This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in DSCA operations, and it provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination during DSCA operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.
Restricted Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual: Exercises Impacting Global Positioning System (GPS) in U.S. and Canada
This manual provides guidance to Joint Staff, Service (including Service intelligence centers and reserve components), Combatant Command (CCMD), and Combat Support Agency (CSA) personnel for conducting collaborative intelligence planning (IP) primarily in support of Combatant Commander (CCDR) campaign plans, contingency plans, and orders.
This publication provides guidance for planning, executing, and assessing joint space operations. It provides space doctrine fundamentals for all joint forces; describes the military operational principles associated with support from, through, and operating in space; explains Joint Staff, combatant command (CCMD), United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and USSTRATCOM functional and Service component relationships and responsibilities; and establishes a framework for the employment of space forces and space capabilities.
In accordance with (IAW) reference a, MISO replaces the term psychological operations (PSYOP). This instruction provides strategic direction for inclusion of MISO to support the full range of military operations including military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; major operations and campaigns; and as an integrated information activity within the DOD’s overall contribution to United States Government (USG) communication strategies.
The purpose of operations security (OPSEC) is to reduce the vulnerability of US and multinational forces from successful adversary exploitation of critical information. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces. The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control, and protect critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions associated with military operations.
Military information support operations (MISO) play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses.
All modern forces depend on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, the EMS is the key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as the focus of operations themselves. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS throughout the operational environment.
Specific guidance from the joint force commander (JFC) or higher authority during planning will determine the military deception (MILDEC) role in a joint operation. MILDEC is intended to deter hostile actions, increase the success of friendly defensive actions, or to improve the success of any potential friendly offensive action. Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation should help to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. In combat situations, the focus is on driving the adversary to culmination and achieving the objectives defined by the JFC. In noncombat situations, the JFC seeks to dominate the situation with decisive operations designed to establish conditions for an early, favorable conclusion.
(U//FOUO) Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study
The intent of Phase I initial impressions is to provide rapid support to the Warfighter. In parallel, these insights serve as part of a broader Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study, which JCISFA will publish in the spring of 2011. These observations and insights may support planning and decision-making within the NTM-A/CSTC-A as well as joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) organizations responsible for force generation supporting the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission. Specifically, this report addresses contemporary issues and senior leader perspectives within the NTM-A/CSTC-A Ministerial-Level Advisor program to include prospective gaps across joint DOTMLPF-P domains. The following illustrates the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission.
This publication provides joint doctrine for planning and executing counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations. It outlines responsibilities, provides command and control considerations, discusses organizational options, details the C-IED process and attack the network methodology, and introduces models for coordinating with C-IED supporting organizations.
(U//FOUO) Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Iraqi Federal Police Advisor Guide
As the U. S. Defense Department scales back operations in Iraq, one of the most significant questions that remains is whether the Iraqi security forces will be capable of maintaining civil order on their own. This manual was produced by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) to help prepare deploying advisors, trainers, and partner forces that will work directly with Iraqi police. The intent is to provide a basic understanding of the country of Iraq and a solid understanding of the current organization and utilization of the Iraqi police. This manual also provides guidance on what it means to work ” by, with and through” a counterpart, and includes observations and insights learned by your predecessors.
This handbook provides an understanding of the processes and procedures being employed by joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to plan, execute, and assess counter threat finance (CTF) activities and integrate them into their joint operation/campaign plans. It provides fundamental principles, techniques, and considerations related to CTF that are being employed in the field and are evolving toward incorporation in joint doctrine.
This guide is designed to assist in making you and your family less vulnerable to terrorists. You should review its contents and incorporate protective measures applicable to your particular situation. It is important that you ensure all members of your family are made aware ofthis valuable information so they not only protect themselves, but also become an integral part of the overall community force protection effort. Terrorists generate fear through intimidation, coercion, and acts of violence such as bombings, hijackings, or kidnappings. As recent events have shown, terrorists have reached new levels of organization, sophistication, and violence, often targeting members of the Department of Defense and their families. Their tactics and techniques are also continually changing and will continue to be a challenge to predict and neutralize. Accordingly, we must remain vigilant.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS EXORD IS TO DELEGATE LIMITED APPROVAL AUTHORITY TO SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDERS, WHO HAVE DSCA RESPONSIBILITIES, FOR ROUTINE PA REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE (RFA), INCLUDING THE TYPES OF RFA HISTORICALLY SUBMITTED BY PA, TO PROVIDE A RAPID AND FLEXIBLE DOD RESPONSE TO FEDERAL PRIMARY AGENCIES FOR POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL EMERGENCIES AND OR DISASTERS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES, POSSESSIONS, AND PROTECTORATES.
This document presents the results of the Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solutions Analysis (FNA/FSA) for the functional area of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND). The FNA/FSA are structured in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01D, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and its companion manual, CJCSM 3170.01A, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
Operation Northwoods was a plan circulated in the U.S. government in 1962 to stage false flag terrorist attacks inside the U.S. and abroad to provoke “military intervention in Cuba”. The plan called for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or other operatives to commit genuine acts of terrorism in U.S. cities and elsewhere. These acts of terrorism were to be blamed on Cuba in order to create public support for a war against that nation, which had recently become communist under Fidel Castro. One part of the Operation Northwoods plan was to “develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.”
Joint Staff / Defense Threat Reduction Agency Anti-terrorism Vulnerability Assessment Benchmarks 2008
FOUO Joint Staff / Defense Threat Reduction Agency Anti-terrorism Vulnerability Assessment Benchmarks, January 1, 2008.
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.
This publication sets forth planning policies and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.
This manual sets forth administrative instructions and formats to govern the development of joint operation plans submitted for review to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereafter referred to as “Chairman”). Unless otherwise indicated, the formats and procedures in this document are mandatory for the Joint Staff, all combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies responsive to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Procedures for the development of Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) and for the deployment and redeployment of forces within the context of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) in support of joint military operations.
Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.