A key aspect of our Economic Line of Operation is the creation of economic expansion, employment, and skills development opportunities for the people of Iraq. The “Iraqi First” program seeks to leverage this command’s resources to accomplish this critical task. I expect all commanders to be creative and focused on supporting this program, and to make sound, riskbased decisions that provide economic opportunities for the Iraqi people, without compromising mission critical logistics capabilities, force protection, or safety.
In March 2010 Channel 4 News was shown a large consignment of weapons, reportedly destined for Afghan insurgents, which had been intercepted on the Iranian border in Herat province. The weapons seized included landmines, explosives, mortar rounds, RPG rounds and grenades as well as possible IED main charges in cooking pots and jerry cans. Some of the mines had Persian serial numbers. Afghan government records show that 10.5 tonnes of weapons from Iran were intercepted in Herat province during the previous 12 months and Afghanistan claims that 60% of the weaponry came directly from the Iranian government.
U.S. Army Installation Information Infrastructure Architecture Technical Guide, Distribution Statement C, July 2008.
ISAF Governance Working Group Brief, May 2010.
The Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) is issuing this policy to help agencies better safeguard National Security Information (NSI) during wireless transmission and delivery, while stored on mobile systems, and while stored on fixed systems that can be accessed by wireless media. It addresses the use of wireless technologies in areas where NSI is discussed or processed. It also assigns responsibilities for improving the security posture of the Executive Departments and Agencies (D/A), and provides references for a minimum set of security measures required for the use of wireless technologies in a national security environment.
More than 1200 pages listing individual dossiers of detainees currently being held by Coalition Forces inside of Iraq. Each dossier contains a list of reasons for detention, along with the time and place that the individual was detained. The dossiers range in classification level from “For Official Use Only” to “Secret” and are believed to be current as of April 14, 2010. This document was originally made available by the pro-Islamic, Arabic News site al-raeed.net.
A current method used by the Taliban in Afghanistan to gain control of an area deemed of strategic interest to the Taliban leadership, which operates from safe havens in Pakistan or within Afghanistan, is to identify and target villages to subvert. The Taliban have recognized the necessity to operate with the cooperation of the local population, with their modus operandi being to gain villagers’ cooperation through indoctrination (preferred) or coercion (when necessary).
In early July 2008, a British infantry company based in Sangin set up a patrol base south of the town, along a major insurgent transit route. Within days, the insurgents attacked the outpost, known as Patrol Base Armagh, and attempted to cut it off from the company headquarters downtown. They laid IEDs along the outpost’s supply routes and harassed its troops by firing small
arms and RPGs from different directions. The insurgents managed to pin British forces down in the outpost and move around the position to the south.
Under DA Authorization, TRADOC and Rapid Equipment Fielding (REF) purchased TACTICOMP and Ku SATCOM systems for the 1-23 IN, 3/2 SBCT for use during a National Training Center (NTC) mission readiness exercise and future deployment. TRADOC Spiral Development Division tasked USAIC Infantry Futures and the SBL to observe the unit and their employment of these systems. The observation team was a compilation of personnel from the SBL Futures Branch, TSM-SB C4ISR, and DCD Battle Command Division.
(U//FOUO) U.S. Air Force 21st Century Threat Guide, 2009.
FOUO Coalition Forces Capture Avoidance/Personnel Recovery Plan Guide, January 2007.
Helmand Province‟s political scene is perhaps unique in Afghanistan due to several atypical tribal dynamics produced by the unintended consequences of Western development activities. Projects, like the Helmand Valley Development Authority, led to an uneven tribal resettlement process that introduced outsider ethnic groups into the central portion of the province where they had never resided previously. Second, the potential wealth of the illegal opium industry associated with the reclaimed land from the development project and tribal desires to control it has also been a factor in the development of conflict.
(U//FOUO) JIEDDO Report: Alternative Motivations for IED Use in Afghanistan, December 11, 2009.
The recent capture of the Taliban’s code of conduct manifesto, “Rules and Regulations for Mujahidin,” has offered analysts critical clues into how the Taliban intend to operate as well as how the movement is structured according to the Taliban. Importantly, the new document provides Coalition and Afghan forces a catalog of weak points, vulnerabilities and fears currently entrenched within the Taliban organization and its top echelon of leadership. A thorough examination of the document reveals the Taliban’s attempt to wage a guerrilla campaign implementing a rudimentary population-centric strategy; while calling upon elements of Pashtunwali and Shariat (Islamic) Law into the doctrine as well.
FOUO DoD Network Quantitative Capability Delivery Increments (QCDI) Overview, May 12, 2010.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has implemented the Synchronized Predeployment & Operational Tracker (SPOT) as the single source to track deployed personnel supporting DoD military operations worldwide. SPOT is a scalable, net-centric, Web-based application that provides the capability to maintain accountability and report status for deployed personnel across the military, civilian, and contractor communities.
The IED Effects Simulator (IEDES) kit is a Training Aids Device that will assist the Army in training the joint and individual service on operational support tasks, conditions, and standards needed to achieve U.S. Military IED objectives. The IEDES is configured to simulate a Small, Medium, Large, and Extra Large explosive signature. The IEDES is designed to train key tasks of Explosive Hazards (EHs) defeat, to predict, prevent, detect, classify, neutralize, mark, report and record EH and to protect personnel, equipment and facilities from EH effects.
(U//FOUO) Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center Brief, May 3, 2010.
(U//FOUO) Army Electronic Warfare Brief, May 3, 2010.
FOUO Naval Base San Diego Detailed Map with Key, 2009.
OIF is a dynamic, full spectrum operation encompassing both kinetic and non-kinetic operations and is arguably the most complex and challenging fiscal environment in our nation’s history. The dollar amounts spent supporting or are substantial and represent the treasure of our nation. Leaders must know what funding resources are available and how to best apply them in order to gain the maximum operational effectiveness. This “Money as a Weapons System” (MAAWS) SOP is published to educate and advise you on how to financially resource operations here in Iraq. It will serve as a financial road map to assist you in navigating the myriad of funding challenges and issues that will arise during your time in Iraq.. recommend you keep a copy readily available, and ensure the appropriate leadership in your organizations has access to a copy as necessary.
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) are five- to nine-person teams deployed by the Human Terrain System (HTS) to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of events occurring within their area of operations. The team is composed of individuals with social science and operational ackgrounds that are deployed with tactical and operational military units to assist in bringing knowledge about the local population into a coherent analytic framework and build relationships with the local power-brokers in order to provide advice and opportunities to Commanders and staffs in the field.
Information Operations (BOTTOM LINE)
•IT IS NOT:
–All about technology
–Focused on individual capabilities, i.e., PYSOP, EW, CNO, etc
–All about influencing key decision makers and populations through operations within and affecting the information environment
–The art of integrating lethal and non-lethal capabilities to affect the information environment (supports combat operations)
–Employed across the spectrum of conflict and throughout every phase (0-5) of operations
–Consistent with strategic communication goals and synchronized with public affairs
FOUO Joint Air Defense Operations Homeland (JADO-H) Fuzzy Logic Brief, April 10, 2010.
NSA Global Information Grid Information Assurance Roadmap, October 26, 2004.