Tag Archive for Department of Defense

(U//FOUO) DoD Defense Security Enterprise Strategic Plan 2013

To reduce deficiencies in security, DoD Directive 5200.43 established the Defense Security Enterprise (DSE) Executive Committee (ExCom). The ExCom is the senior-level governance body for the strategic administration and policy coordination of the DSE. The ExCom created and tasked the DSE Advisory Group (DSEAG) to plan, coordinate, and prioritize decisions for the ExCom and establish, oversee, and launch project teams. These project teams receive tasks from the DSEAG, research an issue, and recommend a plan of action.

Special Inspector General Strategic Plan for Tracking Anti-Corruption Progress in Afghanistan

Reducing corruption and increasing accountability are important components of the U.S. reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States has appropriated over $96 billion for reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan and, as part of that assistance, has designated numerous programs or activities to directly or indirectly help strengthen the ability of Afghan government institutions to combat corruption. In 2010, in line with a commitment to provide more assistance directly to the Afghan government, the United States and other donors committed, in part, to providing technical assistance to develop the Afghan government’s capacity to reduce corruption. The ability of the Afghan government to deliver services to its citizens without the illicit diversion of resources is crucial to the country’s development and the government’s standing as a legitimate, sovereign authority. Further, as Afghanistan subsequently enters a transformation phase during which it will need to rely on progressively smaller amounts of funding from international donors, it must work to ensure that the revenue it generates is not susceptible to graft and corruption.

DoD Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations

The following definitions align key cyberspace operations (CO) concepts with doctrinally accepted terms and definitions used in the other joint operational domains. For explanatory purposes, in each case, the current Information Operations (IO) doctrinal definition for some aspect of CO is presented, followed by its conventional analogue, if any, and the current terminology it would replace.

Defense Science Board Report: Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland

This report on unconventional operational concepts and the homeland was prepared as part of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests. The summer study recognized that asymmetric tools of war in the hands of potential adversaries may well be employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. Moreover, the battlefield may no longer be limited to regions afar, but may include the U.S. homeland. The United States could well confront the possibility of going to war abroad in the face of significant devastation in the homeland—dividing forces between homeland catastrophe relief operations and combat abroad, or even facing the possibility that deploy and supply of U.S. military forces could be delayed and disrupted.

U.S. Government Foreign Telecommunications Providers Network Security Agreements

A collection of Network Security Agreements (NSAs) entered into with foreign communications infrastructure providers ensuring U.S. government agencies the ability to access communications data when legally requested. The agreements range in date from 1999 to 2011 and involve a rotating group of government agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Defense (DoD) and sometimes the Department of the Treasury. According to the Washington Post, the agreements require companies to maintain what amounts to an “internal corporate cell of American citizens with government clearances” ensuring that “when U.S. government agencies seek access to the massive amounts of data flowing through their networks, the companies have systems in place to provide it securely.”

(U//FOUO) DoD Instruction: Balanced Survivability Assessments (BSAs)

Multidisciplinary, integrated, performance-based, mission survivability assessments to identify and quantify vulnerabilities in systems, networks, architectures, infrastructures, and assets that support DoD MEFs, PMEFs, or the NEFs they support, to assess the mission impact if the vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and to recommend measures to remediate or mitigate the vulnerabilities.

(U//FOUO) DoD Directive: Counterintelligence (CI)

Defense CI activities shall be undertaken as part of an integrated DoD and national effort to detect, identify, assess, exploit, penetrate, degrade, and counter or neutralize intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, espionage, sedition, subversion, assassination, and terrorist activities directed against the Department of Defense, its personnel, information, materiel, facilities, and activities, or against U.S. national security.

Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Reducing and Mitigating Civilian Casualties: Enduring Lessons

The United States has long been committed to upholding the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and minimizing collateral damage, which includes civilian casualties (CIVCAS) and unintended damage to civilian objects (facilities, equipment, or other property that is not a military objective). In support of these goals, the U.S. military developed capabilities for precision engagements and accurately identifying targets, such as the development of refined targeting processes and predictive tools to better estimate and minimize collateral damage. These capabilities permitted the conduct of combat operations with lower relative numbers of civilian casualties compared to past operations. However, despite these efforts, and while maintaining compliance with the laws of war, the U.S. military found over the past decade that these measures were not always sufficient for meeting the goal of minimizing civilian casualties when possible. Resulting civilian casualties ran counter to U.S. desires and public statements that the United States did “everything possible” to avoid civilian casualties, and therefore caused negative second-order effects that impacted U.S. national, strategic, and operational interests.