This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) provides information on the 21 September 2013 attack in Nairobi, Kenya likely conducted by al-Shabaab—an al-Qai‘da linked militant group based in Somalia. This JIB examines the ongoing incident and provides background on the threat from al-Shabaab. This JIB also highlights protective measures that can assist in mitigating threats in the United States using similar tactics and is provided to support the activities of FBI and DHS and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials, as well as first responders and private sector security officials to deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks in the United States or overseas targeting US interests.
Court documents related to the U.S. government’s efforts to force Lavabit LLC, an encrypted email provider used by Edward Snowden, to hand over encryption keys to decode all secure traffic flowing through the site. The documents were originally obtained and released by Kevin Poulsen of Wired.com after being unsealed by a judge on October 2, 2013.
From late 2011, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has recorded 27 cases of deaths in custody where there is significant information to suggest that torture was the cause, and is aware of allegations about additional cases which it has not been able to fully investigate. Eleven of the 27 cases, detailed in this report, took place in 2013, all in detention centres under the nominal authority of the Government but effectively under the authority of armed brigades.
The value of exploded ordnance scrap metal and UXO that can be collected from CF artillery ranges is a lucrative risk the Afghan population is willing to take. Reports indicate that Afghan adults send their children to the properly marked CF artillery ranges, after live fire and calibration training events, in order to collect exploded ordnance scrap metal to sell.
The Commonwealth Critical Infrastructure Program (CCIP) analyzed school shooting incidents from 1992-2012 to identify patterns in attacker backgrounds or tactics which could assist officials. Observations are presented in summary format to allow officials to draw their own conclusions. Mitigation steps included in this document are presented to facilitate discussion and are not comprehensive or prescriptive.
This handbook provides pre-doctrinal guidance on the planning, execution, and assessment of joint integrated persistent surveillance (JIPS) by a joint task force (JTF) and its components. Significant prior work has been done in support of persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and much of the information in this handbook was gleaned from that data. However, the scope of this handbook pertains to the subset of persistent surveillance: the processes which contribute to creating a persistent surveillance strategy and those required for executing persistent surveillance missions. The document serves as a bridge between current best practices in the field and incorporation of value-added ideas in joint doctrine.
A report produced by the National Security Council Study Group headed by Paul Nitze in 1950. NSC-68 is considered to be one of the most significant documents in the history of the U.S. national security apparatus, defining goals, values, and functions of U.S. national security policy throughout the Cold War and beyond. Historian Michael J. Hogan, scholar of U.S. foreign policy and former fellow at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, has described the document as the “bible of American national security policy.”
Our world today is replete with fear and hope; fear of war and hostile regional and global relations; fear of deadly confrontation of religious, ethnic and national identities; fear of institutionalization of violence and extremism; fear of poverty and destructive discrimination; fear of decay and destruction of life-sustaining resources; fear of disregard for human dignity and rights; and fear of neglect of morality. Alongside these fears, however, there are new hopes; the hope of universal acceptance by the people and the elite all across the globe of “yes to peace and no to war”; and the hope of preference of dialogue over conflict, and moderation over extremism.
Terrorists may engage in sabotage, tampering, or vandalism as part of an attack or to gain access to restricted areas, steal materials, or provoke and observe security responses. For example, the 1Oth edition of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire magazine suggests torching parked vehicles and causing automobile accidents by using lubricating oil or nails driven through wooden boards as simple tactics to cause both casualties and economic damage.
To reduce deficiencies in security, DoD Directive 5200.43 established the Defense Security Enterprise (DSE) Executive Committee (ExCom). The ExCom is the senior-level governance body for the strategic administration and policy coordination of the DSE. The ExCom created and tasked the DSE Advisory Group (DSEAG) to plan, coordinate, and prioritize decisions for the ExCom and establish, oversee, and launch project teams. These project teams receive tasks from the DSEAG, research an issue, and recommend a plan of action.
Impersonation by assuming the identity, behavior, or appearance of first responders can allow terrorists access to restricted or secure locations, including the scene of emergencies when unchallenged. This access can allow terrorists the ability to conduct pre-operational surveillance or carry out a primary attack or a secondary attack against first responders. The method of impersonation may not be limited to the use of uniforms, clothing, badges and identification; civilian vehicles may be accessorized to appear as legitimate emergency vehicles.
On the basis of the evidence obtained during our investigation of the Ghouta incident, the conclusion is that, on 21 August 2013, chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale.
DHS and its operational components have recognized the value of using social media to gain situational awareness and support mission operations, including law enforcement and intelligence-gathering efforts. However, additional oversight and guidance are needed to ensure that employees use technologies appropriately. In addition, improvements are needed for centralized oversight to ensure that leadership is aware of how social media are being used and for better coordination to share best practices. Until improvements are made, the Department is hindered in its ability to assess all the benefits and risks of using social media to support mission operations.
Reducing corruption and increasing accountability are important components of the U.S. reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States has appropriated over $96 billion for reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan and, as part of that assistance, has designated numerous programs or activities to directly or indirectly help strengthen the ability of Afghan government institutions to combat corruption. In 2010, in line with a commitment to provide more assistance directly to the Afghan government, the United States and other donors committed, in part, to providing technical assistance to develop the Afghan government’s capacity to reduce corruption. The ability of the Afghan government to deliver services to its citizens without the illicit diversion of resources is crucial to the country’s development and the government’s standing as a legitimate, sovereign authority. Further, as Afghanistan subsequently enters a transformation phase during which it will need to rely on progressively smaller amounts of funding from international donors, it must work to ensure that the revenue it generates is not susceptible to graft and corruption.