The United States and our allies are fighting terrorists who have defined this conflict as religiously based. Commanders on both sides have identified the center of gravity as the popular support of the people and understand the value of leveraging the religious aspects of the indigenous culture. Coalition commanders must apply that knowledge to support the overall objectives. Using chaplains, whose expertise includes religion and religious culture, shows great potential for success for enabling operational goals.
The need to communicate effectively with a wide range of audiences is not just desirable, it is essential to gain understanding and support for NATO’s operations. Public support for NATO’s missions and tasks follows from public understanding of how the Alliance makes a difference to international peace and security. Public confidence, in turn, is enhanced by NATO’s ability to achieve its mandate in a way that is open, transparent. and consistent with member nation values and expectations.
A September 2012 presentation from NATO’s International Security Assistance Force for training media spokespersons to work with Afghan and international media.
Terrorists might use disguises, fraudulent or stolen credentials, and cloned or repurposed vehicles to gain access to restricted areas, to blend in with their surroundings when conducting surveillance, or to conceal other activities while planning or executing an attack. Anders Breivik, the gunman who was sentenced to 21 years in prison for the July 2011 attack on the Workers’ Youth League summer camp in Norway, wore a police uniform and displayed false identification to gain unauthorized access to the camp. Depending on the target, disguises might be aimed at impersonating law enforcement, emergency services, or officials of an institution who have legitimate access to secured/restricted sites.
Known or possible terrorists have displayed suspicious behaviors while staying at hotels overseas—including avoiding questions typically asked of hotel registrants; showing unusual interest in hotel security; attempting access to restricted areas; and evading hotel staff. These behaviors also could be observed in U.S. hotels, and security and law enforcement personnel should be aware of the potential indicators of terrorist activity.
This guide gives Department of Defense (DoD) staff and contractors an overview of the kinds of marking required to protect classified and unclassified controlled information that cannot be disseminated to all audiences. The guide offers an integrated approach to the major requirements for marking and control of information, briefly explaining the reasons for marking and providing examples of correctly marked information. To facilitate information sharing and declassification processes, whenever practicable a classified attachment, addendum, annex, enclosure, or similar section shall be used when classified information constitutes only a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document.
This field guide provides small unit leaders and individual Soldiers and Marines a proven collection of actions to focus their efforts while attacking networks. Primarily, these actions consist of mission analysis, briefing, and execution and are adapted for use by these small unit leaders in a population-centric operating environment.
A list of 2,059 names of Greek citizens that have Swiss bank accounts with HSBC. The list was originally published by a Greek magazine called Hot Doc on October 27, 2012 resulting in the arrest of its editor Kostas Vaxevanis for “breach of privacy”.
NATO/ISAF engagement in Afghanistan in 2010 was characterised by a refreshed, comprehensive civ-mil strategy as reflected in a substantial force uplift, significant progress in the growth and development of the Afghan National Security Forces, and discernable campaign progress in priority districts. These were reflected in the NATO/ISAF Strategic Communications Framework 2010. In parallel, political events, including the London Conference, the Consultative Peace Jirga, the Kabul Conference, Afghan Parliamentary elections and the NATO Summit in Lisbon, helped define a clear political roadmap for Afghanistan. These developments are reflected in the Lisbon Summit Declaration which provides political guidance for the focus of our efforts in 2011 and reaffirms that NATO’s mission in Afghanistan remains the Alliance’s key priority.
The mission of KFOR as authorised by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and to support the development of security institutions capable of operating without NATO assistance. The adaptation of KFOR’s force posture during 2010 and its unfixing from Properties with Designated Special Status have been supported by an effective strategic communications (StratCom) approach which has been closely coordinated at all stages throughout the NATO chain of command and NATO HQ. Continued StratCom efforts will be required to complement and support military and civilian activities during 2011 as KFOR’s footprint and posture continues to adapt and as progress is made toward mission achievement.
OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD was launched by the North Atlantic Council on 17 August 2009. NATO is conducting counter-piracy activities as part of an internationally recognised and supported effort in a region of strategic interest to the Alliance. NATO’s commitment is as a complementary player in coordination with the other international counter-piracy actors including the EU’s Operation ATALANTA, CTF-151, and individual nations.
A coordinated and integrated StratCom approach to support NATO action in response to events in Libya is key to achieving the Alliance’s overall objective. Managing the information domain will be critical to NATO’s efforts being understood – and ultimately supported – by the audiences. It will require the use of the full range of information and communication capabilities, in line with NATO policies and authorities establishing an appropriate level of NATO visibility will be important to ensure unity of message, to manage and shape perceptions, to counter potential misinformation and to build public support.
Technology is one of the strategic factors driving the increasing use of the Internet by terrorist organizations and their supporters for a wide range of purposes, including recruitment, financing, propaganda, training, incitement to commit acts of terrorism, and the gathering and dissemination of information for terrorist purposes. While the many benefits of the Internet are self-evident, it may also be used to facilitate communication within terrorist organizations and to transmit information on, as well as material support for, planned acts of terrorism, all of which require specific technical knowledge for the effective investigation of these offences.
All aspects of NATO activities have a critical information and communications component. This concept proposes that Strategic Communications is not an adjunct activity, but should be inherent in the planning and conduct of all military operations and activities. As part of the overarching political-military approach to Strategic Communications within NATO, the vision is to put Strategic Communications at the heart of all levels of military policy, planning and execution, and then, as a fully integrated part of the overall effort, ensure the development of a practical, effective strategy that makes a real contribution to success.
Today’s information environment, characterized by a 24/7 news cycle, the rise of social networking sites, and the interconnectedness of audiences in and beyond NATO nations territory, directly affects how NATO actions are perceived by key audiences. That perception is always relevant to, and can have a direct effect on the success of NATO operations and policies. NATO must use various channels, including the traditional media, internet-based media and public engagement, to build awareness, understanding, and support for its decisions and operations. This requires a coherent institutional approach, coordination of effort with NATO nations and between all relevant actors, and consistency with agreed NATO policies, procedures and principles.
The following maps and satellite photos depict refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan and provide statistics regarding the displacement of persons as the result of the conflict in Syria. The first map was created by the U.S. State Department Humanitarian…
A September 2012 presentation from the Fire Department of the City of New York describing the “transient threat” posed by by gourmet food trucks around the city.
If you’re trying to set up an untraceable shell corporation, your best bet may no no longer be a tax haven or some far away island nation. According to a surprising new study, developed countries like the U.S. and Canada are among the easiest places in the world to set up the kind of anonymous shell corporation that could be used for money laundering, terrorist financing and other nefarious activities. In contrast, known tax havens like the Seychelles, Bahamas and the Cayman Islands all present far more obstacles to the establishment of untraceable corporate structures due to their more stringent compliance with international regulations. In fact, the study found that U.S.-based incorporation services provide one of the easiest routes to establishing an anonymous shell corporation, with only Kenya surpassing the U.S. in terms of noncompliance.
The current transatlantic environment will continue to challenge NATO’s ability to carry its messages proactively and engagingly to diverse audiences across the globe, but it also entails a number of positive trends on which NATO’s future communication efforts should build. From a broader perspective, the public climate in Europe and North America has recently become more supportive of a close transatlantic security relationship compared to previous years. As the 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey shows, the Alliance has regained public support in many, albeit not all Allied countries. Moreover, NATO’s 60th anniversary, the NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl, the arrival of a new Secretary General in late summer and the launching of a public debate about NATO’s new Strategic Concept have spurred broader public attention and interest in the Alliance.
The role of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) is to induce or reinforce the perceptions. attitudes and behaviour of North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved audiences in support of Alliance political and military objectives. Additionally, PSYOPS can mitigate the effective use of hostile propaganda against friendly forces, local civilian audiences and other audiences of importance to NATO.
The purpose of Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.10.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations is to address the planning and conduct of military PSYOPS in support of NATO activities. PSYOPS, as one of the key contributors to most information operations (INFO OPS) activities, will achieve their greatest effect when coordinated within the larger INFO OPS plan and supporting a much broader information strategy. The new construct of INFO OPS is focused on affecting will, understanding, and capability through the three activities of influence, counter-command, and information protection. It must be noted that PSYOPS has influence activity as its mission; and by influencing target audiences (TA) directly, PSYOPS, in turn, has indirect effects on understanding and capability.
Criminal complaint in the matter of United States of America against Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis who is accused of attempting to detonate an explosive device in front of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on October 16, 2012.
A memorandum of understanding between the Obama and Romney 2012 campaigns detailing rules for the arranged Presidential and Vice Presidential debates signed on October 3, 2012.
The aim of this reference book is to provide the additional information needed by Information Operations (Info Ops) practitioners to better understand and implement the advising and coordinating function of Info Ops in the staffs throughout all levels of command. The reference book covers the experiences and lessons learned on principles, procedures, and techniques in current operations as well as some basic understanding on how to best integrate the Info Ops function in the new evolving structures (new Peacetime Establishment) and procedures within NATO with respect to effects based thinking and the new Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.
The Information Environment (IE) comprises the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs. This environment has seen significant changes in recent years. The importance of worldwide distributed information, the speed at which information is communicated, the role of social media and the reliability of information systems have created a situation in which no Alliance decision or action can be taken without considering its potential impact on the IE. The ubiquitous nature of information and the potential strategic ramifications of tactical actions add to the challenge faced by NATO Commanders. In this new IE it is more difficult to distinguish between the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The coordination, synchronisation and execution of information activities (IA) that deliberately create desired effects in the IE is essential to the Alliance’s successful functioning in peace, crisis and conflict.