This Manual is issued under the authority of DoD Directive 0-8530.1, “Computer Network Defense (CND),” January 8, 2001. It provides direction to the DoD Components for obtaining Certification and Accreditation (C&A) of their Computer Network Defense Services (CNDS).
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation
A collection of Network Security Agreements (NSAs) entered into with foreign communications infrastructure providers ensuring U.S. government agencies the ability to access communications data when legally requested. The agreements range in date from 1999 to 2011 and involve a rotating group of government agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Defense (DoD) and sometimes the Department of the Treasury. According to the Washington Post, the agreements require companies to maintain what amounts to an “internal corporate cell of American citizens with government clearances” ensuring that “when U.S. government agencies seek access to the massive amounts of data flowing through their networks, the companies have systems in place to provide it securely.”
Multidisciplinary, integrated, performance-based, mission survivability assessments to identify and quantify vulnerabilities in systems, networks, architectures, infrastructures, and assets that support DoD MEFs, PMEFs, or the NEFs they support, to assess the mission impact if the vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and to recommend measures to remediate or mitigate the vulnerabilities.
A series of “limited release” directives from the Department of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff including instructions, directives and manuals detailing DoD policy on a variety of topics from counterintelligence to the use of lasers in space.
DIB CS/IA is the DoD program to protect critical DoD unclassified program, technology, and operational information residing on, or transiting, DIB unclassified networks. DoD Components and industry participants collaborate to protect DoD information through the development, implementation, and execution of DoD and DIB processes and procedures.
The mission of RRMC is to support the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, select DoD Components and, as appropriate, non-DoD agencies of the Federal Government, and to enable the execution of DoD mission-essential functions (MEFs) in accordance with DoDD S-5100.44 and continuity of operations (COOP) plans and operational orders.
(U//FOUO) DoD Instruction: Counterintelligence (CI) Activities Supporting Research, Development, and Acquisition
The CI mission in RDA informs the DoD Components and supporting CDCs of foreign collection threats and detects FIE targeting of defense-related technology. The CI support enables RDA program personnel to implement countermeasures and enables CI to develop activities that negate, counter, penetrate, or exploit an FIE.
Defense CI activities shall be undertaken as part of an integrated DoD and national effort to detect, identify, assess, exploit, penetrate, degrade, and counter or neutralize intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, espionage, sedition, subversion, assassination, and terrorist activities directed against the Department of Defense, its personnel, information, materiel, facilities, and activities, or against U.S. national security.
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Reducing and Mitigating Civilian Casualties: Enduring Lessons
The United States has long been committed to upholding the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and minimizing collateral damage, which includes civilian casualties (CIVCAS) and unintended damage to civilian objects (facilities, equipment, or other property that is not a military objective). In support of these goals, the U.S. military developed capabilities for precision engagements and accurately identifying targets, such as the development of refined targeting processes and predictive tools to better estimate and minimize collateral damage. These capabilities permitted the conduct of combat operations with lower relative numbers of civilian casualties compared to past operations. However, despite these efforts, and while maintaining compliance with the laws of war, the U.S. military found over the past decade that these measures were not always sufficient for meeting the goal of minimizing civilian casualties when possible. Resulting civilian casualties ran counter to U.S. desires and public statements that the United States did “everything possible” to avoid civilian casualties, and therefore caused negative second-order effects that impacted U.S. national, strategic, and operational interests.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges in Northeast Asia. North Korea remains a security threat because of its willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of its international agreements and United Nations Security Council Resolutions. North Korean aspiration for reunification – attainable in its mind in part by expelling U.S. forces from the Peninsula – and its commitment to perpetuating the Kim family regime are largely unchanged since the nation’s founding in 1948, but its strategies to achieve these goals have evolved significantly. Under Kim Jong Il, DPRK strategy had been focused on internal security; coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic and security interests; development of strategic military capabilities to deter external attack; and challenging the ROK and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. We anticipate these strategic goals will be consistent under North Korea’s new leader, Kim Jong Un.
The CERP was formally established by the Coalition Provisional Authority in July 2003 to provide U.S. military commanders in Iraq with a stabilization tool that benefitted the Iraqi people. The program supported urgent, small-scale projects that local governments could sustain, that generally cost less than $25,000, and that provided employment. DoD defined urgent as “any chronic and acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that, in the judgment of the local commander, calls for immediate action.” Among other things, CERP funds were used to: build schools, health clinics, roads, and sewers; pay condolence payments; support economic development; purchase equipment; and perform civic cleanup. DoD used CERP as a “combat multiplier” whose projects helped improve and maintain security in Iraq through non-lethal means. The program was considered “critical to supporting military commanders in the field in executing counterinsurgency operations” and its pacification effects important to saving lives.
Defending U.S. territory and the people of the United States is the highest priority of the Department of Defense (DoD), and providing appropriate defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is one of the Department’s primary missions. This Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities orients the Department towards an increasingly complex strategic environment. It emphasizes innovative approaches, greater integration, deepening of external partnerships, and increased effectiveness and efficiencies in DoD’s homeland activities. It applies the vital capabilities of the Total Force – in the Active and Reserve Components – to make the nation more secure and resilient. Finally, the Strategy guides future decisions on homeland defense and civil support issues consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Establishes DoD policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for DoD support to Federal, State, tribal, and local civilian law enforcement agencies, including responses to civil disturbances within the United States, including the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States or any other political subdivision thereof in accordance with DoDD 3025.18 (Reference (c)).
A 2009 document from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense creating performance standards for “successful” and “outstanding” employee performance within the U.S. intelligence community.
The following videos were released by Joint Task Force Guantanamo Public Affairs on March 1, 2013. They depict detainees in Camp 5 and 6 as well as the Expeditionary Legal Complex. Videos and photos of detainees held at Guantanamo are…
The policy of the U.S. Government is that all classified information must be appropriately safeguarded to assure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of that information. This document provides procedural guidance for the protection, use, management, and dissemination of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), and is applicable to the Department of Defense (DoD) to include DoD components and Government contractors who process SCI.
This Study Plan outlines the background, scope, strategic assumptions, study objectives, analysis methodology, scenario considerations, timeline, and management responsibilities in conducting the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-based Assessment (HD/CS CBA) to include production of the Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and a Joint Capabilities Document (JCD). This CBA, through the execution of the FAA, FNA. And JCD; identifies, describes, documents, and prioritizes DOD’s capability gaps and excesses in the HD/CS mission areas (to include the Mission Assurance (MA) function).
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations
In general, operations during the first half of the decade were often marked by numerous missteps and challenges as the US government and military applied a strategy and force suited for a different threat and environment. Operations in the second half of the decade often featured successful adaptation to overcome these challenges. From its study of these operations, JCOA identified overarching, enduring lessons for the joint force that present opportunities for the US to learn and improve, best practices that the US can sustain, and emerging risk factors that the US should address. These lessons were derived from JCOA’s 46 studies during this past decade and vetted through the Joint Staff J7-sponsored Decade of War working group in May 2012; input from working group members was consolidated into this report. This initial effort is envisioned to be the first volume in a sustained, multi-phased effort to identify critical, high-level lessons for the joint force.