A number of hacked emails from the private intelligence firm Stratfor have shed light on a global suspicious activity surveillance system called TrapWire, that is reportedly in use in locations around the world from the London Stock Exchange to the White House. The emails, which were released yesterday by WikiLeaks, provide information on the extent and operations of a system designed to correlate suspicious activity reports and other evidence that may indicate surveillance connected with a potential terrorist attack.
Trap Wire dramatically increases the ability to detect pre-attack preparations and to take appropriate action to detect, deter and intercept tenorist attacks. A visual monitor of the entire system-a map with dynamic status indicators for each entity connected to the Trap Wire network- facilitates the ability of decisionmakers to absorb vast quantities of information quickly and efficiently. The dynamic status indicators show the threat level at each facility and highlight those that have moved to a higher threat level over the preceding 24 hours. Security officials can thus focus on the highest priorities first, taking a proactive and collaborative approach to defense against attacks. The information collected by Trap Wire can also be shared with law enforcement agencies to assist in their counterterrorism efforts.
Human Terrain Team Survey Finds U.S. Soldiers Widely Believe the Afghan Army is Making Little to No Progress
A research report compiled earlier this year by a group of social scientists working for the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System found that members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are largely seen by coalition forces as unmotivated, highly dependent and making little to no progress. The report, titled “ANA and CF Partnership in Khost and Paktiya”, is based on interviews and observations made during the Human Terrain Team’s time embedded with a U.S. cavalry squadron from November to December 2011. A survey distributed to three other companies also informs much of the report’s findings, which are intended to analyze “the dynamics that influence partnering between the ANA and [coalition forces] and how they contributed to the ANA’s effectiveness in gaining the Afghan population’s support.” The soldier’s candid responses to the survey provide a great deal of insight into the perceptions of the Afghan National Army among coalition forces.
U.S. Army Human Terrain Team Report: Afghan National Army and Coalition Forces Partnership in Khost and Paktiya
Members of Human Terrain Team AF01 embedded with a U.S. cavalry squadron from November to December 2011. Our goal was to understand the dynamics that influence partnering between the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Coalition Forces (CF) and how those dynamics impacted ANA effectiveness in gaining the Afghan population’s support. We conducted 22 interviews with U.S. Army personnel, including U.S. enlisted Soldiers and officers, U.S. troop commanders, police trainers, and ANA mentors. In addition, we conducted 21 interviews with high- and low-ranking ANA enlisted Soldiers and officers and Afghan police officers. We accompanied U.S. forces on non-kinetic missions to villages throughout Khost and Paktiya to gather perceptions from the Afghan civilian population.
The purpose of this field manual (FM) is to familiarize personnel with air defense artillery (ADA) operations and weapon systems and their roles in air and missile defense (AMD).
FM 3-20.98 provides basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the tactical employment of the reconnaissance and scout platoons of the reconnaissance squadrons in the heavy, infantry, and Stryker brigade combat teams (HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT) as well as the battlefield surveillance brigade’s (BFSB) reconnaissance and surveillance squadron and the cavalry squadron of the armored cavalry regiment (ACR).
On May 5-6, 2012, the Minneapolis-St. Paul area conducted a major test of the National Postal Model for distribution of medicine to the public in an emergency, using U.S. Postal Service assets to supplement mass dispensing sites and other strategies. The May exercise, known as Operation Medicine Delivery, was the culmination of planning efforts that began in February 2004, with a memorandum of agreement signed by the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and the Postmaster General. Parties to the 2004 MOA agreed to make USPS resources available for distributing emergency medicine in response to a bioterrorist attack. A subsequent presidential executive order (December 2009) called for the development of a federal capability to distribute medical countermeasures (MCM) in response to a bioterrorist attack.
Terrorists may use small aircraft flyovers to conduct preoperational activities such as reconnaissance or rehearsals for planned attacks. When suspicious flyovers occur, law enforcement and first responders should report the key attributes of the flight and the aircraft for timely identification (time of day, location and direction of flight, facility overflown, aircraft size, markings, color scheme, tail number, number of windows, placement of wings or rotor, number of engines, and weather) to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) through a local Air Traffic Control facility or office, a local Flight Standards District Office, or directly to the FAA’s Domestic Events Network at 202 493 5107, and the Transportation Security Administration. The FAA is often best able to distinguish between legitimate air traffic and suspicious flight operations that warrant further investigation.
This study examines the history of the fighting in southern and western Afghanistan since 2001. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity sponsored the study. Its purpose is to give Marines a basic understanding of what has happened in southern and western Afghanistan. Most Marines will operate in that area and we hope a historical reference source will be useful. If the study has any single argument it is that government misrule has been a driving factor behind the continuing violence in southern and western Afghanistan. The Afghan government favored warlords, handicapped competent governors, took part in the poppy trade, and allowed the police to abuse the people. Scarcity of security forces and collateral damage from Coalition operations did not help either. Yet above all, we find it unlikely that the instability in southern and western Afghanistan today could have been averted without addressing government misrule.
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki June 1946
The available facts about the power of the atomic bomb as a military weapon lie in the story of what it did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many of these facts have been published, in official and unofficial form, but mingled with distortions or errors. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, therefore, in partial fulfillment of the mission for which it was established, has put together in these pages a fairly full account of just what the atomic bombs did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Together with an explanation of how the bomb achieved these effects, this report states the extent and nature of the damage, the casualties, and the political repercussions from the two attacks. The basis is the observation, measurement, and analysis of the Survey’s investigators. The conjecture that is necessary for understanding of complex phenomena and for applying the findings to the problems of defense of the U.S. is clearly labeled.
What distinguishes civil support from homeland defense operations? How do operational variables differ from mission variables? What factors define the operational environment? The vocabulary of conflict in U.S. military operations can be unusually complex and esoteric. There can often be huge doctrinal differences indicated by the addition of a single word to a name or description. The amount of epithets and acronyms can sometimes overwhelm even military personnel, causing military communications to appear as a language unto itself. To eliminate the barriers and confusion created by this technical vocabulary, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) worked with a number of government agencies to produce a lexicon detailing the precise definitions of terms and concepts employed by military personnel in countering enemy networks.
This first edition of the Attack the Network (AtN) Lexicon was produced by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The lexicon contents were developed after extensive interviews with military units who successfully employed AtN principles and practices to reduce the number and effectiveness of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment where they encountered multiple and sometimes interconnected adversary networks. The lexicon contents were further developed and refined by subject matter experts from over fifty organizations across the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security.
Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaida ally, relies on a broad range of funding sources to support its terrorist and paramilitary operations in Somalia. However, little comprehensive information is available on the character and extent of this funding network within the large communities of Somali expats in Kenya. Existing reports suggest that alternative remittance systems (ARS), especially hawaladars, are a reliable source of income for Somalis still living in Somalia. Expat family members living in Kenya rely on these systems to transfer money to their relatives in Somalia. Recent reports suggest al-Shabaab is a beneficiary of these services1. Al-Shabaab could exploit current and future hawaladar networks in Kenya to transit funds to support IED operations against US or allied humanitarian or military operations. Thus, networks of undocumented and unmonitored hawaladars within the country could pose a threat to future counterterrorism or humanitarian operations in the region. Further study of the role of ARS in Kenya in the funding of al-Shabaab operations is recommended.
This study investigates Iran’s strategy of smuggling weapons to Afghan insurgents. Based on the hypothesis that Iran utilizes its weapons smuggling networks as proxies to leverage against foreign threats with predictable results, this study will address Iran’s future weapons smuggling behaviors. Iran, like the United States, is a complex actor pursuing rational, national strategic objectives. The perceived dichotomy between Iran’s words and actions results in an atmosphere of suspicion surrounding Iranian motives that can potentially lead to unintended escalations between Iran and other nations. An increase in tensions between the U.S. and Iran, specifically over perceived threats to Iranian sovereignty, will be matched with an increase in the rate and quantity of weapons, an introduction of more capable weapons, or both. Given the elasticity of realizing strategic success by increasing the rate and quantity of weapons, Iran will likely attempt to quickly counter an imminent threat by deploying more destructive weapons comparable to those Iran supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah.
This newsletter does not strive to make readers environmental experts. However, it does emphasize the importance of incorporating environmental considerations throughout the military decision-making process (MDMP). Through a variety of environmental lessons learned, this newsletter provides tactics, techniques, and procedures in an effort to reduce overall environmental risk.
Over the last 10 years, the U.S. government has made significant investments in science and technology in order to enhance its ability to understand and shape public opinion and behavior abroad—a domain of activity referred to in this report as “shaping,” “influencing,” or “communication and persuasion.” Because this effort is taking place across a vast government bureaucracy, the policy-makers and practitioners engaged in communication and persuasion do not always know what tools are at their disposal and what tools need to be invented. To address this problem, the Department of Defense’s Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) issued a “Strategic Communication Science and Technology Plan” in 2009 that surveyed the government’s programs in this area and their gaps. To keep abreast of the latest technological developments, RRTO commissioned CNA to update this report for FY 2012. The updated report discusses domains for future investment in research and development (R&D); identifies gaps and proposes new science and technology (S&T) initiatives; and surveys current S&T programs.
A list of current, ongoing, and planned Department of Defense Science and Technology Strategic Communication (SC) programs taken from the 2009 Strategic Communication Science and Technology Plan compiled by the Defense Research and Engineering Rapid Reaction Technology Office.
In order to help ensure public safety and security and to detect, deter, and prevent potential terrorist activities, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has developed a networked Domain Awareness System. The Domain Awareness System not only supplies critical supplemental assistance to officers’ ongoing security and public safety efforts, but also enhances the collaborative nature of those efforts by leveraging the resources of the private sector and other City agencies. Given the ongoing threat of terrorist attack, the Domain Awareness System is an important part of the NYPD’s integrated approach to providing protection for those who work in, live in, and visit New York City.
The Director of National Intelligence’s Open Source Center produced a report in June 2012 to help representatives of the U.S. government analyze and communicate with the Syrian people more effectively. The report, part of the Master Narratives series produced in conjunction with a private consulting firm called Monitor 360 and other “partners across the U.S. government”, is focused on “surfacing and articulating master narratives across a range of important geographies. These insights can be used to better understand critical audience segments and key influencers, build analytic capabilities, and develop actionable messaging and counter-messaging strategies.”
Understanding master narratives can be the difference between analytic anticipation and unwanted surprise, as well as the difference between communications successes and messaging gaffes. Master narratives are the historically grounded stories that reflect a community’s identity and experiences, or explain its hopes, aspirations, and concerns. These narratives help groups understand who they are and where they come from, and how to make sense of unfolding developments around them. As they do in all countries, effective communicators in Syria invoke master narratives in order to move audiences in a preferred direction. Syrian influencers rely on their native familiarity with these master narratives to use them effectively. This task is considerably more challenging for US communicators and analysts because they must place themselves in the mindset of foreign audiences who believe stories that — from an American vantage point — may appear surprising, conspiratorial, or even outlandish.
The following photos depict various pieces of art held in the CIA Museum at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The museum’s collection, interestingly, seems to hold only one abstract art piece by artist Gene Davis who was known for paintings…
A formerly classified document from 1952 on the CIA’s Project BLUEBIRD, an offshoot of Project MKULTRA.
A report from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence detailing an investigation into the CIA’s MKULTRA program, dated August 3, 1977
A CIA Inspector General report written in 1963 following an investigation into the Agency’s MKULTRA program.
This publication provides multi-Service TTP for the seamless integration of air assets during the conduct of maritime surface warfare. The maritime domain is defined as the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. AOMSW is intended to support the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives by providing capabilities/forces in support of joint maritime operations. The end state of this publication is a streamlined support process for maritime surface warfare within the joint force maritime component commander’s (JFMCC’s) area of operations (AO).