMC Online Social Media Guidance for Unofficial Internet Posts
Marines are personally responsible for all content they publish on social networking sites, blogs, or other websites. In addition to ensuring Marine Corps content is accurate and appropriate, Marines also must be thoughtful about the non-Marine related content they post, since the lines between a Marine’s personal and professional life often blur in the online space. Marines must be acutely aware that they lose control over content they post on the Internet and that many social media sites have policies that give these sites ownership of all content and information posted or stored on those systems. Thus Marines should use their best judgment at all times and keep in mind how the content of their posts will reflect upon themselves, their unit, and the Marine Corps.
Naval Network Warfare Command
Naval Network Warfare Command Guidance for Internet-Based Capabilities
**************** UNCLASSIFIED// ****************
Subject: INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INTERNET-BASED CAPABILITIES
Originator: COMNAVNETWARCOM VIRGINIA BEACH VA(UC)
DTG: 181714Z Mar 10
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Tactical Combat Casualty Care Handbook
Tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) is the pre-hospital care rendered to a casualty in a tactical, combat environment. The principles of TCCC are fundamentally different from those of traditional civilian trauma care where most medical providers and medics train. These differences are based on both the unique patterns and types of wounds that are suffered in combat and the tactical conditions medical personnel face in combat. Unique combat wounds and tactical conditions make it difficult to determine which intervention to perform at what time. Besides addressing a casualty’s medical condition, responding medical personnel must also address the tactical situation faced while providing casualty care in combat. A medically correct intervention performed at the wrong time may lead to further casualties. Put another way, “good medicine may be bad tactics,” which can get the rescuer and casualty killed. To successfully navigate these issues, medical providers must have skills and training oriented to combat trauma care, as opposed to civilian trauma care.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Contracting Basics Smartcard
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Contracting Basics Smartcard, February 2008.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Radio Operator Handbook
The unit radio operator (RO) provides platoon- to brigade-level maneuver leaders a command and control capability that is critical to mission success. The RO is more than a Soldier who carries the radio for the commander, serves as the commander’s driver, or provides the commander personal security, although he often serves in these functions. The RO is the commander’s tactical information manager. The process for selecting and training an RO varies widely and is based on the role the unit commander intends the RO to perform; however, there are common factors that every maneuver RO should possess in order to enable effective unit command and control.
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Air Force Warning Against Accessing WikiLeaks
Air Force personnel should not access the WikiLeaks website to view or download the publicized classified information. Doing so would introduce potentially classified infonnation on unclassified networks. There has been rumor that the information is no longer classified since it resides in the public domain. This is NOT true. Executive Order 13526, Section 1.1 ( 4)( c) states “Classified Information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information …
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army “Unit RESET” Redeployment Handbook
For purposes of this handbook, unit RESET is the process a unit uses to plan and execute those critical tasks needed to restore the unit to combat readiness after redeployment. This process must be carefully planned and synchronized by all stakeholders, beginning with actions a unit sets in place before the unit deploys. The unit follows the RESET model published in Army RESET ordersand executes RESET tasks while still in theater to redeploy and return the unit to collective training capability as quickly as possible. This enormous task is complex and requires detailed planning, clear communication and intent, and strong unit leadership not only from the unit conducting RESET but also from those supporting the mission (e.g., garrison, contractors, and other Department of Defense organizations). The goal is returning the unit to combat readiness quickly, efficiently, and—most importantly—safely.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) Handbook
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) has become a critical capability in the commander’s toolbox for conducting stability operations. CERP funds provide tactical commanders a means to conduct multiple stability tasks that have traditionally been performed by U.S., foreign, or indigenous professional civilian personnel or agencies. These tasks include but are not limited to the reconstruction of infrastructure, support to governance, restoration of public services, and support to economic development. This handbook focuses on basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the application of the CERP. Its intended audience is the brigade, battalion, and provincial reconstruction team commander and staff. This handbook is based on lessons learned and best practices in use today in both Iraq and Afghanistan and identifies the training, planning, and operational procedures required to fund projects and services the commander requires during the conduct of stability operations. This handbook also provides the TTP to guide the commander through the regulatory and administrative requirements of the CERP.
Afghanistan, Department of Defense
Money as a Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A) SOP
The purpose of the CERP program is to enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their Area of Responsibility (AOR) by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population. “Urgent” is defined as any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that, in the judgment of the local commander, calls for immediate action. CERP is intended for projects that can be sustained by the local population or government and cost less than $500K per project. Projects equal to or greater than $500K are expected to be relatively few in number. Commanders are required to verify that local, national, donor nation, nongovernmental organizations or other aid or reconstruction resources are not reasonably available before using CERP funds.
U.S. Navy
(U//FOUO) Distributed Tactical Communications System (DTCS) Position Location Information (PLI) Collector Training
(U//FOUO) Distributed Tactical Communications System (DTCS) Position Location Information (PLI) Collector Training, July 2010.
U.S. Navy
(U//FOUO) Distributed Tactical Communications System (DTCS) Radio Only Alpha (ROA) Operator Training
(U//FOUO) Distributed Tactical Communications System (DTCS) Radio Only Alpha (ROA) Operator Training, August 2008.