Tag Archive for International Security Assistance Force

The U.S. Government’s Diminishing Expectations Plan for Afghanistan

Public Intelligence has obtained the most recent version of the U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, the second revision of the document dated August 2013, detailing the U.S. government’s goals and priorities for rebuilding Afghan society. Issued by the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan James Cunningham and signed by the commander of U.S. forces Joseph Dunford, the framework covers U.S. priorities related to governance, the rule of law, socioeconomic development as well as the gradual transfer of authority to the Afghan government. When compared with a previous version of the framework from March 2012, also obtained by Public Intelligence, the document solidifies the prospect of long-term U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, removing optimistic statements about turnover dates and self-sustaining funding estimates and replacing them with measured assessments reinforcing the notion that U.S. and international forces will be present in Afghanistan far into the next decade.

ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide

This guide is designed to provide NATO partners and troop contributing nations (TCNs) participating as part of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) a common understanding of Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities. It provides a summary of the ISAF SFA concept as well as guidance and information concerning SFA activities, countering the insider threat, mission critical tasks, and training requirements in support of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

NATO/ISAF Afghanistan Strategic Communications Framework

NATO/ISAF engagement in Afghanistan in 2010 was characterised by a refreshed, comprehensive civ-mil strategy as reflected in a substantial force uplift, significant progress in the growth and development of the Afghan National Security Forces, and discernable campaign progress in priority districts. These were reflected in the NATO/ISAF Strategic Communications Framework 2010. In parallel, political events, including the London Conference, the Consultative Peace Jirga, the Kabul Conference, Afghan Parliamentary elections and the NATO Summit in Lisbon, helped define a clear political roadmap for Afghanistan. These developments are reflected in the Lisbon Summit Declaration which provides political guidance for the focus of our efforts in 2011 and reaffirms that NATO’s mission in Afghanistan remains the Alliance’s key priority.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Afghanistan Civilian Casualty Prevention Handbook

The U.S. military has long been committed to upholding the law of armed conflict and minimizing collateral damage. This includes the killing or wounding of noncombatant civilians — described in this handbook as civilian casualties or CIVCAS — as well as damage to facilities, equipment, or other property. Due to several factors, the impact of CIVCAS has increased to the point that single tactical actions can have strategic consequences and limit overall freedom of action. These factors include: the increased transparency of war, where tactical actions can be recorded and transmitted worldwide in real time; increased expectations for the United States’ conduct of war in light of improved precision and overall capabilities; and the enemy exploitation of CIVCAS to undermine U.S. legitimacy and objectives.

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan Counterinsurgent’s Guidebook

The purpose of The Counterinsurgency Training Center—Afghanistan (CTC-A) “Counterinsurgent’s Guidebook” is two-fold. First, to provide a common language and framework for counterinsurgents currently engaged in Afghanistan, as well as those involved in yet-foreseen conflicts. While each insurgency is unique, the principles, processes, and tools in this Guidebook are intended to be broadly applicable. The second purpose is to provide a structured cognitive process—and supporting tools—whereby counterinsurgents can translate existing counterinsurgency doctrine and theory into practical application. The intended audience for this Guidebook is operational and tactical level U.S./NATO/Coalition counterinsurgents, military and non-military alike.

ISAF Afghan Female Engagement Teams Proposal

According to FM 3-24, the population is the center of gravity for COIN operations. Afghanistan‘s population is roughly half female, half male, but in Afghanistan, the culture segregates by gender. As such, the appropriate operational response that is culturally sensitive to that segregation is to interact male to male & female to female. We want to understand 100% of the community by engaging them directly (Figure 1). By doing so, we get the insight that we need, while being respectful of the culture, yet building the fundamentally essential social contracts founded on trust and established in a cooperative environment. That social contract needs to be with the male and female population…both of whom are making decision about the future of this country, whether publicly or privately. ISAF forces are currently making decisions along all lines of operations that affect the entire population but with limited insight or perspective from the female half of the population.

Where’s the Evidence Against Staff Sergeant Robert Bales?

The lawyer for the soldier accused of massacring seventeen people in a small Afghan village earlier this month has stated publicly that there is little or no evidence against his client. John Henry Browne, who is defending Staff Sergeant Robert Bales, told NBC that the U.S. government’s prosecution of Bales will be difficult as “They have no bodies, they have no autopsies, they have no forensics, they have no photographs, they have no witnesses. There is no Afghan who is going to come here to testify against this guy, so how do they prove premeditation? It’s going to be a problem for them.” In an interview with PBS, Browne reiterated this claim stating “There is no crime scene. There is no CSI stuff. There’s no DNA. There’s no fingerprints.” Browne has also stated that there is “no evidence about how many alleged victims” or “of where those remains are.”

ISAF Guide to Collecting Evidence for Prosecution in Afghan Courts

For the National Security Prosecutor’s Unit (NSPU) or a provincial court to prosecute and convict detainees, including Afghan murder suspects or National Security criminals, capturing units must provide evidence and witness statements against the suspects for use in an Afghan court of law. Appropriate evidence collection may result in admissible evidence in support of effective prosecutions. Turn all evidence associated with the suspect over to Afghan authorities and obtain a thoroughly documented receipt for the evidence.

ISAF CAAT Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Guidelines in Partnering for Transition

The level of partnership with ANSF units largely depends on the individual coalition commander’s discretion whether it is a partnered unit or an advisor team. Although this discretion is important to empower leaders on the ground, the current parameters in partnering guidance are very broad which leads to varying levels of effectiveness and consistency. Standardized guidelines would provide specific tasks (e.g. develop and conduct all planning and operations from a Joint TOC) to units designated as ANSF partners. Additionally, true embedded partnership improves ANSF development, mission accomplishment and force protection. The recommendations in this paper offer uniformed standards throughout diverse allied forces, assistance during RIP/TOA, improvement in the development of the Afghan forces, and a path to effective transition.

(U//FOUO) ISAF CJIATF-Shafafiyat Afghan Corruption Information Paper

The level of corruption across Afghanistan’s public and private sectors represents a threat to the success of ISAF’s mission and the viability of the Afghan state. Corruption undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of Afghanistan’s government, fuels discontent among the population, and generates active and passive support for the insurgency. Corruption and organized crime also serve as a barrier to Afghanistan’s economic growth by robbing the state of revenue and preventing the development of a strong licit economy, thus perpetuating Afghan dependence on international assistance. Corruption also threatens the process of security transition, as institutions weakened by criminality will be unable to accept the transfer of responsibility for security and governance.

ISAF Joint Command Media Operations Standard Operating Procedures

Media Operations is responsible for the Command’s media relations activities, including identifying media to engage with to disseminate information, responding to queries, arranging interviews, and advising senior leaders and IJC members on media issues. Media Operations works with local and international media. The staff also manages the IJC media accreditation and embed programs, and works closely with Regional Commands and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) Public Affairs staffs. IJC Media Operations distributes, under its letter head, releases from special operations units.

ISAF Afghan National Police Logistics Training Handbook

The mission of CJTF Phoenix is to train and mentor the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to conduct independent, self-sustained Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Security Operations in order to defeat terrorism and provide a secure, stable environment within the borders of Afghanistan. The ANSF is primarily composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Patrol (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).

ISAF Afghan Insurgent Reintegration Guide and Soldier Information Cards

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) is active. It provides for both reintegration (where fighters leave the fight and peacefully rejoin their communities) and reconciliation (where entire insurgent groups reach a settlement with GIRoA that ends hostilities). Reintegration is the focus of this guide. Information is presented on the APRP, its place in the COIN Campaign and ISAF‟s role. It provides those in ISAF with what they need to work with community leaders and GIRoA and ANSF partners to build their understanding of the Programme and its opportunities. It is an Afghan Programme and ISAF‟s role is to assist and encourage GIRoA to implement it fully.

UN-NATO Documents Detail Violence and Voter Supression in Afghan Elections

According to a series of classified reports from NATO and the UN recently published by this site, the recent elections in Afghanistan were marred by “unprecedented” levels of violence including voter intimidation, kidnapping of election workers and candidates, as well as attacks on polling stations and ballot distribution systems. A confidential United Nations “Joint Security Analysis” covering the week of the elections states that the country experienced a “massive increase” in violence “due to an unprecedented peak of security incidents recorded on Election Day 18 September.” In fact, there was such a significant and “unprecedented” increase in violence leading up to the elections that this created a significant decrease in subsequent attacks because insurgent forces were literally running out of ammunition.