This paper provides a comprehensive introduction to Afghanistan’s various police agencies, where their authority originates, how they are organized, and the stated purpose and responsibility of each. The paper does not include status or capability information on these agencies with the intent to preserve its utility as a long-lasting reference document. The reader should refer to the IJC IDC’s State of the ANSF and other available intelligence and open source products for current status and capability information on Afghan police agencies.
For a number of years, Congress has recognized that State and local law enforcement could benefit from access to excess and surplus personal Federal property and has passed legislation to make this property and equipment available. The largest generator of this property has been the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Although this source of property has passed its peak and the amount and variety of excess property will continue to decline over time, law enforcement agencies can still obtain high-quality, high-value property at little or no cost.
A copy of the model memorandum of agreement that the Defense Logistics Agency signs with states as part of their programs to transfer excess military property to civilian law enforcement agencies through the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO).
An autonomous or federal Kurdistan within Syria — similar to that which exists in Iraq — is unlikely because of intra-Kurdish conflict and the opposition of Turkey and the Syrian National Council (SNC) — the main external Syrian opposition group.
DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate Protective Security Advisors and Special Event Domestic Incident Tracker Overview presented at the FEMA National Preparedness Symposium on August 8, 2012.
The purpose of this special edition is to provide a practical reference guide for individuals and units to use in preparation for missions as trainers and advisors to foreign military units. The publication includes tactics, techniques, and procedures successfully used by both United States Army special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces in conducting foreign military training (FMT). The final section of the special edition is an explanation of the security assistance process and includes the organizations involved in planning and resourcing foreign training missions and their respective responsibilities.
From 28 Feb 06 to 18 Apr 06, a five-man Combat Arms Assessment Team from the 2-315th Field Artillery Transportation Support Battalion focused on collecting the most current security force convoy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in the Iraq Theater. The focus of this collection was convoy security force actions before, during, and after convoy operations including personal security detachment, escort of civilian vehicles (convoy security), and self escort of military convoys.
The Multi-National Corps–Iraq logistics staff and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) support operations cell, an element of the Iraqi Assistance Group, merged at the operational level to publish plans, policies, and procedures that met the strategic aims of the coalition forces, the national goals of the government of Iraq, and the joint campaign plan published by Multi-National Force–Iraq. Corps sustainment planners published operational objectives for execution at the operational and tactical levels in an effort to develop a sustainment-based system for the ISF. Based on experiences and observations over the past 18 months, the partners, advisors, and planners gathered the best practices for advising and assisting security forces at all levels of the sustainment system. This handbook presents partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining, host nation security force.
Field Manual (FM) 3-05.230, Special Forces Tactical Facilities, supports key United States (U.S.) Army Special Forces (SF) doctrine. An SF tactical facility (TACFAC) is defined as any secure urban or rural facility that enables Army special operations forces (ARSOF) to extend command and control (C2), provides support for operations, and allows operational elements to influence a specified area. SF TACFACs include a variety of secure locations for SF operations, including (but not limited to) firebases, camps, and team houses.
A recently discovered directive from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) details the policies behind Special Response Teams (SRT) which have been drawing attention in recent years for their large, militaristic armored vehicles and increasing involvement in law enforcement actions around the country. The directive was posted online in 2009 by a local chapter of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), one of the the largest labor unions for federal employees.
When an ICE enforcement activity is determined to be of high risk or sensitive in nature. It may require the use of tactical capabilities beyond those of the typical ICE enforcement officer in order to ensure the safe and successful resolution of the action. Under these circumstances, Tactical Teams possessing specialized skills, specialized equipment and specialized training to meet these particular challenges may be required. The deployment of these teams can be viewed as the use of an elevated level of force. For these reasons, it is important for ICE to have processes and procedures for the establishment and operation of these teams, appropriate training and qualification standards for team members, and very specific reporting requirements through defined reporting channels, for team activities.
Intelligence has played an important role in the exercise of the responsibilities and operations of the Treasury Department since the Department assumed its enforcement responsibilities in 1789. The mission and culture of Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis builds on this strong tradition of intelligence and national security at the Department.
This field manual interim (FMI) establishes guidelines for medical support to detainee operations (DO) as part of the Army Health System (AHS) in the theater. It discusses command structure and staff operations necessary to provide medical support to detainees. This FMI is designed for use by commanders and their staffs in the planning and execution of providing medical support to detainees. Field Manual Interim 4-02.46 is not a stand-alone manual and must be used in combination with other publications. These publications are noted throughout the manual and a consolidated listing is provided in the references.
Security guards at large facilities, such as airports, monitor multiple screens that display images from individual surveillance cameras dispersed throughout the facility. If a guard zooms with a particular camera, he may lose image resolution, along with perspective on the surrounding area. Embodiments of the inventive Imaging System for Immersive Surveillance (ISIS) solve these problems by combining multiple cameras in one device. When properly mounted, example ISIS systems offer up to 360-degree, 240-megapixel views on a single screen. (Other fields of view and resolutions are also possible.) Image-stitching software merges multiple video feeds into one scene. The system also allows operators to tag and follow targets, and can monitor restricted areas and sound an alert when intruders breach them.
Terrorists may attempt to breach secured perimeters or gain unauthorized access to facilities, sensitive locations, or restricted areas for preoperational activity or to conduct an attack. Timothy McVeigh breached a locked storage shed at a Kansas rock quarry with a battery-operated drill and stole explosives that were later used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Attempts at intrusion could take the form of trespassing, forced entry, or impersonation of authorized personnel and could possibly involve the assistance of knowledgeable ‘insiders.”
A number of hacked emails from the private intelligence firm Stratfor have shed light on a global suspicious activity surveillance system called TrapWire, that is reportedly in use in locations around the world from the London Stock Exchange to the White House. The emails, which were released yesterday by WikiLeaks, provide information on the extent and operations of a system designed to correlate suspicious activity reports and other evidence that may indicate surveillance connected with a potential terrorist attack.
Trap Wire dramatically increases the ability to detect pre-attack preparations and to take appropriate action to detect, deter and intercept tenorist attacks. A visual monitor of the entire system-a map with dynamic status indicators for each entity connected to the Trap Wire network- facilitates the ability of decisionmakers to absorb vast quantities of information quickly and efficiently. The dynamic status indicators show the threat level at each facility and highlight those that have moved to a higher threat level over the preceding 24 hours. Security officials can thus focus on the highest priorities first, taking a proactive and collaborative approach to defense against attacks. The information collected by Trap Wire can also be shared with law enforcement agencies to assist in their counterterrorism efforts.
Human Terrain Team Survey Finds U.S. Soldiers Widely Believe the Afghan Army is Making Little to No Progress
A research report compiled earlier this year by a group of social scientists working for the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System found that members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are largely seen by coalition forces as unmotivated, highly dependent and making little to no progress. The report, titled “ANA and CF Partnership in Khost and Paktiya”, is based on interviews and observations made during the Human Terrain Team’s time embedded with a U.S. cavalry squadron from November to December 2011. A survey distributed to three other companies also informs much of the report’s findings, which are intended to analyze “the dynamics that influence partnering between the ANA and [coalition forces] and how they contributed to the ANA’s effectiveness in gaining the Afghan population’s support.” The soldier’s candid responses to the survey provide a great deal of insight into the perceptions of the Afghan National Army among coalition forces.
U.S. Army Human Terrain Team Report: Afghan National Army and Coalition Forces Partnership in Khost and Paktiya
Members of Human Terrain Team AF01 embedded with a U.S. cavalry squadron from November to December 2011. Our goal was to understand the dynamics that influence partnering between the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Coalition Forces (CF) and how those dynamics impacted ANA effectiveness in gaining the Afghan population’s support. We conducted 22 interviews with U.S. Army personnel, including U.S. enlisted Soldiers and officers, U.S. troop commanders, police trainers, and ANA mentors. In addition, we conducted 21 interviews with high- and low-ranking ANA enlisted Soldiers and officers and Afghan police officers. We accompanied U.S. forces on non-kinetic missions to villages throughout Khost and Paktiya to gather perceptions from the Afghan civilian population.
The purpose of this field manual (FM) is to familiarize personnel with air defense artillery (ADA) operations and weapon systems and their roles in air and missile defense (AMD).
FM 3-20.98 provides basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the tactical employment of the reconnaissance and scout platoons of the reconnaissance squadrons in the heavy, infantry, and Stryker brigade combat teams (HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT) as well as the battlefield surveillance brigade’s (BFSB) reconnaissance and surveillance squadron and the cavalry squadron of the armored cavalry regiment (ACR).
On May 5-6, 2012, the Minneapolis-St. Paul area conducted a major test of the National Postal Model for distribution of medicine to the public in an emergency, using U.S. Postal Service assets to supplement mass dispensing sites and other strategies. The May exercise, known as Operation Medicine Delivery, was the culmination of planning efforts that began in February 2004, with a memorandum of agreement signed by the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and the Postmaster General. Parties to the 2004 MOA agreed to make USPS resources available for distributing emergency medicine in response to a bioterrorist attack. A subsequent presidential executive order (December 2009) called for the development of a federal capability to distribute medical countermeasures (MCM) in response to a bioterrorist attack.
Terrorists may use small aircraft flyovers to conduct preoperational activities such as reconnaissance or rehearsals for planned attacks. When suspicious flyovers occur, law enforcement and first responders should report the key attributes of the flight and the aircraft for timely identification (time of day, location and direction of flight, facility overflown, aircraft size, markings, color scheme, tail number, number of windows, placement of wings or rotor, number of engines, and weather) to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) through a local Air Traffic Control facility or office, a local Flight Standards District Office, or directly to the FAA’s Domestic Events Network at 202 493 5107, and the Transportation Security Administration. The FAA is often best able to distinguish between legitimate air traffic and suspicious flight operations that warrant further investigation.
This study examines the history of the fighting in southern and western Afghanistan since 2001. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity sponsored the study. Its purpose is to give Marines a basic understanding of what has happened in southern and western Afghanistan. Most Marines will operate in that area and we hope a historical reference source will be useful. If the study has any single argument it is that government misrule has been a driving factor behind the continuing violence in southern and western Afghanistan. The Afghan government favored warlords, handicapped competent governors, took part in the poppy trade, and allowed the police to abuse the people. Scarcity of security forces and collateral damage from Coalition operations did not help either. Yet above all, we find it unlikely that the instability in southern and western Afghanistan today could have been averted without addressing government misrule.