Tag Archive for Department of Defense

DoD-DoJ-CIA-NSA-ODNI Inspectors General Report on the President’s Surveillance Program

A declassified report from 2009 compiled by the offices of the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and Office of the Director National Intelligence on the President’s Surveillance Program.

DHS Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment Report on Executive Order 13636

Section 5 of Executive Order 13636 (Executive Order) requires the DHS Chief Privacy Officer and Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to assess the privacy and civil liberties impacts of the activities the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, or Department) undertakes pursuant to the Executive Order and to provide those assessments, together with recommendations for mitigating identified privacy risks, in an annual public report. In addition, the DHS Privacy Office and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) are charged with coordinating and compiling the Privacy and Civil Liberties assessments conducted by Privacy and Civil Liberties officials from other Executive Branch departments and agencies with reporting responsibilities under the Executive Order.

Department of Defense Cyber Strategy April 2015

In concert with other agencies, the United States’ Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for defending the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests from attack, including attacks that may occur in cyberspace. In a manner consistent with U.S. and international law, the Department of Defense seeks to deter attacks and defend the United States against any adversary that seeks to harm U.S. national interests during times of peace, crisis, or conflict. To this end the Defense Department has developed capabilities for cyber operations and is integrating those capabilities into the full array of tools that the United States government uses to defend U.S. national interests, including diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, and law enforcement tools.

Defense Personnel Security Research Center Counterintelligence Reporting Essentials (CORE) Guide

Supervisors and coworkers are willing to report on behaviors that have a clear connection to security, such as transmitting classified documents to unauthorized personnel, but they are unwilling to report on colleagues’ personal problems, such as alcohol abuse. Because it was difficult to discern which reporting requirements were clearly related to security, there was very little reporting. PERSEREC, in collaboration with counterintelligence professionals, developed a clear, succinct list of “Coworker Reporting Essentials” (CORE) behaviors that could pose a possible threat to national security and thus should be reported if observed. The draft CORE was reviewed and edited by counterintelligence professionals at the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), and was coordinated by the DoD Investigative Working Group (IWG).

DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (SRG) Version 1

Cloud computing technology and services provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with the opportunity to deploy an Enterprise Cloud Environment aligned with Federal Department-wide Information Technology (IT) strategies and efficiency initiatives, including federal data center consolidation. Cloud computing enables the Department to consolidate infrastructure, leverage commodity IT functions, and eliminate functional redundancies while improving continuity of operations. The overall success of these initiatives depends upon well executed security requirements, defined and understood by both DoD Components and industry. Consistent implementation and operation of these requirements assures mission execution, provides sensitive data protection, increases mission effectiveness, and ultimately results in the outcomes and operational efficiencies the DoD seeks.

DoD Open Business Model for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Ground Control Stations

Over the past twenty years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has acquired a diverse portfolio of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) across the Military Services to meet its national security needs. Newly emergent threats and evolving national security requirements are prompting the DoD to re-evaluate its entire portfolio of systems, while at the same time, seeking to reduce the total ownership costs including lifecycle sustainment costs of these systems. The anticipated reduction in defense spending in concert with advances in information technology provides ample opportunity for DoD to rethink how it acquires, designs, and builds its systems. As a result, DoD is adopting and exploiting open system design principles and architectures to increase competition, foster reuse across systems, and increase interoperability. This new acquisition model requires access to multi-vendor solutions to enable rapid insertion of new technologies to counter emerging threats, avoid technology obsolescence, and decrease time to field new capabilities. DoD is adopting an Open Business Model (OBM) to support the implementation of an Open Architecture (OA) for UAS Ground Control Stations (GCS) in order to drive greater acquisition efficiencies and reduce the total ownership costs. This new model is built upon several lessons learned from the Navy’s own open architecture efforts in the submarine community when it radically changed its approach to building weapon systems due to an emerging threat from an adversary in conjunction with declining budget.

(U//FOUO) DoD Strategy for Defense Critical Infrastructure

The United States currently faces a dynamic, flexible, and very pragmatic adversary. Due to the unconventional nature of the terrorist threat and the asymmetrical tactics demonstrated both at home and abroad by our enemies, we can no longer expect the protection formerly provided by the oceans bordering our coasts to serve as an effective deterrent to attack. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and other events demonstrated that an act of terrorism can cause worldwide infrastructure asset disruption. In the past decade, hurricanes or other violent storms have also revealed that our infrastructure assets are at risk from destruction, degradation, or disruption by natural events. Given scarce resources, this Strategy’s objectives must be balanced against other priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy.

DoD Instruction: The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities

This instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for the use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in accordance with the authority in section 502(f) of Title 32, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (a)), DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1 (Reference (b)), and Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (c)); the responsibilities and functions in accordance with DoDD 5111.13 (Reference (d)); and the guidance in DoDD 3025.18 (Reference (e)).

DoD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

The purpose of this Roadmap is to articulate a vision and strategy for the continued development, production, test, training, operation, and sustainment of unmanned systems technology across DoD. This “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap” establishes a technological vision for the next 25 years and outlines actions and technologies for DoD and industry to pursue to intelligently and affordably align with this vision.

Defense Science Board Report: Understanding Human Dynamics

Understanding human dynamics is an essential aspect of planning for success across the full spectrum of military and national security operations. While the adage that “warfare is political conflict by other means” is widely recognized, combatants who underestimate the impact of the human element in military operations do so at their risk. During the Second World War and the reconstruction that followed, as well as during the Cold War, understanding human dynamics was considered essential. As conceptualized in this report, the term “human dynamics” comprises the actions and interactions of personal, interpersonal, and social/contextual factors and their effects on behavioral outcomes. Human dynamics are influenced by factors such as economics, religion, politics, and culture. Culture is defined herein as the particular norms and beliefs held by every human, that impacts how individuals, groups and societies perceive, behave and interact.

Sociocultural Behavior Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense Context

Significant progress has been made toward building a DoD capability for understanding sociocultural behavior, and some solutions have been delivered to military end users. However, there is much work to be done. The complexity of human behavior defies easy understanding or reliable forecasting. In the context of irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, post-conflict recovery, or any other mission setting of the Armed Forces, technology—including computational models—is essential to support decision making. That technology must be rooted in well-validated, inter-disciplinary theory, and applied appropriately, with recognition of its strengths and limitations.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan Country Handbook and Cultural Field Guide

This handbook provides basic reference information on Afghanistan, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Afghanistan.

(U//FOUO) DoD Defense Security Enterprise Strategic Plan 2013

To reduce deficiencies in security, DoD Directive 5200.43 established the Defense Security Enterprise (DSE) Executive Committee (ExCom). The ExCom is the senior-level governance body for the strategic administration and policy coordination of the DSE. The ExCom created and tasked the DSE Advisory Group (DSEAG) to plan, coordinate, and prioritize decisions for the ExCom and establish, oversee, and launch project teams. These project teams receive tasks from the DSEAG, research an issue, and recommend a plan of action.

Special Inspector General Strategic Plan for Tracking Anti-Corruption Progress in Afghanistan

Reducing corruption and increasing accountability are important components of the U.S. reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States has appropriated over $96 billion for reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan and, as part of that assistance, has designated numerous programs or activities to directly or indirectly help strengthen the ability of Afghan government institutions to combat corruption. In 2010, in line with a commitment to provide more assistance directly to the Afghan government, the United States and other donors committed, in part, to providing technical assistance to develop the Afghan government’s capacity to reduce corruption. The ability of the Afghan government to deliver services to its citizens without the illicit diversion of resources is crucial to the country’s development and the government’s standing as a legitimate, sovereign authority. Further, as Afghanistan subsequently enters a transformation phase during which it will need to rely on progressively smaller amounts of funding from international donors, it must work to ensure that the revenue it generates is not susceptible to graft and corruption.

DoD Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations

The following definitions align key cyberspace operations (CO) concepts with doctrinally accepted terms and definitions used in the other joint operational domains. For explanatory purposes, in each case, the current Information Operations (IO) doctrinal definition for some aspect of CO is presented, followed by its conventional analogue, if any, and the current terminology it would replace.

Defense Science Board Report: Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland

This report on unconventional operational concepts and the homeland was prepared as part of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests. The summer study recognized that asymmetric tools of war in the hands of potential adversaries may well be employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. Moreover, the battlefield may no longer be limited to regions afar, but may include the U.S. homeland. The United States could well confront the possibility of going to war abroad in the face of significant devastation in the homeland—dividing forces between homeland catastrophe relief operations and combat abroad, or even facing the possibility that deploy and supply of U.S. military forces could be delayed and disrupted.