Targeting of high profile and international events by state-sponsored or other foreign adversaries, cyber criminals and issue motivated groups is a real and persistent threat. The information contained on government systems, whether classified or unclassified, is of strategic interest to cyber adversaries. Information gathered through cyber espionage can be used to gain an economic, diplomatic or political advantage.
This is the first unclassified Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) Threat Report. All ACSC partner agencies have contributed to provide information tailored for Australian organisations about the threats their networks face from cyber espionage, cyber attacks and cybercrime. It also contains mitigation and remediation information to assist organisations to prevent, and respond to, the threat.
A collection of documents released publicly on July 11, 2012 in response to a Freedom of Information request from the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet for material relating to WikiLeaks, Julian Assange and Bradley Manning.
Telecommunications interception reform recognises that there are significant challenges facing intelligence and law enforcement agencies in accessing communications, particularly in keeping pace with rapid changes in the telecommunications environment. New, emerging and future technologies impact on the ability of these agencies to access communications to collect intelligence and effectively detect and prosecute crimes. The Australian Crime Commission’s Future of Organised Criminality in Australia 2020 assessment reveals that access to highly effective software, ciphers and other methodologies are increasingly being utilised by organised crime to impede detection by law enforcement. Lawful interception, therefore, is the most important tool in the investigation and prosecution of serious and organised and other technology‐enabled crime, and is vital to effectively collect security intelligence. Proposed reforms seek to allow those agencies to utilise modern technologies to maintain effective investigative techniques.
Australia-United Kingdom Memorandum of Understanding on National Security/Counter-Terrorism Research
The objective of this Memorandum of Understanding is to establish a framework to encourage, develop and facilitate bilateral cooperative activity in science and technology that contributes to the National Security and Counter-Terrorism activities of both Signatories.
Coalitions, which are created for limited purposes and for a set time, do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances. Thus, planners must closely study the political goals of each participant as a precursor to detailed planning. Political considerations weigh more heavily with coalitions than with alliance operations. Coalition military operations are not new. The American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) nations have participated together in several coalition operations during the twentieth century. Since human nature has not changed, conflicts over territory, religion, politics, and economics, such as those that prompted previous military operations, will continue to be widespread. The precise role of armies in these operations will vary according to each political and military situation.
American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies Security Force Capacity Building Handbook
SFCB has come to play an increasingly important role in each of our armies over the last decade and will undoubtedly feature in operations spanning the spectrum of conflict in the future. Its affect on organization, training, equipping and doctrine has been felt to a greater or lesser extent by each of us and will help define recent conflicts and their effects. However, SFCB cannot be done in isolation. What must be borne in the military planner‘s mind from the outset is that SFCB is a part of the wider SSR campaign and as a consequence must be part of a comprehensive approach. Furthermore, if coalition partners are present, an extra layer of complexity is present and must be planned for. Failure to take these two aspects into account runs the risk of failure at worst or a fragmented HNSF as a result, at best. This handbook aims to assist the military planner in their approach to SFCB. It is aimed at both commanders and staff officers, primarily on brigade and divisional staffs, although it also has utility for those charged with training, mentoring and advising HNSF forces at the tactical level.
Australian Federal Police Radiation and National Security in Australia Brief from October 2010.
The following photos were all taken in Rockhampton and Brisbane within the past week. Photo credits are at the bottom of the page. Salvation Army of Australia – http://www.flickr.com/photos/aus_salvos/ Martin Howard – http://www.flickr.com/photos/martinhoward/ Tyler Wright – http://www.flickr.com/photos/twyze/ Erik Veland –…
• Media are reporting concerns about the imminent arrival of almost 1,000 organ recipients on the Gold Coast for the World Transplant Games. The Local Organising Committee Chairman is said to be negotiating with a health provider to set up a flu clinic at the Games. [couriermail.com.au, 4/8/09]
• Queensland Health has had extensive correspondence with the United Kingdom Organising Committee for the Transplant Games regarding the event. The Organising Committee concluded it would continue with the Games as planned.
Townsville HSD reported a youth at Cleveland Detention Centre was displaying influenza like symptoms. The inmate was swabbed, isolated and commenced on Tamiflu, with ten further courses of Tamiflu supplied to the Centre’s nurse. Two further suspected cases have been swabbed, administered Tamiflu and isolated. On Tnesday, 04 Angnst 2009, Townsville HSD reported two positive cases of Pandemic (HlNl) 2009 at the facility.
This report is based on the most recent and accurate available information at the time of preparation. Given the rapidly changing nature of the incident, readers should be aware of the potential requirement for later confirmation or clarification.