(U//FOUO) ISAF Regional Command SIGACTs Maps October 4-10, 2010.
CSTC-A Afghan National Police Training Facility Maintenance and Life Support Services Contractor Work Statement
CSTC-A requires contracted life support services, to include training facility force protection, in the areas identified in the chart below. These efforts directly support the US and NATO missions to develop a trained and professional Afghan police force, enhancing public security, and supporting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Facilities covered under this requirement support various aspects of the training of the ANP, including providing life support for mentors and trainers of the Afghan government, USFOR-A, and Coalition Forces who support the training of the ANP. Due to the changing nature of combat support requirements, the Contractor shall expect that quantities, types, and/or locations of the services to be required within this geographic area will change over the Period of Performance.
Complete Afghanistan Commander’s Emergency Response Program Project Data from July 31, 2009-August 1, 2010.
Primary Route: Turn left at the main gate. Turn left on to the road parallel to the ISAF Southern Wall. Turn right on the intersection with the road that runs parallel with the ISAF’s East wall with the rear gate on it. Move South following the road until you get on to “Indigo” to the roundabout with route “Violet”. At this roundabout go straight (180º), cross Kabul river. After the Olympic Stadium turm left, proceed to the next intersection (5-way) and turn halfright (45º). Follow the street for about 300m. ACCI gate will appear ahead.
Primary Route: Turn left from the main gate. Pass CFC-A on the south side. At the roundabout go left (270º). Follow route ‘indigo’. First roundabout go straight ahead (180º), after 200m at the crossing turn left. Again after 200m turn right on route ‘green’/ ‘Highway 1’. Follow this road for 2.7km (pass the Kabul zoo (left-hand side)) to the roundabout. Turn left at this roundabout (270º). You are still on route Green. After approximately 1.6km MoCI is on your right-hand side (turn right app 20m before the SIEMENS sign).
(U//FOUO) BLUF: This facility is in dire need of assistance. Daily there are hundreds of children in admittance to this hospital suffering from the following ailments: malnutrition, burns, blast trauma, and the need for urgent surgical intervention. There are very few medical supplies available (few families of the patients can afford the medicine), minimal food (limited to one meal a day), and no consumable medical materials available to adequately treat these patients. The inevitability of death for many of these patients becomes a reality.
(U//FOUO) ATMOSPHERIC VALUE: Negative: The local people of Zabul Province do not believe that there can be peace made with the Taliban by giving in to some of their demands because there are so many different Taliban leaders fighting for different reasons and goals it would be hard to satisfy all of their demands.
Commander, International Security Assistance Force Campaign Overview June 2010.
ISAF Joint Command District Assessments, April 10, 2008.
ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Partnering Directive, August 29, 2009.
ISAF Governance Working Group Brief, May 2010.
FOUO Coalition Forces Capture Avoidance/Personnel Recovery Plan Guide, January 2007.
These photos have been released by the Department of Defense and ISAF over the last few years. Some of the photos discuss instances of troops helping with the destruction of poppy fields. Many of the photos do not mention anything…
All of the PRTs in Afghanistan have been under one theater military command (ISAF) since October 5, 2006, when ISAF completed its four-stage geographic expansion throughout the country by assuming responsibility of Region East. Until then, there were two separate military commands – Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) and ISAF – each commanding PRTs in its own separate area of operation. Bringing all the PRTs under one theater commander constituted a major step forward in achieving unity of effort. But even with a single command, achieving coherence among all 26 PRTs remains a challenge, if for no other reason than, as of March 2008, there are 14 different nations leading PRTs.
This Concept of Operations (CONOPS) identifies and describes the use of International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment (INDURE) Version 1.1 on the World Wide Web Internet domain. Under the guidance of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Theater and Under Secretary Defense – Intelligence (USD-I), the need for INDURE was scoped and funded. INDURE will be fully interoperable with the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) (which resides on Secret and higher classification networks) and will be able to exchange data with CIDNE. The Secret-to-Unclassified exchange will require data to be air-gapped between the systems due to the classification of the information domain CIDNE resides on and will require FDO and/or release authority to move data between domains.
FOUO U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Lessons Brief, February 17, 2010.
FOUO U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Overview Brief, February 17, 2010.
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) institutions, corruption, lack of economic opportunity and insufficient physical protection.
• Mission can succeed but requires a fundamentally new approach
– Operational culture of ISAF: focus Counter-insurgency (COIN) on winning support of the people.
– Stronger security partnership: accelerate Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and partner at all levels.
– Responsive and accountable governance: an equal priority with security.
– Internal ISAF organizational changes: Unity of Command, Unity of Effort.
• Time is critical. ISAF must be properly resourced to gain and maintain the initiative while ANSF capacity and capability is built.
In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping.
HQ International Security Assistance Force Support Group Engineers Brief to the Joint Engineer Training Conference. May 20, 2009.
“Every action of the counterinsurgent should be anchored in law. Any effort to build a legitimate government through lawless action – including unjustified use of force, unlawful detention, torture or punishment without trial – is self-defeating.”
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency
Map of all ISAF RC and PRT Locations in Afghanistan as of October 22, 2009.
Kabul International Airport belongs to the MoTCA, which operates KAIA. It is supported by the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). COM KAIA, under the command of COM ISAF, operates the military component of KAIA, assists the Afghan authorities in operating KAIA, and also assumes Air Traffic Control Authority in KABUL Control Zone (CTR).
The first 100 days of any deployment are the most dangerous. It is the time when you know the least about your environment, the time when most of the team really comes together. The enemy knows the first 100 days are when units are the most vulnerable. This handbook is written for Soldiers and leaders. It is intended to help you accomplish your mission and stay alive during the most dangerous and uncertain period. The information presented in this handbook was collected from combat experienced Soldiers, company leaders, and battalion leaders, and it will help you develop your leadership and training skills before deployment and during the first 100 days after deployment.
Map of ISAF Afghanistan PRT/FSB Locations as of October 2007.