Terrorists may engage in sabotage, tampering, or vandalism as part of an attack or to gain access to restricted areas, steal materials, or provoke and observe security responses. For example, the 1Oth edition of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire magazine suggests torching parked vehicles and causing automobile accidents by using lubricating oil or nails driven through wooden boards as simple tactics to cause both casualties and economic damage.
To reduce deficiencies in security, DoD Directive 5200.43 established the Defense Security Enterprise (DSE) Executive Committee (ExCom). The ExCom is the senior-level governance body for the strategic administration and policy coordination of the DSE. The ExCom created and tasked the DSE Advisory Group (DSEAG) to plan, coordinate, and prioritize decisions for the ExCom and establish, oversee, and launch project teams. These project teams receive tasks from the DSEAG, research an issue, and recommend a plan of action.
Impersonation by assuming the identity, behavior, or appearance of first responders can allow terrorists access to restricted or secure locations, including the scene of emergencies when unchallenged. This access can allow terrorists the ability to conduct pre-operational surveillance or carry out a primary attack or a secondary attack against first responders. The method of impersonation may not be limited to the use of uniforms, clothing, badges and identification; civilian vehicles may be accessorized to appear as legitimate emergency vehicles.
A presentation from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) describing concepts related to big data including all-source, cloud-enabled analytics, semantic integration and entity resolution of data across multiple fields of intelligence.
Trends in the operational environment continue to indicate that cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) will remain important entities within the operational environment for the foreseeable future. The Army understands the importance of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to human societies in general, and to military operations specifically. Army leaders and Soldiers must possess an in-depth understanding of this contest, and how to gain, maintain, and leverage advantages in this contest. To this end, the Army Concept Framework recognizes an increasingly important aspect to military operations: the cyber/electromagnetic contest (C/EM contest).
An August 2013 presentation from the Texas Department of Public Safety Intelligence & Counterterrorism Division focusing on suspicious activity reporting in relation to critical infrastructure, particularly dams. The presentation is noteworthy for its reference to the use of TrapWire, a private surveillance product designed to correlate suspicious activity across a variety of domains to detect per-operational indicators of terrorist activity.
The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), a pro-regime hacker group that emerged during Syrian anti-government protests in 2011, has been compromising high-profile media outlets in an effort to spread pro-regime propaganda. The SEA’s primary capabilities include spearphishing, Web defacements, and hijacking social media accounts to spread propaganda. Over the past several months, the SEA has been highly effective in compromising multiple high-profile media outlets.
Android is the world’s most widely used mobile operating system (OS) and continues to be a primary target for malware attacks due to its market share and open source architecture. Industry reporting indicates 44 percent of Android users are still using versions 2.3.3 through 2.3.7-known as Gingerbread-which were released in 2011 and have a number of security vulnerabilities that were fixed in later versions. The growing use of mobile devices by federal, state, and local authorities makes it more important than ever to keep mobile OS patched and up-to-date.
The GEOFILE is the authoritative automated repository of the Department of Defense for the registration of military installations and worldwide geographic locations subject to reference during military planning and operations.
The purpose of this bulletin is to increase the awareness and improve response to acts of violence perpetrated by individuals acting out in violent behavior towards healthcare providers and emergency responders. This bulletin provides an analytical overview of significant acts of violence, specifically throughout the Central Florida region, statewide (FL), a nationwide perspective from 2009 – 2013, and statistical analysis of notorious mass shooting incidents throughout the U.S. attributed by claims of mental illness.
The primary intent of this Center for Army Lessons Learned publication is to provide a reference to assist commanders and planners in understanding how these complex systems are organized, managed, and operated — from a civilian perspective. It will not make the reader an expert. Each chapter was developed by students attending the Command and General Staff College during an elective course titled “Restoring Essential Services in Stability Operations.”
BEI and FEI are strategically important identity discovery and identity resolution intelligence processes used to unambiguously identify persons, networks, and populations of interest who pose potential threats to U.S. forces and national security.
DoD instruction establishing policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for the management of the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Training-Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE) from April 18, 2012.
This report presents data and conclusions from the Heroin Domestic Monitor Program (HDMP) conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for calendar year (CY) 2011. The HDMP provides data on the price, purity, and geographic source of heroin sold at the retail level in 27 U.S. cities. The data contained in this report are based on actual undercover heroin purchases made by the DEA and its law enforcement partners on the streets of these cities.
This Manual is issued under the authority of DoD Directive 0-8530.1, “Computer Network Defense (CND),” January 8, 2001. It provides direction to the DoD Components for obtaining Certification and Accreditation (C&A) of their Computer Network Defense Services (CNDS).
Implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures necessary to provide the essential structure and support to the U.S. Space Command (USCINCSPACE) for Computer Network Defense (CND) within Department of Defense information systems and computer networks.
This instruction provides policy and guidance for planning, programming, and implementing the modernization of cryptographic products certified by the National Security Agency (NSA) and held by Department of Defense (DOD) components.
Multidisciplinary, integrated, performance-based, mission survivability assessments to identify and quantify vulnerabilities in systems, networks, architectures, infrastructures, and assets that support DoD MEFs, PMEFs, or the NEFs they support, to assess the mission impact if the vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and to recommend measures to remediate or mitigate the vulnerabilities.
Recent incidents in the Homeland demonstrate that consumer fireworks—widely used during the upcoming 4 July 2013 celebrations—can be misused by criminals and violent extremists to construct improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Consumer fireworks are defined as devices that produce audible and visible effects by combustion, containing between 50-130 milligrams of explosive material. They are banned in Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York.
Implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures under reference (a) regarding the illumination of satellites by lasers to protect space assets from any potential harm that could be caused by such illumination.
Within DHS, this overarching responsibility for critical infrastructure protection is delegated to the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), specifically the Sector-Specific Agency Executive Management Office (SSA EMO) CF Branch for commercial facilities. Serving as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the CF Sector, the CF Branch works with its partners to address and highlight low-cost preparedness and risk management options in the products and tools it makes available to the private sector. For example, the CF SSA has been working to produce a suite of protective measures guides that provide an overview of best practices and protective measures designed to assist owners and operators in planning and managing security at their facilities or events. The Protective Measures Guide for the U.S. Outdoor Venues Industry is one of these guides and reflects the special considerations and challenges posed by the Outdoor Venues Subsector.
In accordance with (IAW) reference a, MISO replaces the term psychological operations (PSYOP). This instruction provides strategic direction for inclusion of MISO to support the full range of military operations including military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; major operations and campaigns; and as an integrated information activity within the DOD’s overall contribution to United States Government (USG) communication strategies.
DoD Instruction O-3115.07 concerning Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) or intelligence comprising, either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signal intelligence, however transmitted.
DIB CS/IA is the DoD program to protect critical DoD unclassified program, technology, and operational information residing on, or transiting, DIB unclassified networks. DoD Components and industry participants collaborate to protect DoD information through the development, implementation, and execution of DoD and DIB processes and procedures.
Malicious actors may leverage the Internet to gain information against a potential target to support pre-operational planning efforts for kinetic or cyber attacks. Malicious actors can use Internet search engines for information such as maps, company photographs or blueprints, and gain additional details from social media sites and Web blogs. Some actors may use more sophisticated techniques—such as phishing, spear phishing, or actual penetration of an organization’s network or devices—which can be used to gather personal, sensitive, or proprietary data.