Organizational charts depicting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministries of Defense and Interior created by NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) and provided to coalition advisers to the Afghan government.
The Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for judge advocates is a product of the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). Its content is derived from statutes, Executive Orders and Directives, national policy, DoD Directives, joint publications, service regulations, field manuals, and lessons learned by judge advocates and other practitioners throughout federal and state government. This edition includes substantial revisions. It incorporates new guidance set forth in Department of Defense Directive 3025.18 (Defense Support of Civil Authorities), Department of Defense Instruction 3025.21 (Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies), numerous new National Planning Framework documents, and many other recently updated publications. It provides amplifying information on wildfire response, emergency mutual assistance compacts, the role of the National Guard and Army units in domestic response, and provides valuable lessons learned from major incidents such as the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill and Hurricane Sandy of 2012.
An excerpt from the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 2012 Annual Report listing the locations of surveillance cameras throughout the district as well as every activation of the Department’s Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) that occurred in 2012
Understanding human dynamics is an essential aspect of planning for success across the full spectrum of military and national security operations. While the adage that “warfare is political conflict by other means” is widely recognized, combatants who underestimate the impact of the human element in military operations do so at their risk. During the Second World War and the reconstruction that followed, as well as during the Cold War, understanding human dynamics was considered essential. As conceptualized in this report, the term “human dynamics” comprises the actions and interactions of personal, interpersonal, and social/contextual factors and their effects on behavioral outcomes. Human dynamics are influenced by factors such as economics, religion, politics, and culture. Culture is defined herein as the particular norms and beliefs held by every human, that impacts how individuals, groups and societies perceive, behave and interact.
Significant progress has been made toward building a DoD capability for understanding sociocultural behavior, and some solutions have been delivered to military end users. However, there is much work to be done. The complexity of human behavior defies easy understanding or reliable forecasting. In the context of irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, post-conflict recovery, or any other mission setting of the Armed Forces, technology—including computational models—is essential to support decision making. That technology must be rooted in well-validated, inter-disciplinary theory, and applied appropriately, with recognition of its strengths and limitations.
This Environmental Assessment (EA) has been prepared to analyze the potential environmental, cultural, transportation, and socioeconomic effects associated with the establishment and operation of a U.S. Army Cyber Command / 2nd Army (ARCYBER) Command and Control Facility at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland (hereinafter referred to as Fort Meade), or at Fort Gordon, Georgia. ARCYBER leads a corps of 21,000 soldiers and civilians who serve worldwide operating and defending all Army networks with supporting organizations such as the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, 780th MI Brigade, and 1st Information Operations. ARCYBER plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, directs, and conducts network operations and defense of all Army networks; when directed, ARCYBER conducts cyberspace operations in support of full spectrum operations to ensure U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace, and to deny the same to our adversaries.
Special Forces (SF) Soldiers use various biometric identification systems in SF operations. Biometric applications are fundamental to a wide array of SF operational activities, including, but not limited to, the growing field of SF sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and the range of unit protection activities. SSE applications include the identification of enemy personnel and cell leaders in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment following tactical operations, particularly during direct action missions. Unit protection applications include maintaining databases on the identities of both United States Government (USG) and local national personnel.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Afghanistan, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Afghanistan.
Understanding master narratives can be the difference between analytic anticipation and unwanted surprise, as well as the difference between communications successes and messaging gaffes. Master narratives are the historically grounded stories that reflect a community’s identity and experiences, or explain its hopes, aspirations, and concerns. These narratives help groups understand who they are and where they come from, and how to make sense of unfolding developments around them. As they do in all countries, effective communicators in Afghanistan invoke master narratives in order to move audiences in a preferred direction. Afghan influencers rely on their native familiarity with these master narratives to use them effectively. This task is considerably more challenging for US communicators and analysts because they must place themselves in the mindset of foreign audiences who believe stories that — from an American vantage point — may appear surprising, conspiratorial, or even outlandish.
Malicious cyber actors have used compromised social media accounts to spread disinformation about alleged emergencies and attacks, most prominently through Twitter. Because it is difficult to determine the authenticity of a tweet, we anticipate malicious cyber actors will continue to seek to exploit Twitter and other social media platforms used by news organizations and public safety agencies to propagate disinformation.
This publication identifies multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and Integrating with National Guard Civil Support. It sets forth MTTP at the tactical level to assist the military planner, commander, and individual Service forces in the employment of military resources in response to domestic emergencies in accordance with United States (US) law. This MTTP focuses on planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of DSCA operations conducted within the US and its territories.
The following document contains the full roster, including ranks, of the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office as of June 2011. The roster was obtained via a public records request. The names of certain deputies and detectives are redacted because they work on gang and narcotics task forces making their identities exempt from disclosure under California Government Code 6354 (c), (f) and (k).
A statistical analysis of school shootings released in August by the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (LAJRIC) studied school shootings throughout the U.S. from January 2008 to August 2013. In that five-year span, there were 85 school shootings that took place in 29 states, a majority of the country, with most states experiencing between one and three incidents over the last five years. California ranked highest with 18 incidents, followed by Michigan and Tennessee. The majority of school shootings, about 52%, took place at high schools, with the rest equally distributed between colleges/universities and elementary/middle schools.
From January 2008 to August 2013, 85 school shootings took place across the United States involving 97 attackers. Incidents analyzed met the definition of targeted school violence, including gang‐related shootings. “Targeted violence” is any incident of violence where an attacker selects a particular target prior to the violent attack. The number of incidents peaked at 29 in 2009 and have decreased to an average of 14 per year; two incidents have occurred this year to date.
Snapchat is a smart phone application accessed through the iPhone AppStore or Google Play. The application provides a new way to share moments with photos and videos. The purpose of this guide is to familiarize law enforcement agencies with the categories of information available from Snapchat and the specific le8al process necessary to obtain that information. Snapchat is committed to assisting law enforcement investigations to the fullest extent allowed by applicable law. In addition to this guide, Snapchat also provides phone and email support to law enforcement agencies for both emergency and non-emergency inquiries. Contact information for law enforcement support is listed on the cover of this guide.
The Navy is pursuing improved information-based capabilities that will enable it to prevail in the higher-threat, information-intensive combat environments of the 21st Century. This document outlines challenges anticipated over the next 15 years in the operating and information environments, and highlights long-term opportunities for fully integrating Navy’s information-related activities, resources, processes and capabilities to optimize warfighting effects and maintain decision superiority across the spectrum of warfare. The Navy’s plans for achieving Information Dominance center on: 1) assuring command and control (C2) for our deployed forces regardless of the threat environment; 2) enhancing battlespace awareness to shorten the decision cycle inside that of the adversary and to better understand the maritime operating environment; and, 3) fully integrating traditional kinetic and emerging non-kinetic fires to expand warfighting options to both Navy and Joint commanders.
This is a working paper for an ongoing SNA Tool Comparison effort at the Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence Center’s (COIC) Data Analysis Research and Collaboration (DAR C) Cell. It contains the results of the first phase of this effort. A Power Point presentation summarizing this paper is also available. This paper will be edited and amended as additional results become available from subsequent phases. The objective of this study was to compare and analyze four different Social Network Analysis (SNA) tools for the basic measures of Centrality (Degree, Closeness, Betweenness and Eigenvector), in order to set a baseline for further evaluation of the tools and their capabilities. The four tools compared were Analyst Notebook (ANB), Palantir, UCINet and ORA.