U.S. Army Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) Reference Card produced by the Asymmetric Warfare Group in December 2010.
With the continuing growth in the world’s urban areas and increasing population concentrations in urban areas, the probability that the US Army will conduct full spectrum operations in urban environments is ever more likely. As urbanization has changed the demographic landscape, potential enemies recognize the inherent danger and complexity of this environment to the attacker, and may view it as their best chance to negate the technological and firepower advantages of modernized opponents. Given the global population trends and the likely strategies and tactics of future threats, Army forces will likely conduct operations in, around, and over urban areas—not as a matter of fate, but as a deliberate choice linked to national security objectives and strategy. Stability operations––where keeping the social structure, economic structure, and political support institutions intact and functioning or having to almost simultaneously provide the services associated with those structures and institutions is the primary mission––may dominate urban operations. This requires specific and timely intelligence support, placing a tremendous demand on the Intelligence warfighting functions for operations, short-term planning, and long-term planning.
America has entered an era of persistent conflict where states, nations, transnational actors, and nonstate actors are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. These entities will continue to challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare. Globalization, technology, population growth, urbanization, and demand for natural resources are creating an environment where the location of the next crisis requiring American intervention is not always predictable. Generally with little notice, Army units will be employed in complex and multidimensional environments; usually fought in urban terrain among noncombatant populations. Additionally, they will be called on to conduct full spectrum operations as part of an interdependent joint force conducting simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations.
Currently, the intelligence warfighting function includes a formidable set of capabilities across all echelons from “mud-to-space.” This flexible force of personnel, organizations, and equipment collectively provides commanders with the timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence they need. We provide the intelligence that continuously supports the commander in visualizing the operational environment, assessing the situation, and directing military actions through ISR synchronization and the other intelligence tasks. The intelligence warfighting function is comprised of nine powerful intelligence disciplines. Eight of those disciplines essentially feed the discipline of all-source intelligence which in turn is focused on the commanders’ requirements. Technological advances have enabled single-discipline analysts to leverage other analysts and information and to conduct multi-discipline analysis to an extent not possible in the past. However, all-source intelligence is still the nexus that integrates information and intelligence from all units and the other intelligence disciplines.
TC 2-50.5 replaces FM 34-8-2, dated 1 May 1998. This publication does not replace the fundamental principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures contained in the other FM 2-series manuals; however, it does focus on their application. It is to be used in conjunction with the other FM 2-series manuals and conforms to the overarching doctrinal concepts presented in FM 3-0 and FM 2-0. The target audience for this manual is the intelligence officers serving as the G-2/S-2 and their staffs— intelligence warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted Soldiers. TC 2-50.5 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated.
U.S. Army Company Intelligence Support Team (COIST) Development, December 3, 2007.
FOUO U.S. Army 902d MI GROUP Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) Brief.
The 11 Star Memo, signed in 2005 By CGs FORSCOM, AMC and TRADOC also addressed this gap with specific recommendations to “Realign CONUS DOIMS from IMA to NETCOM for a more unified support similar to OCONUS; optimize C2 for IT management; provide central oversight for IT resources and support; provide MACOMs single POC; and provide adequate investment in DOIM operations” CSA has specifically directed that “ protecting the Army’s networks is not just G6 or G3 business, but rather it is Cdr’s business at all levels (MSG 161304Z Aug 04). Yet, there is no single commander responsible for security and quality of service ensuring CONUS LWN capabilities are prioritized and available to support warfighting, business, and intelligence domains. And, no one is responsible to represent the Information Needs of the Unit and User through all Operational Phases and ensure access to the global collaborative environment.