(U//FOUO) U.S. Strategic Command Cyber Warfare Lexicon

Since the 2006 signing of the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO), the emerging US cyber warfare community continues to mature and its capabilities increasingly compete for consideration when US forces plan operations. Computer network attack (CNA) and electronic attack (EA) technologies have progressed to the point where their use could be routinely considered in the context of existing and developing OPLANS. In order to effectively integrate and standardize use of these non-traditional weapons, the developers, testers, planners, targeteers, decision-makers, and battlefield operators require a comprehensive but flexible cyber lexicon that accounts for the unique aspects of cyber warfare while minimizing the requirement to learn new terms for each new technology of the future. Without a shared understanding of the accurate meanings of a significant number of frequently used terms, it will be difficult to make progress on the more complex and unresolved technical and operational issues for non-traditional weapons: actionable requirements, technical and operational assurance, effective mission planning techniques, and meaningful measures of effectiveness. In fact, the Secretary of Defense’s Information Operations (IO) Roadmap listed its first benefit to the combatant commanders as “a common lexicon and approach to IO, including support to integrated information campaign planning.” Although the focus of cyberspace operations is not the same as that of IO, they share some technologies and until now, no such lexicon (for IO, or any portion of IO) has been published.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Handbook

This handbook provides basic reference information on Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(U//FOUO) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Singapore Cultural Field Guide

Singapore is made up of three main ethnic groups: Chinese, Malays, and Indians. The Chinese ethnic group makes up the majority (75 percent) of the population, followed by the Malays (15 percent) and the Indians (8 percent). Each ethnic group is internally diverse. However, in the view of most Singaporeans, the divisions within each ethnic group are far less significant than those between groups.

DHS Unaccompanied Alien Children (UACs) 2014 Location of Origin Map

We analyzed these locations to determine the factors pushing child migration to the US Border. We assess these reasons vary regionally. For example, many Guatemalan children come from rural areas, indicating they are probably seeking economic opportunities in the US. Salvadoran and Honduran children, on the other hand, come from extremely violent regions where they probably perceive the risk of traveling alone to the US preferable to remaining at home. This violence, combined with poor economies and other secondary factors will make stemming the flow of UACs to the US a very complex issue to address.

(U//FOUO) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Ukraine Cultural Field Guide

Ukraine is positioned between Eurasia and Europe, and the region has been influenced by many major civilizations. Ukraine, whose name means “borderland,” has lived under foreign powers for most of its existence. This is most recently evidenced by the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, controlled by the centralized establishment in Moscow under the communist regime. Even today the capital, Kiev, struggles internally between Moscow and the West, forcing Ukrainians to more closely identify with either their own cultural brethren or a new, more independent direction for the country.

FBI Notifications: Malicious Cyber Actors Targeting U.S. Government Networks and Employees

The FBI and NCIS believe a group of cyber actors have been using various social networking sites to conduct spear phishing activities since at least 2011. FBI and NCIS investigation to date has uncovered 56 unique Facebook personas, 16 domains, and a group of IP addresses associated with these actors. These personas typically would attempt to befriend specific types of individuals such as government, military, or cleared defense contractor personnel. After establishing an online friendship the actor would send a malicious link (usually through one of the associated domains) to the victim, either through e-mail or in a chat on the social networking site eventually compromising the target’s computer.

International Biometrics and Identification Association Draft Privacy Best Practices for Commercial Biometrics

One fact should not be lost in this discussion. As has always been the case, new methods of authenticating identity, like biometric identification, are necessary to augment existing conventions and meet current needs. Biometric technologies do this and, as a major privacy‐enhancing technology, preserve privacy at the same time. The facial template itself, like other biometric templates, provides no personal information. Indeed, protecting the non‐biometric personal information is enhanced through the use of biometric verification of identity to limit data access to only authorized persons. Biometrics can provide a unique tool to protect and enhance both identity security and privacy and to protect against fraud and identity theft, especially as a factor in identity verification. When your personal data are protected by access mechanisms that include one or more biometric factors, it becomes much more difficult for someone else to gain access to your personal data and applications because no one else has your unique biometric attributes. This enables legitimate access and reduces the risk that a person can steal your identity and, posing as you, collect benefits; board an airplane; get a job; gain access to your personal data, etc.

(U//FOUO) Pennsylvania Fusion Center Bulletin: Targeting First Responders

First responders, such as law enforcement, emergency medical services (EMS), and firefighters, often arrive at incidents completely focused on the emergency at hand. Whether it is a fire, a chest pain complaint, or a vehicular accident, the first responders prepare for certain events to take place during emergency situations and personal safety is a priority throughout the response. Unfortunately, in the past few years there are have been several occurrences where first responders became the victims of ambushes while performing their duties to protect citizens and save lives.

(U//FOUO) New York Fusion Center Bulletin: Recent Spike in Violence Targeting Law Enforcement

Over the last week there have been three attacks – one in Canada and two in the United States – in which law enforcement officers were targeted, leading to the death of five officers and one civilian. Based upon reporting it appears all the suspects in these incidents were motivated by elements of a far right anti-government ideology with a particular fixation on law enforcement. While it is unknown whether this spike is indicative of a long term increasing trend, it is significant from a near term perspective due to the short time frame and purposeful targeting of law enforcement.

(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI-NCTC Bulletin: Terrorists Continued Interest in Targeting Mass Transit

Terrorists in late December 2013 conducted three attacks targeting people using public transportation systems in Russia, emphasizing terrorists’ persistent interest in attacking locations where large congregations of people are confined to small, often enclosed spaces. Russian officials claim North Caucasus-based violent extremists associated with the Imirat Kavkaz (IK) probably conducted these attacks to embarrass the Russian government in the build-up to the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi. The IK, a violent extremist group based in Russia, has no known capability in the Homeland and is unlikely to directly target Western interests overseas.

(U//FOUO) Washington D.C. Fusion Center Bulletin: Nationwide Fuel Theft Trend

Incidents involving the theft of fuel (gasoline, diesel, kerosene, ethanol, etc.) from fuel storage tanks have been reported across the United States. Fuel theft has significant health and safety implications, including risk for spills, fires, and explosions. Fuel thieves typically do not adhere to security standards or practices, and may inadvertently expose fuel to a hot engine, lit cigarette, or ignition source. First responders and other maintenance personnel also may be exposed to fuels through skin contact or inhalation routes during recovery and/or cleanup operations, which can result in potential health effects.

U.S. Air Force Instruction: Domestic Imagery Requests for U.S. Missions

Operations involving DI support using ISR/OPSRECCE/RPA involve a balancing of fundamental interests: conducting aircrew training in support of national security objectives and providing incident awareness and assessment support when requested while also protecting individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the U.S. The primary objective of the ACCI is to ensure that ACC units conducting DI missions within U.S. do not infringe on or violate the Constitutional or privacy rights of U.S. persons. Commanders, inspectors general, and judge advocates at all levels must be cognizant of DI policies.

Bilderberg Association Annual Reports 2011-2013

Several annual reports for the Bilderberg Association from 2011-2013 made available through the U.K. Charities Commission. The Bilderberg Association is one of several international non-profit affiliates of the group known as Bilderberg Meetings. The U.S. affiliate is called American Friends of Bilderberg, Inc. and is a registered non-profit in the State of New York.

FBI Chinese Military Hacking Indictments Private Industry Notifications

Today the Western District of Pennsylvania unsealed an indictment naming five members of the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China on 31 counts, including conspiring to commit computer fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1030), accessing a computer without authorization for the purpose of commercial advantage and private financial gain (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (c)(2)(B)), damaging computers through the transmission of code and commands (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)), aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A), economic espionage (18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1)), and theft of trade secrets (18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1)). Each of the defendants provided his individual expertise to a conspiracy to penetrate the computer networks of six US companies while those companies were engaged in negotiations or joint ventures with or were pursuing legal action against state-owned enterprises in China. The following technical details are indicators released in the indictment related to these actors’ activity.