The Mad Scientist 2050 Cyber Army project explored the visualization of the Army’s Cyber Force out to 2050 and its ability to address three major objectives of the Army’s Cyberspace Strategy for Unified Land Operations 2025: What does the cyber environment look like in 2040-2050 (how will cyber influence the environment and the population? What will connecting look like / what will they connect to? What are the drivers influencing this or not)? How do we build an Army Cyber Force that can dominate the cyber domain in the context of the multi-domain battle concept to gain a position of relative advantage? How can we build shared goals and expectations as well as develop an understanding of roles and responsibilities in order to build and maintain partnerships with U.S., and international academia, industry, defense departments/ministries and other agencies to enhance cyberspace operations? What new ideas should we be considering? Co-sponsored by the TRADOC G-2 and the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy, the 2050 Cyber Army project leveraged submitted papers, an on-line technology survey, and a 13-14 September Mad Scientist Conference that generated the insights synthesized in this report.
DHS has no indication that adversaries or criminals are planning cyber operations against US election infrastructure that would change the outcome of the coming US election. Multiple checks and redundancies in US election infrastructure—including diversity of systems, non-Internet connected voting machines, pre-election testing, and processes for media, campaign, and election officials to check, audit, and validate results—make it likely that cyber manipulation of US election systems intended to change the outcome of a national election would be detected.
This report fulfills the requirement contained in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, Section 933(e) “National Guard Assessment.” The results of the National Guard’s assessment reflect the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s (CNGB) view for successfully integrating the National Guard into the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Cyber Mission Force (CMF) and across all Cyber missions to create a Whole of Government and Whole of Nation approach to securing U.S. cyberspace.
In concert with other agencies, the United States’ Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for defending the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests from attack, including attacks that may occur in cyberspace. In a manner consistent with U.S. and international law, the Department of Defense seeks to deter attacks and defend the United States against any adversary that seeks to harm U.S. national interests during times of peace, crisis, or conflict. To this end the Defense Department has developed capabilities for cyber operations and is integrating those capabilities into the full array of tools that the United States government uses to defend U.S. national interests, including diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, and law enforcement tools.
Training guide released in November 2014 for airmen who perform “duties to develop, sustain, and enhance cyberspace capabilities to defend national interests from attack and to create effects in cyberspace to achieve national objectives. Conduct Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) and Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) using established tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to achieve COCOM and national objectives. Executes command and control (C2) of assigned cyberspace forces and de-conflict cyberspace operations across the kinetic and non-kinetic spectrum. Supports cyberspace capability development, testing and implementation. Partners with DoD, interagency and Coalition Forces to detect, deny, disrupt, deceive, and mitigate adversarial access to sovereign national cyberspace systems.”
Since the 2006 signing of the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO), the emerging US cyber warfare community continues to mature and its capabilities increasingly compete for consideration when US forces plan operations. Computer network attack (CNA) and electronic attack (EA) technologies have progressed to the point where their use could be routinely considered in the context of existing and developing OPLANS. In order to effectively integrate and standardize use of these non-traditional weapons, the developers, testers, planners, targeteers, decision-makers, and battlefield operators require a comprehensive but flexible cyber lexicon that accounts for the unique aspects of cyber warfare while minimizing the requirement to learn new terms for each new technology of the future. Without a shared understanding of the accurate meanings of a significant number of frequently used terms, it will be difficult to make progress on the more complex and unresolved technical and operational issues for non-traditional weapons: actionable requirements, technical and operational assurance, effective mission planning techniques, and meaningful measures of effectiveness. In fact, the Secretary of Defense’s Information Operations (IO) Roadmap listed its first benefit to the combatant commanders as “a common lexicon and approach to IO, including support to integrated information campaign planning.” Although the focus of cyberspace operations is not the same as that of IO, they share some technologies and until now, no such lexicon (for IO, or any portion of IO) has been published.
FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, provides overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA). This manual describes the importance of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to Army forces and provides the tactics and procedures commanders and staffs use in planning, integrating, and synchronizing CEMA. This manual provides the information necessary for Army forces to conduct CEMA that enable them to shape their operational environment and conduct unified land operations. It provides enough guidance for commanders and their staffs to develop innovative approaches to seize, retain, and exploit advantages throughout an operational environment. CEMA enable the Army to achieve desired effects in support of the commander’s objectives and intent.
This Environmental Assessment (EA) has been prepared to analyze the potential environmental, cultural, transportation, and socioeconomic effects associated with the establishment and operation of a U.S. Army Cyber Command / 2nd Army (ARCYBER) Command and Control Facility at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland (hereinafter referred to as Fort Meade), or at Fort Gordon, Georgia. ARCYBER leads a corps of 21,000 soldiers and civilians who serve worldwide operating and defending all Army networks with supporting organizations such as the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, 780th MI Brigade, and 1st Information Operations. ARCYBER plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, directs, and conducts network operations and defense of all Army networks; when directed, ARCYBER conducts cyberspace operations in support of full spectrum operations to ensure U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace, and to deny the same to our adversaries.
Trends in the operational environment continue to indicate that cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) will remain important entities within the operational environment for the foreseeable future. The Army understands the importance of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to human societies in general, and to military operations specifically. Army leaders and Soldiers must possess an in-depth understanding of this contest, and how to gain, maintain, and leverage advantages in this contest. To this end, the Army Concept Framework recognizes an increasingly important aspect to military operations: the cyber/electromagnetic contest (C/EM contest).
The following definitions align key cyberspace operations (CO) concepts with doctrinally accepted terms and definitions used in the other joint operational domains. For explanatory purposes, in each case, the current Information Operations (IO) doctrinal definition for some aspect of CO is presented, followed by its conventional analogue, if any, and the current terminology it would replace.
This functional concept details capabilities and effects necessary to perform operational cyberspace functions desired by the warfighter, from the present through 2030. This concept broadly describes how AFSPC intends to conduct cyberspace operations in support of both joint and AF operations of all types, and provides a foundation for developing more detailed concept documents. Moreover, AFSPC will use this concept, along with emerging joint guidance, to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct cyberspace operations. Finally, this concept provides the operational perspective to underpin the many activities necessary to realize the AF institutional vision for a mature set of cyberspace capabilities.
The United States Air Force (USAF) Blueprint for Cyberspace provides commander’s guidance and intent, identifies opportunities and delineates objectives and strategies that will shape USAF actions over the next five years. This document describes the first phase of a two-phase approach. It defines specific actions to align cyber activities and functions, to evolve and integrate the unique capabilities the USAF brings to the joint fight, and to build cyberspace operational capacity.